Contrasting contexts

7In France, the institution of marriage has been profoundly transformed in the last forty years. The number of marriages has fallen, while that of consensual unions has increased, and unions have become more unstable, leading to a radical change in the family landscape, and notably a large increase in lone-parent families. However, these changes are not associated with a rejection of the family as such, and the majority of couples express the desire to have children. In fact, more than half of all births in France today occur outside marriage (Pla and Beaumel, 2010). In most European countries – including France and Italy – another key feature of the changing dynamics of family formation is the postponement of first births. For France, this has been explained by the longer time spent in education (Robert-Bobée and Mazuy, 2005) and increasingly delayed labour market entry, the desire to be in a stable relationship (Mazuy, 2009), but also the wish to make the most of life as a childless couple (Régnier-Loilier and Solaz, 2010). These changes are inseparably linked to the diffusion of modern contraception (notably the pill, the most widely used method in France) from the 1970s, and the massive entry of women into the labour force.

8In Italy, by contrast, the majority of children are born to married couples (20 % of non-marital births in 2008 according to ISTAT). However, despite the persistence of this Italian singularity (Dalla Zuanna and Micheli, 2004), the country has recently entered a new demographic phase marked by an increase in divorces, consensual unions and non-religious marriages (Rosina, 2007; Vignoli and Ferro, 2009). In this context, the obstacles to parenthood are probably greater in Italy than in France due to the absence of institutional support for the family and for mothers. Career opportunities for women are seriously compromised by family obligations, especially when the spouse makes little or no contribution to domestic chores or childcare. This situation leads many women to delay their first child, to limit the number of children they wish to have, or even to forego childbearing altogether (Mencarini, 2007). High youth unemployment in recent years and growing job insecurity, for women especially, are additional factors at play (Salvini and Ferro, 2007). Among the reasons for delayed childbearing in Italy, and in addition to those shared by France and other modern societies, such as longer schooling and greater difficulty in entering a labour market whose contours are increasingly ill-defined (Vignoli, 2011), other factors specific to Italy include strong family relationships and a particularly unfavourable housing market (Dalla Zuanna et Billari, 2008). Indeed, families are very closely knit in Italy at all stages of the life cycle; young people live for longer with their parents, and often continue to live nearby after leaving home. Moreover, the difficulties of buying a home and the prohibitive cost of the rare properties available on the rental market are a further disincentive to family formation for young Italians.

9These differences in the backdrop to the fertility choices made by couples in France and Italy are also associated with fertility models that have diverged in certain respects over recent decades.

Growing disparities in the intensity and timing of fertility

10The mean number of children per woman aged 45-64 (at the time of the first survey wave) is quite similar in both countries, although slightly lower in Italy, with 1.9 children per women versus 2.0 in France. In terms of distribution, two-child families are most frequent (39 % in France and 44 % in Italy), but the proportion of families with three or more children is much higher in France (32 % versus 24 %).

11The Italian fertility decline that began in the late 1970s is reflected in the fertility timing of younger cohorts (Figure 1). For women aged 45-64, the first birth follows the same pattern in both countries: at age 25, 58 % of women in France and 55 % in Italy already had a first child, and at the end of their reproductive life (at age 45), 90 % and 88 %, respectively, were mothers. For these cohorts of women, there is nonetheless a slight delay in the arrival of the second child in Italy. At age 30, 49 % of women had had a second child, versus 58 % in France, resulting in a lower final proportion of women with two or more children in Italy than in France (67 % versus 71 %). This difference is even more pronounced for the third child.

Figure 1

Aggregate proportions of women with a first (second, third) child at a given age, France and Italy

Aggregate proportions of women with a first (second, third) child at a given age, France and Italy

12While we cannot observe the lifetime fertility of the younger cohorts (aged 35-44) because they have not all completed their reproductive lives, a postponement of first and second births is visible in both countries, but more marked in Italy: at age 25, 42 % of women in France and 35 % in Italy have had a first child (a 7-point difference between countries compared with a 3-point difference in the 45-64 age group), and at age 30, the proportions with a second child are 43 % and 32 %, respectively (an 11-point difference versus a 9-point difference for the 45-64 age group). These differences are not simply the consequence of longer birth postponement in Italy than in France, since the gap remains at age 35, by which time 84 % of women in France have had a first child and 61 % a second, versus 74 % and 47 %, respectively, in Italy. Last, for the youngest cohorts (aged 25-34, results not presented here), first-birth postponement is even more pronounced in Italy.

