Modes of public intervention by the Federation of Property Developers

14A first indicator concerns the strategies of collective action utilised by the FPC. The FPC’s various mobilisations correspond to three main lobbying activities: expertise, organization of events and participation in consultative processes. These depend on the financial, social and societal [22] resources that the organizations have at their disposal in order to operate in policy-making; and they are analysed in terms of how they are used to interact with public actors. This analysis reveals lobbying activities which are largely dominated by those developed by other professional actors in the sector.

15Producing expertise is an important part of the association’s strategy, especially in the Île-de-France. But the expertise produced is intended above all for the property developers themselves. The developers’ regional association in the Île-de-France, is, for instance, the sole shareholder of a company which issues and controls a database registering new housing programmes in the Île-de-France. This database comprises a certain number of elements that are not available in public statistics, in particular the identity of property developers and the price ranges for programmes. Thanks to these data, property developers can support their offers and public positions; but above all, they have accurate information on local markets and they are able to compare their market share with that of the competition. Property developers also produce specific expertise on certain fiscal tools, and specifically on tax incentives for rental property investments. These data concern in particular figures about the number of housing units sold to investors and the cost of these fiscal tools. However, I have shown elsewhere that mastering this type of expertise does not guarantee any influence on these tools or on their evolutions. [23] An indication of this is the fact that one of the property developers’ major claims concerns the stabilization of these fiscal tools, while one of the tools’ distinctive features is precisely their high level of variability and their sensitivity to political change. In addition, this expertise is aimed at public actors, but even more at property developers and their clients – we will return to this point in the second section. On the whole, the expertise produced by the developers’ professional federation appears to be highly specialized and tightly connected to the activities of property developers. The use of this expertise in policy-making appears to be of secondary importance compared to the internal use of this expertise.

16Organizing events is a second lobbying strategy. It covers a wide range of activities: conferences, training seminars, symposiums, ceremonies for prizes awarded by the association, etc. In her PhD thesis about property-owners’ mobilisations, Hélène Michel shows that these activities, especially the conferences, are acts of “publicisation of the group”, through which it “demonstrates that it is part of a sector and aims to be part of every discussion about policies”. [24] These events help structure the group as a collective actor and manifest its existence to its members as well as to external actors. Through them, they are able to maintain and to promote the social resources of the group by making these visible. And yet, the information gathered from the professional press and the questions asked during my interviews about this topic show some bitterness, which reflects how difficult it is both to have leading politicians come to these events, and to create one’s own space among all the events organized by other professional federations within the sector. While evaluations of the attendance at the property developers conference puts it at between 200 and 500 attendees, the participants at the conferences organized by the social housing agencies are numbered in the thousands – for 2007, the figure of 10,000 attendees has been put forward. This excerpt from an interview with a previous head of the FPC provides a good illustration of this discrepancy.

17

“There are two important conferences in France: that of the notaires [conveyancing and estate lawyers] and the HLM conference [social housing developers]. Cities fight to organize the HLM conference; it drags in thousands of people and every single business comes. They organize amazing parties. […] Over 3,000 participants register and their conference is magnificent! As for the notaires, they have had dinners with over 1,500 people, notably one in the Town Hall and another one in les Halles [in Lyon] – nobody had ever done such a thing! At the very best, we have 400 registrations and 200 people actually come… On the whole, unlike other conferences, it’s never been a crucial event in the housing sector.”

18Lastly, a third lobbying activity is negotiating and consulting. [25] The developers’ professional association is one of the main coordinating institutions in the sector. For instance, it is a member of the Conseil national de l’habitat (national council for housing), an advisory institution for the Minister of Housing; and of the Association des rencontres construction aménagement du territoire, a group studying construction for the Assemblée nationale. It is a member of organizations which bring together professionals in the sector: the Conseil national des professions de l’immobilier (national council for real estate professions), and the Conseil national de la construction (national council for construction), in particular. At regional level, the regional office for the Île-de-France is a stakeholder in the work of the Observatoire régional de l’immobilier d’entreprise (regional observatory for commercial real estate), and the Observatoire regional du foncier (regional observatory for land use). It is also part of the Cellule économique du bâtiment et des travaux publics d’Île-de-France (economic office for construction and public work in Île-de-France). The fact that these organizations exist and that the developers’ regional office is one of them confirms the necessity of not limiting our analysis to the national scale. But even though so many institutions exist, none of the people I spoke to, either public or private figures, accords them any real importance. They appear to be formal structures rather than actual places of power or where proposals are developed. The formal existence of these structures proves to be of only marginal importance in contributing to the development of housing policies.

