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The collusion of the media, finance, and politics has created a swarming crowd that traffics and speculates on the stock market just as it traffics and speculates in politics.
Jean-Louis Bory, preface to Bel-Ami by Guy de Maupassant (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 10

1The relationship between money and politics has always been problematic, and is usually presented as antagonistic. Since the ancient city-states of Greece and Rome, politics has regularly been called into question for the self-interested relations of those in public office with public funds and/or economic actors. The figure of the sycophant highlights the age-old nature of this concern (Mélèze 1987; Rivière 2005; Doganis 2007). [1] In France, the great classic novels of Guy de Maupassant (Bel-Ami, 1884) and Émile Zola (L’Argent, 1898) [2] dissect the deleterious effects of connivance between the financial and political worlds. Georg Simmel summarizes the issue as follows: [3]


Such an attitude among bribable persons and in the whole phenomenon of bribery as such is most readily facilitated and encouraged to spread through the money form itself. Money, more than any other form of value, makes possible the secrecy, invisibility and silence of exchange. By compressing money into a piece of paper, by letting it glide into a person’s hand, one can make him a wealthy person. Money’s formlessness and abstractness makes it possible to invest it in the most varied and most remote values and thereby to remove it completely from the gaze of neighbors.… Whereas for the owner himself the fact that values can be expressed in money provides a clear and unveiled insight into the state of his possessions, for other people it allows a concealment and disguise of possessions and transactions that would be impossible for other tangible forms of property.
(Simmel [1900] 2004, 387)

3Two dimensions are highlighted here. On the one hand, the observable relations between money and politics are simply one effect in particular of the development of a monetary economy. On the other hand, money allows for one of the essential conditions of corrupt dealings: concealment, a property that is contrary to all standards of democratic transparency. [4] The features identified by Simmel are a constant of literary and academic writings and essays about the lack of integrity in politics and the extent of self-serving practices conducted under the guise of defense of the common good. Here, corruption is understood, in a broad sense, as the pecuniary abuse of public office. It applies as much to elected representatives as to ministers and public servants. In the relations between money and politics, the fear of private interests holding sway over the public interest, of the common good being perverted by individual needs, is always involved.

4Over the last fifteen years in France, the number of citizens who believe that their “elected representatives tend to be corrupt” has grown considerably. This indicator saw a significant rise especially in the 1980s, in connection with the first major court cases concerning illegal party funding. From 38% in 1977, it increased to 55% in 1990. It reached 65% in 1991 and since then has remained at between 60% and 65%. [5] (Mayer 2002a; Lascoumes 2010). During the survey we carried out in 2006, [6] a third of those questioned (33%) believed that there was more corruption today than before. For 62% “there is as much corruption today as before, but it is more widely spoken of.” Only 4% thought that there was less. This evolution may seem paradoxical. Until the mid-1980s, there were no specific measures to control the funding of political activities (the running of parties, elections, remuneration of elected representatives). [7] Beginning in 1988, a dozen laws and decrees were issued to organize public funding and provide some degree of transparency with regard to resources and spending. [8] However, the institution and implementation of standards did little to restore citizens’ confidence in their leaders’ integrity.

5In France, historians were the first to analyze the relations of collusion between large corporations, banks, and politicians (ministers and members of parliament) (Jeanneney 1976; 1981). The study of several major trials of the Third Republic provided plenty of supporting material (Ferry 1868; Desanti 1968; Mollier 1991). The sociology of political and financial scandals, which analyzes the production and differential treatment of “affairs,” constantly returns to the permeability of policymakers to private interests (Lascoumes 1997; Garrigues 2004; de Blic 2005). In political science, the problematic relationship between money and politics is approached from two main angles. [9] The first series of research deals with the growing distrust in democracies (“disaffected democracies”); that is, the loss of public confidence in the political system, its actors, and its institutions. This phenomenon has long been analyzed in the U.S. (Steffens 1904; Heidenheimer 1970; 1989; Pharr and Putnam 2000) and more recently in Europe (Mény 1992; Della Porta and Mény 1995; Rosanvallon 2006, 19–38; Algan and Cahuc 2007; Algan, Cahuc, and Zylbergerg 2012). Such distrust is often linked, firstly, with a negative representation of leaders considered to be potentially corruptible (especially ministers and national politicians) and, secondly, with the failure of democracies to effectively prevent and punish such abuses of power. A second series of studies focuses on the negative effects of the professionalization of politics on collective representations of that “shameful profession” (Damamme 1999; Phélippeau 2002). The analyses developed by Paul Bacot (1999) and Daniel Gaxie (2001) also show that the ordinary, dominant perceptions of political figures are based firstly on the social characteristics of elected representatives as “privileged” (their ability to access specific functions), and secondly on the opportunities provided by being in office to “take advantage” of their mandate. The combination of financial and symbolic rewards reinforces negative opinions of political activity, which is consequently seen as a means of enrichment. Another study highlighted the significant link made by respondents between the existence of politicians’ specific interest (the “defense of one’s post”) and criticism of their supposed “dishonesty” (Norris 1999). While Campbell et al. (1960) rightly showed in The American Voter that for want of more developed arguments, the common forms of criticism of politics are often based on everyday moral categories (disapproval of lying, careerism, and greed), the work of Daniel Gaxie (2001) demonstrated that today, this type of reasoning can also be observed among the social classes with higher sociocultural capital (the middle class, managers).

6The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between money and politics from a different angle, by comparing conceptions of private money to those about money in politics. More precisely, we try to verify whether or not there exists a relationship between, on the one hand, individual views of money and of the means to acquire it and, on the other, representations of the economic dimension of political activities (remuneration, use of public funds, integrity). We begin with the hypothesis that a positive image of money and private gain is linked to a greater acceptance of the role of money in politics. Conversely, a negative image of money and private gain is likely to be accompanied by a stronger disapproval of money in politics.

7Later in the study we formulate a second hypothesis on the social status of money presented in the general introduction to this issue. The force of the economic rationalism that has been growing for four centuries and the almost universal financialization of all social activities over the last forty years’ should have discredited, or greatly marginalized, all attitudes hostile to the accumulation and circulation of wealth, or so-called “antichrematistic” positions. [10] The rational and pragmatic logic of modern capitalism highlighted by Werner Sombart (1902) and Max Weber (2003 [1904–5]) should have led, by the early twenty-first century, to the conception of the legitimate economy being fully emancipated from any religious norms. “Chrematistic life conduct” as described by Weber, favorable to monetization and market exchange, should be the dominant model in contemporary Western societies. It should also result in a positive and pragmatic appreciation of the financial dimension of public activities. The limit of this model is the figure of the corrupt politician with his egotistical, self-interested behavior. Being in the “conscious enjoyment of his power” (Weber 2002 [1904–5], 24), he embodies the negative model of the rational, ascetic entrepreneur, and as such should be strongly rejected. What of this theoretical framework today?