Different fertility intentions

13The differences in fertility behaviour between France and Italy are mirrored, to a certain extent, in fertility intentions (Figure 2). Among childless women aged 20-40, the proportion intending to have a child in the next three years [1] is lower in France (74 %) than in Italy (85 %). This is due to a selection effect, however, since the proportion of women who are already mothers in this age group is higher in France (71 % versus 49 % in Italy). Conversely, a higher proportion of mothers in France intend to have another child in the next three years. In France, 62 % of mothers of one child intend to have a second, versus 53 % in Italy. A similar gap is observed for the intention to have a third child (23 % versus 10 %, respectively).

Figure 2

Percentages of women intending to have a child in the next three years by number of children already born, France and Italy

Percentages of women intending to have a child in the next three years by number of children already born, France and Italy

Population: Women in a union aged 20-40 (Italy: N = 3,766; France: N = 1,229).

14Generally speaking, the number of children (including those already born) desired by women aged 20-40 is slightly higher in France than in Italy, (2.4 children per woman on average versus 2.1, respectively) (Régnier-Loilier and Vignoli, 2009). In France, 43 % desire two children and 41 % desire three or more, while in Italy the majority express a desire for two children (60 %). Despite this difference, the family of two children or more is still a strong symbolic reference in both countries, and only a small minority of women state a preference for just one child (15 % in Italy and 11 % in France). This applies equally in Italy, even though current trends show that a growing number of women are ending their reproductive life with just one child (Breton and Prioux, 2009). While most women intend to have one or more children, the current fertility differentials observed between France and Italy suggest that desires are not always fulfilled, especially in Italy. To explore these behavioural differences in greater depth, it is important to verify, ex-post, whether reported intentions have been realized or not, and to characterize the couples who never have the child that they initially desired.

Brief literature review

16A recent contribution to the debate on the correspondence between fertility intentions and realization has been developed by Rinesi (2009). Using a database that matches the results of a survey of mothers of at least one child (who reported their intentions) against population registers (to see whether intended births occurred), she shows that the expressed intentions, among other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, represent the factor with the strongest influence on behaviours for the transition to both second and third child.

17Among the demographic variables, age and number of children already born play a key role (Noack and Østby, 2002; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan, 2003; Berrington, 2004; Testa and Toulemon, 2006). Birth postponement does not simply reduce the desired number of children, but also the likelihood of having the desired family size. Moreover, the greater the difference between the number of children already born and the intended family size, the lower the probability of a transition to the next parity (Symeonidou, 2000).

18Certain studies suggest that the type of union plays a central role. They include two conducted in the United States, (Schoen et al., 1999; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan, 2003) which found that, at a given parity, married couples are more likely to realize their positive intentions than unmarried ones. In France, on the other hand, the type of union does not appear to significantly influence realization, all other things being equal [2] (Toulemon and Testa, 2005). The role of gender arrangements within the couple is also variable across countries. In Greece, for example, women with a less traditional view of gender relations are less likely to achieve their intended number of births (Symeonidou, 2000), but this correlation has not been found in the United States (Thomson, 1997).

19Concerning the effect of socioeconomic characteristics, the most highly educated women appear to realize their positive fertility intentions more frequently, both in France and in Italy (Toulemon and Testa, 2005; Rinesi, 2009). However, Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan (2003) show that beyond the realization of short-term intentions, the most educated women tend to have fewer children than initially desired in the United States.

20Last, among economic factors, the roles of housing conditions and of financial security (including employment status) are often cited (Thomson, 1997; Symeonidou, 2000; Berrington, 2004). Rinesi (2009) shows, for example, that in the Italian context, couples with a more stable situation are more likely to have the number of children they desire. Economic uncertainty also plays a role in France, where unemployment adversely affects the realization of initial fertility intentions (Testa and Toulemon, 2006).

Fewer positive fertility intentions are realized in Italy

21Among cohabiting couples where the woman was of childbearing age in the first wave, 19 % in France had a child in the three following years, compared with 15 % in Italy. [3] These results are consistent with those obtained in both countries using different data sources (France: Toulemon and Testa, 2005; Italy: Rinesi, 2009).

22This overall proportion conceals large differences by type of intention recorded three years previously and its degree of certainty. [4] Generally speaking, and whatever the country considered, negative fertility intentions (not wanting a/another child) are highly predictive of future behaviour (Figure 3). Very few of the persons who reported definitely not wanting a/another child had one between the two waves (only 6 % in France and 2 % in Italy). Conversely, positive intentions tended to be over-optimistic: among persons who definitely intended to have a child in the next three years, only two-thirds did so, both in France and in Italy. [5]

Figure 3

Proportion of couples who had at least one child between the two survey waves, by reported intentions three years earlier, France and Italy

Proportion of couples who had at least one child between the two survey waves, by reported intentions three years earlier, France and Italy

Population: Persons in a cohabiting union and of childbearing age in the first wave (where the women is below 50 and where both partners think that they can still have children) (France: N = 2,225 ; Italy: N = 3,390).