Proposals and positions on housing policies: a lack of visibility

19The second indicator I chose concerns the positions adopted by the group in relation to housing policies, and how visible these positions are. The capacity to stake out a position and to communicate it marks out the status of an actor within a policy sector. But the positions of the developers’ professional association are often fragmentary. Proposals are made on the economic aspects of housing policies. For the most part, these propositions revolve around two important themes: encouraging home ownership and supporting real estate investment. But important aspects of housing policies are left aside by property developers. For instance, with respect to social housing, they cannot be heard. Regular perusal of the daily national press enables us to highlight the sporadic nature of the developers’ association’s media presence, and also how rarely they are offered press platforms. Articles mentioning this association’s points of view almost exclusively concern fiscal tools to promote real estate investment, and are almost never general articles about housing policies. [26] A systematic reading of the press packets prepared by Sciences Po’s library about real estate themes [27] reinforces this impression of weak coverage of the developers’ association’s positions in the media. The only file that really deals with property development is with respect to real estate scandals: “real estate development, real estate scandals, multi-ownership in France”, “Promotion immobilière, scandales immobiliers, multipropriété en France” (since 1961). The file provides a very specific angle on the profession. At the level of discussion of a general framework for housing policies, the proposals of French property developers seem to be few and far between most of the time, and are hardly reported by the media, except by the professional press. This relative absence from the press appears to be endured rather than being the result of a deliberate strategy to remain invisible, which would require the group to choose “subtle” channels of influence rather than making its claims, proposals and positions public.

Limited interpersonal connections

20Lastly, as our final indicator, one might assume that these relative weaknesses, internal and external, could be compensated for by other less visible lobbying activities – stable relationships with parlementarians or the staff of ministerial cabinets, in particular. Do property developers favour less institutionalized and more informal lobbying activities? This is more difficult to evaluate, but here again the comparison with other groups in the sector is helpful. Interpersonal connections between the members of the Union sociale pour l’habitat (Social union for housing, USH), which represents social housing agencies, and politicians at the national level, seem to have nothing in common with the potential connections between national political actors and property developers. Several studies confirm and analyse this close relationship. [28] Many ministers or secretaries of state in charge of housing, as well as cabinet staff, come from the Union sociale pour l’habitat or take up responsibilities within it at the end of their political functions. For instance, Marie-Noëlle Lienemann, secretary of state for housing in Lionel Jospin’s government from 2001, is currently vice-president of the executive committee of the Union sociale pour l’habitat. The secretary general of this association, Pierre Quercy, used to be the deputy director of Jean-Louis Borloo’s cabinet when he was Minister for Employment, Social Cohesion and Housing. Between 1998 and 2008, the social housing agencies association was chaired by Michel Delebarre, previously a secretary of state, and the mayor of Dunkirk since 1989. Two candidates, both elected political representatives, stood to take over after Michel Delebarre: Marie-Noëlle Lienemann and Thierry Repentin. In the French context, where the interests of property developers and social housing agencies are frequently in conflict, the latter benefit from much more important political connections. We should not forget however, that this close relationship does not prevent sometimes intense conflict, as was the case between Benoist Apparu, Secretary of State for Housing, and the social housing agencies. [29]

21At the national level, our analysis therefore leads us to nuance the capacity of property developers – as a collective actor – to influence the elaboration of housing policies in France. In many respects, the current situation recalls that portrayed by J.-F. Dhuys in the 1970s. [30] He described the progressive establishment of the developers’ professional association within the French institutional scene, focusing especially on the relationships established with the ministers for Infrastructure and for Finances. However, he refines his description by acknowledging that these meetings have no practical consequences, and by pointing out how the Federation was excluded from a number of important discussions. “It was nevertheless sidelined in important property discussions – especially by Olivier Guichard when the local tax for urbanisation was under discussion – and it hardly participated in the development of housing policies.” [31]

22This ambivalent situation still exists. The developers’ professional association appears as a potential partner, but it has not become an essential institutional partner. Only sporadically are property developers included in policy-making. They seem more likely to make isolated proposals than to suggest a wider renewal of these policies. [32]

