1 The temporality of organizations, the actions that are built up and the identities that are formed within them, are compromised by the permanence and interdependence of the changes made. Transformation processes are either not introduced in a synchronous manner or cause conflict when certain rules remain independent of the changes affecting the whole. “Dyschrony” therefore exists between stakeholders and structures and between structures and stakeholders.

2 The situation described here is that of a movement: a stream of transformations that are not in the same state of development and that do not develop according to the same logic. This movement is composed of small processes—small in comparison with the larger whole represented by the overall dynamic, in which learning is sometimes accommodated and sometimes not. Each constituent part of this dynamic follows a specific course or is in a specific state within its course. As a stable structure, the organization becomes less significant as far as the definition of working constraints and the coordination of organizational activity are concerned.

3 This idea is not new within the field of Sociology. Sztompka (1991) points out, in this respect, that what is usually referred to as social change is in fact a confluence of numerous processes, with a variety of vectors that converge and diverge and are mutually supportive or destructive of one another. The state of a society is, thus, the consequence of the interaction of these processes, the result of which is largely unpredictable since each process has its own specific rhythm. This idea comes close to the notion of the “broken rhythm” of change, an idea developed by Rocher. [1] These views, however, have little to do with the chaos theories that derive from the natural sciences and are applied to the world of organizations (Guastallo 1995). There is at least one reason for this, namely, that far from being “autoregulated,” repeated change creates a lack of regulation with an ability to produce legitimate social rules.

1. Change and Movement

4 Whatever the frame of reference, the social sciences that relate to the world of work have traditionally been more widely concerned with the analysis of individual changes, limited in space and time. The analysis of change as a flow corresponds exactly, however, with a train of thought that is both contemporary and controversial.

5 Comparisons made between the circumstances existing before and after a change have formed the object of a large body of research; in the 1960s, for instance, concerning the automation of industrial activity (Trist and Bamforth 1951; Naville 1963), or, more recently, concerning “new productive models” (Aoki 1991; Coriat 1991). A new state with regard to social and organizational make-up is described in these works, assisted by a succession of indicators. A study carried out by Moscovici (1961) concerning the industrialization of hat-making processes in the Aude, in France, is a perfect example of this perspective. The nature of the work, the social relationships, and the attitude toward work were radically transformed. The passage to “industrial coherence” of an entire local society, its artisans, and cottage industry is expressed here. It is a question of the comparison of two states. Change per se, that is to say, the specific moment between the two states, is not perceived as relevant. It is understood not in terms of that which is changing, but in terms of that which has changed.

6 Another angle of research is directly concerned with the process leading from state A to state B. This diachronic interpretation of the phenomena of change is widespread, historically speaking. Bloch, for instance (1935), attempts to highlight cultural, economic, and legal dimensions that intervened, slowing up of the spread of the watermill over the course of a millennium. White (1962) carries out an analysis concerning the wheeled plow along similar lines. This type of study is analogous to research carried out in psychology (Lewin 1947) and management (Argyris and Schön 1978). Organizational sociology (Reynaud 1989; Friedberg 1993) occupies a specific position in that change is considered to be the result of a process that has been arranged more or less explicitly as a social structure deserving of analysis in itself, rather than as the character of new plans, rules, and relationships.

7 Looked at from a third point of view, contemporary firms are characterized by the permanence of change and by the conflicts with temporality engendered by this permanence. It is no longer a question of treating a problem within it, but of treating it repeatedly “within a given time,” according to the dynamic of the environment and internal structures (Hannan and Freeman 1984). It is a matter of carrying out changes on a tight deadline, while protecting the expertise and routines that promote efficacy (Sastry 1997). It is also a question of harmonizing asynchronous changes, or those of a different character (Nooteboom 2000) or those that are contradictory (Bacharach, Bamberger, and Sonnensthul 1996). The continuous nature of change leads to the design of work structures and management rules that remain temporary and experimental (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). The organization does not then represent a “punctuated equilibrium” with brief, but radical periods of change (Romanelli and Trushman 1994), but more of a movement that makes forecasting and planning difficult. In any case, the authors come up against the paradox expressed by March in 1981; a paradox according to which organizations are in a state of continual change, but are unable to easily control this change.

2. Movement in a Bank

8 The perspectives referred to above correspond relatively well to what can be observed in a major French bank. [2] The permanence of change that concerns skills, organization, products, and management procedures may therefore be considered as commonplace and recurrent. [3] This tide of change “structures” (defining and restricting) the work a lot more than the established forms in a new organization. The sociological question does not therefore consist in understanding what it is that distinguishes state A from state B, nor what has allowed for the passage from state A to state B. It consists precisely of understanding how the social relationships and the rules that relate to them function in a situation where state A has disappeared without having been replaced by state B. The situation relating to movement is neither linear nor synchronic, since all the constituent parts of the whole do not change according to a single, unifying rhythm, and certain elements do not change at all.

