1A growing number of Southern countries, notably in East and Southeast Asia, have completed their fertility transition and now have fertility levels below 2 children per woman. These fundamental changes in childbearing behaviour are the consequence of major socioeconomic and cultural transformations, but also, in some cases, of firm and effective birth control policies. With a total fertility rate of around 1.5 children, China is a well-known and widely documented example of this trend. Once this low fertility level has been reached, is it still appropriate or useful to maintain such a restrictive family planning policy? Would an easing of legislation – to authorize an additional child for example – ultimately lead to a fertility rebound? These are the questions addressed by M. Giovanna Merli and S. Philip Morgan, based on a survey conducted in Shanghai in 2007-2008. Analysing the responses of 1,241 married individuals (Shanghai-registered residents and migrants), they compare actual fertility and desired fertility in the hypothetical context of an easing of current policy. These empirical findings help ground speculations on the future of fertility in the hypothetical absence of policy constraints.

Introduction and background

2China has joined the group of low-fertility countries. A variety of data sources and estimation approaches of its period total fertility rate (Retherford et al., 2005; Cai, 2008; Goodkind, 2011), corroborated by cohort trends by parity (Morgan et al., 2009), suggest that China’s total fertility rate (TFR) dropped from 2.8 children per woman at the end of the 1970s to somewhere in the range of 1.4 to 1.6 in 2000. This fertility level is also consistent with local official fertility regulations: the aggregation of local policies resulted in a TFR of 1.5-1.6 children per couple at the end of the 1990s (Attané, 2002; Gu et al., 2007). Indeed the timing of the transition to low fertility can be attributed in large part to the success of China’s birth planning policies which were strictly enforced in urban areas, but which accommodated to the overwhelming preference for a son through the introduction of the one son-two children policy in rural areas.

3But what would trends have been, and what would current levels be in the absence of the one-child policy? The answer to this interesting and important counterfactual is uncertain. Lavely and Freedman (1990) argued that the fertility decline was underway among the urban and more educated prior to major governmental intervention. And other Asian countries with far weaker family planning programmes (e.g. South Korea) have experienced remarkable fertility declines, reaching fertility levels that are now well below replacement.

Figure 1

Total fertility rate (TFR) by human development index (HDI) in selected Asian countries

Total fertility rate (TFR) by human development index (HDI) in selected Asian countries

4So a current focus of academic and policy debate is whether and how much China’s fertility would increase if the current birth planning policies were abandoned. One view is that such a move would produce a significant baby boom. A sizeable proportion of the population may have a pent-up demand for second children and perhaps a latent desire for larger families. More exactly, some assume that the almost universal preference for two children in China today will set the minimum level of fertility at 2.0 (Zeng, 2007). Others argue that Chinese fertility is somewhat higher than many current estimates suggest because female children are underreported in the census because of policies that hold birth planning officials responsible for achieving pre-set targets and quotas within their jurisdiction (Merli and Raftery, 2000; Merli et al., 2004; Goodkind, 2004; Goodkind, 2011). For example, the TFR in the 2000 census (short form) of 1.35 children per woman (0.94 in urban areas and 1.43 in rural areas) is believed to be too low. Adjusted estimates range from 1.4 to 1.6 (Retherford et al., 2005).

5The opposing view, supported by a significant amount of new data and some new arguments, questions whether the current policy is necessary (Merli and Smith, 2002; Morgan et al., 2009; Cai, 2010). As noted above, other Asian countries with similar and different cultural heritages (e.g. South Korea, Singapore, Japan and Thailand) have low fertility without policies that explicitly constrain family size. Judging from the experience of these other countries, China’s economic and social development would be expected to produce low fertility (although not necessarily at below replacement levels). To make this point more vividly, Figure 1 shows the total fertility rate for selected Asian countries by a frequently used indicator of social and economic development – the Human Development Index (HDI), [1] (Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996; Myrskylä et al., 2009). The data, plotted as a line for each country, cover consecutive five-year periods from 1960 to 2005. China’s dramatic decline occurred at relatively low levels of HDI, a feature requiring an “exceptionalist” interpretation, such as the strong effect of China’s population control policies: the “later, longer, fewer” (wan, xi, shao) campaign first, and then the “one-child policy”. But the pace of decline for other countries with respect to HDI is equally dramatic while beginning at higher HDI levels. Having now reached approximately 0.75 on the HDI index (China’s value in 2000-2005), China’s fertility no longer seems “artificially low”. Moreover, these other countries show continued fertility decline with additional increases in HDI. Given these referents, no special explanations – such as the birth planning programme – are needed to account for China’s current level of fertility and for predictions of further decline. Social and economic development, indexed by HDI, provides an explanation applicable to the full set of countries shown here. [2]