8The empirical data used come from a study conducted at CEVIPOF on the social representations of public probity. The study combined qualitative field research (the monographs of three municipalities, eleven focus group discussions) and a quantitative survey. The latter was conducted in January 2006 by the ISL institute, administered face to face in the homes of the respondents (CAPI). A sample was formed of 2,028 people, representative of the French population aged eighteen and over. Quota sampling was used to ensure representativeness (gender cross-tabulated by age, occupation or last occupation of the household reference person, qualification), after stratification by major regions (ZEAT) and urban/rural categories. The average time to complete the questionnaire was thirty to forty minutes.

9In order to show how representations of money and of means of enrichment are involved in views of political office, we will proceed in four stages, successively presenting:

  • general opinions about private money,
  • the relationship between the image of money and general opinions about politics,
  • the relationship between the image of money and opinions about political integrity,
  • finally, a typology of attitudes that summarizes the previous variables.

1 – Views on Money and Enrichment

1 – General Opinions about Money

10First of all, we sought to assess the general image of money among the sample population in a comparative manner. The aim was to measure the value attributed to money compared to other concepts. [11] In a continuation of the research presented in the introduction, we wanted to identify views on several terms referring to a set of our society’s social and economic values, and their degree of coherence or ambivalence. Contrary to common perceptions that present the financialization of human activities as a major feature of contemporary society, we show that a non negligible proportion of the population surveyed does not consider this economic influence in a positive light. Monetarization has not been naturalized. According to our survey, around a third of respondents are, instead, critical vis-à-vis the role money plays in social relations. As we will see, the old background of antichrematism, suspicion, and distrust of economic activity and monetary practices still endures today.

11Overall, the image of money that emerges is positive: a little over three quarters of the sample (77%) share a positive perception, including more than a quarter (29%) with a very positive perception. The terms “honesty” and “freedom of expression” are those that trigger the most positive opinions (over 88% very and quite positive). In contrast, the state and economic liberalism attract the most negative opinions (over 40% quite and very negative). The perception of money is in mid position, on a level with authority for example. When compared with the set of terms proposed in the survey, money comes in ninth in the quite and very positive opinions. Terms such as honesty (90%), freedom of expression (89%), solidarity (88%), ambition (88%), tolerance (88%), work (87%), business (83%), and equality (83%) receive higher scores.

12The results of the 2008 European Values Study (EVS) show an even clearer distrust of monetary values. The question asked was different, but of similar meaning: “If there were less emphasis on money and material possessions, do you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or do you not care?” [12] For the whole study overall, the “good thing” response (less emphasis on money and material possessions) scored 67%. In France, this option scored slightly less (65%), [13] placing the country towards the middle: [14] the respondents from fifteen countries are more distrustful (maximum level for Malta, Cyprus, and Finland at over 80%) and nine countries adhere more to these values (maximum level for Austria and Lithuania at 49%).

13In our study, positive opinions about money are fairly evenly spread in social terms, with a tendency to be more common among younger people (under 24 years old), people with higher incomes --especially among the self-employed, farmers, and those not in paid work (not retired)--and right-wing (UMP) and far-right (FN) voters. But deviations from the mean are usually small. The image of money is a little more negative among adults aged from 25 to 49, people with lower incomes (<€1500/month), people working in the national or local public service and those who claim a left-wing political allegiance (Greens, Communist Party, and extreme left). The table in Appendix 1 specifies the trends observed for all of these variables.

14Moreover, it should be noted that opinions about money are strongly related to the representation that respondents have of economic liberalism and business. If one is judged negatively, the other two items are likely to be seen negatively also. [15]

2 – Legitimate and Less Legitimate Ways of Acquiring Wealth

15The next set of questions complemented the previous ones by investigating opinions on legitimate, less legitimate, or illegitimate ways of making large sums of money. [16]

16– Four legitimate means were put forward: “inheriting,” “saving,” “starting a business,” “working overtime.” The means most approved of were “starting a business” (“perfectly acceptable” and “quite acceptable”: 97%), “saving,” and “inheriting” (“perfectly acceptable” and “quite acceptable”: 93%). “Working overtime” was considered acceptable by 79% of the sample.

17– The respondents were also invited to consider four less legitimate or illegitimate means: “tax evasion,” “working several jobs,” “employing people without declaring them,” and “making use of schemes.” The means most disapproved of were, almost unanimously, “tax evasion and benefit fraud” (“quite unacceptable” and “perfectly unacceptable”: 96.5%) and “employing people without declaring them” (“quite unacceptable” and “perfectly unacceptable”: 92%), whereas 82% of the sample found it unacceptable to make use of schemes.

18– “Working several jobs” appears to be the most controversial way: 51% consider it perfectly acceptable and quite acceptable and 48% quite unacceptable and perfectly unacceptable.

19These preliminary results merit further analysis. We will try to understand the divisions present in the sample more holistically, and to identify the reasons why respondents take a more or less benevolent or hostile view (in comparison to each other) of ways of making money. To this end, we constructed two indicators, one for approval of legitimate means to gain wealth, and the other for approval of less legitimate means. The approach is statistically valid, insofar as these questions create a scale between them (Cronbach’s alpha for the four questions concerning legitimate means is 0.597, and with regard to the less legitimate means, 0.650).

20This method allowed us to isolate 53% of the sample who were most favorable to legitimate means of making money (approval 53% / disapproval 47%) on one side, and on the other side, 65% who clearly disapprove of the more illegitimate ways of acquiring wealth (disapproval 65% / approval 35%).

21In the population studied, there evidently is a high level of discord regarding the legitimacy of forms of enrichment. There are two clear divisions, as much on the approval of legitimate means (53% / 47%) as on the disapproval of illegitimate means (65% / 35%). These findings identify the first form of ambivalence towards money and the ways of acquiring it.

22What are the specific characteristics of each of these subgroups (see Table in Appendix 1)?

23Those who most approve of the more legitimate means are commonly aged 18–49, with average qualifications (upper primary and Baccalauréat), self-employed, individuals belonging to a non-Catholic religion, and who support right-wing parties (UMP, FN).

