1 – Natural increase at a historic low

8On 1 January 2020, the population of France was slightly above 67 million (67,063,703), including 2.16 million in the overseas departments and regions (i.e. 3.2% of the total, equivalent to the population of central Paris) (Papon and Beaumel, 2020). The population continued to increase in 2019 but at a historically low rate of +1.3 per 1,000 overall and +1.2 per 1,000 in metropolitan France (mainland France and Corsica), [1] down from 4.9 per 1,000 a decade earlier (Table 1, Appendix Table A.1 [2]). France gained just 86,000 inhabitants in a year, equivalent to a medium-sized town such as Versailles or Saint-Pierre de La Réunion. This gain contrasts with an average annual increase of 347,000 between 2005 and 2015, equivalent to the city of Nice. Total population change varies considerably across geographical regions. It is in the Caribbean departments and the Grand Est region of eastern France that the proportional decrease is greatest (−13.2 per 1,000 in Martinique, −11.7 per 1,000 in Guadeloupe, −12.7 per 1,000 in Haute-Marne, −11.0 per 1,000 in Meuse, and −10 per 1,000 in Ardennes). The departments with the most rapid growth are Corse-du-Sud (+10.2 per 1,000), Gironde (+9.9 per 1,000), Loire-Atlantique (+9.6 per 1,000), and Seine-Saint-Denis (+9.1 per 1,000), well behind Mayotte (+35.8 per 1,000) and French Guiana (+24.6 per 1,000) where the demographic transition is still ongoing. [3]

9Natural increase (the difference between births and deaths) is almost 3 times greater than net migration (difference between migrant inflows and outflows) and in 2019 still accounted for the largest share of population increase, although it decreased again in that year and is now well below 150,000 (+141,000). This historic low is due to both a decrease in births (crude birth rate of 11.2 per 1,000, the lowest rate ever recorded) and an increase in deaths (stable crude mortality rate of 9.1 per 1,000), although the former contributed 3 times more to the decline than the latter.

Table 1

Indicators of population change

Population on 1 January (thousands) Births (thousands) Deaths (thousands) Natural increase (thousands) Net migration (thousands) Migration adjustment (thousands) Total change (thousands) Crude birth rate (per 1,000) Crude death rate (per 1,000) Total increase (%) before adjustment Total increase (%) Year Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France Metro. France Whole of France 1990 56,577 57,996 762 793 526 534 236 259 80 77 -53 -52 316 336 13 14 9.3 9.2 5.6 5.8 4.7 4.9 2000 58,858 60,508 775 807 531 541 244 267 70 72 94 94 314 339 13 13 9.0 8.9 5.3 5.6 6.9 7.2 2010 62,765 64,613 802 833 540 551 262 282 43 39 0 0 305 320 13 13 8.6 8.5 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 2015 64,301 66,422 760 799 582 594 179 205 53 40 -64 -65 232 246 11.8 12.0 9.0 8.9 3.6 3.7 2.6 2.7 2016 64,469 66,603 745 784 581 594 164 190 88 65 -81 -83 252 255 11.5 11.8 9.0 8.9 3.9 3.8 2.6 2.6 2017 64,639 66,774 730 770 594 606 137 163 60 46 -98 -100 197 209 11.3 11.5 9.2 9.1 3.0 3.1 1.5 1.6 2018* 64,738 66,884 720 759 597 610 123 149 60 46 -99 -101 183 195 11.1 11.3 9.2 9.1 2.8 2.9 1.3 1.4 2019* 64,822 66,978 714 754 599 612 115 141 60 46 -99 -101 175 187 11.0 11.2 9.2 9.1 2.7 2.8 1.2 1.3 2020* 64,898 67,064 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Indicators of population change

n/a: not available.
* Provisional results, end 2020.
Coverage: Whole of France (including Mayotte since 2014).

10Net migration is difficult to estimate. ‘Apparent’ net migration, the difference between total population change and natural increase, has been negative since 2015 (−55,000 [4] in 2019), while ‘adjusted’ net migration is positive (+46,000, Table 1). This adjustment has been made annually by INSEE since 2015 to ensure comparability between population numbers for successive years (Brutel, 2015; INSEE, 2020). It takes account of changes in the census dwelling form made in 2018 to facilitate identification of individuals with more than one residence and thus avoid double counts. This improvement, referred to as the ‘questionnaire effect’ or ‘adjustment’ by INSEE, has affected the population count. It will have an increasing impact until the results of the 2020 census are published (annual census surveys 2018 to 2022) (INSEE, 2020). As a result, the contribution of immigrants to French population growth in a given year changes over time. Each year, the adjustments made in previous years are corrected, sometimes quite considerably, until the final estimates are obtained after 5 years (duration of a complete census cycle). For example, net migration in 2013 was estimated at +47,000 in 2015 but was adjusted upwards to +100,000 in 2016 (Figure 1). In 2019, apparent net migration was +46,000 but was adjusted downwards by −101,000 to achieve consistency with the population estimates for 1 January based on census data (Papon and Beaumel, 2019).

Figure 1

Estimated annual net migration to France published since 2009 as adjusted by INSEE

Estimated annual net migration to France published since 2009 as adjusted by INSEE

Coverage: Whole of France (including Mayotte).

2 – A new ‘depleted cohort’ in the population pyramid?

11The base of the population pyramid began to narrow in 2011, and the process is continuing, albeit more slowly, with births decreasing annually by 15,000 on average between 2014 and 2018 but by only 5,600 between 2018 and 2019 (Figure 2). The year 2019 is probably the low point of a new ‘depleted cohort’ almost symmetrical to that of the 1990s that occurred 3 decades earlier. On 1 January 2020, the under-20s represented just 24.0% of the total population (23.7% in metropolitan France, Appendix Table A.2). The steady numerical decline in this age group again illustrates the process of population ageing and the narrowing of the pyramid at its base. The top is widening simultaneously, mainly because of increasing life expectancy: 26.6% of the total population is now over 60 and 9.6% over 75 (Appendix Table A.2).

Figure 2

Population pyramid of France on 1 January 2020 (numbers)

Population pyramid of France on 1 January 2020 (numbers)

Coverage: Whole of France (including Mayotte).

12On 1 January 2020, France had 21,860 centenarians, most of whom were women (83%). With 32.6 centenarians per 100,000 population, France has the highest ratio in Europe. As the depleted cohorts born during the First World War reached their 100s during the 2010s, the ratio has remained relatively stable since 2011 (Teixera et al., 2017), but the number of centenarians is set to double over the next 10 years (Blanpain and Buisson, 2016).

13The COVID-19-related excess mortality in the second half of 2020 will affect the shape of the population pyramid, but without altering its overall structure. Under the worst-case scenario, the share of over-75s, which had been increasing steadily, may drop by 0.5 percentage points in 2020. [5]

3 – Family situations that vary across age groups

14Using census data on family relationships between people living in the same dwelling, we can determine the family structure of all French households (Figure 3). This distribution of family types is shaped by the family behaviours of adults, and it varies over the life course differently for women and men. Read from bottom to top, the pyramid reveals the ages when young adults leave the parental home (from age 18), form a union (up to age 28), have their children, in most cases with a partner (up to age 45), separate from their partner, experience their children’s decohabitation (up to age 60), and last, enter residential care (from age 80). Read horizontally, it reveals the differences between males and females. The pyramid is almost perfectly symmetrical before age 18, but as women leave home and form a union at younger ages than men, it becomes asymmetrical between ages 19 and 29. Beyond age 60, excess male mortality and the large share of women living alone lead to further dissymmetry.

Figure 3

Family structure pyramid in 2017

Family structure pyramid in 2017

Coverage: Whole of France (including Mayotte).

15On 1 January 2020, children under 18 numbered 14.4 million. As children grow older, the share of those living in lone-parent families increases due to parental separation. But most minors live in households of the type ‘couple with child(ren)’ that include children living with both parents and those living in stepfamilies. Until 2018, these two categories could not be distinguished. The census bulletin has since been changed to make this distinction possible, but data from five annual census waves will be needed to obtain a final estimate of the proportions of each family type. According to provisional INSEE figures, 72% of minors living in a family in 2018 lived with both parents, 21% with a lone parent, and 7% with one parent and his or her partner (Algava et al., 2020). In the 1990 census, these proportions were respectively 85%, 10%, and 5% (Festy, 1994). Over time, the proportion of children living with both parents has fallen, while that of children living in a stepfamily and, even more so, in a lone-parent family, has increased. Shared-custody arrangements have become increasingly prevalent across cohorts, as shown by a recent analysis of tax returns: at age 10, the proportion of children concerned increased from 2.0% to 3.7% between 2000 and 2006 (Algava et al., 2019). Of course, these family arrangements and their evolution by sex and age vary across time and over geographical and social space, giving rise to divergent family norms, depending on whether the family lives in metropolitan France or an overseas department, for example, or on the social background of the household reference person. [6]

16Due to family recomposition and subsequent births, 80% of ‘children in a family’ [7] live with a sibling, a half-sibling, or a stepsibling (Figure 4). [8] The size of this cohabiting sibship in the broad sense is greatest at age 10, when children are reaching the end of their primary school years. The position of this pivotal age is linked to birth timing (birth intervals of around 2–3 years), family size (rarely more than three children), and age at leaving the parental home.

Figure 4

Distribution (%) of children in families by age, family structure of the household, and number of children in families in 2017

Distribution (%) of children in families by age, family structure of the household, and number of children in families in 2017

Coverage: Whole of France (including Mayotte).

1 – An upward trend in inflows

20Table 2 shows inflow data for the years 2013 to 2018. A total of 249,474 people received a residence permit in 2018, the highest since 2000 (Appendix Table A.3). Inflows in 2018 were 5% higher than in 2017 and 30% higher than in 2013.