6Equally compelling, internal comparisons suggest that some areas have fertility levels below those allowed by current government policy. Perhaps most importantly, multiple sources suggest that mean ideals/intentions might remain below replacement level even without policy constraints. By comparing reproductive behaviour against previously stated fertility preferences measured with a hypothetical question (regarding additional births if government policies changed), Merli and Smith (2002) showed where and when women in four Chinese counties changed from wanting to not wanting more children. Acceptance of the policy-sanctioned family size was higher in most industrial and urbanized areas and in areas of strong policy enforcement and weaker in the poorest areas or where policy enforcement was most lenient. These findings suggested that a policy relaxation would allow some women to have the additional children that they intended. Yet few wanted more than two children and many had accepted the government goal of one child as a personal one. Thus, to the extent that policy constraints are internalized and that other non-policy constraints are operating to dampen fertility levels, the effect of policy on intentions will not fully translate into raised fertility levels under a hypothetical suspension of policy. Zheng et al. (2009) focused on the fertility intentions of young couples in Jiangsu province, where the husband or the wife was a singleton and thereby qualified for a second child; they found that intended family size for these couples is largely below the current policy limit of two. Gu and Liu (2009) report that fertility increase associated with relaxing policy restrictions in several experimental counties was modest – far less than allowable by the policy change. As Merli and Smith (2002) claim for China and Goldstein and colleagues (2003) argue for German speaking parts of Europe, a generation of constrained low fertility may usher in acceptance of – or accommodation to – very low fertility. Finally, Morgan et al. (2009) argue that China has a set of characteristics that make it increasing likely that fertility levels will fall short of stated intentions. Specifically, using a low fertility proximate determinants model usefully applied in a number of settings, these authors conclude that the forces leading couples to have more children than intended are weak (e.g. “unwanted” births are rare). By contrast, various factors are likely to lead to fewer children than intended, especially the effects of fertility postponement in the face of economic pressures.

7With much of the speculation about the future of fertility in China (and elsewhere) depending on stated fertility intentions, a closer examination of these intentions is warranted. Evidence suggests that the gap between individual and state fertility preferences is narrowing and that achieved fertility may not reach women’s stated goals due to social and economic constraints.

8Shanghai provides an interesting and important setting to study fertility preferences because of the significant heterogeneity in policy-sanctioned fertility options now available to its population. Since the launching of the era of economic reform and opening to the outside world, Shanghai – presently China’s largest city with 19 million people as of 2008 and 23 million in 2010 – is a centre of economic growth in industry, finance and commerce and is the Chinese city with the fastest pace of modernization, market transition and per capita income growth. Shanghai’s history of low fertility is related to socioeconomic factors as well as to its long history of fertility control policies, already advocated by the Shanghai government in the 1960s (Nie and Wyman, 2005; Guo, 1996). Shanghai’s fertility decline started approximately 10 years ahead of other Chinese provinces. Fertility dropped from 4 children per woman in 1963 to close to 1 child per woman in 1979, a level much lower than the national average of 2.7 children per woman at the end of the 1970s, suggesting that a one-child norm was already prevalent in Shanghai prior to the nationwide launch of the one-child policy (Peng and Cheng, 2005; Guo, 1996). Although socioeconomic development explains the early onset of the Shanghai fertility transition, the very rapid achievement of low fertility was attributed to the birth planning programme, in particular the promotion and regulation of abortion (Guo, 1996). Over the last decade, Shanghai period TFR has remained consistently below 1, reaching a low of 0.88 children per woman in 2008 (Lutz and Basten, 2010; Shanghai Population and Family Planning Commission, 2010).

9Today, after decades of very low fertility, many newly married Shanghaiese of childbearing age are themselves only children. By policy, married couples in which both members are singletons are allowed to depart from the strict one-child rule by having two children. This was a provision of the One-Child Policy as promulgated in 1979, but one that, until recently, most newly married in China were not eligible to invoke. The extent to which eligible couples are taking advantage of this option is unclear but of great interest. The behaviour of this group provides a natural experiment of the impact of relaxing the one child policy.

10Shanghai is also a major destination for China’s internal migrants. The number of migrants in Shanghai, i.e. people living in the city without a permanent Shanghai household registration (hukou), has grown unabated since the early 1980s, from 0.26 million in 1981 to 2.6 million by 1997 and 4.4 million in 2005, a number equal to 25% of Shanghai’s total population. While the birth planning regulations that apply to migrants with an urban hukou are similar to those applying to Shanghai’s registered residents, the fertility of migrants with a rural hukou is subject to the regulations of their areas of origin, which, with some exceptions, allow rural couples to have two children if the first-born is a girl.

11While previous studies of fertility preferences in Shanghai have relied on small nonprobabilistic samples of the Shanghai population (e.g. Nie and Wyman, 2005) or on samples of the population living in the most developed urban districts (Liu, 2005), we rely on data collected from a probability sample representative of the citywide Shanghai population. We use these data to assess whether there is a pent-up demand for second and higher order children, or if a rationale for very small families has established fertility preferences at or below the level currently allowed by Chinese policy. Our results cannot be generalized to the rest of China, especially rural China. However, very low fertility has been documented for Beijing, Changchun and Shenyang (the latter two being the capitals of two provinces, Jilin and Liaoning, which boast among the lowest fertility levels in China) (Liu, 2005). Differences in fertility between the Shanghai/Beijing pair and Changchun/Shenyang were explained by differences in levels of socioeconomic development (Liu, 2005). Hence, Shanghai can provide insights into the future of fertility of other urban areas in China as they approach similarly high levels of social and economic development.