23Analysing collective mobilisations by property developers does not therefore explain how their interests have converged with the direction of housing policies. Property developers obtain collective benefits, despite the flaws in their fragmented collective action. The developers’ professional association does not need to be a powerful actor to see the interests of its members favoured. There are several possible explanations to this puzzle. The one I suggest here is to be found in the integration of sub-national levels of mobilisation. Analysing local mobilisation by property developers effectively allows us to include mobilisations happening at other “times” – meaning at the time of policy implementation – and in other “places” – that is to say, mobilisations intended for local governments. This shift in perspective leads me to focus more on companies’ individual mobilisations, developed locally, rather than on collective mobilisations. Such individual mobilisations nevertheless have effects on the sector’s regulation. Other explanations, which complement the one I offer in this article, could also be explored. Among them are the existence of interpersonal links between the heads of the biggest property development firms and ministers, or the highest levels of the administration; or the fact that supporting property developers also benefits other economic actors, etc. Political considerations may also throw light on this convergence. Effectively, supporting a policy with tax incentives – and state resources which benefit property developers primarily consists of tax incentives – enables the government to act quickly on offering housing in order to meet quantitative targets and gain breathing space in the context of budgetary constraints. I have examined this theory in more detail in an article which attempts to characterize tax expenditure policies (as opposed to budgetary expenditure policies). [33]

The role of property developers in the rise of tax incentive tools for rental investment

26Tax incentives for rental investment were introduced at the beginning of the 1980s. They were made more attractive by the authorities in 1996 and their popularity dates from this point. Tax incentives represent a substantial indirect benefit for property developers. Since 1996, between 32% and 65% of the housing units built every year by property developers have been sold to private individuals who benefit from this kind of incentive. The tool works as follows: buying a new-build unit entitles the taxpayer to a tax reduction which corresponds to a percentage of the acquisition price of the housing unit, providing he agrees to rent it for a certain number of years. Depending on the situation, variable conditions are added, either limits to the amount of rent that can be charged and/or means-testing of tenants’ income. [37]

27I have shown elsewhere that property developers play a minor role in the elaboration of these incentive tools. [38] The latter are largely controlled by politicians, as demonstrated by the effects of changes in political power (or a change of minister in charge of housing) on the general direction of incentive schemes. On the other hand, these fiscal incentives provide private actors with considerable power during their implementation. Effectively, state fiscal support constitutes an opportunity that a private investor may or may not choose to make use of, while there is no way for the state to control how many actors will do so. Whether the take-up of the scheme is significant or not is difficult to predict since it depends both on the attractiveness of the incentive, but also on the way in which it is promoted and “sold” to potential investors by property developers. This influence results more from convergent individual strategies by companies than from collectively organized lobbying. Nevertheless, the effects produced are obvious at the sector level. The strategies of these market actors to maximize their profit are therefore focused on spreading a public incentive rather than on elaborating public policies.

28In practical terms, property developers favour the development of these products in different ways. Firstly, they contribute to advertising fiscal benefits in the housing sector. The websites of the most prominent French property developers systematically feature information and advertising promoting the profitability and the advantages of rental investments. Property developers present themselves as essential contacts to provide private individuals with advice on their investment. Beyond this, some also actively canvass through mailing, emailing and phoning. In addition, property developers adapt their offer in two ways: they develop it in previously unexploited areas where market prices make the fiscal benefit optimal; and they offer products designed to maximize fiscal benefit. This is what the report by members of parliament François Scellier and Jean-Yves le Bouillonnec highlights in particular. [39] They emphasise how the offer has been developed in middle-size cities and rural districts such as Corrèze, Landes, Gers or even Indre, where property developers were only marginally present before the introduction of these schemes. A number of property developers are now focusing exclusively on the production of housing units designed to be sold to investors; others have directed part of their activity towards these kinds of buyers. In some cases, whole housing construction projects are built to be sold as financial investments. Another example of this promotional activity is the training offered to salespeople in the biggest property development companies to sell flats by specifically targeting potential investors. [40]