24Those who most approve of the illegitimate means are mainly young (18–24), with higher qualifications (Baccalauréat and/or higher education), business managers and professionals, [17] as well as laborers and those not in paid work, individuals belonging to a non-Catholic religion and who support peripheral parties (far left, Greens, and FN).

3 – Chrematistic and Antichrematistic Attitudes

25The most interesting finding is the following. Counterintuitively, the main divide in our population is not that between those who only support legitimate means and those who support all means whether legitimate or illegitimate. Instead, we observed a different type of separation, based not on the choice of means, but on the very principle of enrichment. Indeed, two groups highly opposed on this issue represent more than half of our sample (55%). On one side are those who reject the very principle of enrichment and therefore refuse all means, including legitimate ones (as such, their position is typically antichrematistic, 33%). Table 1 (p. 235) shows the relationship between the rejection of legitimate means (rejection of two or more means) and the refusal of illegitimate means (rejection of more than three means). On the other side is the group of respondents who instead value enrichment and subscribe to all means of gaining wealth, even those which are illegitimate (their position is typically prochrematistic, 22%). The same table shows the existence of a symmetrical relationship between the acceptance of legitimate means (three or more means) and acceptance of illegitimate means (three or more means).

Table 1

Combination of opinions towards legitimate and illegitimate means of acquiring wealth

Table 1
Number of illegitimate means considered acceptable Number of legitimate means considered perfectly acceptable 0 out of 4 1 out of 4 2 out of 4 3-4 out of 4 Total 0-1 out of 4 42 31 16 11 100 2 out of 4 32 35 18 15 100 3 out of 4 31 31 20 18 100 4 out of 4 17 39 20 23 100 Total 31 34 19 17 100

Combination of opinions towards legitimate and illegitimate means of acquiring wealth

26Table 2 gives the percentages of the two groups presented above (antichrematistic group 1, 33%; and prochrematistic group 2, 22%) and the two intermediary groups. Group 3 (31%) is made up of respondents who, as expected, approve of legitimate means (three or four means) and disapprove of illegitimate means (two or more). It is surprising that the group with the most predictable normative profile represents only a third of respondents. Group 4, in contrast, is the smallest. It can be regarded as the deviant group insofar as, paradoxically, its members (14%) approve of illegitimate means (three or four ways) while refusing most of the legitimate means (three or more).

Table 2

The four groups of attitudes towards means of enrichment

Table 2
Number of illegitimate means considered acceptable Number of legitimate means considered perfectly acceptable 0 out of 4 1 out of 4 2 out of 4 3-4 out of 4 0-1 out of 4 Group 1: antichrematistic (33%) Group 4: intermediary (14%) 2 out of 4 3 out of 4 Group 3: intermediary (31%) Group 2: prochrematistic (22%) 4 out of 4

The four groups of attitudes towards means of enrichment

27If we compare this typology with the general image of money held by the members of each of these groups, the distinction is essentially confirmed (Table 3). It is the antichrematistic group which has the least favorable image of money (the average for the whole of our sample is 29% for “very positive” responses and 48% for “quite positive” responses; see above).

Table 3

Pro/antichrematistic attitudes and image of money

Table 3
Very positive Quite positive Quite negative Very negative Prochrematistic 37 42 15 6 Antichrematistic 21 52 22 5 Intermediary groups 30 48 17 5

Pro/antichrematistic attitudes and image of money

28Finally, we characterized the socioeconomic profile of each of these groups (table in Appendix 1):

29– Group 1: the antichrematistics (33 %) are mostly adults and senior citizens (aged 50 and older), with a low level of education (no qualifications or primary school only). This group includes a large proportion of state employees (especially teachers), retirees, and nonworking people, and of practicing Catholics. Politically, they are in part left wing (especially the Communist Party and to a lesser extent the Socialist Party) or are apolitical (no party).

30– Group 2: the prochrematistics are mostly young (18–34 years old), well educated (baccalauréat and above). They are often private sector employees and individuals with monthly incomes of over €3,000. Those who say they belong to a religion other than Catholicism are more numerous. Politically, they are mainly situated to the right (often close to the National Front or FN), but some have no partisan attachment and others say they support the Greens.

2 – Money and Conception of Politics

1 – Views of Money and Views of Politics

31Following on from the studies presented in the introduction, which show the significance of money matters in the negative images and distrust of political players and politics in general, we investigated this issue in several ways. Using the answers to three questions, we were able to identify potential links between perceptions of money and perceptions of trust in politicians, the respectability of political office, and the professionalization of political functions. [18]

32There is a statistically significant link between the perception of money and the three variables reflecting a more or less distant and distrustful view of politics. [19] This validates the hypothesis that there is a close relationship between a positive image of money and a better perception of politics (Figure 1).

Figure 1

People with a positive view of money* and their trust in politicians, their opinion of the respectability of holding political office, and their view of politics as a profession

Figure 1

People with a positive view of money* and their trust in politicians, their opinion of the respectability of holding political office, and their view of politics as a profession

* For the sake of clarity, only the percentage of people with a positive image of money is shown here. People with a negative image form the exact remainder of what is shown on the graph. For example: 18% of those who say their trust in politicians has grown have a negative image of money (100 – 82 = 18)

33People whose trust in politicians has increased, who consider holding office respectable, and who approve of professionalization more often give a positive assessment of money than those who are more distrustful with regard to these three dimensions (respectively, + 8 points, + 10 points, and + 9 points). In contrast therefore, people whose confidence in politicians has decreased, who consider holding office unrespectable, and who disapprove of professionalization are also those who more frequently have a negative view of money.

34The construction of an indicator of trust in politicians supports this conclusion. Only 67% of those who are most distrustful of politicians (decreased trust, little respectability, profession a bad thing = 0 attribute on the indicator) have a positive image of money (Table 4). In contrast, this figure rises to 88% for those who consider political staff in a positive light in their responses to all three questions (3 attributes = + 21 points). A cumulative effect can be seen here: the greater the trust of politicians, the more often the perception of money is positive.