I – Data

12Data come from the Shanghai Sexual Behaviour and Sexual Networks Survey (SSNS), the first ever local sexual networks survey in China conducted between October 2007 and January 2008. The study design yielded citywide representative samples of 18-49 year-old residents with a Shanghai household registration (hukou) and migrants (residents without a Shanghai hukou). Response rates – 56% for registered residents and 61% for migrants – were lower than in the first ever nationwide survey of sexual behaviour, the 2000 China Health and Family Life Survey (CHFLS), which achieved a response rate of 75% (Parish et al., 2003; Parish et al., 2007). However, such low response rates are not uncommon in urban China where rapid social changes are constraining access to the urban population and where individuals are increasingly reluctant to participate in social surveys (de Leeuw and Heer, 2002; Treiman et al., 2009). In the SSNS, the total sample sizes were adjusted for non-response (see sampling scheme in Appendix A) with final samples of 1,192 Shanghai registered residents and 496 migrants.

13Sampling weights were calculated in two stages to compensate for unequal selection probabilities and non-coverage, the latter stage involving calibration of the sample age-sex distribution to match the values in the Shanghai 2005 3% intercensal sample survey. When weighted according to sampling fractions, the dataset had too few young persons (age 18-24) compared with intercensal survey sample figures, young women especially. After calibration, weighted percentage distributions for urban residence, age, and education in the SSNS paralleled the Shanghai 3% intercensal sample data. The adjusted samples were thus representative of Shanghai registered residents and migrants aged 18-49.

14Information was collected from respondents on their demographic and socioeconomic attributes (e.g. age, marital status, education, previous and present occupation, income, etc.), and those of their marital or cohabiting partner, on their most recent three non-marital partnerships and the attributes of these partnerships. An additional module on respondents’ fertility preferences included questions about current number and sex of children with current spouse or cohabiting partner, their personal feeling about current number of children, the number of children they were entitled to have under the current policy regime, and, if they were entitled to more than one child, the type of policy exception. Respondents were also asked whether they would have an additional child in the event of policy relaxation, and their reasons for wanting or not wanting an additional child.

15The first half of the interview, which included questions on individual social and demographic characteristics and on actual and preferred fertility, was administered verbally by interviewers with the traditional paper and pencil method. For the sake of privacy, interviews took place away from the respondent’s home, in private rooms of local neighbourhood committee offices or in hotels. All interviewees were asked to sign an informed consent form and were told that all responses would remain confidential. They also received a small recompense for successful participation.

16To assess the potential validity of the responses, respondents were asked at the end of each interview whether they would participate in a second interview at some later date. Among respondents who agreed to this request (89%), we selected a random sample of 100 to whom we administered a repeat interview after an interval of between one and two months. The items on actual fertility and fertility preferences had an average kappa statistic of 0.89, suggesting very strong agreement between interviews. While this is not the best indicator of accurate reporting, those who reported on these items did so consistently.

17Table 1 presents weighted descriptive statistics of the Shanghai population by sex (1A) and household registration (1B). Migrants make up approximately 40% of the Shanghai male and female populations age 18-49. In this age group, 71% of Shanghai men and 77% of women are currently married, and very few are divorced or widowed. This is consistent with very low divorce rates in China (Zeng et al., 2002) and the relatively young age of the sample. Most Shanghai residents have only one child. Because of gender differences in mean ages at marriage and first birth, proportionately more women than men are currently married and have a child. Differences are more pronounced by household registration. Migrants are, on average, five years younger than Shanghai registered residents, they have less education, and proportionately more report two or more children, while only 3.3% of Shanghaiese do so.

Table 1

Weighted frequency distribution (%) of Shanghai residents (age 18-49) by gender and household registration status (hukou)

1A Men Women Percentage Number Percentage Number 50.9 840 49.1 848 Household registration (hukou) Shanghai hukou 58.7 590 59.8 602 Non-Shanghai hukou 41.3 250 40.2 246 Age (mean) 33.6 33.2 Educational attainment Primary or less 5.2 41 10.5 85 Lower secondary 43.7 322 40.3 306 Upper secondary 29.3 248 27.3 251 Higher education 21.8 229 21.9 206 Marital status Currently married 70.8 559 77.5 651 Cohabiting/plans to marry 3.3 24 1.0 7 Not married 24.3 230 19.3 153 Widowed 0.2 3 0.3 6 Divorced 1.4 24 1.9 31 Current number of children with current spouse/cohabiting partner 0 12.9 72 8.4 51 1 72.5 436 80.6 543 2 12.9 68 10.6 61 3 1.6 7 0.4 3 1B Shanghai hukou Non-Shanghai hukou Percentage Number Percentage Number 59.2 1,192 40.8 496 Gender Male 50.4 590 51.6 250 Female 49.6 602 48.4 246 Age (mean) 35.7 30.0 Educational attainment Primary or less 3.9 44 13.6 82 Lower secondary 33.6 368 54.2 260 Upper secondary 32.0 392 22.9 107 Higher education 30.5 388 9.3 47 Marital status Currently married 74.5 809 73.4 401 Cohabiting/plans to marry 0.9 14 4.0 17 Not married 21.5 307 22.4 76 Widowed 0.4 9 0.0 0 Divorced 2.7 53 0.01 2 Current number of children with current spouse/cohabiting partner 0 9.0 77 13.0 46 1 87.7 723 60.9 256 2 3.3 23 23.6 106 3 0.0 0 2.5 10 Note: All percentages reflect sampling weights but the numbers are the unweighted counts.

