Introduction: going beyond technological determinism

1Following the Iranian protests in 2009, the ousting of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents in early 2011 breathed new life into the question of the internet’s role in social movements operating under authoritarian regimes. These movements are often referred to as “Twitter” or “Facebook” revolutions, protests for which the internet can appear as the principal source. This perspective reflects that of a number of works published over the last decade, which were characterized by technological determinism and strongly influenced by an ideal vision of democratization. More specifically, many case studies have been devoted to examples of “resistance” [1] to authoritarian regimes in different countries. These studies have documented the use of the internet by dissident groups and organizations [2] who create internet sites or distribution lists to broadcast their ideas at the national and international level, to connect with other activist networks, and/or to coordinate the organization of protests. Elsewhere around the world, internet users have expressed their indignation about various events or joined movements which are not generally directed against their respective regimes, but which nevertheless put authorities in a difficult position and force them to respond favorably to their citizens. [3] Chinese internet users did this when they posted indignant messages online in response to arbitrary policing and unfair trials. [4] In Iran, the consequences of September 11^th are discussed and western books and films otherwise outlawed by the regime are downloaded. [5] In Saudi Arabia or in Egypt, police blunders or even the condescending behavior of princes and leaders can create veritable scandals online. [6]

2For the most optimistic authors, by braving censorship and forcing the authorities in question to moderate their repressive politics, these online actions chip away little by little at the inflexibility of authoritarian regimes: they thereby constitute the basis of the gradual but inevitable transformation of political regimes. Part of this orientation can be explained by the fact that a great number of these studies were financed by organizations directly or indirectly interested in promoting democracy, such as the Rand Corporation, the Red Cross and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

3However, the diverse studies available have demonstrated that the effectiveness of online movements led by political dissidents is quite relative. Although activists for democracy generally succeed in broadcasting their ideas to a particular international audience, online actions do not always suffice to obtain results from the relevant authorities. For example, the Saffron [7] revolution in Burma produced significant online actions, without forcing local authorities to concede anything. The same is true for the Falun Gong [8] sect and Tibetan separatists [9] in China. From this point of view, we can see that internet-led actions have had varying results in the different countries that experienced protests during the winter of 2011, including Libya, Morocco and China. It would be equally interesting to retrace the timeline of events in Tunisia and in Egypt to highlight their respective differences.

4When online calls to protest do not bear fruit, these relative failures are often attributed to successful censorship. [10] Such censorship can take various forms, be they technical (URL or keyword filters), legal (holding service providers accountable), or social, by relying on social expectations and self-censorship. This is why Geoffrey Taubman [11] and Christopher Hughes concluded, for example, “that the internet will not democratize China”. [12] Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to evade such censorship by using ironic language [13] or ambiguous meanings, and examples of important messages published using these strategies are abundant. Even if it must obviously be taken into consideration, censorship alone cannot explain the weakness of online protests against certain political regimes, just as successfully bypassing said censorship is not the sole factor explaining the emergence of online social movements.

5The goal of this article is to propose a theoretical framework allowing us to explain the logic behind the formation of these online movements, while avoiding the pitfalls of technological determinism. To begin, we will briefly review the existing literature in order to demonstrate that many authors have been unable to free themselves from a dualist conception of “society” as opposed to the “state”, or even to nuance this dichotomy. To go beyond this obstacle, I will propose an interactionist theoretical approach using the Goffmanian notion of “framing”. This concept, which has already been used many times to analyze social movements, has never before been proposed as a means of understanding online movements in authoritarian contexts. However, its contribution seems potentially useful, as it allows for a nuanced understanding of the part internet users themselves play in limiting public expression, and at times in freeing it, without ignoring the restrictions to which they are subject or the evasive measures they utilize. Finally, I will illustrate this hypothesis with a series of extended interviews with Chinese internet users, which investigate how their understanding of public order drives them to online self-censorship, without prohibiting critical expression in the spaces they deem the most appropriate, and, at the same time, without barring them from engaging in arguments interpreting the contours of this public order. Through its representations of internet users, this article will shed new light on how online movements are focused and directed, while often exceeding the limits established by the authorities.

China : choice of terrain and methodology

32The material I am using comes from a study done in Beijing in 2006 and 2007. As China simultaneously has the largest population of internet users in the world, an exponential number of online movements, and one of the most sophisticated structures of censorship, it is an unparalleled example of the paradoxes of the development of the internet under an authoritarian regime.