Table 4

Trust in politicians (from 0 to 3 attributes) and image of money

Table 4
Image of money Attributes of trust in political staff Positive Negative None 67 33 1 76 24 2 80 20 3 88 12

Trust in politicians (from 0 to 3 attributes) and image of money

2 – Remuneration of Members of Parliament (MPs)

35Another question focuses on how people view the level of MPs’ remuneration. This is a highly sensitive issue, since “making a living from politics” and the continuity of careers that this implies typically form part of negative stereotypes of politics (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the remuneration of MPs and their attitudes toward politics

Figure 2

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the remuneration of MPs and their attitudes toward politics

36The variations are slightly larger for those who think that MPs are overpaid (50% of the study sample). Overall, they are smaller for those who think that MPs are paid as they should be (43%), [20] whatever their view of money.

37Those who think that MPs are overpaid have a more negative image of money than those who think they are paid as they should be. In other words, considering MPs to be overpaid goes hand in hand with an antichrematistic attitude. This can be seen as evidence of a resentment or “social jealousy” of political elites. The effect of these opinions about MPs’ salaries (correctly/overpaid) explains why the positive image of money drops from 84% to 71% according to trust in politicians, from 80% to 69% according to the respectability of holding office, and from 78% to 72% according to opinions of politics having become a profession.

38Figure 3 confirms this trend: as trust in politicians (according to the trust indicator, see above) increases, the image of money is more often positive. However, the opinion that MPs are overpaid is accompanied by a slightly lower opinion of money. Moreover, this is increasingly true the lower the trust in politicians.

Figure 3

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the remuneration of MPs and their attribute of trust in politics

Figure 3

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the remuneration of MPs and their attribute of trust in politics

3 – Use of Public Funds

39A third way of approaching the question of the relationship between money and politics is to examine how the use of public funds is perceived. The overall results of the study give the following proportions: used very well, 7%; used well, 54%; used quite badly, 28%; used very badly, 10%; very well and well, 61%; quite badly and very badly, 38%.

40The results for this third variable confirm the previous results (Figure 4). There is a substantial connection between considering public funds to be badly used and a less frequently positive image of money (from - 1 to - 6 points depending on the situation).

Figure 4

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the use of public funds and their attitudes toward politics

Figure 4

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the use of public funds and their attitudes toward politics

41Similarly (Figure 5), while an expression of strong trust in politicians is accompanied by a positive perception of money, a positive perception is less common for those who consider public funds to be used badly. For those with the greatest trust in politics (level 3), there is a gap of 7 points between those who consider public funds to be used well and those who think they are used badly.

Figure 5

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the use of public funds and their attribute of trust in politics

Figure 5

Breakdown of people with a positive image of money according to their opinion on the use of public funds and their attribute of trust in politics

3 – Conception of Money and Opinions on Public Integrity

42We also explored the relationship between perceptions of money and opinions about the integrity of elected representatives. A comparison of variables confirms the results of the previous section (II), namely a strong statistical link between a negative or positive image of money and opinions about the degree of corruption of public actors (political leaders and institutions). [21] This third aspect is looked at from three angles. First, opinions on the honesty or corruption of leaders. In the survey the breakdown is as follows: honest, 35%; corrupt, 60% (DNK 5%). Then we take into account assessments of how corruption has progressed. Overall responses are: more than before, 33%; as much, 62%; less, 4% (DNK, 1%). Finally, we use a scale measuring attitudes towards clientelism and favoritism. It was constructed using opinions of acceptance or rejection of various behaviors involving a citizen seeking preferential treatment. [22] The breakdown of the survey sample is as follows: high tolerance of clientelism, 23%; moderate tolerance, 37%; disapproval, 40%.

43Figure 6 shows opinions on integrity according to the positive/negative image of money. Overall, a positive image is linked to trust in public life and a tendency to tolerate clientelism. Conversely, a negative image of money is associated with greater distrust of political leaders and a stronger condemnation of clientelism. Let us look at each variable one by one.

Figure 6

Opinions on the integrity of leaders according to views of money

Figure 6

Opinions on the integrity of leaders according to views of money

4481% of people who think politicians are honest have a positive image of money (19% have a negative image); only 74% of those who consider politicians corrupt have a positive image, or 7 points less (26% have a negative image).

4578% of people who believe that corruption has not increased have a positive image of money (22% have a negative image); they make up 74% of those who consider that corruption has increased (26% have a negative image).

4679% of people tolerant of clientelism have a positive image of money (21% have a negative image); they make up 75% of those who disapprove of these practices (25% have a negative image).

47This result indicates a dominant conception of public integrity that combines trust in leaders (honest) and institutions (not very corrupt) with an acceptance of “gray” political practices and arrangements.

48The perception of the level of remuneration of elected representatives introduces no marked differences. 77% of people who think politicians are honest and MPs overpaid have a positive image of money (23% have a negative image). 82% of those who think politicians are honest and MPs are paid as they should be have a positive image of money (18% have a negative image). The differences are more obvious when it comes to assessing how corruption has progressed (same or less than before/more than before). 70% of people who feel that corruption has increased and MPs are overpaid have a positive image of money (30% have a negative image). However, 79% of those who feel corruption is stable and MPs are paid as they should be have a positive view of money (9 points more) (21% have a negative image).

Figure 7

Opinions on the integrity of leaders and their remuneration according to views of money

Figure 7

Opinions on the integrity of leaders and their remuneration according to views of money

49The position on the scale of tolerance of clientelism also introduces differences. 73% of people unfavorable to clientelism and who consider MPs overpaid have a positive image of money (27% have a negative image). 84% (11 points more) of those who are tolerant to favoritism and think MPs are paid as they should be have a positive view of money (16% have a negative image).

50The perception of the use of public funds is a variable that introduces significant differentiation in the survey sample. 82% of those who believe elected representatives are honest and public funds used well have a positive image of money (18% have a negative image). Only 73% hold a positive image when they consider politicians corrupt and public funds misused (27% have a negative image).

51There is as much variation with regard to the assessment of how corruption has progressed. 79% of people who think the level of corruption is stable and public funds well used have a positive image of money (21% have a negative image). The positive image drops to 72% for those who think there is more corruption today and that public funds are used badly (28% have a negative image).

Figure 8

Opinions on the integrity of leaders and on the use of public funds according to views of money

Figure 8

Opinions on the integrity of leaders and on the use of public funds according to views of money

52Attitudes towards clientelism also have a perceptible effect. 80% of those who are tolerant of clientelism and think public funds are used well have a positive image of money (20% have a negative image). Only 72% of those who reject clientelism and believe public funds are badly used have a positive image of money (28% have a negative image).

4 – Map of Opinions on the Relationship between Money and Politics

53A specific multiple correspondence analysis (specific MCA) [23] allowed us to process all the variables presented so far and analyze their interaction. This method has the advantage of being able to take into account a whole set of variables simultaneously and to summarize the main polarizations using a multidimensional approach.