Table 2

Inflows of third-country nationals by first year of validity and period of validity of first residence permit of 1 year or more

Period of validity 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Less than 10 years 10 years or more 173,058 19,338 178,677 21,210 187,626 22,414 193,163 25,191 208,772 28,969 222,155 27,319 Total 192,396 199,887 210,040 218,354 237,741 249,474 Share of permits of 10 years or more in the total (%) 10.1 10.6 10.7 11.5 12.2 11.0

Inflows of third-country nationals by first year of validity and period of validity of first residence permit of 1 year or more

Coverage: Permits granted in France and abroad to foreign nationals excluding citizens of the EEA and Switzerland (constant geographical area from 2013 to 2018). Permits granted in year n and recorded in the data extracted in July of the year n + 2. Permits of less than 10 years are valid for between 364 and 3,649 days; permits of 10 years or more are valid for more than 3,649 days.

21Among the individuals counted, the share of immigrants receiving a residence permit valid for 10 years or more remained low, at slightly above 11% in 2018. A residence permit valid for 10 years or more, typically a resident’s card, is generally granted after one or more permits of less than 10 years.

22Inflows of foreigners can also be estimated using other statistical sources. INSEE uses population censuses and notably a question on the place of residence in the previous year. According to Eurostat, which disseminates INSEE data, 255,185 foreign nationals entered France in 2018. [13] This total also includes nationalities not required to hold a residence permit (i.e. EEA countries and Switzerland) and, potentially, undocumented third-country immigrants. Applying the same geographical scope as that of Table 2 brings the total down to 172,057, a figure well below that obtained using AGDREF data. This underestimation is difficult to explain because no information is available on the method used to construct the series. Students may have been excluded by INSEE, even if they stayed in France for more than a year.

2 – Almost 60% of inflows from third countries are Africans

23Recent immigrants are young. People aged 18–34 represented 64% of all arrivals (Table 3) and 72% of all immigrants who were adults when they received their first residence permit. The share of minors increased slightly in 2018 (10.8%), reaching 27,059. Only minors receiving a residence permit are counted. [14] Foreign minors do not have to hold a residence permit but may need to obtain one if, for example, they wish to travel outside France. Minors born in France to foreign parents are not counted in the inflows. The first row of Table 3 thus only includes minors born abroad who hold a residence permit. These arrivals are detailed below.

Table 3

Distribution (%) of inflows by age group, by first year of validity of first residence permit of 1 year or more

Age group 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 0-17 9.5 10.3 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.8 18-34 62.8 62.2 62.5 63.1 64.5 64.0 35-64 26.2 25.7 25.5 24.9 23.7 23.5 65+ 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

Distribution (%) of inflows by age group, by first year of validity of first residence permit of 1 year or more

Coverage: See Table 2.

24Figure 5 details flows by age and sex in 2018. The peak at age 18 is explained by individuals who arrived as minors and waited until age 18 to apply for a residence permit. Students also contribute to the large share of young people in the distribution. The distributions of women and men are similar overall, although the male distribution is more markedly bimodal. In 2018, the mean age at entry into France was slightly lower than in 2017, at 29.0 years for women and 28.2 years for men.

Figure 5

Distribution of inflows by age and sex in 2018

Distribution of inflows by age and sex in 2018

Coverage: See Table 2.

25A large majority of incoming migrants (excluding those from the EEA and Switzerland) are African nationals. Their share has increased slightly, accounting for 59.2% of the total in 2018, the highest percentage since 2006 (Table 4; d’Albis and Boubtane, 2015). The share of arrivals from America increased slightly in 2018, while that of immigrants from Asia and Europe decreased. [15]

Table 4

Distribution (%) of inflows by continent of origin, by first year of validity of first residence permit of 1 year or more

Continent of origin 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Africa 57.0 58.0 58.2 57.8 58.4 59.2 America 10.8 10.5 10.4 9.4 8.9 9.2 Asia 25.3 24.5 24.4 25.6 25.8 25.3 Europe 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.7 6.3 5.8 Oceania 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 Total* 100 100 100 100 100 100

Distribution (%) of inflows by continent of origin, by first year of validity of first residence permit of 1 year or more

*The total does not necessarily sum to 100 due to rounding and missing values.
Coverage: See Table 2. Turkey is included in Asia. Europe includes all European countries outside the EEA and Switzerland.

26As of 2017, women no longer account for the majority of arrivals. In 2018, they represented 49.2% of total inflows, down from 52.3% in 2014 (Table 5), marking a return to the levels observed in the early 2000s (Beauchemin et al., 2013; d’Albis and Boubtane, 2015). In 2018, there were fewer women than men among inflows from Africa and Asia, although they formed a large majority among inflows from all other continents, from the Americas (57.7%) and Europe (58.3%) especially. As observed below, the declining share of women from Africa coincides with a change in the reasons for granting residence permits, with a shift towards admissions for employment reasons.

Table 5

Share of women in inflows (%) by continent of origin, by first year of validity of the first residence permit of 1 year or more

Continent of origin 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Africa 49.2 49.9 49.3 48.3 46.7 47.5 America 58.3 57.7 56.7 57.3 58.1 57.7 Asia 54.1 53.8 53.0 51.3 48.5 47.9 Europe 60.4 60.2 60.0 58.6 58.1 58.3 Oceania 55.4 50.1 52.7 53.5 54.8 52.5 Overall 52.2 52.3 51.6 50.6 48.9 49.2

Share of women in inflows (%) by continent of origin, by first year of validity of the first residence permit of 1 year or more

Coverage: See Tables 2 and 4.

3 – A sharp increase in the share of admissions for employment reasons

27In 2018, 93,814 people were admitted to France for family reasons—still the main reason for admission—an increase of almost 5% in 1 year. As a proportion of total flows (37.6%), their level has stabilized, however, and remains well below that of 2013 (46.7%; see Table 6). The share of admissions for educational reasons (26.4% in 2018) remains stable with respect to 2017. While admissions for employment reasons account for just 10.5% of total flows (26,280 people), its share increased sharply over the observation period. In two-thirds of cases, the people concerned were in wage employment or non-wage employment. The remaining third were Passeport Talent [16] permit holders (6,543 people in 2018), whose numbers have increased substantially since 2016, and seasonal workers (2,177 people). Admissions for humanitarian reasons fell sharply in 2018, accounting for 12.8% of total admissions. They mainly concern two types of immigrants: foreigners who are ill (3,865 people in 2018) or admitted as refugees, stateless persons, or beneficiaries of territorial asylum or subsidiary protection (27,887 people). [17] Admissions for this second set of reasons fell by almost 8% in 2018, after rising rapidly for 2 years due to increased inflows of asylum seekers from 2014 (d’Albis and Boubtane, 2018a).

28Predictably, the reasons for admission vary by sex. Women are still over-represented among immigrants admitted for family reasons and under-represented among those admitted for humanitarian and, above all, employment reasons (Table 7). Among students, women are only slightly outnumbered by men.

Table 6

Breakdown and distribution (%) of inflows by reason for granting first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, by first year of permit validity

Reason for admission 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Family 89,813 91,573 92,951 89,007 89,708 93,814 Education 46,108 47,547 53,069 56,507 63,809 65,786 Humanitarian 15,872 17,962 19,490 25,866 34,233 31,883 including refugee 9,624 11,050 13,265 19,581 30,180 27,887 Employment 12,946 14,311 16,140 17,731 20,969 26,280 Various and unspecified 27,657 28,494 28,390 29,243 29,022 31,711 Family (%) 46.7 45.8 44.3 40.8 37.7 37.6 Education (%) 24.0 23.8 25.3 25.9 26.8 26.4 Humanitarian (%) 8.2 9.0 9.3 11.8 14.4 12.8 including refugee (%) 5.0 5.5 6.3 9.0 12.7 11.2 Employment (%) 6.7 7.2 7.7 8.1 8.8 10.5 Various and unspecified (%) 14.4 14.3 13.5 13.4 12.2 12.7 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

Breakdown and distribution (%) of inflows by reason for granting first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, by first year of permit validity

Note: Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 have been updated from Breton et al. (2019), following clarification of the reasons provided by the Ministry of the Interior.
Coverage: See Tables 2 and 4. The ‘refugee’ line covers permits granted on the following grounds: refugee and stateless, territorial asylum, and subsidiary protection.

Table 7

Share (%) of women among inflows by reason for granting first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, by first year of permit validity

Reason for admission 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Family 60.4 61.4 61.2 61.2 61.3 62.5 Education 50.4 50.0 49.0 49.4 48.1 49.2 Humanitarian 41.3 41.5 41.3 38.9 34.8 34.6 Employment 33.4 29.9 30.2 21.4 16.8 22.8 Overall 52.2 52.3 51.6 50.6 48.9 49.2

Share (%) of women among inflows by reason for granting first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, by first year of permit validity

Coverage: See Table 2 and the note in Table 6.

29Reasons for admission are distributed very differently from one continent of origin to another (Table 8). Family reasons are still the main reason for admission for immigrants from all continents. Admissions for this reason are over-represented among Africans (43.4% of permits in 2018 compared to 37.6% on average) and Europeans (38.4%) and under-represented among Asians (24.6%). Educational reasons are over-represented among Asians (29.2% vs. 26.4% on average) and Americans (29.6%) and under-represented among Europeans (10.4%). Humanitarian reasons account for a large share of permits granted to Asians (22.7% vs. 12.8% on average), notably due to the impact of the Syrian war, and to Europeans (20.4%), and a slight share among Americans (3.4%), for whom employment-related reasons are over-represented (13.4% vs. 10.5% on average).