Weighted frequency distribution (%) of Shanghai residents (age 18-49) by gender and household registration status (hukou)

18All childbearing in China still takes place within the contours of marriage and questions on actual and intended fertility were not asked of unmarried or non-cohabiting respondents. We therefore analyse the data for the combined sample of Shanghai registered residents and migrants but limit the analyses to 1,241 currently married or cohabiting respondents out of a total of 1,689 respondents interviewed for the survey. Unmarried, cohabiting respondents were included only if they acknowledged plans to marry, as they may have discussed fertility preferences with their future spouse, and, most importantly, they would know the number of children allowed by policy, a number dependent on their own and their future spouse’s characteristics. Of the 34 cohabiting respondents, 30 had plans to marry. This small fraction of cohabiting respondents is not surprising even in Shanghai, a city at the cutting edge of social change, but where cohabitation prior to marriage is still frowned upon. From here on, currently married or cohabiting respondents will be referred to simply as “married”.

II – Actual fertility, policy fertility and preferred fertility in Shanghai

Actual versus policy fertility

19For the nation as a whole, the TFR is very close to the population-weighted average of local birth planning targets (Gu et al., 2007). The Shanghai respondents were asked the number of children that they were allowed to have under the current population policy (hereafter referred to as “policy parity”) and this enabled us to calculate the policy fertility in this sample. After excluding one respondent who reported an authorized number of children of 0, and 16 respondents who did not know their policy limit, Table 2 shows the percentage distribution of the Shanghai population by policy parity together with population counts (adjusted with weights to reflect the 3% intercensal sample counts of 2005) based on 1,224 observations and average number of children born by policy parity. Most Shanghai residents (75.1%) can have one child by policy, 24.9% can have two and 0.07% can have three. Thus, if all realized their current policy parity, the average number of children born to Shanghai married couples would be 1.25.

Table 2

Percentage distribution by policy parity and weighted population counts

Percentage Weighted population counts Average no. of children born (policy parity) 1 75.10 168,602 0.7505 2 24.90 55,873 0.4974 3 0.07 163 0.0022 Total 100.00 224,638 1.2500 Note: 16 respondents who answered “don’t know” on policy parity and one who reported policy parity at 0 were excluded. All percentages reflect sampling weights. Population counts were obtained after adjusting the survey data with sampling weights accounting for unequal selection probabilities and non-coverage. Reference population: Currently married men and women aged 18-49 living in Shanghai (N = 1,224).

Percentage distribution by policy parity and weighted population counts

20Note that this level is above one child because there are a range of policies applicable to the Shanghai population. The most common reason for exemption from the one-child policy is a rural household registration that allows for a second child if the first is a girl (56%). The next most important reason is that both spouses are only children (25% of all exemptions). Indeed the role of migrants in determining fertility levels in Shanghai can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the mean number of children for married female registered residents (N = 441) and married female migrants (N = 210). This figure summarizes the completed fertility of a synthetic cohort. The fertility of married women with a Shanghai hukou is complete by the early 30s and does not exceed one child, while some migrant women have a second child beyond that age. The timing of second births is consistent with the birth planning rules whereby eligible couples are allowed a second child four years after the first birth or when the mother turns 28. However, migrant women in Shanghai fail to reach the 1.5 child limit that we would expect if all migrants originated from rural areas that allow a second child. A variety of factors may explain the lower fertility of migrant women in Shanghai: migrant selectivity, assimilation, and type of policy in their locations of origin. In fact, about 50% of female migrants in Shanghai have their household registration in areas where a one-child policy is in force: 25.2% are registered in another urban area, while 31% of women with a rural hukou are registered in Jiangsu or Sichuan, the only two provinces in China which implement a universal one-child policy regardless of hukou status.

Figure 2

Mean number of children by mother’s age at birth of last child

Mean number of children by mother’s age at birth of last child

21Shanghai respondents were asked the hypothetical question whether they would have another child if birth planning policy was abandoned. We use these responses and information on current parity and policy parity to address the counterfactual: what would the average number of children be in the absence of policy constraints? The answer to this question requires that we consider where each person stands with respect to their policy parity. Each percentage cell in Table 3 shows the fraction of the Shanghai married population aged 18-49 by actual parity and policy parity: 62.6% of Shanghai residents are allowed one birth and are at parity one, 8.1% are allowed two and are at parity two, while 14.1% are at parity one but are one birth shy of their policy parity of two, and 10.5% (8.5 + 2.0) are yet to have the one or two children they are allowed. Few (3.7 + 0.7 = 4.4%) are above the policy limit, although these represent about one-third of the Shanghai population with two or more children (4.4/(11.8 + 1.03) = 0.34).