54– The ten questions that we retained as active variables (that structure the delimited field) are those relating to the image of money and getting wealthy, to opinions of MPs’ remuneration and the use of public funds, as well as on perceptions of political office (trust, respectability, professionalization) and of public integrity; [24]

55– Several attitude scales (concerning favoritism, trust in political institutions and actors, and democratic values), as well as variables relating to interest in politics and voter turnout, were also included in the analysis as complementary variables (or illustrative variables). We also introduced sociodemographic data at this level. These variables are not used directly to structure the space, and are placed afterwards in the space of active variables to characterize the main political and social polarizations observed.

56The results of this specific MCA confirm the importance of perceptions of money for social representations of “politics” (Figure 9, p. 251). The positions space is organized on the basis of two main factorial axes, which help explain the major oppositions that structure the survey responses.

57– The first axis (horizontal axis on the graph) relates to attitudes towards political office (55% of the variance of the scatter): [25] it opposes attitudes of approval (politicians honest, respectable profession, professionalization a good thing, MPs paid as they should be, public funds used well, etc.) and attitudes of distrust (politicians dishonest, unrespectable profession, professionalization a bad thing, MPs overpaid, public funds used badly, etc.).

58– The second axis (vertical axis on the graph) concerns positions with regard to money (14% of the variance of the scatter): it opposes the chrematistic attitude (positive image of private money, positive opinion of all means of making money, both legitimate and illegitimate) [26] and the antichrematistic attitude (negative image of money, negative opinion of all means of making money, both legitimate and illegitimate).

59– A third axis, which we will not use here, plays a secondary part, and concerns the definition of potential corrupters (5% of the variance of the scatter). It opposes corrupters involving economic actors (entrepreneurs, banks) and those involving nepotism (family, relations).

60On this basis, we established a typology of individual positions through a hierarchical classification. The results confirm empirically the significant ambivalence of opinions on the relationship between money and politics (Rundquist et al. 1977; Pharr 1999). This complexity arises in particular from the co-existence of strong opinions (with regard to our two main axes) and much more ambiguous opinions. This finding is consistent with those regarding perceptions of violations of integrity in politics and show that only a little over half of those surveyed (55%) have a clear stance towards corruption – whether it is relatively tolerant (23%) or more hostile (32%). The others (45%) combine strong disapproval and tolerance (27%), or minimization of corruption and strong disapproval (17%) (Lascoumes et al. 2010).

61When images of private money are combined with views on public integrity, six groups can be distinguished among the various positions. Four of them, representing 60% of our population, are clearly characterized (Table 5 and Figure 9): classes 2 (23.5%, n = 476), 3 (12.5%, n = 253), 4 (12.3%, n = 250), and 5 (12% n = 243). The other two types are more mixed: class 1 (20.3%, n = 412) and class 6 (19.4%, n = 394). The results can be summarized as follows with regard to the two main axes:

Table 5

Typology according to attitudes towards private money and trust in politics

Table 5
Axis 1 Trust in political actors and institutions Distrust of political actors and institutions Axis 2 Antichrematistic position Class 3 Trusting nonmaterialists 12.5%, n = 253 (skilled, elderly, left-wing) Class 4 Distrustful nonmaterialists 12.3%, n = 250 (unskilled, left-wing) Chrematistic position Class 2 Trusting materialists 23.5%, n = 476 (skilled, right-wing) Close: Class 1 (20.3%, n = 412) Class 5 Distrustful materialists 12%, n = 243 (unskilled, young, neither left- nor right-wing) Close: Class 6 (19.4%, n = 394)

Typology according to attitudes towards private money and trust in politics

1 – Two Antichrematistic Classes

62– The members of class 3 are antichrematistic, the “trusting nonmaterialists.” They have a quite negative image of money, and as well as being very critical of illegitimate ways to make it, they are also critical of legitimate means. They believe that MPs are rather overpaid.

63This group has every confidence in political institutions and actors. They see politics as a respectable profession, elected representatives as honest and the level of corruption as stable. They also consider that public funds are used quite well. Finally, they are interested in politics, they vote, and feel fairly well represented.

64Socially, it is the oldest group (over 67% of them are over 50 years old), whose members are drawn from among retired skilled workers (executives, engineers, teachers, middle management), with a relatively high income (19% have more than 3,000 euros per month). They mostly claim to be left wing and often live in rural areas. Among them are a large proportion of practicing Catholics.

65– The members of class 4 are the most clearly antichrematistic group, more so than class 3. These are the “distrustful nonmaterialists.” They have a very negative image of money and are as critical of legitimate means of enrichment as of illegitimate means.

66However, unlike class 3, they share with class 5 a set of critical opinions of the political system. They are distrustful of political institutions and actors. They believe that MPs are overpaid and that public funds are used rather badly. In their view, politics is not a very respectable profession. They think that politicians tend to be corrupt and that there is more corruption now than before. They are not in favor of professionalization. They have little interest in politics and feel poorly represented.

67Socially, they are frequently older, unskilled people on low incomes. They are mainly employees, workers, and service staff. They frequently claim to support the left and often live in small towns.

2 – Two Chrematistic Classes

68– The members of class 2 are “trusting materialists.” They have a quite positive image of money, they strongly approve of legitimate means of making it and they disapprove only slightly of illegitimate means. They think that MPs are paid as they should be (or even not enough) and that public funds are fairly well used.

69It is also the group with the most confidence in political institutions and actors. For members of this group, politics is an honorable profession, elected officials tend to be honest, and there is no more corruption today than before. They have an interest in politics, vote, and feel quite well represented.

70Socially, these are working, well-integrated, qualified adults and young adults, who live mainly in large cities. They tend to support right-wing parties. Among them is a significant proportion of non-practicing Catholics.

71– The members of class 5 are the most clearly chrematistic. These are “distrustful materialists,” with a very positive image of money, and they strongly approve of all means of making it (legitimate and illegitimate).

72However, they are clearly set apart from the previous group by a set of critical opinions of political institutions and actors. They believe that MPs are overpaid and that public funds tend to be used badly.

73They see politics as an unrespectable profession, elected officials as quite corrupt, and they think that there is more corruption today than before. They have little interest in politics and feel badly represented.