9 Since the early 1980s, activities have become progressively more commercial and “customer oriented,” but at the same time more complex. Technical, interpersonal, organizational, and cognitive aspects are tightly associated so as to “modernize” the work of the bank. Five logical aspects can be distinguished overall (they are distinct from stages, since they are partially interrelated).

3. The Weakness of the Organization and the Power of Organizational Activity

17 Describing an organization involves the habitual reference to a “production model,” a clear form of the division of labor. Generally speaking, when the question of repeated change and innovation constraints is considered, there is an allusion to the emergence of “new productive models” or “new forms of work organization.” What they have in common is a body of rules that defines and constrains the distribution of tasks in a coherent and cohesive manner. The different tasks are thus linked in a logical and homogeneous way. However, the term “organization” is equally reflective of the idea of action, that of “organizational activity”; that is to say, it consists of implementing ways so that the desired state of the organization can be obtained—for instance, an information system and a forward-looking policy for the management of jobs or “personnel mobilization.”

18 The use of the expression “organization of work” also makes indifferent reference to the state of the structure of the division of labor, or to the action that is definitive of that structure. Both meanings, the form of the organization and the organizational activity, can usefully be associated in an intentional manner. In developing the notion of an “organized action,” Friedberg (1993) integrates both terms in a way that is explicitly justified: an organization is indeed the result of an action, and the action never totally submits to the rules of the organization that only creates spaces for negotiation. Similarly, during their development of the notion of “organizational work,” de Terssac and Lalande (2002) analyze the activity that produces the forms of organization, what weakens them, and what changes them. Seen from these two perspectives, the organization and the action that underpins it are, therefore, associated in order to show that the structure and rules of a business enterprise constitute a negotiated social structure. Despite the proximity of the terms used, these perspectives are not retained.

19 The distinction between the form of the organization and organizational activity does indeed deserve to be preserved for at least one reason: the description of an organization consists of demonstrating its function, a function that is more or less harmonious, while the analysis of the organizational activity sheds light on how the reduction of uncertainty, which ensures the stabilization of an organization, is more or less easily and completely realized. An analysis of movement implies that a distinction is made between these two meanings because the principal assessment involves a considerable weakening of the work structure and a steady increase in organizational activity.

20 What is known as the “Taylorian model” can thus be broken down into two dimensions:

21 a. The first concerns the structure of work, which is defined along five axes: the division of labor (each task is only a limited part of the overall task); the fast work rate (source of productivity in this type of system); specialization relating to maintenance and design (planning departments); ascending and descending information flows; the control of upstream activities (definition of procedures) and downstream activities (the control of performance in a situation). [5]

22 b. The second dimension relating to the “Taylorian model,” the organizational activity, represents the work of the organizer, which involves analyzing the work, drawing up job descriptions and the methods of coordinating these jobs, and working out evaluation techniques for the activities in order to rationalize them and to ensure the “loyalty” of the employees. The arrival of the conveyor belt, on the other hand, means that employees are attached to a job, the rhythm of which is defined by the speed of movement of its parts.

23 The observation of the “modernization” of public companies and the analysis of investigations relating to the Japanese model (Alter 2000) demonstrate that these two dimensions are completely separate. In both cases, the organization aims to shake off Taylorian forms relating to the division of labor (flexibility, lateral and upward information flows, the recomposition of labor, and the control of work partially integrated in the production design), but in both cases, equally, the organizational activity remains largely unchanging. Companies can therefore transform their work structures without modifying their methods of change and their organizational activities. In other words, Taylorism is, at the same time, a lot more and a lot less than a model—a lot more because the character of organizational activity is shared with all other models of organization, and a lot less because this activity can be realized inside structures, the nature of which is not Taylorian. This means, more generally, that the question of “organization models” is a bad one because it is underpinned by the idea of homogeneity, coherence, and the adaptation of structures to their environment. Piotet (1992) shows that this type of reasoning leads to the confusion of an ideal type with a social practice, a form of the division of labor with action policies and, above all, the desired coherence with the relative incoherence obtained.