Table 3

Joint percentage distribution of actual parity and policy parity

Current number of children Number of children allowed by policy 1 child 2 children 3 children Total 0 8.5 2.0 0.0 10.4 1 62.6 14.1 0.0 76.8 2 3.7 8.1 0.0 11.8 3 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.0 Total 75.1 24.9 0.1 100.0 Note: 16 respondents who answered “don’t know” on policy parity and one who reported policy parity at 0 were excluded. All percentages reflect sampling weights. Reference population: Currently married men and women aged 18-49 living in Shanghai (N = 1,224; population count = 224,638).

Joint percentage distribution of actual parity and policy parity

Fertility preferences in the hypothetical absence of policy

22The columns of Table 4 show policy parity relative to actual parity and the rows display a measure of preferred parity, derived from information on current number of children and responses to a question of whether respondents would have another child if the policy was relaxed. This table presents results for married people with at least one child.

23From Table 4, among Shanghai married men and women who are allowed one birth and have one birth, 19.8% say they would definitely or possibly have another child if the birth planning policy was relaxed. We make the “liberal” assumption that the preferred parity for these respondents equals two. Of those whose current parity and policy fertility are both two, only 7% state that they would definitely or possibly have another child. We assign these people a preferred parity of three. Of the few who are above the policy limit, only 4.9% might have another birth (“yes” or “don’t know” answers) if policy were relaxed. The fourth column shows an interesting group. These are people who by policy are allowed two children but currently have one. Surprisingly, only 33.9% of these say they would have another child even if policy changed. In fact, considering married men and women with one child, satisfaction with their current number of children does not vary between those who are allowed to have one more and those who are not: 81% and 76%, respectively, say one child is just right (p = 0.26). The fact that such a high proportion of married people in Shanghai are satisfied with their only child regardless of whether they are entitled by policy to have a second speaks to the future of fertility in the event of policy relaxation.

Table 4

Percentage distribution according to preferred parity, by actual parity and policy parity

Preferred parity in the absence of policy Actual 1 – policy 1 Actual 2 – policy 2 Actual 2 – policy 1 Actual 1 – policy 2 Actual 3 Total 1 80.2 – – 66.1 – 66.5 2 19.8 92.7 95.1 33.9 – 31.5 3 0.0 7.3 4.9 – 100.0 2.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 821 85 43 146 10 1,105 Weighted counts 140,713 18,119 8,340 31,532 2,315 201,019 Note: 12 respondents who answered “don’t know” on policy parity were excluded. All percentages reflect sampling weights. Reference population: Currently married men and women aged 18-49 living in Shanghai with at least one child (N = 1,105).

Percentage distribution according to preferred parity, by actual parity and policy parity

24The interpretation that Shanghai men and women are satisfied with one child is debatable. People might not desire any more children (even if policy changed) because they are “too old” in either a social or biological sense. To address this concern, we focus in Table 5 on those currently with one child (the majority of those in Table 4: 821 + 146), and disaggregate by age of child (0-9 years, 10 years and above) and age of mother (30 years or less, 31 years and above). Individuals in couples where mother and child are both young are at the life course stage where having an additional child is most likely (i.e. they are not “too old”).

Table 5

Percentage of parents of one child preferring two children in the absence of policy, by actual parity and policy parity, age of their child and age of mother

Child’s age Actual 1 – policy 1 Actual 1 – policy 2 Total (N) Mother’s age Total Mother’s age Total 30 years or less 31+ years 30 years or less 31+ years 0-9 years 30.0 (158) 28.9 (124) 29.7 (282) 43.0 (73) 21.7 (25) 38.8 (98) 32.3 (380) 10+ years – (1) 13.3 (538) 13.2 (539) – (0) 20.2 (48) 20.2 (48) 13.9 (587) Total 30.0 (159) 16.3 (662) 19.8 (821) 43.0 (73) 20.8 (73) 33.9 (146) 22.3 (967) Weighted counts 35,297 105,416 140,713 18,567 12,964 31,532 172,244 Note: All percentages reflect sampling weights. Unweighted numbers of respondents (N) are given in parentheses. Weighted counts are given for column totals. Reference population: Currently married men and women aged 18-49 living in Shanghai with one child (N = 967).

Percentage of parents of one child preferring two children in the absence of policy, by actual parity and policy parity, age of their child and age of mother

25Arguably, one key estimate in Table 4 is the percentage of people (19.8%) in the “actual 1 – policy 1” category who report that they would have more children if policy changed (or the 80.2 % who would not). If we focus on cases with a young mother (30 years or less) and a young child (below 10 years), the percentage that would have another child is higher (30%). But this estimate still implies that the great majority of those at actual 1 – policy 1 (70%) are not being constrained by policy. The second key estimate in Table 4 is the percentage of those at actual parity 1 who are allowed to have a second child under the current policy regime (actual 1 – policy 2). If we again focus on cases where mother and child are young (see Table 5), 43% would have another child if policy restrictions were lifted. The comparable estimate for the full sample (in Table 4) is nearly 10% lower (33.9%). So intentions are sensitive to life course stage, but even among people where mother and child are young, most do not intend to have another child even with policy relaxation. [3] These findings suggest that any change in policy will not affect fully the entire population of women. Some will be “too old” to respond to the policy changes and this will dampen the immediate effect. But all subsequent cohorts will pass through this life course stage and could be impacted by a policy change.