74Socially, these are people with little or no qualifications (38% have only primary level schooling); they are relatively young (37.5% under 35 years old), mostly employees, workers and service staff. They support neither the right nor left. [27]

3 – Two Ambiguous Types

75There are two classes which fall in between the previous ones. Specifically, it is the question of their respective positions towards money (chrematistic/antichrematistic attitude) that differentiates them:

76– Class 1 (20%) is in an intermediate position between classes 2 and 3. It includes moderately materialist and trusting people. They are less antichrematistic than class 3 (they disapprove, but less strongly, of the use of legitimate and illegitimate means to make money). They share with the third group a high level of trust in political institutions and actors.

77Sociologically the group is highly composite (with a tendency towards skilled individuals, the self-employed, merchants, and nonworking people).

78– Class 6 (19%) is in an intermediate position between classes 4 and 5. It is made up of people distrustful of politics with a normalized level of materialism. They have a less pronounced chrematistic stance than those in class 5. Though they share a positive image of money and approve of legitimate ways to get rich, they disapprove of illegitimate means of doing so. They are also very critical of political institutions and actors (they are more distrustful and judge politics more severely than class 5).

79Members of this group are young, unskilled, and more often female.

Figure 9

Map of opinions on the relationship between money and politics[28]

Figure 9

Map of opinions on the relationship between money and politics[28]


80This study has allowed us to specify the complex and often antagonistic relationship between money and politics from a quantitative angle. Three main conclusions can be drawn. First, we demonstrated the existence of a relationship between conceptions of private money and perceptions of money in politics. We established a relationship between a positive image of money and private enrichment, and greater acceptance of the role of money in politics. Conversely, a negative image of money and private enrichment is accompanied by a stronger disapproval of the role of money in politics.

81Next, we highlighted the persistence of the classic axiological dichotomy between chrematistic and antichrematistic attitudes. The traditional notion of “money that spoils everything” is still relevant today. This finding indicates that the current premise of the imperialism of economic values​​ should be revised. In contemporary society, the social status of money and enrichment is still disputed by a significant proportion (one third) of the population surveyed. Similarly, the chrematistics, the absolute defenders of all things economic (where the end justifies the means), are a minority (22%). On this issue, nearly half of our sample has mixed feelings about the social value of money and means of gaining wealth.

82Finally, we showed the strength of this divide in combination with perceptions of politics and issues of integrity. Admittedly, 39% of the survey sample is difficult to position on these issues. This is as much due to the limitations of the method used as it is an indicator of complexity. But the remaining 61% form four clearly differentiated classes which are illustrative of the multidimensional nature of perceptions of “corruption” (various abuses of office) and its causes (especially economic and financial). On the contrary, these findings confirm the flimsiness of polls that capture only surface opinions, and of analyses that regularly dramatize judgments of political leaders as “a rotten bunch.”


Appendix 1 – Socioeconomic profiles and views of money and means to get rich

tableau im15
Positive image of money 3 to 4 legitimate means out of 4 considered perfectly acceptable 2 to 4 illegitimate means out of 4 considered acceptable Prochrematistic Antichrematistic Age 18-24 yrs 82 56 61 36 20 25-34 yrs 75 60 48 31 22 35-49 yrs 75 56 39 23 28 50-64 yrs 78 50 27 16 40 65 yrs or over 77 44 18 10 48 Income level <800 € 71 50 36 20 35 800-1500 € 75 51 34 21 36 1500-3000 € 77 53 36 21 32 >3000 € 82 53 37 25 35 Employment status Employer, independent 78 57 44 24 23 State employee or public servant 71 53 38 24 33 Private sector employee 77 57 42 26 27 Not in work (including retired) 78 49 28 17 40 Political affiliation Far left party* 59 41 44 20 35 Communist Party (PC) 71 44 27 21 50 Socialist Party (PS) 76 45 30 15 41 Greens 72 47 44 24 33 UDF (Union for French Democracy, Force démocrate included) 77 56 32 20 32 UMP (Union for a Popular Movement, RPR included) 81 63 31 23 29 National Front (FN) 84 60 44 28 24 Other* 64 44 28 17 44 No party 79 57 40 25 28 Occupation (or former occupation) of the respondent Farmer* 81 55 31 22 36 Craftsperson, merchant 83 59 36 23 28 Entrepreneur, self-employed professional* 81 57 38 14 19 Teacher, academic* 76 33 21 12 59 Executive, engineer 78 46 37 21 37 Middle manager 74 56 30 20 35 Employee 74 54 34 22 33 Worker, service staff 77 52 38 22 32 Not in work (other than retirees) 80 54 40 24 30 Level of qualification No qualification 78 51 36 21 34 Primary 78 48 21 12 43 Upper primary 76 55 37 22 31 Baccalauréat (high school graduation) 78 56 42 27 28 2 or more yrs of higher education 76 53 40 25 32 Religious affiliation Regularly practicing Catholics 80 51 29 18 38 Irregularly practicing Catholics 73 48 31 21 42 Nonpracticing Catholics 79 57 34 22 31 Other religions 78 60 41 24 23 No religion 74 48 40 22 35
* low numbers

Appendix 2 – What is specific multiple correspondence analysis?

83Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) [29] is a means of identifying the main polarizations within a population. These divisions are measured using active variables that summarize the dimensions on which the table of analyzed data is based. It is a geometric method, based on a calculation of distances between individuals[30] (the more different the answers to selected questions between two individuals, the greater the distance will be). Individuals are then organized on a scatter plot (summarizing these distances), which makes it possible to determine factorial axes (main axes), prioritized according to the degree of divisions they generate (from the largest to the most residual). Each individual receives a score that gives his or her factorial coordinate on each axis. From these individual factorial coordinates, it becomes possible to determine the average points of the modalities of variables that were not used to calculate distances between individuals. These are typically called illustrative or complementary variables, and are usually sociodemographic variables useful to “identify a type” for the polarizations highlighted beforehand (age, sex, qualification, etc.). Political indicators (voting in elections, party affiliation, political positioning, etc.) are also used as an illustration to characterize the divisions obtained within the active variables and to provide some explanation.

84Specific MCA is a variant of “classic” MCA that retains the same statistical properties. It makes it possible to classify individuals for whom certain answers to a particular active variable are missing, or individuals who choose response modalities which are underrepresented in the sample or noninterest modalities (“other” category, etc.). With this method, these individuals are retained in the analysis, but occasionally considered “passive” in calculating distances between individuals. This method avoids two pitfalls in particular. (1) Removing individuals characterized by nonresponses or rare responses (this is equivalent to working on a truncated sample, which would no longer be representative of the population studied); (2) retaining rare modalities: this often leads, on the first factorial axes, to the opposition of these “rare” individuals and the others.