23Alongside these similarities between the two countries, a feature specific to France also emerges: the proportion of couples who have a child is systematically higher, whatever the strength of the initial intention. In particular, among the 5 % of undecided persons in France who replied “probably not” to the question, 32 % went on to have a child, versus just 9 % of the 22 % who answered “probably not” in Italy. There seems to be a more flexible attitude in France towards the future among those who give uncertain negative answers, and this may be linked to differences in family policies between the two countries. These policies have been in place for many years in France and may, at individual level, lessen the effect of certain obstacles to childbearing. This is in contrast to Italy, where family policy provides little support to parents, notably for reconciling work and family life (Matysiak and Vignoli, 2010).

24The aim being to identify potential obstacles to the realization of positive fertility intentions, the rest of the study focuses on positive intentions (persons who answered “yes” or “probably yes” to the question on intentions), by comparing those who went on to have a child with those who did not.

Characteristics of couples who did not have the desired child

25The literature review presented above shows that a whole set of characteristics affect the realization of intentions. They include: age, conjugal status, number of children already born, but also partners’ employment status (notably employment security), dwelling occupancy status (owner or tenant), partners’ level of education, distance from the respondent’s mother’s home (who may provide help with childcare), religious practice (which influences fertility intentions). In order to tease out the net effect of these different factors, notably taking account of the degree of intentionality, and to identify the characteristics with the strongest negative effect on the realization of childbearing plans, we modelled the probability of having a child in the next three years among couples who intended to do so, in Italy and in France. Table 1 present the ? coefficients obtained from the logistic regression, the estimated probabilities (expressed as percentages) [6] and the significance level of each factor.

Table 1

Probability (? coefficient and %) of having versus not having a child between the two survey waves, among persons intending to have one at the first survey wave, France and Italy

France Italy ? coef. Prob. Sig. level Number ? coef. Prob. Sig. level Number Constant 0.91 71.2 n.s. – 0.24 55.9 n.s. – Woman’s age Below 25 0.00 72.2 Ref. 87 0.00 55.9 Ref. 27 25-29 0.94 86.4 *** 214 0.14 59.2 n.s. 281 30-34 0.61 82.0 * 190 –0.24 49.9 n.s. 445 35+ –1.16 43.7 *** 140 –1.59 20.5 *** 465 Number of children 0 0.00 71.2 Ref. 255 0.00 55.9 Ref. 444 1 –0.11 69.0 n.s. 204 0.37 64.7 ** 583 2 or more –0.86 51.2 *** 172 –0.14 52.3 n.s. 191 Type of couple Unmarried –0.65 56.4 *** 297 0.30 63.1 n.s. 110 Married 0.00 71.2 Ref. 334 0.00 55.9 Ref. 1108 Separation No 0.00 71.2 Ref. 589 0.00 55.9 Ref. 1157 Yes –2.00 25.0 *** 42 –1.51 21.9 *** 61 Woman’s educational level Low 0.00 71.2 Ref. 158 0.00 55.9 Ref. 322 Medium 0.43 79.2 * 257 0.30 63.1 *** 669 High 0.25 76.0 n.s. 216 0.73 72.4 *** 227 Partner’s educational level Low 0.00 71.2 Ref. 240 0.00 55.9 Ref. 462 Medium 0.00 71.2 n.s. 210 0.22 61.2 n.s. 563 High 0.17 74.6 n.s. 181 0.45 66.4 ** 193 Woman’s occupational status Public sector employment 0.00 71.2 Ref. 177 0.00 55.9 Ref. 207 Private sector employment, permanent contract –0.43 61.7 * 271 0.49 67.5 ** 535 Private sector employment, temporary contract –0.77 53.5 ** 63 0.34 64.0 n.s. 66 Unemployed –0.20 66.9 n.s. 46 –0.03 55.1 n.s. 56 Inactive (homemaker, etc.) 0.17 74.6 n.s. 74 0.73 72.3 *** 354 Partner’s occupational status In employment 0.00 71.2 Ref. 572 0.00 55.9 Ref. 1178 Doesn’t work –0.17 67.6 n.s. 59 0.19 60.4 n.s. 40 Dwelling occupancy status Tenant 0.63 82.2 *** 323 0.15 59.5 n.s. 205 Owner 0.00 71.2 Ref. 285 0.00 55.9 Ref. 847 Other (housed free of charge, etc.) 0.02 71.6 n.s. 23 –0.24 49.9 n.s. 166 Distance from respondent’s mother’s home Near 0.44 79.4 * 222 0.12 58.9 n.s. 455 Moderate 0.27 76.4 n.s. 214 0.46 66.7 ** 420 Far 0.00 71.2 Ref. 144 0.00 55.9 Ref. 237 Mother deceased 0.50 80.4 n.s. 51 0.24 61.6 n.s. 106 Religious practice At least once a month 0.50 80.3 n.s. 48 0.06 57.2 n.s. 630 Less often 0.00 71.2 Ref. 583 0.00 55.9 Ref. 583 Firmness of intention Certainly 0.00 71.2 Ref. 342 0.00 55.9 Ref. 482 Probably –0.83 52.0 *** 289 –1.19 27.9 *** 736 Distribution No children yet 41.0 % 259 47.0 % 572 Has had a child 59.0 % 372 53.0 % 646 Type of model Pseudo R² (firmness of intention only) 0.0417 0.0524 Pseudo R² (complete model) 0.3334 0.1639