24 The perpetual debate concerning the renewal of forms of work organization (post-Taylorism or neo-Taylorism?) is therefore a debate whose terms are unsuitable because they confuse organization and organizational activity. Coriat (1991) explains that Toyotism consists in Taylorism “thought backward” (recomposing work, granting autonomy to employees, etc.), but at the same time, he provides information to show that the organizational activity of the engineer Ohno is of the same order as that of his predecessor, Taylor. On the other hand, Linhart (1991) explains that the methods and objectives within the rationalization of work are perennial and, for that reason, that Taylorism remains the dominant form concerning the division of labor. What is referred to by the authors as the perennial nature of Taylorism is in point of fact only the perennial nature of Taylorian methods (organizational activity), and what is termed post-Taylorism is nothing but the modification of forms relating to the division of labor (the organization).

25 The question of movement enables further clarification of this distinction. In a stable situation, the connection between organizational activity and the organization may be considered to be relatively simple: the former builds the latter “once and for all.” Regarding the movement described here, the situation is different: the organizational activity leads to the organization only very rarely and incompletely.

26 This assertion means a return to the notion of organization, which has been considered up until now as a homogeneous whole whatever the retained “model” of organization, since for Taylor the sole objective of the organizer is to reduce uncertainty. [6] It should also be understood that uncertainty is something other than the “vagueness” of a situation, the contours of which are ill defined, or a playground for stakeholders (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). Stinchcombe (1968) thus explains that uncertainty is characteristic of activities whose variables, which define the result, are very much at odds with one another. Therefore, the one with the most influence cannot be predicted, and the relationship between a variable and its result is unknowable. He adds later on (1990) that the more the uncertainty is reduced, the more scientific the organization becomes, the more “Fordian,” in fact. Likewise, here it is worth recalling Brunsson’s (1985) brilliant idea, according to which it is the lack of confidence in existing information, not the absence of information, that creates uncertainty.

27 Uncertainty does not affect the body of services in the same company in the same way. Work structures have at their disposal a level and type of rationalization that varies according to the significance of the uncertainties encountered by the different services. A given organizational form does not, therefore, suit the whole company, so that there are merely segments of organization. For example, the comparatively repetitive activities carried out in the bank—those of the “back office” (the administrative services)—are comparatively predictable and fairly widely codified. These are “organized” along rational lines and correspond to a substructure of a bureaucratic nature. Conversely, the activities of the planning department or the services that involve “corporate” customer relationships have been very much formalized and correspond to a substructure of a professional type.

28 The degree in which the work is rationalized thus depends on the degree of uncertainty characteristic of each service, not on an overall company policy in terms of organization. The work of the organizer (organizational activity) thus consists in finding a way of coordinating these differences. As regards “integration,” this analysis agrees completely with the works of Thompson (1967) and Lawrence de Lorsh (1967). The latter involves the implementation of measures to ensure the coordination of tasks across the different services. In the case of the bank, for example, it is at the same time a matter of information systems allowing each entity to be orientated in relation to downstream and upstream activities; of quality policies leading employees to register their operations within a framework of formalized procedures that are therefore predictable as far as others are concerned; and of cost accounting that identifies the contribution of each service within the workings of the whole in a specific manner. Perrow (1971) thus points out that the goal of the organizer always involves rationalization to the best of his or her ability, so as to reduce uncertainty and to predict modes of treatment that are perfectly formulated in cases of residual incidents. But, as he explains, this objective should not be confused with an actual situation. Indeed, in practice, its realization comes up against the often uncontrollable nature of a part of the tasks undertaken by the employees. Similarly, Brunsson and Olsen (1993) note the synchronous nature of the work of standardization and homogenization on the one hand, and the constant development of forms of organization that are considered to be models, on the other.

29 Movement brings this situation to the fore—a situation in which organizational activity is permanent, and organization is continuous. For example, in the bank, the increase in complexity and variety of products is reflected by an uncertainty concerning the nature of the skills necessary to deal with this new situation. No one individual has the capabilities necessary to handle the situation encountered at work in its entirety, and therefore, no job is perfectly adapted to suit the character of the tasks to be implemented. Cooperation between colleagues, or with the lower levels of management hierarchy, represents the only effective way of dealing with these circumstances. However, this form of work is problematic as far as the management of the organization is concerned: the delays in the processing of files are too long, and: Who is responsible for what is poorly identified and does not allow for the “traceability” of actions? The development of cost accounting and quality procedures represent the current rationalization practices relating to this question.

30 Of course, the organization, as a stable and coherent structure, is not entirely removed from the situation described above. Decisions involving rationalization give rise to capabilities relating to planning, standardization, and coordination. These do not last very long, however. For example, an influx of insurance products brings new uncertainties to the current plans. Similarly, the development of group projects means that a carefully drawn-up management control policy is partially redundant. In both cases, the management indicators are ill adapted to carry out an evaluation of operations that are both cross-disciplinary and independent of the classic operations relating to production.