Table 8

Breakdown and distribution (%) of inflows by reason for granting first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, by continent of origin and first year of permit validity

Continent of origin and reason for admission 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Africa Family 60,531 63,301 64,755 60,770 61,382 64,097 Education 22,067 23,416 27,858 31,321 38,288 38,891 Humanitarian 7,741 8,432 8,209 11,329 14,357 13,583 Employment 5,617 6,411 6,927 8,101 10,238 14,260 Africa (%) Family 55.2 54.6 53.0 48.2 44.2 43.4 Education 20.1 20.2 22.8 24.8 27.6 26.3 Humanitarian 7.1 7.3 6.7 9.0 10.3 9.2 Employment 5.1 5.5 5.7 6.4 7.4 9.7 America Family 8,183 8,524 8,218 7,498 7,634 8,268 Education 5,933 6,063 6,504 6,113 6,427 6,806 Humanitarian 452 385 389 416 709 789 Employment 2,138 2,193 2,921 2,513 2,716 3,075 America (%) Family 39.5 40.6 37.6 36.7 36.1 36.0 Education 28.6 28.9 29.8 29.9 30.4 29.6 Humanitarian 2.2 1.8 1.8 2.0 3.4 3.4 Employment 10.3 10.5 13.4 12.3 12.8 13.4 Asia Family 15,826 14,329 14,335 14,782 14,979 15,526 Education 16,304 16,321 16,834 17,261 17,291 18,464 Humanitarian 5,330 6,362 7,882 10,399 15,257 14,366 Employment 4,140 4,682 5,241 6,050 6,803 7,647 Asia (%) Family 32.5 29.2 27.9 26.4 24.4 24.6 Education 33.4 33.3 32.8 30.9 28.2 29.2 Humanitarian 10.9 13.0 15.4 18.6 24.9 22.7 Employment 8.5 9.5 10.2 10.8 11.1 12.1 Europe Family 4,855 4,961 5,264 5,575 5,335 5,532 Education 1,657 1,627 1,743 1,685 1,674 1,495 Humanitarian 2,146 2,599 2,775 3,527 3,700 2,947 Employment 865 801 856 888 966 1,071 Europe (%) Family 40.7 39.6 39.7 38.3 35.5 38.4 Education 13.9 13.0 13.1 11.6 11.1 10.4 Humanitarian 18.0 20.7 20.9 24.3 24.6 20.4 Employment 7.2 6.4 6.5 6.1 6.4 7.4

Breakdown and distribution (%) of inflows by reason for granting first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, by continent of origin and first year of permit validity

Coverage: See Tables 2 and 4, and the note in Table 6.

30The share of Africans admitted for family reasons remained practically stable in 2018 (−0.8 percentage points), while admissions for employment reasons increased sharply. Among Americans, the share of admissions for employment reasons increased, and admissions for other reasons remained stable. Among Asians, the share admitted for humanitarian reasons levelled off. Migration of Europeans for family reasons increased in 2018, while admissions for educational and humanitarian reasons (especially high in 2016 and 2017) declined.

4 – Slight decrease in asylum seekers admitted for residence in 2018

31Asylum seekers may be admitted for residence in France (i.e. receive a residence permit of 1 year or more) in several ways. If their application is accepted, they obtain a permit on humanitarian grounds and are counted as ‘refugees’ (Table 6, Row 4). Some of those whose application is rejected are admitted for residence on different grounds, most often family reasons. The rates of admission for residence by submission date of the asylum application are provided in d’Albis and Boubtane (2018a). The perspective here is different. Table 9 shows the annual inflows of people having submitted an application to the French asylum authority (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides [OFPRA]). A total of 44,470 people applied for asylum in 2018, representing 17.8% of inflows, a slight drop from the peak observed in 2017 caused by the rise in inflows from Asia.

Table 9

Inflows of asylum seekers by first year of validity of first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, and distribution (%) by sex, continent of origin, and reason for admission

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Inflow 25,132 25,703 27,507 35,262 46,174 44,470 Share of women (%) 40.7 41.5 41.1 39.7 36.6 36.5 Continent of origin (%) Africa 37.8 37.9 35.9 36.9 38.2 38.8 America 5.2 4.7 4.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 Asia 41.6 41.4 44.0 43.9 45.5 46.0 Europe 13.8 14.5 14.9 15.3 12.9 11.9 Reason for admission (%) Family 33.8 29.9 27.1 24.2 21.2 24.0 Education 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 Humanitarian 48.0 52.6 57.8 62.9 68.9 65.3 Employment 5.3 6.2 6.2 6.3 5.1 5.8

Inflows of asylum seekers by first year of validity of first residence permit valid for 1 year or more, and distribution (%) by sex, continent of origin, and reason for admission

Coverage: Permits granted in France and abroad to foreign nationals who applied for asylum between 1985 and the first year of validity of the first residence permit valid for 1 year or more. Permits granted in year n and recorded in the data extracted in July of the year n + 2; see Table 3. See note in Table 6.

32Asylum seekers are not admitted solely on humanitarian grounds, so the total number of admissions is higher than the number admitted for this reason alone; 24% of asylum seekers in 2018 were admitted for family reasons. The share of women among incoming asylum seekers is lower than among overall inflows; they represented 36.5% of the total in 2018, a proportion similar to 2017. Since 2013, the largest share of incoming asylum seekers has been of Asian origin, representing more than 46% of the total in 2018. Africans accounted for 38.8%.

5 – Almost 1 in 4 Europeans entering France in 2018 were minors

33As indicated in Table 3, 10.8% of arrivals were minors (27,059) and received a first residence permit valid for more than 1 year in 2018. Among them, 47.5% were girls, a much lower proportion than the overall share of women in inflows (see Table 5). The AGDREF database does not specify whether these minors were accompanied by adults. [18]

34The majority of minors arriving in 2018 came from Africa, but their proportion among all minors (Figure 6A) was lower than the proportion of Africans among all inflows (Table 4). This was also the case for arrivals from America, while minors from Asia and Europe were over-represented. Almost 13% of all incoming minors were from Europe, yet Europeans represented less than 6% of total flows. These divergences are found in the share of minors in the flow from each continent (Figure 6B); the share of minors in European flows (23.4%) is much higher than that of Asians (12.4%) or Africans (9.3%).

Figure 6

Share of minors from each continent in overall flows of minors (A) and share of minors in overall flows from that same continent (B) in 2018

Share of minors from each continent in overall flows of minors (A) and share of minors in overall flows from that same continent (B) in 2018

Interpretation: Figure 6A: 50.7% of minors who entered France in 2018 came from Africa. Figure 6B: 9.3% of Africans who entered France in 2018 were minors.
Coverage: See Tables 2 and 4.

35The geographical distribution of inflows of minors in 2018 is shown in Table 10. The departments receiving the largest numbers of minors were Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis. The Paris region (Île-de-France) alone received 33% of all minors entering France (and 35% of those entering metropolitan France). Elsewhere, the departments receiving most minors were Rhône and Bas-Rhin, while Lozère and Creuse received the fewest. In the overseas territories, most minors were received in Mayotte and French Guiana.

36The share of minors in inflows varies considerably across different geographical regions. While the national average was 10.8%, proportions were much higher (above 25%) in Haute-Marne, Gers, and Vosges, and lower (around 7.5%) in Paris, Hérault, and Gironde. The share was higher in overseas departments (14.2%) than in metropolitan France (10.7%). These differences are partly explained by the uneven distribution of inflows of foreign students. Because students are less likely to be accompanied by minors, the departments with large numbers of incoming students have smaller proportions of minors in overall flows.

Table 10

Inflows of foreign minors by department of residence, 2018

Inflow Share (%) of department inflow in national inflow Share (%) of minors in total department inflow Guadeloupe 75 0.28 10.5 Martinique 70 0.26 20.1 Guyane 506 1.87 17.9 La Réunion 66 0.24 8.0 Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 0 0.00 0.0 Mayotte 512 1.89 12.9 Saint-Barthélemy 1 0.00 4.2 Saint-Martin 24 0.09 15.8 Total overseas departments and territories 1,254 4.63 14.2 Ain 232 0.86 16.3 Aisne 182 0.67 19.6 Allier 126 0.47 17.6 Alpes-de-Haute-Provence 42 0.16 15.3 Hautes-Alpes 58 0.21 21.0 Alpes-Maritimes 495 1.83 10.9 Ardèche 100 0.37 21.8 Ardennes 49 0.18 18.7 Ariège 62 0.23 22.2 Aube 129 0.48 13.9 Aude 123 0.45 18.6

Inflows of foreign minors by department of residence, 2018

Inflow Share (%) of department inflow in national inflow Share (%) of minors in total department inflow Aveyron 39 0.14 13.8 Bouches-du-Rhône 738 2.73 8.5 Calvados 126 0.47 8.4 Cantal 41 0.15 21.4 Charente 80 0.30 15.6 Charente-Maritime 103 0.38 9.0 Cher 91 0.34 16.3 Corréze 61 0.23 18.8 Côte-d’Or 160 0.59 9.9 Côtes-d’Armor 107 0.40 15.7 Creuse 21 0.08 12.5 Dordogne 65 0.24 12.9 Doubs 193 0.71 11.5 Drôme 133 0.49 12.9 Eure 228 0.84 23.5 Eure-et-Loir 122 0.45 14.3 Finistère 140 0.52 9.8 Corse-du-Sud 42 0.16 18.3 Haute-Corse 57 0.21 10.3 Gard 116 0.43 9.4 Haute-Garonne 545 2.01 8.3 Gers 92 0.34 28.3 Gironde 371 1.37 7.0 Hérault 311 1.15 6.7 Ille-et-Vilaine 349 1.29 10.5 Indre 31 0.11 7.3 Indre-et-Loire 245 0.91 14.7 Isère 494 1.83 10.2 Jura 70 0.26 17.8 Landes 40 0.15 11.0 Loir-et-Cher 156 0.58 20.3 Loire 259 0.96 12.6 Haute-Loire 50 0.18 20.1 Loire-Atlantique 657 2.43 14.2 Loiret 376 1.39 16.0 Lot 41 0.15 15.2 Lot-et-Garonne 86 0.32 13.8 Lozère 20 0.07 20.4 Maine-et-Loire 258 0.95 13.0 Manche 116 0.43 17.5 Marne 213 0.79 12.5 Haute-Marne 73 0.27 29.1 Mayenne 81 0.30 18.7 Meurthe-et-Moselle 223 0.82 9.0 Meuse 37 0.14 18.4 Morbihan 133 0.49 12.7