26The distribution of preferred parity of childless men and women is displayed in Table 6 by policy parity. Among married respondents, 7.5% were childless at the time of the survey. It is hard to estimate with confidence preferred parity in the absence of policy for these individuals. Childless people’s fertility preferences are highly unstable. Forecasting their fertility under the current policy is already a difficult task since this group includes some people who are childless by choice, some who are in subfecund couples, and some who have yet to reach the policy-sanctioned parity potential (70% of childless respondents have been married for less than four years). For childless respondents at the time of the survey, we therefore provide a range of preferred estimates under scenarios of low, medium and high preferred parity in the absence of policy. Our low scenario assumes that childless respondents consider the hypothetical question “Would you have another child in the absence of policy?” as a question on whether or not they wish to have a child. Under this low scenario, we assign one child only to respondents who answered “yes” and assume that those who did not answer prefer childlessness. The medium scenario assumes that all childless respondents will have at least one child and a fraction of them, corresponding to those who answered “yes” to the hypothetical question, would have an additional child. For these respondents, we assign two children to those who say they would have another child if policy relaxed and one child otherwise. The high scenario assumes that currently childless respondents will all reach their policy parity and a fraction of them, i.e. those who answered yes to the hypothetical question, would have an additional child. We assigned to each their policy parity limit and one more child for those who said they would have an additional child if policy was relaxed. This is equal to a preferred mean number of children among childless couples of 0.40, 1.40, and 1.59, depending on the scenario. The true value is likely to lie somewhere between 0.40 and 1.40 because 43% of childless married men and 38% of childless married women are older than 30, which means that a sizable proportion of childless men and women have already surpassed an age by which Chinese men, but especially Chinese women, are expected to have a child.

27Combining the “derived” preferred parity categories for childless people from Table 6 and for people with one or more children from Table 4, we estimate that married people in Shanghai “prefer” 1.25, 1.36 or 1.38 children, depending on which assumptions we make about the preferred parity of childless couples. This is equal to their current policy parity of 1.25 children, 8.6% higher or 10.2% higher, respectively. Stated differently, if policy were relaxed and all those answering yes to the hypothetical question had one more child, the mean number of children would not exceed 1.38 children. If we focused solely on cases where the last-born child is younger than 10 and the mother is age 30 or less, the estimate of intended fertility would rise to 1.43. Thus, even allowing for the sensitivity of intentions to life course stages and projecting the behaviour of future cohorts, intended fertility in the absence of policy would still be less than 1.5 children.

Table 6

Percentage distribution of preferred parity of childless men and women, by policy parity, under three scenarios

Preferred parity in the absence of policy Policy parity Low scenario Medium scenario High scenario 1 2 Total 1 2 Total 1 2 Total 0 62.1 52.2 60.2 – – – – – – 1 37.9 47.8 39.8 62.1 52.2 60.2 62.1 – 50.4 2 – – – 37.9 47.8 39.8 37.9 52.2 40.6 3 – – – – – – – 47.8 9.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 93 25 118 93 25 118 93 25 118 Weighted count 19,008 4,422 23,430 19,008 4,422 23,430 19,008 4,422 23,430 Note: 4 respondents who answered “don’t know” on policy parity and one who reported policy parity at 0 were excluded. All percentages reflect sampling weights. Reference population: Currently married childless men and women aged 18-49 living in Shanghai.

Percentage distribution of preferred parity of childless men and women, by policy parity, under three scenarios

Are stated fertility preferences consistent with policy limits?

28Are people’s stated intentions consistent with policy limits or do they reflect their real preferences unfettered by political correctness? In Table 7, we compare respondents’ feelings about their current number of children and intentions in the absence of policy by cross-classifying satisfaction with current number of children by preferred parity and actual parity versus policy parity. Among people with two children, there is nearly complete consistency between their stated intentions and their feelings about current number of children. Among people with one child, 90% of those who say they would not want another child report that their current number of children is “just right” and these feelings do not differ by whether they are entitled to two children by policy (p = 0.67). But 7.6% with one child and an intended parity of one say their current number of children is too few. This might suggest that stated intentions incorporate the current policy limits, but it might also suggest other non-policy constraints which prevent the achievement of desired family size. The inconsistency between stated preferences and satisfaction with the current number of children is especially striking among those with one child who would like two children. Despite their preference for two children in the absence of policy, close to half feel their only child is just right. A “just right” answer by those who would like to have two children but are allowed one by policy might suggest that respondents respond with the state’s preferences in mind regarding their current number of children but with their personal preferences in mind regarding a hypothetical absence of the policy. [4] However, a similar fraction (p = 0.84) of those who can have two children by policy and prefer two children express satisfaction with their only child. This apparent inconsistency between preferred family size in the absence of policy and feelings about the current number of children suggests that the latter measure reflects non-policy constraints. This explanation is reinforced by rationales for intending no more children as shown in Table 8 below.