31 Thus, the body of organizational rules in the bank is represented neither by a bureaucracy, a project structure, a network enterprise, nor by any other type of organization model. This body of rules is both heterogeneous and incomplete. It is, in fact, the result of a tension between organizational activity and the permanent quality of the uncertainty that it is seeking to eliminate. Both organizational activity and uncertainty are, therefore, permanent. The weight of this activity is directly related to the defects within the structuring of the forms of organization: the less organization there is, the more developed organizational activity becomes. [7]

4. Movement and Dyschrony

32 This situation creates a conflict of temporality between the different elements of movement, which is referred to as “dyschrony” (Alter 2000).

33 The concept of dysfunction first occupied an important place in North American sociology (Merton 1936, 1940; Selznik 1949; Gouldner 1954) followed by French organizations (Crozier, 1963). It is defined as a repeated gap (an inversion) in terms of practice, in comparison with objectives targeted by the rules or principles of an organization. This gap—an unexpected consequence of the plans that are in place—does not allow the objectives pursued (by those who defined them) to be met. This creates recurrent functional problems, problems that are themselves often referred to as dysfunctional. The meaning of the term has gradually been broadened, so that dysfunction simply represents a discrepancy in comparison with expected continuity. This discrepancy is generally considered to be negative in view of the objectives defined initially. It may be considered as negative and positive in equal measure, as Weick (1976) has made perfectly clear. [8]

34 Comparable natural phenomena may be observed in the analysis of movement. Here, dysfunction is not directly linked to the opposition or incompatibility of different elements or stakeholders in a system, but to the fact that these do not develop according to the same rhythm or normal patterns of learning. Asynchronous encounters between elements are caused by the whole. These encounters create problems in terms of function and overall evolution. This phenomenon should, strictly speaking, be termed “dysynchrony” (δÏς: “difficulty” or “lack” of synchrony), but for the sake of simplicity, it will be referred to as “dyschrony.” This occurs in relation to technical and management planning, investment made by stakeholders, and their performance and views. Here I am temporarily concerned with strictly organizational aspects, such as those that have been identified within the setting of a small mechanical business. [9] Four main categories can be discerned:

35 a. Dyschrony linked to the scheduling of operations. For example, the definition of the new relationship between the engine shop and the commercial services during the installation of “just-in-time (JIT)” manufacturing resulted in the following difficulties: The organizers initially missed certain aspects concerning informal cooperation. The necessary corrective measures were put in place, but held back the development of the information systems intended to ensure the output of figures and the monitoring necessary for the application of the JIT. Obviously, this delay had, in itself, negative effects on immediate production, bringing considerable harm to the commercial viability of the planning.

36 b. Dyschrony linked to the incompatibility of two changes. For example, the implementation of a certification policy came up against that of JIT. The employees had to dedicate time to defining protocols, then to analyzing procedures, and finally, to the implementation of the operations relating to the certification, while at the same time being available and “flexible” in order to work on the JIT. Speaking more generally, these two types of change were relatively conflicting. The processing of the emergency measures and the custom-made product required by the commercial services are not always included within the framework of certification.

37 c. Dyschrony linked to rivalry between procedures. For example, the preventive maintenance policy involving the robots, which had recently been reinforced, was absolutely practical since it allowed for a reduction in the costs and disruption connected with the practices of corrective maintenance. The problem was that preventive maintenance came under a temporal logic independent of circumstantial constraints. For example, the commercial services department might have had an urgent or specific production requirement, necessitating that a number of technicians be summoned in order to carry it out. If these technicians had been involved in the preventive maintenance operations, the commercial services department would have logically required them to put aside their work for the time being, postponing it and thus running the risk of extending the corrective maintenance operations.

38 d. Dyschrony linked to time value. More generally speaking, efficacy (defined as the ability to reach objectives) and efficiency (defined as the ability to produce at the lowest possible cost) create considerable tensions in the development process connected with change because they force operations within an economic framework independent of the constraints of permanent change. The amount of time necessary for the appropriation and learning relative to an innovation is considered by planning and monitoring services to be inefficient (it represents an additional cost) and ineffectual (it delays the achievement of objectives).