Inflow Share (%) of department inflow in national inflow Share (%) of minors in total department inflow Moselle 369 1.36 14.7 Nièvre 74 0.27 22.2 Nord 669 2.47 7.8 Oise 334 1.23 15.0 Orne 53 0.20 12.6 Pas-de-Calais 202 0.75 13.0 Puy-de-Dôme 195 0.72 9.8 Pyrénées-Atlantiques 309 1.14 18.2 Hautes-Pyrénées 53 0.20 14.5 Pyrénées-Orientales 136 0.50 13.0 Bas-Rhin 909 3.36 16.0 Haut-Rhin 259 0.96 12.0 Rhône 965 3.57 9.3 Haute-Saône 51 0.19 24.3 Saône-et-Loire 145 0.54 18.3 Sarthe 138 0.51 11.0 Savoie 203 0.75 15.5 Haute-Savoie 266 0.98 12.8 Paris 1,543 5.70 6.3 Seine-Maritime 473 1.75 11.1 Seine-et-Marne 779 2.88 13.0 Yvelines 1,112 4.11 11.1 Deux-Sèvres 123 0.45 18.7 Somme 123 0.45 8.2 Tarn 95 0.35 14.6 Tarn-et-Garonne 50 0.18 11.2 Var 212 0.78 11.2 Vaucluse 206 0.76 9.6 Vendée 110 0.41 18.5 Vienne 146 0.54 12.8 Haute-Vienne 140 0.52 11.1 Vosges 113 0.42 25.2 Yonne 115 0.42 16.4 Territoire de Belfort 68 0.25 11.0 Essonne 831 3.07 9.8 Hauts-de-Seine 1,218 4.50 8.7 Seine-Saint-Denis 1,510 5.58 9.7 Val-de-Marne 836 3.09 9.2 Val-d’Oise 1,084 4.01 11.4 Total metropolitan France 25,805 95.37 10.7 Total 27,059 100.00 10.8

Coverage: See Tables 2 and 4.

1 – A decline in births in 2019, set to continue in 2020

37The decline in births continued in 2019 (753,400 vs. 758,600 in 2018), and the estimates for the first 6 months of 2020 show no signs of a trend reversal. The year 2020 is likely to be the first in more than a quarter of a century with fewer than 750,000 births and only the fourth since the Second World War, alongside 1976, 1993, and 1994. [19] The annual number of births depends both on fertility rates (behaviour) and the number of women at various reproductive ages (structure). By summing age-specific fertility rates, we obtain the total fertility rate (TFR), which corresponds to the number of children a woman would have throughout her reproductive life if she behaved in the same way as all women in a given year (Table 11; Appendix Table A.4). This TFR has decreased very slightly (1.88 in 2018 and 1.87 in 2019) (Papon and Beaumel, 2020). The decrease in births is thus due mainly to variations in the number of women at each age between 15 and 50, and especially between 20 and 40, ages at which most births occur (84.4%). While the TFR is almost stable, mean age at childbearing is still increasingly slowly, at an annual rate of +0.1 years since 2010, and reached 30.7 years in 2019. [20] Since the mid-1970s, mean age at childbearing has been increasing in parallel with mean age at first birth (Volant, 2017), now close to 28.8 years.

Table 11

Fertility by age group from 2013 to 2018

Age reached Sum of age-specific rates (per 1,000 women) Absolute variation* 2014 2015 2016 2017 (p) 2018(p) 2019 (p) 2014 — 2015 2015 - 2016 2016 - 2017 2017 - 2018 2018 - 2019 Under 20 37 35 32 30 29 28 -2 -3 -2 -1 -1 20-24 252 241 232 225 216 214 -12 -9 -7 -9 -2 25-29 612 592 575 560 547 541 -20 -17 -15 -13 -6 30-34 658 648 645 637 636 633 -9 -4 -8 -1 -3 35-39 347 347 345 345 348 352 0 -2 0 3 4 40-44 87 87 89 92 94 96 0 2 3 2 2 45+ 6 6 6 6 7 7 0 0 1 0 0 Total (TFR*) 1,999 1,955 1,924 1,895 1,876 1,871 -43 -32 -29 -19 -5

Fertility by age group from 2013 to 2018

* TFR: total fertility rate (sum of age-specific fertility rates) expressed as a mean number of children per 1,000 women. Due to rounding, the total may differ slightly from the sum, and the variations may not correspond exactly to apparent differences.
(p) Provisional data.
Coverage: Whole of France (including Mayotte since 2014).

38In 2018, France still had Europe’s highest TFR, ahead of Sweden (1.76) and Ireland (1.75), where fertility has traditionally been quite high. Romania (1.76) and the Czech Republic (1.71), two countries that exemplify the recent fertility rebound in Eastern Europe (Pison, 2020) are reaching similar levels. At the same time, age at first birth in France remains lower than in other countries of Western and Southern Europe (Breton et al., 2019).

39The question is whether the current decrease in the French TFR marks the beginning of a decline in cohort fertility or a new and lasting change in fertility timing. The steady TFR downtrend over the last 10 years (Figure 7) reflects a decrease in rates before age 30 (as already observed up to the mid-1990s) that is not offset by an increase in rates at older ages, unlike the period before 2010.

40For the TFR to reach replacement levels (around 2.06 children per woman), fertility rates over age 30 would need to start increasing again, or more improbably, the fertility downtrend before age 30 would need to be radically reversed. Yet, except for Ireland and to a lesser extent Switzerland, the French fertility rate over age 30 is among the highest of all OECD countries (Figure 8). Ireland has a very atypical profile. With the rise in long-term unemployment observed since the economic crisis of 2008, fertility rates at young ages are now very low (Matysiak et al., 2020), while third births at later ages remain stable. In all these countries, age at first birth is considerably higher than in France (31.2 years in Italy, 31.0 in Spain, 30.9 in Switzerland and 30.5 in Ireland). [21] The high fertility rates at older ages in these countries are due to a larger rise in age at first birth.

2 – Slightly more than 4,000 births to adolescent mothers, one-third of which in the French overseas departments and territories

41In 2018, 1.5% of births (11,650) were to women who had not yet reached their 20th birthday (Papon, 2019). This proportion rises to 2.1% if exact age is used rather than age reached in the year (15,580 births). Among these adolescent births, 4,111 (0.54%, or 1 in 200 births) [22] were to women aged under 18. [23] While relatively low, this is well above the number of births to women aged 45 and over (2,291). As is the case in France, adolescent births are declining in absolute and relative terms across cohorts in most European countries but with different levels and rates of decline (Tomkinson, 2019). A large share of French adolescent births are registered in the overseas departments and territories (which account for 32.3% of adolescent births in France but just 5.1% of all births), in Mayotte and French Guiana especially (473 and 450 adolescent births, respectively, representing 1 in 20 births), but also Réunion (1 in 50 births, 300 in total). [24]

Figure 7

Age-specific fertility rates and TFR in France, 1990–2019

Age-specific fertility rates and TFR in France, 1990–2019

Coverage: Whole of France from 1994 (including Mayotte since 2014) and metropolitan France (1990–1993).

Figure 8

Age-specific fertility rates in France and in 5 OECD countries with the highest mean age at childbearing (over 30.5 years) in 2018

Age-specific fertility rates in France and in 5 OECD countries with the highest mean age at childbearing (over 30.5 years) in 2018

42By applying a specific methodology to census data (Tomkinson and Breton, 2016), two main profiles of French adolescent mothers can be identified. In the first group, which represents a majority of cases, the mothers are inactive and have a low educational level. There is a strong correlation at regional level, in metropolitan France at least, between the proportion of minors not in education, employment, or training (NEET) among 16- to 17-year-olds and the frequency of adolescent births (R² = 0.82, Figure 9). Determining the direction of causality in this relationship is not straightforward, however. Are pregnancy and childbirth the cause or the consequence of dropping out of school? The second main group comprises adolescent mothers whose life events at entry into adulthood follow much the same pattern as that observed among most young people but are more concentrated in time: the birth occurs very shortly after leaving school, forming a union, and/or moving out of the parental home (Tomkinson et al., 2017).

3 – Cohort fertility: signs of a downturn?

43The women born in 1980, aged 40 in 2020, will have a completed fertility of slightly more than 2.0 children. France is a European outlier in this respect, although Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Denmark are close to this level, with completed fertility of between 1.9 and 2.0 children per woman (Breton et al., 2019). Cumulative fertility at different ages reveals the first signs of a further shift to later childbearing from the 1980s cohorts (Figure 10; Appendix Table A.5), but the very slight dip at age 32 for the 1985 cohort probably marks the end of the catch-up mechanism observed in previous cohorts.

Figure 9

Proportion of 17-year-olds not in education or employment and adolescent birth rates in the French regions, 2017

Proportion of 17-year-olds not in education or employment and adolescent birth rates in the French regions, 2017

Note: The values for Réunion (982; 450), French Guiana (1,776; 1820) and Mayotte (2,012; 1,639) are outliers and not represented in the figure. Corsica is also omitted because of the very small number of registered adolescent births. Adolescent childbearing rates: for each region, ratio of adolescent births to the number of girls aged 17 (the majority of adolescent births occur in the year of the mother’s 17th birthday).
Coverage: Whole of France.

Figure 10

Cumulative fertility at different ages, 1960–1995 cohorts, metropolitan France

Cumulative fertility at different ages, 1960–1995 cohorts, metropolitan France

Interpretation: For the 1985 cohort, cumulative fertility at age 32 is 135 children per 100 women versus 153 for the 1965 cohort at the same age.
Coverage: Metropolitan France.