29This relates to Christopher Howard and Jacob S. Hacker’s work on the welfare state and on public expenditure on housing in the USA. [41] Hacker pinpoints the central role played by tax policies in structuring social protection in North America, though it is often hard to see. Howard demonstrates the discrepancy between the structure of tax expenditures and the structure of budgetary expenditures in the American housing sector. While the latter are aimed at rental housing for the poorest, tax expenditures – which are much higher – are focused on home ownership for middle and upper class people, and benefit market actors. Though these policies are the result of public action, they are entirely delegated to private actors. Taking them into account means that we have to reconsider the scope of the American social system. Similar conclusions can be drawn in the case of France. The increase in these tax policies shows how state intervention has shifted to support the market more and more and grant market actors a decisive role. [42] The importance of how policies are implemented is heightened by the very nature of the instrument. Market actors play a central role in regulating the sector by acting at the point of implementation, and directing their mobilisation towards private individuals, who are potential clients.

The effects on sector regulation of property developers’ mobilisations during policy implementation

30To prove the influence of these local strategies on the regulation of housing policies, we need to emphasise the effects of the implementation’s privatisation of these fiscal tools. These effects are most clearly visible in the difficulties local elected representatives encounter in dealing with these incentive tools, and in the problematic nature of their impact on some areas.

31The effective delegation of the implementation of these tax incentives to private actors has made it difficult for local politicians to control such incentives. The whistle was blown on their rapid rise by the media, starting with the “Robien” scheme (introduced in 2003) in particular. The scheme was poorly conceived, in particular the gap between the maximum rents allowed for by the scheme and the diversity of local markets. In some cases, investors who had essentially been sold a tax benefit rather than a housing unit found themselves unable to find tenants for the property they had bought – often in an unfamiliar area – and therefore lost the tax benefit they expected. Many local elected representatives today are reluctant to support the introduction of housing programmes intended primarily for sale to investors in their city. Stormy discussions surrounding the draft law “of mobilisation for housing and against exclusion” in December 2008 are evidence of this reluctance. At this time senators fought for the idea that mayors should be able to limit the proportion of housing units sold under these fiscal incentives for rental investment in their constituencies. What was at stake was giving the elected representatives the means to resist the development of these schemes. The cities where this problem is the most acute are those which seem attractive to property developers and where local political regulation is weak. In such contexts, these schemes have a particularly strong impact in terms of the quantity of housing units produced.

32In Saint-Denis, in the Seine-Saint-Denis departément, political regulation of the production of housing units is strong, and rental investment is at the core of many discussions. The city is particularly averse to the development of programs aimed at investors. Elected representatives cannot openly prevent investors from buying housing units, since that would amount to discriminatory measures. But they can impose conditions on property developers, which generally result in reducing the proportion of investors among buyers. One of the main objectives of a charter regulating cooperation with property developers, introduced in Saint-Denis, is precisely to limit the proportion of investors among buyers of new housing units. Thus a sales offer has to be planned which exclusively targets inhabitants or employees of the city. Moreover establishing a local sales office is compulsory, as is advertising in local newspapers. Political control is thus exercised over the implementation of these schemes. In the case of Saint-Denis, the potential for exercising control is mainly achieved through restricting such schemes.

33We have seen how national schemes can be implemented by property developers, in some cases dodging mayors’ control. The case of incentives for rental investment thus shows practically how and why groups may be especially interested in positioning themselves during the implementation of policy. I have considered the local level as a level where measures decided at other levels of government are implemented. The strategies developed at the time of the implementation maximize the profit that property developers can earn from public expenditure in this policy sector. It is a specific aspect of regulation, that of resource allocation, which is at stake here. In the last section, I will alter my view of sub-national territories, for they are also a place of regulation in themselves, and not only places where national measures and tools are transposed.

Mayors and local political actors: primary targets of property developers’ lobbying

37The analysis relies primarily on Issy-les-Moulineaux and Saint-Denis. Just as in the studies of American cities, it is clear for these cases that the stability of the relationships with local elected representatives is a central element of the strategies developed by property developers. Issy-les-Moulineaux and Saint-Denis are among the attractive cities in the Île-de-France from property developers’ point of view, because of their location close to Paris; the willingness of their elected representatives to promote housing construction; and their political stability – which means that the cities’ objectives are also quite stable. This situation allows the politicians significant room for manœuvre. However we should take note of the limited time period for which the analysis takes place. The balance of power between elected representatives and property developers changes with time, and it is re-negotiated. In Saint-Denis, until the end of the 1990s, the attitude of the local administration was mostly one of dependence, as it attempted to attract property developers onto its territory. Moreover local councils have formal powers, which explains why property developers care about them: taxation, specific urban tools such as the “zones d’aménagement concertées” (“ZAC”), which are areas of planned development, the ownership of public land, and, above all, the power to award building permits.