Table 7

Percentage distribution of feelings about current number of children by preferred parity (in absence of policy), and by actual versus policy parity

Preferred parity 1 Preferred parity 2 Too few Just Right Don’t know Total (N) Too few Just Right Don’t know Total (N) Actual 1 – policy 1 7.6 90.1 2.3 100.0 (662) 44.2 45.3 10.5 100.0 (159) Actual 1 – policy 2 5.2 92.0 2.8 100.0 (99) 40.1 46.1 13.9 100.0 (48) Actual 2 – policy 2 – – – – 0.0 98.9 1.1 100.0 (80) Actual 2 – policy 1 – – – – 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 (40) Total 7.2 90.4 2.4 100.0 (761) 26.2 66.5 7.3 100.0 (327) Note: All percentages reflect sampling weights. Numbers (N) are unweighted counts. Reference population: Currently married men and women aged 18-49 with at least one child and living in Shanghai.

Percentage distribution of feelings about current number of children by preferred parity (in absence of policy), and by actual versus policy parity

What is suggested by the rationales given for not wanting or wanting another child?

29Respondents were asked the question: “What are the main reasons why you would not have another child?”, and invited to give a maximum of three reasons. Table 8 shows, by policy parity, the reasons given by persons with one only child who said they would not have another child in the event of policy relaxation. The three most common replies are economic reasons (“can’t afford another one” or “the burden of raising children is too heavy”) and the policy slogan “one child is enough”. The high prevalence of the latter response, accompanied by the evidence that the perceived costs of children are more frequently given as a reason by those who have already achieved their policy parity, provide a strong indication that the policy rules have been internalized. The fourth most common reason is “I have no energy” which, in the Chinese context, might be a more indirect way of saying “I’m too old or in poor health”.

Table 8

Percentage of respondents with one child giving selected reasons for not wanting an additional child by policy parity

Policy parity 1 Policy parity 2 Total One child is enough 54 55 54.2 Cannot afford another one 62 53 60.9 The burden of raising children is too heavy 73 63 71.7 Could affect quality of life 10 11 10.2 Too much pressure at work 15 19 15.9 Too old or poor health 1 2 1.2 No energy 22 23 22.5 N 662 99 761 Note: All percentages reflect sampling weights. Numbers (N) are unweighted counts. Reference population: Currently married men and women aged 18-49 living in Shanghai who have one child and would not have another one if policy was relaxed.

Percentage of respondents with one child giving selected reasons for not wanting an additional child by policy parity

30Table 9 displays the most frequent reasons given in response to the question: “What are the main reasons why you would have another child? (provide a maximum of three reasons)” by persons with one child who said they would have another child in the event of policy relaxation. The results are shown by policy parity. “To give our child a playmate” is the most frequently given reason for intending a second child. This rationale is stronger among those who have achieved their current policy limit than among those who are eligible for a second child, and may reflect different preferences for family size by parents who grew up with siblings (policy parity 1) and those who grew up without siblings (policy parity 2), consistent with findings on the effect of siblings on desired family size in Shanghai and elsewhere (Lutz, Basten and Qiang, 2010). Otherwise, differences by policy limit are quite small.

Table 9

Percentage of respondents with one child giving selected reasons for wanting an additional child, by policy parity

Policy parity 1 Policy parity 2 Total I can afford it 11.4 13.9 12.1 My personal work situation allows it 2.9 2.9 2.9 We have enough space at home 8.7 5.2 7.7 I am in good health 10.7 16.5 12.3 I have a good marriage 9.5 10.4 9.7 Children bring happiness 10.8 11.1 10.9 I have help at home 4.1 5.3 4.4 Children provide security in old age 17.8 9.3 15.4 To give my child a playmate 52.6 34.5 47.5 To achieve gender balance 14.0 6.7 12.0 To carry on the family line 5.2 4.6 5.0 N 159 47 206 Note: All percentages reflect sampling weights. Numbers (N) are unweighted counts. Reference population: Currently married men and women aged 18-49 living in Shanghai who have one child and would have another one if policy was relaxed.

Percentage of respondents with one child giving selected reasons for wanting an additional child, by policy parity

Conclusion: The effect of policy on stated intentions

31We have addressed the counterfactual question: “What would happen to fertility in Shanghai if the birth planning policy was relaxed?”. Specifically, we have compared the fertility levels that would result if all Shanghai residents had all births allowed to them under current policy with the levels that correspond to their “preferred parity” in the absence of policy constraints. To measure this preferred parity, we analysed their responses to the question: “If birth planning policy were to relax in a way that would allow you to have one more child, would you wish to have another child?”, collected in a citywide probability sample of the Shanghai population of registered residents and migrants in 2007-2008.