4 – More large families among the least educated women, fewer among the most educated

44The number of children per woman is relatively stable across cohorts, but how has the distribution of women according to their completed fertility varied over time? Estimates based on census data (Box 1) show that while this distribution varies little between the 1967 and 1977 cohorts (Figure 12B), it conceals increasing social differentiation of behaviours (Figure 11). In France, as in many countries with low or lowest-low fertility, family size is linked to educational level (Davie and Mazuy, 2010; Van Bavel, 2012). Between the 1967 and 1977 cohorts, the share of low-educated women decreased (Figure 11, circle size); at the same time, education’s effect on the proportion of women with three or more children in the same household increased. With the expansion of education, the proportion of low-educated women has fallen, but their family size has increased. The share of low-educated women in the 1977 cohort with three children is 5.7 points higher than that of women with the same characteristics in the 1967 cohort. At the other end of the educational spectrum, the share of women with at least 2 years of higher education is increasing, while the proportion in this group with at least three children is falling (−3.7 points). These trends indicate greater polarization regarding fertility behaviour by level of education.

Figure 11

Percentage of women aged 40 living with at least 3 children in the 1967, 1972, and 1977 cohorts in France

Percentage of women aged 40 living with at least 3 children in the 1967, 1972, and 1977 cohorts in France

Interpretation: In the 1977 cohort, 40% of low-educated women aged 40 were living with at least three children versus 34.3% in the 1967 cohort. In this 1977 cohort, 9.3% of women living with at least three children were low-educated (circle size) versus 17% (circle size) in the 1967 cohort.
Coverage: Population of women living in ordinary households and aged 40 in the census year.

Box 1. Using census data to estimate cumulative fertility at age x

Age-specific fertility indicators classically combine civil registration data (births in the numerator) and census data (population in the denominator). However, the lack of information in civil registration data on factors needed to study differential fertility, such as education and recent migration history, means that certain analyses cannot be performed using the standard methods. Moreover, inaccurate coding of birth order in civil records and the absence of a census question on the number of children already born presents significant challenges for studying fertility by birth order in France. That said, a number of indirect methods can be used. The most well-known is the Own Children Method developed in the United States in the 1960s and used in France since the 1990s. It involves calculating fertility indicators using census data from year t. The number of children of age x is used as a proxy for the number of births in year t − x. Each child (birth) is linked to his or her mother (whose year of birth is known), provided they live under the same roof. It thus becomes possible to associate this child (birth) with all the characteristics of the mother, including her educational level (Davie and Mazuy, 2012).
Applying the same principle, the distribution of women of age x according to the number of cohabiting children provides an estimate of cumulative fertility at age x based on the standard method. The values obtained underestimate actual cumulative fertility (Figure 12A) because mothers’ and children’s deaths and the under-reporting of newborns in censuses are not factored in. Moreover, not all children live with their mother because of parental separation, placement in care, migration, or departure from the parental home (Tomkinson and Breton, 2016). This last factor explains why this indicator starts dropping off after age 40. The underestimation remains consistent from one census to the next and is lowest at ages 36–40 (between 9% and 12%). The term ‘children’ should be understood as ‘children in a family’ (see Note 7), i.e. the children whose mother is recorded as ‘family reference person’ or ‘partner of family reference person’. As some mothers are actually stepmothers (stepfamilies in which the father has custody of his children), the number of children attributed to a woman does not correspond exactly to her actual fertility. Likewise, women can be distributed by age and number of children in the family to obtain an estimate of net cumulative fertility (taking account of mortality and migration) at age x in a given birth cohort (Figure 12B). However, without reliable statistics on birth order, this indicator’s accuracy cannot be verified. The distribution is nonetheless consistent with the estimates obtained via the 2011 Family and Housing survey (Breton et al., 2019).

Figure 12A

Cumulative fertility and number of cohabiting children in the household by age across cohorts, 2007, 2012, and 2017

Cumulative fertility and number of cohabiting children in the household by age across cohorts, 2007, 2012, and 2017

Figure 12B

Distribution of women aged 40 by number of children in the household across cohorts, 2007, 2012, and 2017

Distribution of women aged 40 by number of children in the household across cohorts, 2007, 2012, and 2017

Coverage: Metropolitan France.

5 – A situation at birth that varies across French regions

45Most children are recognized by both parents at birth, but less and less frequently through marriage (Toulemon, 2013). In 2019, 61% of children were born to unmarried parents, [25] setting a record for France, and for Europe, up from 53.7% 10 years ago and 42.7% 20 years ago. This trend may reflect a weakening of the norm of birth within marriage, still very strong and widespread in many societies. In France, couples now most often marry after the birth of one or more children. In the 2017 census, the proportion of children in families where the reference person (generally the father or mother) is married increases from 43.4% when the child is age 1 to 57.1% at age 10. By the time they finish primary school, the majority of children live with married parents.

46While the link between marriage and childbearing has weakened, other norms are more robust, such as giving the father’s surname to the child. For the last 15 years in France (law of 2005), parents have been free to choose either the father’s name only, as in the past, or the mother’s name only, or both names in any order (father’s followed by mother’s or vice-versa). All children born to the same parents must have the same surname (Mazuy et al., 2013). Very few children have the mother’s name only or the mother’s name followed by the father’s. In 2018, 91.1% of children were given the father’s name either alone or before that of the mother. This proportion has remained stable since 2014 (Table 12) and is even slightly higher than in 2012 (90.3%), the first year for which these figures were published (Mazuy et al., 2013). Double surnames are becoming more popular, however (9.0% in 2012, 10.3% in 2014, and 11.6% in 2018).

47Children born outside marriage were those who most often had a double surname in 2018 (15.6% vs. 5.4% of those born to married parents). Practically all children with only the mother’s surname are born to unmarried parents (1 in 10 children born outside marriage vs. 1 in 300 of those born within marriage) (Table 12).

48Given the link between parents’ marital status and the child’s name, the regions with the highest proportions of non-marital births should be those with the lowest proportions of children with the father’s name only. This is not the case, however, either in metropolitan France (R² = 0.05) or in the overseas territories (R² = 0.15) (Figure 13). The Paris region (Île-de-France), for example, has a low proportion of non-marital births and a high proportion of children bearing the father’s name only, while in Brittany, where the share of non-marital births is relatively high, the share of children with only the father’s name is identical to that of the Paris region. [26] The overseas departments and territories are outliers, with a very high share of non-marital births linked to specific local factors. In Mayotte, ‘customary’ marriage remains the norm (Marie et al., 2017); the French Caribbean has a long tradition of non-marital births (Mulot, 2013) in line with the ‘Caribbean model’; and Réunion has a situation between that of the Caribbean and that of metropolitan France. Except for Mayotte, the overseas departments and territories also have a low proportion of children with the father’s name only, perhaps because children with unmarried mothers are often born and raised in a lone-parent family. Such situations are extremely rare in metropolitan France (Marie et al., 2011).

Table 12

Distribution of surname choices for children born in 2014 and 2018 by parents’ marital status

2014 2018 Born within marriage Born outside marriage Overall Born within marriage Born outside marriage Overall Father’s name 95.2 74.4 83.0 94.2 74.1 82.1 Mother’s name 0.2 11.0 6.5 0.3 10.1 6.2 Father’s name followed by mother’s name 3.3 11.4 8.0 4.0 12.3 9.0 Mother’s name followed by father’s name 1.2 3.0 2.3 1.4 3.3 2.6 Other name or coding problem 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Distribution of surname choices for children born in 2014 and 2018 by parents’ marital status

Coverage: Whole of France.

Figure 13

Children’s surnames and non-marital births in France in 2018

Children’s surnames and non-marital births in France in 2018

Coverage: Whole of France.

1 – More induced abortions in 2019 and new data sources

49Fewer births occurred in 2019 due to a reduction in the number of women of reproductive age and a slight fertility decline over the year (Section III). However, the number of induced abortions increased, reaching 230,000 for the whole of France (217,000 in metropolitan France, Appendix Table A.8), up from 224,000 and 209,000, respectively, in 2018. Abortion frequency (number of abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–49) therefore increased, from 15.6 per 1,000 to 16.1 per 1,000. The total abortion rate (mean number of abortions per woman, calculated as the sum of age-specific rates for a given year) was 0.58, up from 0.56 in 2018 (Breton et al., 2019; Vilain, 2019).

50The increase is observed primarily among women aged 25–29, the ages at which abortion is most frequent, so the impact on the total number of abortions is considerable. It also rose among women aged 30 and over, while it decreased among the under-25s. This increase in abortions does not appear to signal an upsurge in unwanted pregnancies, but rather a more frequent propensity to terminate a pregnancy than in previous years. This is shown by the abortion ratio (ratio of abortions to births), which reached almost 1 abortion per 3 births in 2019, up from 1 abortion per 4 births the previous year. This increase suggests that women and/or couples who have conceived but for whom the conditions for having a child (or another child) are unmet, more frequently decide to have an abortion, perhaps with the aim of bringing a future pregnancy to term (thus contributing to the secular increase in mean age at childbearing). According to data published by DREES, [27] abortion frequency is higher when living standards are low (Vilain et al., 2020). While the reasons behind this trend are multiple, the increasing hardship and insecurity affecting the most disadvantaged households may well be a contributing factor (Delmas et Guillaneuf, 2020). The number of people unemployed or in precarious employment [28] has fluctuated around 8 million since 2015 (Observatoire des inégalités, 2019). The DREES data we mention concerns 2016, and the trend may have amplified over the last 3 years. The issue is not so much reduced contraceptive coverage or less careful contraceptive behaviours, but rather an increasing propensity to terminate pregnancies in a more uncertain social climate.

51This increase should be viewed with caution, however, as new sources are now used to count the number of abortions in France (Box 2). The absolute number of abortions has nonetheless been trending upward since the 1990s, doubtless in response to an initial rise in the number of women of reproductive age, a lengthening of the period of sexual youth (Amsellem-Mainguy, 2019), and the growing complexity of emotional, sexual, and partnership trajectories involving more periods of transition in women’s sexual and emotional lives.