38Taken together, these elements, both formal and informal, which relate simultaneously to the legal framework for the construction of housing, to how attractive a particular area appears, and to how predictable its political objectives are, are more important for understanding how interactions are structured than are political variables. Indeed these two cities present sharp contrasts in terms of social structure as well as of political positioning. André Santini, a right-of-centre leader, has been the mayor of Issy-les-Moulineaux for over 30 years. Saint-Denis, an emblematic city for the old “banlieue rouge” [46] (communist suburbs), has been ruled by communist mayors for decades. But these strong political roots have shown themselves to be of secondary importance in characterizing the interactions between property developers and mayors. What they “exchange”, the resources they each mobilise, and the constraints that mutually apply, seem to be similar in both cases. This does not imply that political variables are meaningless. They are important not for a direct understanding of the established balance of power, but to understand some of the demands made of property developers, such as integrating social housing in private developments, or introducing price controls in particular. How can we account for the importance of stable interactions?

39Stable interactions enable local governments to anticipate the behaviour of property developers on their territory. If they know the property developer, they may already have established common working practices and the progress of a construction project should be less unpredictable. Existing links make things easier, and may be based on cooperation. However, this does not usually mean that an exclusive relationship exists between a mayor (or a city council) and a single property developer. Cities are careful not to depend too much on a single economic actor – or on a very limited number of economic actors – and they try to spread risk. In practical terms, in Issy-les-Moulineaux between 1988 and 2009 around 150 housing construction projects by private property developers have been delivered, amounting to over 7,000 housing units. Six property development companies have built over 500 housing units each during this period of time. In Saint-Denis between 1991 and 2010 there were just over 80 projects led by private property developers representing about 4,500 housing units. [47] Six property developers have exceeded the threshold of 200 housing units built in the city. In particular, the leading property developer constructed a total of over 900 housing units. In both cases, the developers that dominate the construction projects are large national property development companies.

40For property developers, the benefit of stable interactions stems largely from the procedures for granting building permits. These are determined by formal rules, but also rely on informal rules. As Michael Ball indicated in relation to the British system, building permits are granted on the basis of various criteria, some of which can be specific to a particular place and may be unofficial. [48] Each city council intervenes to a greater or lesser degree, and has its own procedures, steps and conditions which much be respected if a construction project is to succeed. Mastering, or at least knowing these procedural elements, allows the property developer to save some time, increases the chances of the project succeeding, and puts the developer in a favourable position if new opportunities for construction arise in the area. By playing by the rules of the game, property developers established in an area can find themselves more or less protected against competition. Patrick Le Galès shows for instance, taking Rennes as a case study, how cooperation works through a set of rules by which property developers must abide. “The city council protects property developers from the effects of competition: on the one hand, it guarantees a minimum number of projects for each of them; on the other hand, it protects them from external competition. While the field is open to competition, formal and informal rules make it very costly for an external operator to break into the market.” [49]

41In the cases I have studied, the requirements – informal but still very demanding – from city councils are of different kinds: objectives in terms of price control and resistance to speculation (restriction on the purchase price for land, or on the sale price for houses), especially in Saint-Denis; the integration of a proportion of social housing and/or large family housing into the programme; respect for standards of sustainable development; choices of architectural style for the buildings, etc. A property developer who does not respond to political demands runs the risk of having future requests for building permits systematically rejected. This extract from a speech by Bertrand Delanoë, mayor of Paris, clearly shows how the legal procedures surrounding construction permit applications can be used as a political instrument.

42

“With the same conviction, let me say again what I have been clearly stating for two years: I will not sign any construction permits for private projects that do not include 20% to 25% of social housing. […] I am not asking you, property developers, to lose money by becoming suppliers of social housing, I do understand what your expectations are. You want construction permits which I am unwilling to grant unless the project contributes to making housing conditions for every Parisian better.” [50]

43Such demands are particularly rigorous for property developers in areas such as the Île-de-France where very few cities are truly proactive in terms of construction projects.

