Identifying and classifying instruments in the medium term

15The longitudinal approach to instruments and their evolution is liable to nuance discourses in terms of innovation and to highlight conflicts in terms of representations and interests occurring as instruments are elaborated, selected and integrated, within the pre-existing repertoires of instruments.

16For each of the instruments identified for these purposes – 53 for environmental policy and 33 for urban policy – we have filled out a detailed information sheet that provides an in-depth presentation of their origins, their main features, and in particular of the evolutions of the techniques and tools with which they may have been combined, [35] and of the various stages of their careers. The tables presented in this paper list the instruments used in the two policy areas, or at least those we have identified. These instruments were then classified according to the typology proposed by Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick Le Galès, who distinguish five categories of instruments on the basis of their relation to the polity. [36] The following table presents this typology.

Table 1

Typology of public policy instruments

Type of instrument Type of relation to polity Type of legitimacy Legislative and regulatory Social guardian state Imposition of a general interest by mandated electoral representatives Economic and fiscal Wealth producer, redistributive state Seeks benefit to the community; social and economic efficiency Agreement- and incentive-based Mobilising state Seeks direct involvement Information- and communication-based Audience democracy Explanation of decisions and accountability of actors De facto and de jure standards; best practices Adjustments within civil society; competitive mechanisms Mixed: scientific-technical, democratically negotiated and/or competition, pressure of market mechanisms

Typology of public policy instruments

17This paper relies on a systematic analysis of all the instruments used within the framework of a given sectoral policy since their inception. The box below elaborates on our approach to the identification and classification of the instruments of these two European policies.

A comparative approach to the choice and combination of instruments

18The comparative analysis of the forms of instrumentation favoured at European level enables us to account for their sui generis effects on policy objectives and on the forms of production and legitimisation of the EU’s environmental and urban public policies. Comparing the fields of environment and urban policy is justified first and foremost by significant similarities. Their development is relatively recent – these policies date back to the early 1970s, which made it possible to identify instruments systematically. The European institutions’ handling of environmental and urban issues has been challenged for a long time, due to the extreme complexity of these issues, but also to the high degree of fragmentation of the interests concerned, and to the lack of recognition of a formal EU competence in these areas; also, in the case of urban policy, in the name of the principle of subsidiarity. Lastly, in each of these two policy areas, the emergence and multiplication of “new” public policy instruments has been particularly intense (see Graph 1), with the stated objective of making the decision-making system more democratic and including civil society actors.

Graph 1

Comparative evolution of environmental and urban EU public policy instruments

Comparative evolution of environmental and urban EU public policy instruments

19Despite these similarities, these policies have followed contrasting trajectories, judging from the observation of the criteria traditionally used to characterise the degree of autonomy of a public policy (formal competence, budget, organisation). In this respect, environmental policy appears to be one of the key areas of EU intervention. [39] This European policy area, which benefited from an autonomous administration and budget from very early on (1973), is characterised by a high degree of institutionalisation of the forms of cooperation between stakeholders in its development. Since 1972, more than 580 texts have been adopted, covering a growing number of activities and contributing to the global improvement of the level of environmental protection. [40] Conversely, EU urban public policy has experienced a different trajectory and can today only be termed embryonic, in contrast with the development of other European policies and of the member states’ urban policies. [41] The EU’s competence on urban issues was not formally recognised by the treaties and the European Commission’s urban unit (1993) never expanded. This EU policy area is thus characterised by a low degree of institutionalisation, ambiguous objectives and uncertain competences.

The European Union’s environmental policy: accumulation and transfers of instruments

22As a result of our analysis of the origins of the EU’s environmental public policy instruments (see Table 2), we can first provide a detailed explanation of the existence of a multi-level decision-making system, and of the EU’s limited capacity for instrumental innovation. Then, we show that the choice and combination of instruments sometimes contribute to extending the scope of EU intervention, which does not necessarily translate into a reinforced role for the Commission in relation to member states.