52In the most recent years, the propensity to abort has increased, with an increase in the proportion of pregnancies that do not lead to a birth. From the 1990s, the proportion remained stable at 27 abortions per 100 births, but by 2019 it had risen 31 (Vilain et al., 2020).

2 – Low numbers of adolescent abortions

53The absolute number of abortions among women under age 18 is decreasing, from nearly 10,000 per year in the early 2010s to fewer than 8,000 in 2019, which may reflect improvements in contraceptive coverage and more effective use of contraceptive methods among young people. The proportion of sexually active adolescent girls using no contraception is minute (2.3% at ages 15–19, according to Baromètre Santé) (Rahib et al., 2017).

54The number of abortions among this population still exceeds the number of births (see below). Both are trending downwards, which suggests a decrease in the number of pregnancies and a lower frequency of abortion, perhaps due partly to the growing use of emergency contraception. The ‘day-after pill’ is most frequently used at ages 15–19. In 2016, more than 1 in 5 women in this age group reported having used it in the last 12 months (Rahib et al., 2018). In other age groups, demand for emergency contraception is generally low. A broader range of professionals (pharmacists, school nurses, and more recently, university medical services) are now authorized to prescribe it. The day-after pill is provided free of charge and anonymously in pharmacies for girls under 18.

55After an uptrend in the early 2000s, adolescent abortions have now fallen back to the levels observed in the 1990s. [29]

3 – More than 1 in 5 non-hospital abortions performed by a community midwife

56Under the health system modernization act of 26 January 2016 (Article 127), midwives are now authorized to provide abortion services. The law came into force on 6 June 2016, after the implementing decree detailing the practical rules of application was published in the Official Journal of 5 June 2016. Consequently, obtaining an abortion is becoming easier, and geographical inequalities are narrowing. In 2018, abortion services were provided by 248 midwives (Vilain, 2019). In 2019, almost 11,000 non-hospital abortions were provided by midwives, representing 5% of all abortions and 17% of non-hospital abortions. [30] Only medical abortions are provided by midwives; an extension to surgical abortions is under discussion. [31]

57The share of abortions provided by midwives varies considerably across geographical regions, ranging from 0% to more than 50%. The regions where the share is very low may be those where very few non-hospital abortions are provided, where community midwives are scarce, and/or where few community midwives are trained to provide abortions and are able to team up with a healthcare facility. This heterogeneity likely also reflects geographical differences in health- and social-care provision and in services to meet women’s sexual, contraceptive, and reproductive needs.

1 – Registered unions

Stable marriage numbers in 2018 and a continued increase in civil unions

58There were 234,735 marriages in the whole of France in 2018, 820 more than in 2017. This slight increase was temporary, however, as numbers started dropping again in 2019, falling to a record low of 227,000 [32] (Papon et Beaumel, 2020), 7,700 fewer than in 2018 (−3.3%).

59Since 2011, the numbers of marriages and civil unions (pacte civil de solidarité [PACS]) have been converging, [33] and the continued increase in PACS unions in 2018 has narrowed the gap to below 30,000 (Figure 14A). The provisional estimate for the number of PACS unions is 209,000, up nearly 7% from 2017 (195,569). The number of PACS unions in 2019 is still unknown because the various entities that register them (municipal registry offices since November 2017 and notaries since 2011) have been slow to communicate the relevant statistics.

60For same-sex couples, marriages and PACS unions have been trending in opposite directions since 2014. The number of marriages fell to 6,386 in 2018 and 6,000 in 2019 (provisional data), while that of PACS unions rose sharply to 8,589 in 2018, up 17% from 2017 (Figure 14B). This rise continues the trend observed in November and December 2017 (Breton et al., 2019) and may be a temporary phenomenon linked to a change in the organization of PACS registration. [34] For the first time since 2013 and the legalization of same-sex marriage, PACS unions largely outnumbered marriages among same-sex couples (2,200 more PACS unions than marriages in 2018).

Figure 14

Annual numbers of marriages and PACS unions since 2000 by partners’ sex

Annual numbers of marriages and PACS unions since 2000 by partners’ sex

Note: Provisional data for marriages in 2019 and PACS unions in 2017 and 2018.
Coverage: Whole of France (including Mayotte since 2014).

61The share of same-sex marriages among total marriages has continued to fall since 2014 and has reached an all-time low (2.6% in 2019). Conversely, same-sex PACS unions are trending upwards (Table 13), and their share has been increasing steadily since 2013; 4.1% of PACS unions were between same-sex couples in 2018. This is still below the level of 2012 (4.3%), the last year the PACS was the only form of legalized union open to same-sex couples. Clearly, freedom to marry has not led to a massive preference for marriage over the PACS among same-sex couples.

Table 13

Number of unions (PACS or marriage) registered between 2013 and 2019 by partners’ sex

Year Marriages PACS unions Between a man and a woman Between two men Between two women Percentage same-sex Between a man and a woman Between two men Between two women Percentage same-sex 2013 231,225 4,307 3,060 3.1 162,714 3,354 2,734 3.6 2014 230,770 5,666 4,856 4.4 167,487 3,519 2,745 3.6 2015 228,565 4,085 3,666 3.3 181,949 3,933 3,085 3.7 2016 225,612 3,672 3,441 3.1 184,444 3,863 3,251 3.7 2017 226,671 3,637 3,607 3.1 188,233 4,084 3,252 3.8 2018 228,349 3,268 3,118 2.7 200,282 8,589 4.1 2019 221,000 6,000 2.6

Number of unions (PACS or marriage) registered between 2013 and 2019 by partners’ sex

Note: Provisional data for marriages in 2019 and PACS unions in 2017 and 2018.
Coverage: Whole of France, excluding Mayotte up to 2013 and including Mayotte from 2014.

62The total marriage rate [35] has been increasing slightly since 2016. It stood at 576 marriages per 1,000 men and 565 per 1,000 women in 2018 (Table 14). This increase is due solely to the slight rise in first marriages of different-sex couples (459 first marriages for men and 454 for women in 2018). The total marriage rate for remarriages has been trending downward since 2014, as has that of same-sex marriages for both men and women. The pronounced increase in PACS unions in 2018 presages an increase in the total PACS rate, which probably exceeded 500 per 1,000 individuals for men in 2018, and approached that level for women.

Table 14

Number of unions (marriage, PACS) per 1,000 people by partners’ sex and marital status at union formation, 2014–2018

Year Different-sex marriages Different-sex PACS unions Men Women Men Women Overall of which first marriages of which remarriages Overall of which first marriages of which remarriages Overall Overall of widows of divorcees of widows of divorcees 2014 560 453 6 101 551 451 6 94 420 410 2015 556 451 6 99 546 448 6 93 457 445 2016 550 448 5 97 541 445 6 90 465 454 2017 554 451 5 98 545 448 5 91 474 463 2018 561 459 5 97 550 454 5 91 — — Same-sex marriages Same-sex PACS unions Year Men Women Men Women of which of which remarriages of which of which remarriages Overall first Overall first Overall Overall marriages widows divorcees marriages widows divorcees 2014 26 24 0.1 2.5 22 20 0.1 2.6 18 13 2015 19 17 0.1 1.8 17 15 0.1 1.9 20 15 2016 17 16 0.0 1.4 16 14 0.0 1.6 19 16 2017 17 16 0.0 1.3 17 15 0.0 1.7 21 16 2018 15 14 0.0 1.5 15 13 0.0 1.5 — — Year All marriages All PACS unions Men Women Men Women 2014 586 573 438 423 2015 575 563 477 460 2016 568 557 485 470 2017 572 561 495 479 2018 576 565 — —

Number of unions (marriage, PACS) per 1,000 people by partners’ sex and marital status at union formation, 2014–2018

Note: Dashes indicate data were not available for PACS unions in 2018.
Coverage: Whole of France.

An ongoing increase in age at marriage, except for same-sex couples

63While total marriage rates and first marriage rates [36] varied little between 2016 and 2018 (Table 14) due to the stability of marriage numbers over the period, age at marriage continued to increase. In 2018, the mean age at marriage for all marriages (including remarriages and marriages after age 50) was 35.4 years for women and 37.9 for men, up by 0.4 and 0.2 years, respectively, with respect to 2017. This increase is closely linked to the rise in mean age at first marriage of different-sex partners (+0.4 years for men and +0.3 years for women between 2017 and 2018). Conversely, age at first marriage of same-sex couples is moving in the opposite direction, at 36.7 years on average for women and 41.8 years for men (down 0.5 years between 2017 and 2018 for both sexes), and converging towards the ages at marriage of different-sex couples (Figure 15).

Figure 15

Mean age at marriage by spouses’ sex

Mean age at marriage by spouses’ sex

Note: Mean ages determined from marriage rates at all ages.
Coverage: Whole of France.

64Between 2017 and 2018, fewer men under age 30 and fewer women under 28 married for the first time, but this decline was offset by an increase at older ages that contributed to a slight increase in the total first marriage rate in 2018, for men especially (Table 14). First marriages after age 40 accounted for 24.3% of the total first marriage rate in 2018, and those after age 50, 8.9%, up by 2.8% and 1.4%, respectively, since 2014. Similar increases are observed for women (+2.7% after age 40 and +1.4% after age 50), even though fewer women than men marry for the first time at a late age (18.7% after age 40 and 6.4% after age 50 in 2018).

A decline in remarriage, especially after divorce

65Remarriages of widows and widowers have been declining rapidly since the 1970s. The annual number in metropolitan France has fallen fourfold (from 10,000 in 1965 to around 2,600 in 2018), with widows and widowers accounting for just 1.2% of newlyweds in 2018 versus more than 3% in 1965. This trend is due mainly to the increase in age at widowhood linked to the rise in life expectancy at birth.