39 Thus, when viewed in isolation, the management qualities in each change are often apparent. On the other hand, their extrinsic qualities are regularly debated by stakeholders because each change answers to a particular dynamic. Therefore, the encounter between two good decisions is not automatically expressed by harmony; it can very well manifest itself by tension or pernicious effects (Boudon 1977) and, here, by dyschrony, because the encounter between two localized learning processes does not always produce a comprehensive learning process. Put differently, the learning process is limited because it is contained within, and through, the division of labor; it cannot therefore be superimposed on the organization, which does not possess a homogeneous unity. This type of situation is commonplace, but during the last few years the question of “organizational learning” (see, for example, in France the works of Midler 1993 or Moisdon 1997) has occupied scholars (in the world of research into management as well as enterprise) to such an extent that the tendency has been to believe that all learning is necessarily part of the development of the whole. [10]

40 Therefore, from the point of view of the management of firms, the problem here does not concern change so much as of the articulation of permanent changes and the stakeholders who implement them (Bacharach, Bamberger, and Sonnensthul 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Put differently, the collective ability of the stakeholders to change their working methods so as to improve their efficacy is obvious, so that each service tends to participate in the creation of efficacy, and in a manner that is intrinsically legitimate. Thus, we come back to Reynaud’s idea according to which regulation rests on its efficacy (1988). However, the concept of efficacy and the manner in which it is created may be varied and variable enough over time to call into question the legitimacy of the action of both. Thus, the variety of localized regulations poses the problem of the overall regulation of an enterprise. [11]

41 Seen from all these angles, dyschrony does not rest on the same foundations as the bureaucratic dysfunction identified by Crozier: “A bureaucratic organizational system is a system that is incapable of being corrected by virtue of its errors and in which dysfunction has become one of the elements essential to the balance” (1963, 239). The various stakeholders are constantly learning and introducing knowledge derived from their learning into the methods and tools of management. [12] The problem is created by the temporality relative to the different learning processes and the rivalry between these temporal elements.

5. The Relative Autonomy of Rules and the Lack of Regulation

42 The rules of an organization can become relatively autonomous, both in relation to the forces that created them and the situations they were originally supposed to remedy. Once they have been created in answer to a situation that has arisen at a particular given moment, they also regulate new situations later on, according to a register of criteria relating to evaluation and sanction that remain firm and are, therefore, ill adapted for new situations. They do not, therefore, readily bend to the desire for transformation on the part of the stakeholders. The rules are then merely an imperfect way of regulating management problems caused by movement because they have a “life of their own” and do not adhere to the same rhythm as the action.

43 This idea owes much to the works of Georg Simmel, to whom I shall return later on, leading to the observation of two major points in the analysis of organizations: (1) not all the elements in an organization are transformed simultaneously, and some of them even remain at the rule stage; (2) each rule does not necessarily contribute to the overall organizational coherence and some of them may have a logic independent of the will of the organization so that, at the end of the day, they do not “regulate” anything at all.

44 The situation relating to the whole is characterized by a consistent lack of regulation, a lack that is directly linked to the fact that the rules are comparatively autonomous compared with the action.

Conclusions

57 The movement described here leads to the modification of certain perspectives prevalent in the sociology of work and organizations, seen from two angles. On the one hand, organizational activity should be distinguished from organization qua structure. The organization can clearly be perceived as a permanent action, as a “mission” rather than as a stable and rational structure. Repeated change is, therefore, in no way associated with any “post-Taylorian” or “neo-Taylorian” model whatsoever, but rather with a body of management rules, the consistency of which is merely partial and occasional. On the other hand, certain technical, managerial, or social rules are not readily bent to action because they have become relatively autonomous. This autonomy, however, cannot be analyzed without reference to the commitment of the stakeholders. Their capacity for transforming rules mobilizes and demobilizes them because the repeated action constitutes an effort and a risk and, above all, because it is the rules that guarantee socialization.

58 Recently, the question of learning, whether “organizational” or “collective,” has become popular in research relating to management and sociology. A wide variety of situations that might be included within the body of theory are encountered in this analysis. However, empirically speaking, the phenomena observed here do not share the same characteristics as those that are generally cited by scholars interested in questions relating to learning, namely, that several types of localized learning do not automatically lead to overall and cohesive learning. This leads me to the view that the problem of management and organization that faces business enterprises is more a question of the ability to harmonize change than the ability to implement it. The enterprises are confronted more by issues relating to dyschrony than to dysfunction.

59 The body of these analyses highlights the fact that movement tends on the whole toward a lack of effective and legitimate regulation—a situation of anomie. This situation is often difficult to see because the lack of regulation does not have much to do with the lack of rules. On the contrary, there are numerous, even too many, rules in the movement described, but for all that, they do not create organization. A paradoxical situation thus arises, one in which the constraint exercised by the rules cannot be associated with what is currently termed “organizational constraint.”