Table 2

List of EU environmental policy instruments [43] [44]

Legislative and regulatory instruments Date Origin Directive (common market) Communication Directive (environment) Framework Directive Resolution Decision Environmental Treaty Zoning (species) Notification (products) Regulation Directive (environmental procedure) Authorisation (activity) Derogation Authorisation (GMO) Authorisation (substances) Zoning (management) Authorisation (products) 1967 1971 1976 1976 1978 1980 1974 1979 1979 1981 1983 1984 1988 1990 1991 1991 2001 EURATOM Rome Treaty (Art. 100 & 235) 2nd EAP1 + Art. 100 2nd EAP + Art. 100 International law (+ US) International law International law International lax Sub-national (France) International law 3rd EAP + Art. 235 Sub-national (France) Derogative principle (Single EU act) Pollution control Pollution control Sub-national (France) Pollution control (IPPC) Economic and fiscal instruments Date Origin Fiscal incentives Pollution charges Quotas (natural resources) Public subsidies Burden-sharing Import quotas (substances) Carbon tax (project) Emissions trading Non refundable public subsidies 1970 1975 1983 1984 1988 1989 1990 2003 2000 Polluter pays principle Sub-national (West Germany) International law 3rd EAP International law International law Sub-national (Denmark) Sub-national (Denmark) & international (US) International law & EU development policy Agreement- and incentive-based instruments Date Origin Registration (products)2 Observation network Monitoring network Voluntary Agreements (VAs) (self-regulation) Codes of conduct Monitoring mechanism Environmental agreements VAs (co-regulation) 1967 1978 1987 1988 1991 1993 1993 1998 International law International law International law International law Agriculture International law Sub-national Pollution control Information- and communication-based instruments Date Origin Labelling (substances) Consultative forum Information network Information procedure Labelling (GMO) Eco-label Packaging label Consultation conference Mapping 1967 1974 1978 1990 1990 1992 1994 1996 2002 International law International Sub-national Information principle Chemicals Sub-national (Germany, Sweden, France) Sub-national (Denmark) Information principle Sub-national De facto and de jure/best practice Date Origin Source standards (Emission) Environmental quality standards Target standards (biological) Standardised methods Product standards Best available technology Environmental Impact Assessment Eco-Audit Energy certification Reference documents (BAT) 1970 1973 1973 1973 1975 1976 1985 1993 1993 1996 Sub-national (West Germany) Sub-national Sub-national Sub-national Sub-national (West Germany) Sub-national EU Sub-national (UK) Sub-national (UK) Sub-national (UK)

List of EU environmental policy instruments [43] [44]

23The evolution of EU environmental public policy instruments since 1972 (Table 2) first shows that this policy field is characterised by a particularly high number of instruments: 53. This first finding confirms the EU’s activism in the field, a feature that is frequently emphasised in the literature. [45] But the analysis of the origins of public policy instruments also shows the EU’s limited capacity for instrumental innovation in a then-emerging field, which is our second finding. Apart from a few cases of instrumental innovation, such as the Emission Trading Scheme, EU environmental public policy instruments are derived from processes of diffusion and hybridisation across government levels and sectors (see also Graph 2). [46]

Graph 2

Origin of EU environmental public policy instruments

Origin of EU environmental public policy instruments

24Hence, over the entire period under study, more than two thirds of the instruments (34) were developed, or imported, on the basis of choices made at international level (international agreements, international environmental law, non-EU national projects) and/or in member states. Therefore, according to our data, choosing an instrument to implement European public policy is generally importing an instrument that exists at international level. The instrumental analysis confirms the structuring role of the processes of diffusion and transfer of instruments from national environmental policies on the development of European public policy in the field. The influence of French policy on legislative and regulatory instruments, and of West German and then UK policy on de facto/de jure good practices, [47] is particularly noteworthy. [48]

25Despite what has been written on their novelty, roughly a third of the instruments (16) were mobilised following a process of reorganisation of pre-existing instruments at European level, on the basis of experience from other public policy fields (agriculture, chemical products) or other sub-sectors of environmental protection, in particular pollution control – one of the first issues addressed at EU level and whose instruments were then re-used to deal with other environmental issues.

26The findings of our analysis of the origins and evolution of EU environmental policy instruments clearly raise a challenge to the relevance of the distinction between “old” and “new” public policy instruments in analysing the transformations of EU environmental policy. Between 1972 and 1986, although regulatory instruments were favoured (12), they were introduced in combination with other types of instruments enabling the centralisation of information on a number of environmental issues, either to monitor dangerous substances in the EU (product labelling and registration), or to exchange information and expertise on issues for which EU intervention is strongly contested (follow-up, information networks), such as marine pollution (a theme we will discuss later in this paper).