66Most remarriages are between divorcees, and increasingly so since the 1970s, due to the fall in marriages between widows and widowers and the increase in those between divorcees (Bonnet et al., 2019). In 2018, 94% of people who remarried did so after a divorce and just 6% after being widowed. The figures are quite similar for both sexes.

67Since the mid-2000s, fewer divorcees marry each year. From a high of around 50,000 in 2005, just 40,000 divorced women and 41,500 divorced men remarried in 2018. Since 2005, with the decrease in first marriages, the share of divorcees among newlyweds has now stabilized at around 19% for men and 18% for women due to the lower frequency of remarriage after divorce. For all divorce cohorts, the proportions who have remarried 5, 10, and 15 years later is decreasing very sharply across cohorts (Figure 16).

68Finally, while remarriages of divorcees are declining, numbers are still quite high. Among women who divorced in 2000, 1 in 3 was married again 15 years later, and among men the proportion was slightly higher (36.8%).

Figure 16

Total remarriage rates, per 100 divorces, by sex, year of divorce and time since divorce

Total remarriage rates, per 100 divorces, by sex, year of divorce and time since divorce

Note: Total rate calculated for each sex with respect to the initial number of divorces.
Interpretation: Out of 100 men who divorced in 1990, 24 had remarried within 5 years.
Coverage: Metropolitan France.

One-third of couples who marry for the first time already have common children

69In 2018, one-third of the different-sex couples who married for the first time reported common children born before the marriage. [37] This proportion has remained stable in recent years, but it increases with the wife’s age, older women having had more time to conceive before marrying. Slightly above half of the women who marry for the first time at ages 35–44 have already had children with their husband (Figure 17, all years except 2010).

Figure 17

Percentage of couples with common children at the time of marriage* by wife’s age

Percentage of couples with common children at the time of marriage* by wife’s age

*Different-sex marriages between never-married partners.
Coverage: Whole of France.

2 – Divorce and PACS dissolutions

Incomplete recent data due to new registration methods

70Little new information is available for divorces and PACS dissolutions in 2018. No figures have been published for PACS dissolutions, and following the new divorce procedures introduced in 2017, divorce data are very incomplete. Divorce by mutual consent can now be registered before a notary without going to court. [38] The number of divorces pronounced in court fell sharply in 2018 to 62,321, slightly below half the number recorded in 2016 before the reform [39] (128,043, Table 15). As most divorces are by mutual consent, it is not surprising that many are settled out of court, and statistics on these divorces are not yet available. Data for 2017 and 2018 are still incomplete. [40]

Table 15

Divorces and PACS dissolutions in France

Year Number of divorces (a) Total divorces rate (divorces per 100 marriages) Number of PACS dissolutions Metropolitan France Whole of France Metropolitan France Whole of France 2005 1 52,020 1 55,253 52.3 8,564 8,690 2010 130,810 133,909 46.2 43,250 43,628 2015 120,731 123,668 44.7 78,725 79,386 2016 124,768 128,043 46.7 83,937 84,662 2017 88,146 (b) 90,613 (b) 33.1 (b) 82,345 (c) 2018 62,321 (b)

Divorces and PACS dissolutions in France

(a) Direct divorces and separations converted into divorces.
(b) By virtue of law no. 2016-1547 of 18 November 2016, divorces can also be registered by a notary. These divorces are not included in this table, so the figures for 2017 and 2018 are incomplete.
(c) Provisional data.

71Since 2007, annual numbers of divorces have been trending downward (below 130,000 since 2012), and the total divorce rate has remained relatively stable since 2006, at around 45 divorces per 100 marriages (Table 15).

72Given the steady rise in new PACS unions each year since 2011, the increase in PACS dissolutions is expected to continue. This increase is resulting in a higher number of couples in recent PACS unions, with higher frequency of dissolutions (Breton et al., 2019). For the first time since the PACS union was introduced, the provisional figures for 2018 nonetheless show a slight decrease in dissolutions (82,345, down 2,300 from 2017), but this may be due to a data updating problem. [41] The data for 2018 and 2019 to be issued shortly should clarify this point.

73Between 50%–55% of PACS unions registered between 1999 and 2007 had been dissolved by the end of 2017 (Breton et al., 2019). Some of these couples dissolved their PACS in order marry (1 in 4 couples who entered a PACS in 2016), while for others the dissolution marked the end of the relationship (between 25% and 36% across cohorts).

Divorce affected 170,000 children in 2016, of whom 116,000 were minors

74According to figures issued by the Ministry of Justice, among the 169,830 children whose parents divorced in 2016, [42] around two-thirds were minors (115,945). With the relative stability of divorce numbers over the last decade, the number of children concerned fluctuates around 120,000 each year, with no significant change since the drop observed in 2013 (Mazuy et al., 2015b). In 2016, each divorce affected 0.91 minors on average and 1.33 sons and daughters of all ages. These figures have remained stable since 2010. They increased to 0.93 and 1.40, respectively, in 2017, but this change is difficult to interpret pending the publication of statistics on divorces pronounced by notaries.

75In 2016, 52.4% of divorces affected at least one child, most often an only child (29,848; 23% of divorces) or two children (27,638; 21.6% of divorces). There were fewer divorces among couples with at least three children (7,789 with three children and 1,178 with four or more, representing 6.1% and 1.4% of divorces, respectively). Divorce most often concerns children when the woman is aged 35–45 (Figure 18). Three-quarters of all divorces involving children occur in this age group, and the mean number of minors concerned is highest at these ages (1.5 minors per divorce). Women aged over 45 at the time of divorce most often do not have a child under 18 in the household. In 2016, more than 30,000 divorces—almost a quarter of the annual total—concerned women aged over 50 with no children under 18. These are divorces of couples with adult children or of those who never had children. However, the share of divorces among couples with children has increased in recent years for women aged 45–60, reflecting the rise in age at childbearing among the cohorts of women born after 1960. Married women over age 50 now more often live in households with children under age 18.

Figure 18

Divorces in 2016 by woman’s age and number of children under 18

Divorces in 2016 by woman’s age and number of children under 18

Coverage: Whole of France.

1 – Limited progress below age 15

79INSEE’s 3-year life tables show that the probability of surviving to age 15 increased very slowly over the 10 years between 2006–2008 and 2016–2018 (Table 16), unlike previous decades. While the probability of dying at ages 0–14 fell by a third for both sexes between 1986–1988 and 1996–1998, and by a quarter between 1996–1998 and 2006–2008, it decreased by less than 10% for males and 5% for females between 2006–2008 and 2016–2018.

80After the first year of life, the probability for a child of dying before their 15th birthday is now negligible (1 per 1,000), so the potential for further progress is very limited, although there is still scope to reduce accidental deaths (mainly avoidable road traffic accidents) which are the main cause of death at ages 1–14. However, with 3.6 infant deaths per 1,000 births in metropolitan France (3.8 per 1,000 in the whole of France), little progress has been made in reducing infant mortality over the last 10 years. It has even increased slightly since 2013–2014, when it stood at 3.4 per 1,000 in metropolitan France and 3.5 per 1,000 in the whole of France (Appendix Table A.11), unlike many European countries where it has continued to fall. It is now below 3.0 per 1,000, and in some cases 2.0 per 1,000 in several northern countries (Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Slovenia, and Sweden, followed closely by Norway; Table 17).

Table 16

Probabilities of dying by age group in France, by 10-year period between 1986–1988 and 2016–2018*

Age group Probability (per 1,000) Variation (%) 1986-1988 1996-1998 2006-2008 2016-2018 From 1986-1988 to 1996-1998 From 1996-1998 to 2006-2008 From 2006-2008 to 2016-2018 Males 0-15 13.6 8.3 6.1 5.5 -39.1 -27.0 -8.6 15-25 12.1 9.4 6.3 4.5 -22.3 -32.5 -28.7 25-45 44.3 40.0 27.6 22.0 -9.7 -31.1 -20.4 45-65 207.2 169.7 143.4 122.6 -18.1 -15.5 -14.5 65-80 499.7 434.7 350.3 299.6 -13.0 -19.4 -14.5 80-100 991.3 981.8 974.0 964.3 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 Females 0-15 10.1 6.4 4.8 4.6 -37.0 -24.8 -4.4 15-25 4.3 3.4 2.2 1.8 -20.5 -34.6 -20.7 25-45 18.9 17.0 12.8 10.1 -9.8 -25.0 -20.7 45-65 84.7 72.1 65.5 61.2 -14.9 -9.2 -6.5 65-80 285.6 419.4 342.2 303.2 -16.2 -18.4 -11.4 80-100 970.1 938.4 911.3 895.2 -2.0 -2.9 -1.8

Probabilities of dying by age group in France, by 10-year period between 1986–1988 and 2016–2018*

* Provisional data for the 2016–2018 life table.
Coverage: Metropolitan France.

81Not all components of infant mortality are affected in the same way by this stagnation (Figure 19). The post-neonatal mortality rate (deaths between the end of the first month of life up to the first birthday) stabilized at around 3.7–3.8 per 1,000 in the 1980s, before falling sharply in the mid-1990s, thanks notably to the success of measures to reduce sudden infant death syndrome (Barbieri, 1998). It has since halved again, falling from 2.0 per 1,000 in 1995 to 1.0 per 1,000 in 2018. The neonatal mortality rate (deaths in the first month per 1,000 live births) fell steadily until the mid-2000s, then more slowly up to 2011, reaching a low of 2.2 per 1,000 before rising again to 2.7 per 1,000 in 2017 (2.6 per 1,000 according to provisional figures for 2018). The reasons for this upturn remain unclear (Papon, 2018). One possibility is that thanks to advances in neonatal care, severely premature infants who would previously have been stillborn now survive for a few hours or days after birth. This hypothesis is consistent with the rising share of perinatal illnesses (which account for 2.0 per 1,000 deaths), in causes of infant death. Another possible explanation is the steady rise in high-risk births linked to the growing number of multiple births and the increase in age at childbearing.