44Through lobbying, property developers aim to position themselves as familiar and reliable actors, as trustworthy partners capable of successfully managing a project to completion and of being receptive to the demands of local elected representatives. This idea is expressed by one of the property developers I interviewed:

45

“To succeed in this profession, which is very close to local authorities, means understanding their wishes, their issues, and trying to fit in with them, because this is politics… You really need to have understood what they want.” [51]

46Another property developer explains to what extent positioning oneself in relation to the demands of local elected representatives enables one to become “well-placed”, including in relation to political allies in neighbouring cities. He mentions how a project in a city in the suburbs of Paris was sold exclusively to the local market (the developers targeted inhabitants or employees of the city) – meaning that it was likely to benefit directly the electors of the current mayor.

47

“As a result of which, the city can’t praise us enough. For them, this is fantastic, they’ve never seen this happen before… That’s great! The mayor is calling all his friends in the sector to speak well of us. So, this is very good. But it’s very difficult to deal with because we’re right on the edge of what’s legal… It is very tricky.” [52]

48To secure new markets and be, at least partly, protected from competition, it is therefore a common strategy for property developers to maintain privileged relations with local elected representatives. Stable relationships of this kind are achieved through the observance of informal rules.

Interventions directed towards the local level

49The actions which property developers engage in in order to consolidate their position and their connections with political actors are mostly informal; for instance, forging interpersonal contacts, an active presence on the ground, etc. In their positions regarding lobbying, they claim to be very focused on local political life. What is striking in interviews with the top management of property development companies, all active on the national market, is the emphasis on local roots. The interviewees constantly refer to local constraints, provide endless examples about specific cities and the relationship they enjoy with certain mayors. They say how necessary it is to attend the meetings organized by city councils, to take every opportunity to be visible in the local area, to be seen at local openings and previews, etc. The following extract is representative of the position taken:

“For me, the really important thing is to stick to the vision the elected representative has for his city… Property developers are economic operators first and foremost. Their aim is to make money. But we have to do it the smart way because we have two clients: the buyers and the elected representatives. As for us, our goal is to make the elected representatives value us so that we get another contract within the city and other projects… it only takes one project that turns out badly to be blacklisted for good…” [53]

The effects of local interactions and mobilisations at the level of the housing sector: the example of social housing projects

50The results of this lobbying and the balance of power which is established between property developers and local authorities are different in every city. The cities in which land is attractive, where houses are likely to be easy to sell and which choose to promote housing construction, can take advantage of the competition between property developers in order to ensure their demands are met. They do not depend on any specific developer, and those who do not play by their rules will be excluded from their city. In this respect, solving conflicts in these areas is achieved through the threat of a forced exit from the market. Other cities, those which have less favourable conditions, are more subject to property developers’ strategies. But in every case, the mutual dependence of the parties is strong.

51Through a specific example that of social housing construction by property developers – my objective now is to underline the consequences that these local interactions have beyond the territories where they take place. These consequences may extend to the disruption of formal national regulation of the housing sector.

52In France, the housing construction sector is characterized by a clear distinction between two categories of actors. On the one hand, social housing agencies (HLM) are responsible for the construction of social housing, and on the other hand property developers build houses for the open market. [54] The activities of these two kinds of operators are clearly distinguished, HLM agencies being solely in charge of building social housing, and exclusively entitled to do so. This segmentation between HLM agencies and property developers is rooted in the separation of housing policies after World War Two. This legislative framework is reinforced by a strong antagonism between the professional federations representing these actors (the Fédération des promoteurs constructeurs de France, FPC, and the Union sociale pour l’habitat, USH). Maintaining this distinction, as well as the exclusive right for HLM agencies to build social housing, is one of the rallying cries of the professional association representing social housing agencies. On the national level, this association systematically opposes any intervention by property developers in social housing. The developers’ association is just as suspicious of the attempts by some HLM agencies to develop construction activities in the open market. The developers’ association has been campaigning for the opening up of the social housing market for years – in vain. Opening up this market would enable private property developers to benefit from a “back-up activity”, less profitable but safer, in periods of economic downturn, since the demand for social housing is significant and bears little relation to the economic situation.