27The EU’s activism and the dynamics at work in the selection of the instruments can first be explained by the contested character of EU policy in the field until the formal recognition of its environmental competence in the Single Act. Focusing on the initial 1972-1986 period allows us to explain the different facets of this instrumental activism. During this period, 28 instruments were adopted at European level, including 18 imported from other government levels. The recourse to these instruments in favour elsewhere conferred a degree of legitimacy on the proposals made by European institutions on environmental protection – the EU acted either as a conveyor of international environmental law, or as a channel for the harmonisation of measures taken by member states on environmental protection during the same period. This left states and economic interest groups, organised by sector, with a large amount of leeway to get actively involved in the elaboration of these standards, and, at national level, in their implementation.

28Lastly, the choice of regulatory instruments, particularly favoured over this period (see Graph 3), also conferred a formal legal basis on the environmental measures taken at European level. The initial lack of legal basis of EU environmental policy elicited numerous referrals to the Court of Justice. [49] The rulings issued on these occasions have led to the progressive development of a jurisprudence in environmental matters (which is not an instrument), with two main effects: first, a general principle of “environmental protection” was established; secondly, the external competence of the European Commission in environmental matters, i.e. the right to participate in international negotiations with third party countries, [50] was asserted.

29Overall, the choice of regulatory instruments has enabled European institutions, and the Commission in particular, to bypass political and institutional barriers and assert the environmental competence of the EU and its policies.

Graph 3

Instrumental activism and environmental competence of the EU (1986)

Instrumental activism and environmental competence of the EU (1986)

30The longitudinal analysis of EU environmental policy instruments shows, however, that legislative and regulatory instruments were combined with less binding instruments throughout the period under review. These innovating forms of instrumentation have, on the one hand, contributed to the extension of the EU’s environmental competence and, on the other, structured the European integration process.

31The initial choices favouring the combination of directives or framework directives and standards contributed to the institutionalisation of a two-tier system of actors, in which national actors and interests play a key role, be it at European level during the phase of implementation of framework directives, or at national level during the transposition of a European regulation or of its implementation in national law. This approach is thus largely disconnected from the objectives and principles of action, which remain contradictory and based on differentiated representations of environmental protection and sustainable development issues. Over the long term, the adoption of different types of standards largely inspired by choices made at national level (West Germany then UK) had more long-lasting structuring effects on the development of EU environmental public policy. First, mirroring observations made by Wyn Grant [51] on the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU’s environmental public policy can be increasingly thought of as the sum of the member states’ environmental policies. Hence, some of the effects identified result from the generic dimension of the instruments, and can accordingly be observed in other political systems. Second, these initial choices have structured forms of mobilisation and representation of actors and interests in the European decision-making process, in particular economic interest groups. Organised by sector, the latter are actively involved, at European level, in the elaboration of these standards and their respective parameters, and at national level in their implementation. Thirdly, this approach combining different types of standards contributed, when they were transposed to national law and implemented, to reinforcing national approaches in environmental protection matters, as the example of pollution control shows.

32The association of this approach, which combines standards and directives or framework directives with more binding techniques and tools, then contributed to the restructuration of this first form of instrumentation. More precisely, the degree of constraint ascribed to these techniques and tools can be explained either from a legal perspective, with the control exerted by the Court of Justice, or from a political perspective, with the setting up of monitoring systems which included non-sectoral actors and interests. Their introduction aimed at bypassing inertia and sedimentation effects related to the institutionalisation of a two-tier system of actors. The generalisation of the so-called “best available technology” technique, of impact assessments, audits, energy certifications and reference documents, all inspired by national (particularly UK) regulation, contributed to reinforcing the European institutions’ steering capacity in matters of environmental public policy, especially the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. [52]

33Lastly, the introduction of “new” environmental policy instruments, observed since 1972 but heightened during the recent period, was initially justified by the objective of reinforcing and structuring citizens’ rights and the freedom of access to information on the environment. [53]

34Over the long term, it provided the impetus for a process of centralisation of information, data and expertise at European level, first to the benefit of the European Commission. More precisely, in fields where European intervention was non-existent or very underdeveloped, economic interest groups, national administrations and local authorities were encouraged to pass on information about the use of dangerous products and substances, or on various sources of pollution, such as industrial plants. Initially voluntary, these incentives were combined with reporting and measurements of pollution or of the danger posed by the substances or products concerned, with two types of effects. On the one hand, this form of instrumentation contributed to structuring these information and data flows, so that they could be aggregated at European level. On the other hand, and on a more long-term basis, it directly enabled the reorganisation of forms of participation and representation of interests at European level, and the structuring of favoured repertoires of action, to the benefit of expertise and lobbying. [54] The combination of instruments such as classification, labelling, mapping or information networks contributed to this process of centralisation of information and expertise.