32Most people who live in Shanghai are allowed only one child and currently have one child. When asked this hypothetical question, 19.8% of this group would wish to have another child or are uncertain. This finding does indicate substantial “pent-up” demand for a second child. Very few people with two or three children would like to have another child, even in the event of policy relaxation. The most remarkable result is the large proportion of those eligible for two children who do not intend to have a second child (66.1%). These results partially offset each other, such that the mean preferred family size is estimated to fall between 1.25 and 1.43, depending on the assumptions we make about the preferences of respondents who were childless at the time of the survey, and allowing for the sensitivity of intentions to life course stages. We also estimated that if women had exactly the number of children allowed by current policy, the resulting fertility level would be 1.25 children per woman. By comparison, the maximum level of preferred fertility in Shanghai in the absence of policy would be 1.43. This is 14% higher than the level consistent with everybody achieving their policy allowance, a difference which captures the deflating effect of policy on fertility intentions. However, if policy does not change, the failure of a substantial number of people with one child to reach their policy allowance of two children implies a level of completed fertility of 1.16, well below the policy estimate of 1.25. There are various reasons for the low fertility intentions among this sizable group of people for whom policy is irrelevant. They include economic constraints, a perceived heavy burden of raising children in competition with other demands, compliance with the one-child policy and internalization of the one-child norm. With continued social and economic development, the number of people who prefer one child or even childlessness may well increase in response to the growing cost of children and to the appeal of lifestyle choices which compete with childrearing, especially in a city like Shanghai, but also increasingly in other urban areas characterized by pervasive ideologies that stress self-actualization, materialism and consumerism.

33When considering the implications of intentions for actual behaviour, a broader perspective is useful. In most contemporary contexts, fertility intentions are powerful predictors of fertility at the individual level (Schoen et al., 1999; Morgan, 2001), but they are far from perfect. Moreover, the “errors” (i.e. the differences between intended and achieved fertility) frequently do not “balance” (Morgan, 2001). Thus intentions do not provide reliable indicators of cohort or individual-level fertility (Westoff and Ryder, 1977). Bongaarts (2001) has offered a conceptual model for understanding the pattern of such errors at the aggregate level (and the logic can be extended to the individual level; see Morgan and Rackin, 2010).

34Morgan et al. (2009) have applied the Bongaarts model to the Chinese case. Specifically, there is a set of factors that can inflate fertility relative to intentions and a set that can deflate it. The most important deflationary factors include: i) a “mechanical” effect of fertility postponement on the TFR (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998), ii) a biological effect of declining fecundity at older ages, and iii) a social process whereby postponement leads to downward revisions in desired family size due to competition with other goals and preferences. It is deflationary factors that, according to Morgan (2003), account for much of below replacement fertility in developed countries. All of these forces are operative in China and the latter two suggest that the actual fertility of contemporary Chinese cohorts may be well below the level intended. Yet, the greatest uncertainty regarding future Chinese fertility concerns the levels of intended fertility in the event of current policy relaxation. The extent of the demand for children pent-up by current birth planning policy was raised by Morgan et al. (2009). It is precisely the question we address in this paper.

35For Shanghai, our results suggest that in the absence of policy, preferred fertility would rise only modestly (by no more than 14%) over a policy fertility level of 1.25. Deflationary pressures, to the extent they are operative, would further deflate the expected impact on fertility of increased intentions, and, in the absence of major inflationary factors, Chinese below replacement-level intentions would imply fertility levels well below replacement. In terms of inflationary pressures (i.e. that increase fertility relative to intentions), one major factor, in some contexts, is “unwanted fertility” – births resulting from unintended pregnancies to women who intended no more children. Current availability of birth control, including the acceptability of abortion, and a historical/cultural “rationality” about child numbers (Greenhalgh, 1988) suggest contraceptive failure will exert a very modest inflationary effect in China. Sex preference can also be an inflationary factor. However, its future effects are likely to be small for several reasons. First, persons can allow for sex preferences in their statement of intentions. Second, sex-selective abortion reduces the impact of this factor for those willing to use it. Third, our data suggest that son preference in contemporary settings like Shanghai is quite modest.

36In sum, Shanghai residents report very low fertility intentions. They also report that their fertility intentions would increase only modestly if family planning restrictions were relaxed. Even this modest increase is suspect because factors that can deflate fertility relative to intentions are likely to be more powerful than inflationary ones (in Shanghai and beyond). The norm of two children has eroded because of the experience of accommodation to policy and because of economic constraints. [5]

37Our interpretation of these results and the literature on fertility intentions and behaviours leads us to conclude that the current birth planning policy in Shanghai is anachronistic. In the contemporary socioeconomic context, fertility would be very low in any case.

38 Acknowledgements
The results presented in this paper are based on the Shanghai Survey of Sexual Behaviour and Sexual Networks (SSNS), 2008. This survey was jointly organized by the first author in collaboration with Ersheng Gao and Xiaowen Tu of Fudan University School of Public Health and the Shanghai Institute of Planned Parenthood Research, and Anan Shen of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. The data collection was funded by NICHD/NIDA grant R21HD047521, supplemented by two smaller grants from NICHD to the University of Wisconsin (Merli, PI). Thanks are due to William Kalsbeek for expert consultation on the design of the survey, to Feng Tian and Wei He for their able research assistance, to Herbert Smith and the editors and anonymous reviewers at Population for helpful suggestions and comments.