Probability (? coefficient and %) of having versus not having a child between the two survey waves, among persons intending to have one at the first survey wave, France and Italy

Interpretation: A positive (resp. negative) and statistically significant coefficient indicates a factor which increases (resp. decreases) the probability of having a child, all other things being equal. The stronger the coefficient (either positive or negative), the greater the factor’s influence on this probability.
Significance levels: * 10 %; ** 5 %; *** 1 %; n.s. non-significant.
Population: Persons having expressed the intention to have a child “in the next three years” in a cohabiting union and of childbearing age in the first wave (where the women is below 50 and where both partners think that they can still have children).

26The selected characteristics all refer to the situation observed at the first survey wave, except the indicator of union dissolution which describes changes that occurred between two waves. The other characteristics may also have changed over the same period (employment status, for example), but we do not always have information on the dates of these events. It would have been useful to include other characteristics, such as the partner’s intention, [7] the share of household tasks assumed by each partner, union duration [8] or fecundity problems. However, these data are not presented simultaneously in the two surveys, or are not sufficiently comparable. In addition, in view of the small sample size, it was not possible to create interactions between certain variables. For example, it would have been interesting to match the number of children already born with the woman’s labour market status, as these two variables are linked (Neyer et al., 2011).

27The reference situation corresponds to a married childless couple, who did not separate between the two waves, where the woman is aged below 25 at the time of the first wave and works in the public sector, where the man is active, where both partners have a low educational level, [9] are homeowners (or homebuyers) and live far from the home of the respondent’s mother, [10] never or rarely attend religious services and have stated a firm intention to have a child in the next three years (“definitely yes”). This “reference couple” more often realized its positive fertility intention in France (71 %) than in Italy (56 %).

28Comparing the results for both countries reveals a number of similarities, notably the decisive role of intentions (Ajzen, 1991) and their firmness in subsequent behaviours (Toulemon and Testa, 2005). The probability of having had a child is twice as high for persons who replied “definitely yes” to the question on intentions as for those who replied “probably yes”. All other things being equal, age also has a marked effect in both France and Italy, though with some nuances. The probability of having had a child is higher for couples where the woman was aged 25-34 at the time of the first wave (relative to couples where the woman was below 25), but only in France, although it is higher in both countries after age 35. In France, the intentions expressed are probably less realistic at young ages, given that many couples define a set of preconditions to be satisfied before starting a family: a stable job, confidence in the stability of the union, a chance to enjoy life as a childless couple before starting a family (Régnier-Loilier, 2007), but also a sense of readiness felt by both partners in the couple. In France and Italy alike, most couples have their children in the period between ages 25 and 34, by which time most of these preconditions have been met. After age 35, age can become an obstacle to the realization of intentions, since fecundity declines progressively over a woman’s reproductive life (Leridon, 2010).

29Among other points shared by both countries, the geographical proximity of parents, notably the mother, who is the main carer of potential grand-children, favours the realization of positive intentions. This intergenerational support probably eases the constraints upon working mothers, especially in Italy where formal childcare provision is very limited. The effect is modest, however, but probably weakened due to the imprecision of the indicator used (see above). Conversely, and not surprisingly, a couple’s separation between the two waves adversely affects the realization of intentions. Last, religious practice, which strongly influences the desired number of children – the most religious respondents want more children (Régnier-Loilier and Vignoli, 2009) –, has no significant effect on the realization of short-term intentions.