Appendix 3 – The 10 active variables of the specific multiple correspondence analysis

tableau im16
Q1. – I am going to read you a list of words. For each word, tell me if, in your opinion, it represents something positive or negative: Money – Very positive (Money ++) 29% – Quite positive (Money +) 48% – Quite, very negative (Money -) 23% – DNK (MoneyDNK)* 0.3% Q2. – In general, would you say that members of parliament are… ? – Overpaid (MPsOverpaid) 50% – Quite well paid (MPsWellPaid) 29% – Paid just as they should be / not paid enough (MPsNotWellPaid) 15% – DNK (MPsDK)* 6% Q3. – Do you think that in France… – There is more corruption than before (MoreCorruption) 33% – There is as much as before, but it is more widely spoken of/there is less (AsMuchLessCorruption) 66% – DNK (CorruptionDK)* 1% Q4. – When an elected representative is accused of corruption, other people are often involved. In your opinion, which ones…: firstly – His or her voters/family members (CorrVotersFamily) 21% – Company directors (CorrComDir) 33% – Public servants (CorrCivilServants) 16% – Trade union leaders (CorrUnions) 7% – Bank managers (CorrBanks) 16% – None of the above (CorrNone)* 2% – DNK (CorrDK)* 4%
tableau im17
Q5. – In general, would you say that the public funds used by the councilors elected in your municipality are… – Used very well (PublicFunds++) 7% – Used quite well (PublicFunds+) 54% – Used quite badly (PublicFunds-) 28% – Used very badly (PublicFunds--) 10% – DNK (PublicFundsDNK)* 1% Q6. – Would you say that holding political office is… ? – Respectable (PolRespectable) 67% – Unrespectable (PolUnrespectable) 30% – DNK (PolRespectableDK)* 3% Q7. – Would you say that in general, French elected representatives and political leaders tend to be… ? – Honest (PolLeadHonest) 35% – Corrupt (PolLeadCorrupt) 60% – DNK (HonCorrDK)* 5% Q8. – It is said today that politics has become a profession. Would you say that this is… ? – Rather a good thing (PolJob++) 47% – Rather a bad thing (PolJob--) 48% – DNK (PolProDK)* 5% Q9. – Number of legitimate means of making money seen as acceptable (“inheriting,” “saving,” “starting a business,” “working overtime”) – 0-1 means (legal--) 28% – 2 means (legal-) 19% – 3 means (legal+) 26% – 4 means (legal++) 27% Q10. – Number of illegitimate means of making money seen as acceptable (“tax fraud,” “working several jobs,” “employing people without declaring them,” “making use of schemes”) – 0-1 means (illegal--) 30% – 2 means (illegal -) 34% – 3 means (illegal +) 19% – 4 means (illegal ++) 17%
* signifies that the modality was treated as a passive modality in the analysis (see Appendix 2)


  • [1]
    Originally, these were vigilant citizens who denounced, under protection, problems or dysfunctions which occurred in the city. As such, they fulfilled the role of a Public Ministry in a justice system that had none. However, the institution eventually backfired and, for some, denunciation became a source of income and the object of extensive and varied individual and political manipulation. The sycophant became the archetype of the informer or slanderer with perverse intentions.
  • [2]
    Beyond the hero’s ambitiousness and the press’s collusion with financial and political powers, Bel-Ami transposed to Morocco “the Tunisian affair,” which had set the stage for massive market speculation. The book portrays the government and parliament as completely instrumentalized by a war between banks. L’Argent is the eighteenth volume of the Rougon-Macquart series based on the story of the failure of the “universal bank.” It presents the life and death struggle of two bankers (Saccard and Gundermann) against a backdrop of constant political manipulation. In the same vein: Anatole France, L’Île des pingouins (1908).
  • [3]
    He gives the notion a broad definition: “Corruption: to sell one’s duties or one’s convictions,” but the examples he gives are essentially political (Charles V, the Irish parliament, 488–489) or concern the Catholic church (486).
  • [4]
    “Under the modern highly complex circumstances of public life with its innumerable subterranean forces of the money economy that extend in all directions, the bribery of officials has much more detrimental effects” (Simmel [1900] 2004, 391).
  • [5]
    SOFRES has asked the same question for twenty-seven years: “Would you say that, in general, elected representatives and political leaders tend to be honest or corrupt?” The highest level of response was reached in the fall of 2013, during the Woerth-Bettencourt affair.
  • [6]
    See the presentation at the end of the introduction.
  • [7]
    Contrary to popular belief, this did not mean that anything and everything was allowed. The penal code provided for a series of offenses regarding the breach of public integrity (bk. 4, sect. 3, articles 432-10 to 432-17) including bribery and accepting bribes, influence peddling, illegal taking of interest, embezzlement of public funds, etc.
  • [8]
    Commission for the Financial Transparency of Political Life (Commission pour la transparence financière de la vie politique, or CTFVP, 1988), National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques, or CNCCFP, 1990), Central Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (Service central de prévention de la corruption, or SCPC, 1993).
  • [9]
    Here, we purposely do not include the many studies on the forms of political corruption, the factors which encourage it, and their development (Bayley 1966; Heidenheimer 1989; Neild 2002; Lambsdorff 2007). We also disregard research that addresses corruption in terms of the exchange of services, favors, and patronage, since the financial dimension is not a central focus (Padioleau 1975; Médard 1976; Briquet and Sawicki 1998).
  • [10]
    The distinction was developed by Aristotle, who opposed activities related to the oikos (for meeting human needs) and chrematistic activities (unnatural, focused on the accumulation of wealth and based on mercantile exchange). See the general introduction to this issue.
  • [11]
    The question was: “I am going to read you a list of words. For each word, tell me if, in your opinion, it represents something very positive, quite positive, quite negative, or very negative.” Successively: money, work, equality, ambition, freedom of expression, state, solidarity, economic liberalism, honesty, authority, business. In general, “do not know” responses accounted for only 0.1% to 0.8%, indicating that this set of questions was no problem for respondents. Only the terms “economic liberalism” and “tolerance” garnered a larger share of “do not know” responses (6% and 3% respectively).
  • [12]
    Survey conducted in twenty-eight European countries, of 40,773 people, of whom 1,484 were French.
  • [13]
    Giving less emphasis to money and material possession is: a good thing, 65.4%; a bad thing, 13.7%; indifferent, 20.9%.
  • [14]
    At the same level as Belgium (65.8%) and Bulgaria (65.5%).
  • [15]
    This made it possible to establish, with Guy Michelat, a Loevinger-type attitude scale from these three variables.
  • [16]
    The question was: “Do you think it is acceptable to make a lot of money by…” (followed by a list of ways). The possible responses were: perfectly acceptable, quite acceptable, quite unacceptable, perfectly unacceptable.
  • [17]
    This result may seem counterintuitive (a functionalist conception of deviance links social integration-- access to legitimate opportunities--and compliance), but it concords with a recent psychosociology study that shows, on an empirical basis, a correlation between higher social status and a capacity to break the rules. The authors interpret this as a “more favorable perception of greed” in the upper classes (Piff et al., 2012).
  • [18]
    The general results of the study are – Trust: has increased, 3%; has stayed the same, 42%; has decreased, 55%, DNK 1% – Respectability of holding office: Yes, 67%; No, 30%; DNK 3% – Politics as a profession: rather a good thing, 47%; rather a bad thing, 48%; DNK, 5%.
  • [19]
    The chi-square tests were significant.
  • [20]
    Overpaid, 50%; Fairly well paid, 29%; Paid just as they should be, 14%; Underpaid, 1%, DNK 6%.
  • [21]
    Here we used two questions from the survey. The first has been asked in the same way for over twenty years, which makes comparison possible: “Would you say that in general, French elected representatives and political leaders tend to be honest or corrupt?” Overall result of the 2008 survey: honest, 35%; corrupt, 60%, DNK, 5%. The second is “Do you think that in France: there is more corruption than before; there is as much as before but it is more widely spoken of; there is less?” Overall result: more corruption than before, 33%; as much as before but it is more widely spoken of, 62%; there is less, 4%; DNK, 1%.
  • [22]
    Political recommendation to get a place in a child care center, using political connections to get a municipal job, joining a political party to obtain social housing, acceptance of a large gift from a client.
  • [23]
    For a presentation of the specific ACM method used, see Appendix 2.
  • [24]
    Appendix 3 details the 10 active questions of the specific MCA and specifies the labels of the response modalities used in Figure 9.
  • [25]
    Modified rate (Benzécri 1992).
  • [26]
    Bottom of Figure 9, p. 251.
  • [27]
    In France, this position is often associated with a favorable attitude towards the far right (Mayer 2002b).
  • [28]
    Black diamonds: modalities of the active variables that contribute to the factorial design, white squares: additional modalities. Appendix 3 shows the precise meaning of the modalities of the active variables (caption).
  • [29]
    For further statistical indications, refer to Henry Rouanet and Brigitte Le Roux, Analyse des données multidimensionnelles: Statistique en sciences humaines (Paris: Dunod, 1993); Brigitte Le Roux and Henry Rouanet, “L’analyse multidimensionnelle des données structurées,” Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines 85 (1984): 5–18. For an empirical example, refer to Jean Chiche, Brigitte Le Roux, Pascal Perrineau, and Henry Rouanet, “L’espace politique des électeurs français à la fin des années 1990: Nouveaux et anciens clivages, hétérogénéité des électorats,” Revue Française de Science Politique 50, no. 3 (2000): 463–487.
  • [30]
    Here “individual” is used in the statistical sense of the term.