35In some cases, such as chemical products and GMO, this comprehensive dataset constitutes a preamble to the implementation of binding regulation on the use, circulation and marketing of products with suspected or actual effects on health. [55] Yet, and in the majority of cases, this process of centralisation of information and expertise has not systematically resulted in a strengthening of the European Commission’s steering capacity, particularly due to the creation of specialised agencies, such as the European Chemicals Agency. [56]

36The analysis of the differentiated roles of information and observation networks in the fields of marine protection, forestry and fishery exemplifies the structuring role of this form of instrumentation based on the combination of incentive-and information-based instruments (see Table 2), although it shows its limitations in terms of the autonomisation of European public policy. Thus, an information network was introduced in 1978 in the field of marine protection and later extended to the fishery sector in order to facilitate the aggregation of data on the pollution of natural resources and environments. Later still (1987), these information networks were linked to monitoring networks, which are incentive-based instruments. As public policy instruments, these information and monitoring networks were introduced at European level to ensure the transposition of international law [57] and limit the introduction of more binding forms of regulation on these issues. Depending on the degree of politicisation of these issues at European level, these information and monitoring networks were combined with binding procedures, for instance registration in the case of fishery, or more flexible ones, such as exchange of data on marine pollution. Their more or less binding character partly explains that, in the case of fishing, these networks acted as a prelude to the development of an integrated and autonomous policy in the field, contributing to the apparition of opportunities for stakeholders in the process and to the stabilisation of the representation of this issue. [58] In the field of marine pollution, however, due to the low degree of constraint of the instrument’s procedural dimension, and the mobilisation of the stakeholders, this combination of instruments only acted as a channel for the centralisation of information at European level.

37In the forestry sector, the evolution of European intervention, based on the combination of an information network and a monitoring network, shows how this form of instrumentation hindered the development of a European policy. In the absence of international legal incentives, only an information network was introduced at European level in the early 1980s, and binding European regulation only targeted forest pollution resulting from the activity of large combustion plants, i.e., conceived as an industrial pollution issue. The monitoring network was meant as an incentive for member states to monitor their forests on a regular basis, but this process facilitating the exchange of information and data (European Forest Information and Communication System), without aiming at their centralisation, was placed under the aegis of an organisation that guarantees the competence of member states on forest protection (the Standing Forestry Committee). Forest fires were also regularly placed on the European agenda, in a specific context of politicisation due to the fires in southern Europe. First, an information network was set up and introduced with the 1981 enlargement, acting as an incentive for member states to take preventive measures against forest fires. With new regional policy opportunities, this first European intervention was extended in 1986, with the introduction of a monitoring network with binding effects. From its inception, the latter was combined with an economic and fiscal instrument, enabling the funding of preventive measures at national level, and progressively with two other types of instruments: a range of standardised methods (good practice) and information campaigns on forest fires.

38The combined analysis of the evolution of EU environmental public policy instruments and of their origins thus shows that few of them are specifically European and that they have been characterised by their diversity since 1972 – and even more so since the mid 1990s. The EU’s instrumental activism in the environmental field does not so much result from its capacity for instrumental innovation as from its tendency to import instruments developed at other government levels to increase its legitimacy in the field. The instrumental approach thus explains the paradox of the status of the EU as a leading force in the development of national environmental policies, even though its influence on the choice and selection of the instruments remains weak. [59] In other words, the diffusion and transfer of EU environmental policy instruments have arguably been a marginal phenomenon in the processes of Europeanisation of national policies in the sector. [60] This finding should however be refined with the comparative analysis of the evolution of the member states’ environmental policies. [61]

39EU environmental public policy is saturated with instruments, which raises specific issues of sedimentation and coordination that are now partly resolved. More precisely, our instrumental approach shows that the EU’s competence and steering capacity in the environmental field are (still) regularly challenged: EU environmental policy is more structured by its instruments than by its objectives or results; a situation that contrasts sharply with that observed in the urban policy field.