53Local practices call into question this double structure that exists at the national level. Indeed, since the beginning of the 2000s, property developers have increasingly been building social housing. The logic of local coordination therefore comes into contradiction with the formal national framework of the sector. This local development stems in particular from the fact that HLM agencies are encountering increasing regulatory constraints and financial difficulties when building social housing, while local elected representatives have more and more incentives to create social housing on their land. This development does not concern the management of housing which is already built – for which HLM agencies are still responsible – but only housing construction. For property developers, even if they are sold at a lower price, conceding part of a construction program to a HLM agency has several attractions. It enables them to sell a number of housing units, which often represent a significant part of a project (up to 50% of the available housing) in one fell swoop. Usually, these units are sold before or at the point when construction starts, with no sales cost. This solution has been widely used elsewhere to “get rid of” housing built by private property developers and which could not be sold at the point from 2008 when the property market experienced a downturn.

54The dynamics of institutionalising these practices began at local level. Charters coordinating regional associations of property developers, associations of social housing agencies, and some local authorities have been signed more and more frequently. Among these local initiatives, we might highlight the charter signed by the city of Grenoble (Isère département), the association of social housing agencies of the Isère département and the regional Federation of property developers. Another agreement of the same kind was signed for the Nantes region in 2006. This agreement brings together representatives of HLM agencies, the regional office of property developers and the Nantes Atlantique real estate club, thus linking a significant number of real estate professionals. While property developers play no role in social housing at a national level, as I emphasise in the first section of this article, they are omnipresent in this area at a local level. Property developers play an essential role in the redefinition of what building social housing means at a local level, whilst they are “excluded” from this debate at the national level.

55To conclude this final section of my article: it is clear that local government can represent a strategic level of mobilisation for interest groups and economic actors. Directing their action towards local elected representatives is particularly important for property developers. Moreover I have shown that the relationships that are forged at this sub-national level have effects on the regulation of the sector, insofar as they overcome antagonisms and oppositions that are set in stone at the national level. Thus I have touched on another dimension of the regulation of the sector that deals with the mode – or modes – of coordinating the sector’s actors. Coordination between the actors within the housing sector happens locally. On the whole, the analysis of the local level leads us to reconceptualise the influence and the contribution of property developers in relation to policies. I have shown that this holds for different dimensions of the regulation of the sector. [55] The local level leads us to reconsider how actors within the housing supply sector work together. It also allows us to adopt a renewed perspective on the allocation of public resources through the implementation of fiscal incentives to rental investment. Similarly, the ways in which conflicts are solved are explained by local issues: when there has been a conflict in one of the cities I have studied, local government can force property developers into an exit strategy.

56Property developers appear as marginal actors in the national development of housing policies: they are nevertheless key actors in changes within the sector because of their role in the implementation of certain policy schemes, and because of their actions at local level. Implicitly, this work reveals the limitations of studies which try to grasp the influence of interest groups by focusing exclusively on national government, or which only take supranational dynamics into account. This line of thinking leads me to emphasise three main conclusions.

57Firstly, the value of studying collective and individual mobilisations simultaneously is now clear. Companies develop interactions and strategies in relation to public actors, which may impact the whole sector. Here, the strategies of market actors are focused on the implementation of housing policies. In the housing sector, taking into account both collective and individual mobilisations enables us to study the influence of property developers on policies.

58Next, the most powerful interest groups for a specific policy may change depending on the policy levels, and the stage of the policymaking process under scrutiny. In order to study the influence of particular interest groups on policies, it is useful to look at how interactions between public and private actors, forged at different levels of government, either converge or potentially conflict. This idea fits with Baumgartner and Jones’s analysis in terms of venue, [56] and it builds on studies concerning the Europeanisation strategies developed by interest groups. It is linked here to the question of the policy stage at which interest groups step in during the elaboration of policies. Looking at the local level to analyse the strategies of interest groups reveals not only how groups intervene in the implementation of schemes that are managed by central government, but also how they intervene in the decision-making processes of local governments.

59Lastly, my analysis is part of wider thinking on the role of private economic actors in policies. For policies that are highly institutionalised and structured by public intervention, such as housing policies in France, shifting the focus towards these actors makes changes appear that are sometimes hard to discern, but decisive for the structure of policies. Through their role in the implementation of policy, these actors contribute to changes in the regulation of the housing policy sector. This approach enables us to analyse how, in practical terms, the dynamics of the market and the dynamics of policy mesh at different levels of government and at different stages, and how policies are affected by the role granted to private actors. [57]