Money and politics have always existed in a problematic relationship to one another. At stake is the worry that private interests will take precedence over public ones; in other words, that the common good will be perverted towards parochial ends. On the basis of quantitative analysis and statistical methods, this article seeks to understand the extent to which perceptions of personal fortune and of private gain influence the way in which politics is conceived.
The demonstration proceeds in four steps. Having presented general judgments on money and private gain, we illustrate the relationship of these judgments to appraisals of the political sphere. We subsequently analyze the relationship between perceptions of money and the judgment of breaches of integrity. Finally, we present an attitudinal typology that summarizes the foregoing variables.


  • integrity
  • money
  • profit
  • political corruption

Les relations entre l’argent et le politique ont toujours été problématiques. C’est toujours la crainte d’une emprise des intérêts privés sur l’intérêt public qui est en cause, c’est-à-dire le dévoiement du bien commun par les besoins particularistes. Sur la base d’une enquête quantitative et de traitements statistique cet article se propose de préciser dans quelle mesure les représentations de l’argent privé et des moyens d’enrichissement influent sur la conception de la fonction politique. La démonstration procède en quatre temps. Après avoir présenté les jugements généraux sur l’argent et l’enrichissement, nous montrerons leur relation avec l’appréciation du politique. Puis, nous traiterons des relations entre l’image de l’argent et les jugements sur la probité publique. Enfin, nous présenterons une typologie d’attitudes qui synthétise les variables précédentes.


  • argent
  • corruption politique
  • intégrité
  • profit


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Pierre Lascoumes
Pierre LASCOUMES is a CNRS senior researcher. He is a member of the Center for European Studies at Sciences Po, Paris. He worked in the field of sociology of law and justice for many years, before specializing in the analysis of public policy, particularly the history and implementation of environmental policies. His research has also focused on economic and financial crime-prevention policies. He has conducted studies on the social representations of corruption and on anti-money laundering measures. He is coauthor (with Gilles Favarel and Thierry Godefroy) of Les sentinelles de l’argent sale: Les banques aux prises avec l’antiblanchiment (Paris: La Découverte, 2009); Favoritisme et corruption à la française, petits arrangements avec la probité (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 2010), and Une démocratie corruptible, arrangements, favoritisme et conflits d’intérêts (Paris: Seuil, 2011).
Viviane Le Hay
Viviane LE HAY has a doctorate in sociology from the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris and is a CNRS research engineer with the Émile Durkheim Center at Sciences Po Bordeaux. She specializes in issues of statistical and quantitative methodology in the social sciences, and teaches electoral sociology and methodology at Sciences Po Bordeaux. With Thierry Vedel and Flora Chanvril, she recently published “Usages des médias et politique: une écologie des pratiques informationnelles,” Réseaux 170 (2011): 45–74; with Pierre Lascoumes, “Tolérances de la fraude et relations de confiance,” in Les Français: Des Européens comme les autres?, ed. Daniel Boy, Bruno Cautrès, and Nicolas Sauger (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2010), 73–108; with Mariette Sineau, “‘Effet patrimoine’: 30 ans après, le retour?,” Revue Française de Science Politique 60, no. 5 (2010): 869–900.
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