European urban policy: the constraint of regional policy instruments reveals a lack of autonomy

40EU urban policy has a long history of failed institutionalisation. The EU has no specific competence in the field, but the urban question has been a key concern of numerous working groups and parliamentary committees since at least the early 1960s. [62] This policy can be primarily characterised by its objectives: [63] over the past 50 years, urban policy has always been presented, formalised and justified on the basis of three normative and cognitive frames. The first, historically, emphasises the risks of urban concentration in a perspective of urban planning and in a context of inequality between regions, while stressing the economic productivity of the major urban centres and their capacity for development. The second frame, which appeared in the 1970s, emphasises environmental questions, quality of life, pollution and resource consumption issues related to cities; this was all reframed in terms of sustainable development in the 1990s. Lastly, the third frame is structured around the urban crisis issue, the decline of the major industrial cities and ports in Europe. Priorities have varied with time but overall, since the 1980s, urban policy programmes have always combined these three elements. Policy objectives are economic development, the renewal of urban areas and cities in crisis, and sustainable development. These objectives tend to be rather broad, not always very precise and relatively stable over the long term, i.e., since the first “integrated operational programmes” implemented in Naples and Belfast after 1978.

41These objectives only provide a very general characterisation of this policy, and give no indication of its dynamics. The analysis of the instruments is liable to give us more precise elements to address its transformations (see Table 3).

Table 3

List of EU urban public policy instruments

Legislative and regulatory instruments Date Art. 92.2 (b) & (c), Art. 92.3 of the Treaty of Rome Additionality Regulation (regional policy) Operational programmes Criteria for the designation of zones Criteria for eligibility (poverty indicators) Zoning Single programming document Regional development plans Community support framework National strategic reference framework Regulation (State aids) 1957 1975 1988 1989 1989 1989 1989 1993 1993 1993 1993 1997 Mainstreaming 1997 Economic and fiscal instruments Date European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) European Social Fund (ESF) JESSICA JEREMIE 1975 1975 2006 2006 Agreement- and incentive-based instruments Date Integrated development operations Co-financing Partnership Multi-annual programming Urban pilot projects 1978 1989 1989 1989 1990 Information- and communication-based instruments Date Concerted research project (on the growth of large urban concentrations) Networks for exchanging good practice Guidelines Consultative forum (Vienna) Urban audit Vade mecums, aide-memoires URBACT Citizens’ conference Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities 1978 1990 1993 1998 1998 1999 2003 2005 2007 De facto and de jure/best practice Date Monitoring procedures Evaluation indicators 1988 1993

List of EU urban public policy instruments

42Urban policy is essentially characterised by two types of instruments: on the one hand, a range of regulatory devices set up in the late 1980s and early 1990s; on the other, a wide array of information-and communication-based instruments complemented by a broader choice of other instruments. The origins of these two categories are quite different.

43Regarding the first type of instruments, their origin is fairly clear: they all come from European regional policy. European urban policy has developed in its footsteps, by experimenting with, deviating from or making exceptions to the rules and instruments of regional policy. [64] The first urban policy instruments and the main instruments for intervention were those of regional policy, of ERDF regulation such as additionality, multi-annual programming, eligibility criteria, zoning or partnerships. There was very little instrumental innovation, and for good reason. After the experimental period of 1979 and 1980, urban policy started to take shape when the Commission decided to support cities. Jacques Delors and his regional policy commissioner Bruce Millan negotiated an ERDF regulation allowing for experimentation, [65] thus paving the way for an array of programmes that came to constitute a burgeoning urban policy. This innovation resulted notably in the creation of an urban unit within the Directorate for Regional Policy, initially informal and subsequently formalised in 1993. This unit was put in charge of the instrumentation of regional policy, but faced across-the-board hostility from the Directorate of Regional Policy, where in particular Spanish actors and interests prevailed. Instrumentation indeed often reflects political power struggles. These actors, and the representatives of other member states who benefited from the regional policy, were concerned that urban policy might serve as a pretext to divert funds from the cohesion policy for regions lagging behind away from their intended recipients – primarily Spain, Greece and Ireland – to the benefit of metropolises in crisis, mostly located in Northern Europe. Other states, such as Germany, contested the legitimacy of Community intervention in this field, in the name of the subsidiarity principle. Alleging the EU’s lack of competence in the field and despite pressure from the Parliament, the Directorate-General of Regional Policy closely monitored the implementation of urban policy.