Table 17

Infant mortality rate in Europe, 2009–2018, per 1,000 live births

Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Austria 3.8 3.9 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.7 Belgium 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.8 Bulgaria 9.0 9.4 8.5 7.8 7.3 7.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 5.8 Croatia 5.3 4.4 4.7 3.6 4.1 5.0 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.2 Czech Republic 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.6 Denmark 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.5 4.0 3.7 3.1 3.8 3.7 Estonia 3.6 3.3 2.5 3.6 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.6 Finland 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 Whole of France® 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 Metropolitan France® 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 Germany 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.2 Greece 3.1 3.8 3.4 2.9 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.2 3.5 3.5 Hungary 5.1 5.3 4.9 4.9 5.0 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.5 3.3 Iceland 1.8 2.2 0.9 1.1 1.8 2.1 2.2 0.7 2.7 1.7 Ireland 3.3 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.9 Italy 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.8 Latvia 7.8 5.7 6.6 6.3 4.4 3.8 4.1 3.7 4.1 3.2 Lithuania 4.9 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.5 3.0 3.4 Luxembourg 2.5 3.4 4.3 2.5 3.9 2.8 2.8 3.8 3.2 4.3 Netherlands 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.5 Norway 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 Poland 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 Portugal 3.6 2.5 3.1 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 2.7 3.3 Romania 10.1 9.8 9.4 9.0 9.2 8.4 7.6 6.8 6.7 6.0 Slovakia 5.7 5.7 4.9 5.8 5.5 5.8 5.1 5.4 4.5 5.0 Slovenia 2.4 2.5 2.9 1.6 2.9 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.1 1.7 Spain 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 Sweden 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.0 Switzerland 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.3 United Kingdom 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9

Infant mortality rate in Europe, 2009–2018, per 1,000 live births

82The long-term trend shows that mortality is increasingly concentrated in the first days of life. The share of neonatal mortality in total infant mortality has risen from 55% in the early 1980s to 70% in the late 2010s. A quarter of deaths before age 1 occur during the first day, a quarter during the following 6 days, another quarter during the following 3 weeks, and the last quarter between the second and twelfth month. That said, infant mortality is now so low in absolute terms that its impact on life expectancy at birth is small compared to that of other ages, for which mortality is still decreasing.

Figure 19

Absolute and relative trends in infant mortality and its components, 1980–2018

Absolute and relative trends in infant mortality and its components, 1980–2018

Coverage: Metropolitan France.

2 – A steady decline in mortality among adults below age 45

83The downtrend in mortality between 2006–2008 and 2016–2018 was especially pronounced at ages 15–25. The probability of dying fell by almost one-third for males (from 6.3 per 1,000 to 4.5 per 1,000) but much more slowly for females (from 2.2 per 1,000 to 1.8 per 1,000), at a pace comparable to that of previous decades. Male excess mortality is at its maximum in the 15–25 age range, with a probability of dying that is 3 times higher for males than females. Compared with the previous period, the slower decline in female mortality has gradually narrowed the gap, however, as the male-to-female probability ratio stood at almost 3.5 in 1986–1988 (Figure 20). Mortality has also declined substantially at ages 25–45 (−20%), at a pace similar to that of the 2 preceding decades, and the gender mortality gap has remained stable, with ratios of probabilities ranging between 2 and 3 in favour of women.

Figure 20

Excess male mortality by age in 1986–1988, 1996–1998, 2006–2008, and 2016–2018

Excess male mortality by age in 1986–1988, 1996–1998, 2006–2008, and 2016–2018

Note: The graph represents the male-to-female ratio of probabilities smoothed over 3 years of age, except at age 0.

3 – A slower decrease in mortality after age 45

84At ages 45–64, progress over the last decade continued at a similar pace as in the preceding decade for males, while for females it slowed considerably. The probabilities of dying fell by almost 20% for males and 15% for females between 1986–1988 and 1996–1998; by 16% and 9%, respectively, between 1996–1998 and 2006–2008; and by just 15% and 7% between 2006–2008 and 2016–2018 (Table 16).

85At ages 65–80, mortality fell by 15% for males in the last decade, a decrease identical to that observed at ages 45–65, while for females the decrease was slightly stronger (11%). Over age 80, the mortality decline between 2006–2008 and 2016–2018 was very limited (−1% for males and −2% for females), and the gender gap narrowed steadily with age, becoming negligible at around age 100.

4 – A growing contribution of old-age mortality to life expectancy at birth

86Over time, mortality below age 65 has become very low. More than 85% of males and 92% of females lived to this age in 2018, compared with 74% and 88%, respectively, 40 years earlier. Today, the increase in life expectancy at birth is increasingly determined by mortality at advanced ages (Figure 21). Over the period 2006–2008 to 2016–2018, 50% of the years of life gained by men and 70% of those gained by women were the result of progress achieved after age 65. This proportion reflects an acceleration of progress in this age group over time. Between 1986–1988 and 1996–1998, its contribution to years of life gained was 40% for men and 63% for women. Examining changes in the age structure by medical cause of death can help to shed light on this trend.

Figure 21

Contribution of age groups to life expectancy gains in years from 1986–1988 to 1996–1998, from 1996–1998 to 2006–2008, and from 2006–2008 to 2016–2018

Contribution of age groups to life expectancy gains in years from 1986–1988 to 1996–1998, from 1996–1998 to 2006–2008, and from 2006–2008 to 2016–2018

5 – Mortality trends by cause of death

87The distribution of deaths by medical cause of death is published by the National Institute for Health and Medical Research (INSERM), the body responsible for coding all the death certificates issued in France and for disseminating the information obtained. In 2020, however, the COVID-19 epidemic disrupted the routine activities of the Centre d’épidémiologie sur les causes médicales de décès (CépiDc), the laboratory that performs these coding operations. At the time of writing, data are available only for deaths occurring up to 2016, as was already the case in 2019.

Remarkable progress in cardiovascular disease management

88The decrease in cardiovascular disease mortality has been the main driver of progress in life expectancy since the 1970s. Its impact has increased over time, accounting for almost half (45%) of the years of life gained for males and almost three-quarters (70%) of the years gained for females between 2006 and 2016. This situation reflects a long-term trend stemming from more effective management of these diseases by comparison with the other main causes of death (Figure 22). Substantial progress has been achieved in ischaemic heart diseases, whose standardized mortality rate fell from 58 deaths per 100,000 for men and 22 per 100,000 for women in 2006 to 39 and 13 per 100,000, respectively, in 2016 (Appendix Table A.13). Deaths from cerebrovascular diseases also declined sharply, with rates of 25 and 18 per 100,000, respectively, in 2016 versus 35 and 25 in 2006. The progress attributable to an overall decline in diseases of the circulatory system slowed, however. Between 1986 and 1996, and again between 1996 and 2006, more than a year of life expectancy was gained for both sexes, but between 2006 and 2016, this gain was just 0.92 years for men and 0.79 years for women.

Figure 22

Standardized mortality rate by sex and group of causes of death, 1980–2016

Standardized mortality rate by sex and group of causes of death, 1980–2016

Coverage: Metropolitan France.

Cancer, the leading cause of death in France

89Cancer has been the leading cause of death in France since around 1990 for males and 2000 for females. Male and female cancer mortality trends are very different. Steady progress has been achieved for males, with a 20% decrease in the standardized mortality rate between 2006 and 2016 (from 251 to 208 per 100,000). For females, standardized rates have fallen very little (from 123 to 117 per 100,000). While the decline in cancer mortality increased male life expectancy at birth by 0.76 years over the last decade, the lack of progress for females is reflected in a gain of just 0.16 years. These overall trends conceal highly contrasting tendencies across different tumour sites, however (Figure 23).

90For males, deaths from all the deadliest forms of cancer, excepting cancers of the hematopoietic system (blood cancers), have been declining over the last 40 years (since 1990 for prostate cancer) under the combined effect of lower alcohol and tobacco consumption and progress in screening and treatment. A similar trend is observed for women, except for deaths from uterine cancer, which have stagnated since the early 2000s and, above all, lung cancer, which has been increasing steadily for 4 decades. While lung cancer is still the most deadly cancer for males, the standardized mortality rate fell from 63 per 100,000 in 2006 to 52 in 2016. For females, it is set to become the leading cause of cancer death, ahead of breast cancer. While the standardized mortality rate for breast cancer fell from 25 to 22 per 100,000 between 2006 and 2016, it rose from 14 to 18 per 100,000 for lung cancer over the same period, largely cancelling out the gains achieved for other types of cancer.

Figure 23

Standardized mortality rate by cancer site and by sex, 1980–2016

Standardized mortality rate by cancer site and by sex, 1980–2016

Coverage: Metropolitan France.

A convergence of male and female mortality rates due largely to cancer deaths

93Analysing the contribution of causes of death to the gains in male and female life expectancy at birth helps to explain why the gender gap has narrowed. One can do so by calculating the contribution of each age group and each category of causes of death to the gender difference in life expectancy in 2006 and 2016. The difference between contributions for each age group and each group of causes can then be represented on a graph (Figure 24) to reveal the difference between male and female life expectancy gains. The age groups and cause-of-death categories that helped to narrow the gender gap have positive values, while those that widened it have negative values.

Figure 24

Contributions of age groups and cause-of-death categories to the narrowing of the gender gap in life expectancy at birth between 2006 and 2016

Contributions of age groups and cause-of-death categories to the narrowing of the gender gap in life expectancy at birth between 2006 and 2016

Coverage: Metropolitan France.

94The results confirm the key role of cancers, which explain 42% of the male life expectancy gain (+1 year) with respect to females. The contribution of cancers to the narrowing of the gender gap mainly concerns adults aged 45–85. The faster decrease in male deaths from circulatory diseases also contributed significantly (explaining around one-third of the convergence). Among young adults aged 20–45, deaths from external causes contribute most to the convergence, with males benefitting more than females from the decrease in road deaths. At advanced ages (beyond 85), the gender gap continues to widen for all causes of death.