30Unlike the study of characteristics affecting the desired number of children, which revealed a majority of similarities between France and Italy (Régnier-Loilier and Vignoli, 2009), here we observe a larger number of differences. The number of children plays a role, but differently in each country. In France, the probability of having realized their intentions is 71 % for childless couples, but just 51 % for parents of at least two children. While for most couples, a second child is a foregone conclusion for both partners, there is less consensus regarding the decision to have a third child. Moreover, a third child implies a greater upheaval in the couple’s life (Régnier-Loilier, 2007), and this may explain their decision to forego an initially desired third birth. In Italy, on the other hand, it is the positive intentions of couples who already have a child which are most often realized between two waves. This may be due to a selection effect, however. In a sociopolitical context generally unfavourable to families, we may suppose that couples with a first child have more “realistic” fertility intentions than those who are not yet parents.

31Marital status also matters, but only in France, where marriage is not as universal as in Italy. Married couples realize their intentions more frequently than unmarried ones. As marriage is in decline, it tends to concern increasingly selected couples with strong family values. While marriage is associated with a more traditional attitude to the family and with specific family behaviours, it also more frequently concerns couples who have been together for longer, [11] for whom we can assume that the intention to have a child is more well thought out. However, the probability that they will have had a child is lower, all other things being equal (model not presented here). [12] It is interesting to note that when this variable is introduced, the effect of marital status persists, contradicting the results obtained for France in a previous study by Toulemon and Testa (2005), who did not find any difference by marital status. This may be because the interval chosen between intention and realization covered a longer period (5 years versus 3 years here), or again because married couples today are increasingly selected. [13]

32The partners’ educational level only affects behaviour in Italy, where the highest educated more frequently realize their intentions. This finding is confirmed by a recent study on this same country (Rosina and Testa, 2009). This could be explained by an income effect, since education is a good proxy for the chances of successful labour market integration, and hence for the couple’s income (Kreyenfeld, 2002). We can therefore posit that these couples are in a stronger position to surmount certain difficulties – childcare for example, a very important factor in Italy where there is little government support for families – both in financial terms and in terms of the means available to reconcile work and family life. In this context, more realistic fertility intentions or a greater capacity to plan for the future among the most highly educated are also plausible hypotheses.

33In France, on the other hand, educational level has no effect. [14] It is employment stability that appears to count most. The likelihood of having realized a fertility project increases with female employment stability, following an upward path by level of job security (OECD, 2009). While for a couple where the woman has a temporary contract the estimated probability of having had a child is just 53 %, it rises to 62 % if she has a permanent contract and 71 % if she works in the public sector. Employment stability effects a couple’s financial situation, but also their scope for reconciling work and family life: flexible working hours are easier to obtain for public sector employees than for private sector employees on temporary contracts, for example. In Italy, the effect is different. Couples where the woman has a permanent private-sector contract are those whose earnings are highest (private-sector wages are higher than public-sector wages), and these couples have more often had a child than those where the woman works in the public sector. Likewise, couples where the woman is inactive – a more frequent situation in Italy than in France – have more often had a child. Contrary to expectation, the man’s employment situation in the first wave has no significant effect, however. The traditional microeconomic interpretations focus on the central role of the male partner’s financial situation in the realization of fertility intentions. Our non-significant result may be due to the imprecise definition of the man’s employment status used here, and to the small number of couples where the man is not in employment.

34Last, the dwelling occupancy status (owner or not) influences realization, but only in France, and in an unexpected direction. While one might expect homeowners (or homebuyers) to realize their intentions more frequently, given that this status tends to be associated with a more settled financial, geographical and conjugal situation, the reverse is actually observed. Intentions are more frequently realized by tenants than by homeowners or homebuyers. One explanation for this may be that parenthood and home ownership are competing goals in financial terms (Courgeau and Lelièvre, 1992). For Italy, the absence of a significant effect is hardly surprising. A previous study has shown that the dwelling occupancy status does not affect fertility intentions, which are more dependent upon the perceived sense of housing security over the coming three years [15] (Vignoli et al., 2011). The majority of households are confronted by a variety of constraints: high housing prices, limited rental market, difficulties obtaining a bank loan (Ström, 2010). We cannot give more information here, however, since the French and Italian data do not include the same level of detail: the Italian survey does not distinguish between owners and buyers, while the French survey gives no indication of the respondents’ sense of security about their future housing situation.