44The instrumentation of urban policy was therefore constrained. The choice of instruments was limited; only those from the cohesion policy were accepted, with a few twists, deviations and adjustments. Urban policy initially had no autonomy, which is reflected in the choice of its instruments.

45Regarding the second type of instruments, instruments selected on a more experimental basis concern information and communication with citizens, such as consultative forums or citizens’ conferences. They have limited effects. This dynamic is particularly clear in the instrumental innovation of the recourse to article 10 of ERDF regulation enabling experimentation. The Commission uses this article to fund numerous networks of local authorities, neighbourhoods and cities, which in turn become stakeholders in the development of this policy. These instruments first aim at formalising, codifying, diffusing and legitimising urban renewal projects in Europe, as well as promulgating the methods and priorities that have emerged within the European framework. Lastly, these instruments enable the production and comparison of data, either in networks for exchange on these projects, or through the production of systematic indicators, as in the case of urban audits, in order to compare situations, to make European cities more “readable”. [66]

46The combination of instruments adapted from the cohesion policy and of others selected on a more experimental basis structures the evolution of EU urban policy and explains the limits of its autonomisation.

47EU urban policy was institutionalised in the late 1990s, through instruments such as support to networks of cities like Eurocité, the URBAN programme instruments, the Urban Forum or the Urban Audit. These instruments primarily aim at producing information, standardising criteria and categories, highlighting projects in order to apply them to other settings, structuring networks and mobilising supporters of this urban policy. Despite this activism in the introduction of new instruments, the fact remains that everything relating to implementation and funding relies on the instruments of regional policy. These highly visible instruments of mobilisation and information enable the enlisting of stakeholders in urban coalitions and allow for systematic comparisons of the evolutions of European cities and the highlighting of emblematic urban renewal projects. [67] The Commission’s urban unit asserted itself as a key actor through the centralisation of data production, the legitimisation of urban strategies with the European label, and the development of benchmarking of national urban policies. Yet, these instruments contributed little to the implementation of public policy programmes that transformed cities, with the exception of the URBAN programme.

48In 1994, the creation of the URBAN programme conferred a new dimension on EU public policy, and acted as a flagship of that policy (see Graph 4). It combines traditional regulatory instruments and more limited instrumental innovations. The urban unit created within the Commission in the preceding year set up this public policy programme on the basis of several national projects. As in the case of the environment, the Commission combined the results of its own experiments with local projects developed in countries such as France and the UK.

49The URBAN programme was first based on the French “contrats de ville” project, and on the City Challenge in the UK. [68] These “contrats de ville”, a flagship instrument of Rocard’s socialist government’s urban policy, coordinated actions and investments at the level of the urban agglomeration. They were negotiated by the Minister for Cities, the prefect and the mayor; the contracts had rather broad objectives and their medium-term perspectives were not always very clearly or precisely evaluated. Their goal was to fight the crisis in urban areas, in a perspective of urban social development. Then, roughly at the same time, the second main inspiration of the URBAN programme was developed in Britain. The City Challenge programme relied on a competitive call for projects, and the mobilisation of public and private resources in a very detailed yearly contract that favoured economic development and steering through performance indicators. Lastly, the URBAN programme was influenced by the Urban Pilot Projects initially developed almost in secret by the Commission in 1989 in London and Marseilles, two cities in crisis that were not eligible for regional policy funding (then objectives 1 and 2). [69] Urban Pilot Projects made use of the instruments of regional policy (such as additionality) to contribute to the renewal of city areas. Following the initial experiments, the instrument was more widely implemented: 33 projects were launched in the early 1990s.

Graph 4

Instrumental activism and URBAN programme (1994)

Instrumental activism and URBAN programme (1994)

50The URBAN I and URBAN II programmes resulted from a compromise aiming at mobilising French and British instruments, the experiments of the first urban programmes and some Italian projects, combining them with the traditional instruments of EU regional policy: zoning, additionality, partnership, and multi-annual programming. In policy terms, the URBAN I programmes (1994-1999, 800 million ecus, 118 projects) had classic objectives of economic, social and environmental development, but they were justified in terms of innovation, effectiveness and citizen participation. This combination of instruments was used again for URBAN II (2000-2006) with roughly similar criteria, producing differentiated effects on the treatment of urban issues in member states and the development of national urban policies. [70]

51The elaboration and the implementation of the URBAN programme were also structured by the dynamic of instrumentation that characterises this policy field, with a combination of policy instruments relating to cohesion and others selected on a more experimental basis. The most notable innovation consisted of demanding from applicant cities that they develop a rhetoric of innovation, to promote “innovative” urban renewal projects, “innovative” approaches, “innovative” modes of governance. The Commission’s urban unit thereby put itself in a position to grant labels, to progressively codify the strengths and weaknesses of URBAN programme projects, and to rely on networks of cities and experts involved in the programme. The creation of the URBACT exchange programme in the early 2000s exemplifies the systematic aspect of this approach. [71]

52The remaining instruments mobilised in urban policy come from regional policy, including JEREMIE and JESSICA, instruments of financial support to economic development developed with the European Investment Bank. Lastly, the adoption of mainstreaming as an urban policy instrument, consisting in replacing specific urban programmes by a general priority to urban matters in EU programmes, is not very original: mainstreaming had already been applied to both environmental and gender policy. [72]

53Thus, in the urban field, the most important and effective instruments remained strictly those of regional policy. Even if they were reinterpreted or manipulated, this frame considerably limited the institutionalisation and autonomy of urban policy. In order to free itself from these chains, the Commission introduced numerous instruments of mobilisation and coordination to enlist actors, and form a coalition of potential political supporters. But the effects of these “new instruments” remained limited. In terms of the dynamic, the EU urban policy can be seen as the result of pressure in favour of its institutionalisation from the Parliament, the Council of European Municipalities and, progressively and cautiously, the European Commission. However, the absence of a specific EU competence in the field has regularly elicited the opposition of member states. This policy thus emerged in a slightly clandestine manner, based on the negotiation of exceptions to the rule. The first experimental programmes were set up in the early 1980s, and after 1989, this policy experienced a strong institutionalising dynamic that led several authors to forecast the advent of an overarching EU urban policy symbolised by the European Urban Agenda published in 1999. [73] The analysis of the instruments and their origin shows why this policy was subsequently and progressively so easily marginalised, and gives insights into a valuable example of failed institutionalisation.

54The analysis of the origins and of the evolution of EU public policy instruments over the past three decades shows that original and specific combinations of instruments, techniques and tools have been developed at European level, thus contributing to the emergence of differentiated forms of instrumentation. Their analysis shows that these innovative forms of instrumentation contribute, first, to the extension of European competences, and second, to the structuring of the European integration process.

55In both policies under review, the choice of instruments reveals two dynamics of instrumentation, sometimes embedded in time. The first, particularly visible in the environmental field, consists of the combination between uniform standards and directives; over the longer term, this form of instrumentation produces undesired effects, insofar as it contributes to the stabilisation of a two-tier system of actors. The second is characterised by the introduction of “new” policy instruments, justified in the name of the democratisation of the decision-making process, in combination with control devices that mobilise other types of actors. The comparative analysis of this second form of instrumentation over the long term shows that ultimately, it has contributed little to the steering capacity of the EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, in these fields. This mobilisation of actors and interests, mainly structured around networks of heterogeneous actors, shows the limitations of a form of instrumentation aiming at enlisting and mobilising actors for the development of an autonomous public policy. [74] The intensity of the phenomena of emergence and multiplication of “new” public policy instruments contributes to this process of enlisting and mobilising actors other than governmental and business actors, i.e., the elusive “European civil society”. Particularly central in the urban field, this form of instrumentation, which relies on a combination of incentive-and information-based instruments, contributes to legitimating EU action in a field where it has no formal competence, to maintaining existing networks, and to conducting multiple experiments as “guerrilla operations”. In the environmental field, this form of instrumentation has been continuously present since the origins of Community intervention in the field, but it does not have the same degree of centrality as in the urban field.

56Beyond the structuring role of these original combinations of different forms of instrumentation in the development of EU urban and environmental public policy, the choice and selection of public policy instruments structure the European integration process. More precisely, public policy instruments constitute a mode of allocation of resources and competences, thus encouraging the reorganisation of the relationships between European institutions and states, as well as between the European institutions themselves. In the case of environmental policy, the evolution of the forms of instrumentation contributes to the institutionalisation of a two-tier system of actors and interests, in which the European Commission’s steering capacity in the field of environmental public policy remains limited. In the case of urban policy, the evolution of the forms of instrumentation explains the fact that EU public policy in the field has remained embryonic and essentially organised at national and infra-national level.