33The proposed theoretical approach, which involves a line of questioning exploring usage, values and representation, invites the use of a qualitative methodology. [57] Observation of events in situ, “in real time”, in a cybercafé or in the homes of the interviewees and commentated by the participants, would no doubt have been the ideal choice in other contexts, but was too delicate in this case. First of all, such observation presented great methodological and deontological problems (how to be present at the right time? could one take excerpts from private instant message conversations?). Secondly, taking into consideration the political context and the nature of my interviews, my presence around the respondents could have led those questioned to strongly self-censor. With such subject matter, it is sometimes more fruitful to present the themes in question as general questions, rather than inquiring into the personal practices of those concerned. In the end, the most valuable material seemed to be the opinions of internet users about their own practices, about the manner in which they did or did not disguise themselves, and about how they justified their behavior.

34For this reason I held a series of extended interviews with 50 internet users in Beijing. Given the main purpose of my study, I sought not to disqualify those who consulted websites without actually commenting, and therefore ruled out the use of an online survey. For the same reason, it was not possible to recruit respondents through an online ad, which would have overly biased the sample. Consequently, I used a survey company to assemble a sample of individuals meeting a series of pre-established criteria. [58] Respondents were thus selected for their intensive use of the internet (consultation without actually contributing being sufficient) and for their association with the most common web surfer profile: between twenty and thirty years old, urban and active. The profiles of respondents in this group were also as diverse as possible in terms of age, gender, professional occupation (secretary, chef, graphic artist, etc.), wages (from 0 to in excess of 2000 euros a month [59]) and places of residence.

35Over the course of these interviews, face to face and in Chinese, which generally lasted two hours, internet users were questioned about their paths in life, their aspirations, about what it meant to them to surf the web, to express themselves or to react to others’ opinions. In particular, they were questioned about the constraints imposed upon them, the manner in which they perceived or justified those constraints, which aspects of these constraints seemed the most important to them, and the possibility of them breaking certain rules. [60]

36The choice of Beijing and the fact that the sample was limited to one particular profile were decisions essentially motivated by practicality. This study does not therefore presume to study a population representative of all of Chinese internet users, but simply to show the value of adopting “framing” as an approach to studying a specific public.

Chinese internet users and the drive towards modernity

37Nevertheless, the characteristics of this group are close to those of the most prevalent internet user profile in China. At the time of the study, there were 338 million web surfers in China, [61] mostly concentrated in large cities. They were generally younger and more educated than the average Chinese citizen, and they enjoyed relatively higher income. On the basis of their profiles and their adoption of new technologies, these web surfers are representative of the generation born after the beginning of economic reforms, referred to in China as the “post 80” generation, and which also corresponds to the first generation of only children. By their presence on the web alone, they have a tendency to consider themselves as the pioneers of Chinese “modernity” and its values.

38

“If someone is modern, they are obligated to be on the internet.” (Deng, F. 28 years old, 2 years of university, housewife, 18 June 2007) “The internet allows for information to be broadcast faster and this then enhances culture and that ultimately makes human culture progress.” (Zhu, H. 23 years old, engineering student, 17 November 2006)

39They thus echo the discourse on the “modernization” of society and “the improvement of the quality of the population” [62] which is ubiquitous in China. This discourse was first created by the Party in official propaganda, which promised modernity in exchange for social and political stability. [63] This argument can be found in official press editorials, in the public relations campaigns accompanying public policies (urbanism, education, major projects, etc.). It is also relayed in public speeches, which frequently depict the ideal “middle class” family – which owns its own house and car, with a child and often a dog. This ideal family is highly educated and “civilized”. This discourse accompanies campaigns against “archaic” behaviors, such as spitting in public places. Beyond the advertising iconography, adopting this “modern” lifestyle and its associated values functions in most of society as a sign of distinction. In the context of growing social stratification, any distance from this norm contributes to the justification of numerous forms of discrimination towards groups such as peasants or migrant workers. This discourse is so pervasive within Chinese society that such people sometimes consider themselves to be “backwards” or “not very civilized”. [64]

40The role of the media in broadcasting this discourse is of central importance. It uis conveyed via Chinese, as well as (pirated) American television shows, and through magazines which endlessly illustrate the characteristics of an ideal urban style (women’s magazines, home decoration, cars, technology, etc.). While all Chinese people cannot presume to adopt the typical attributes of this lifestyle, the internet allows a growing number of them to feed their imaginations and to appropriate these norms for themselves. Blogs and forums thus play a very important role, because they house innumerable discussions about what the modern Chinese lifestyle should be, allowing participants and readers to draw connections with the preoccupations of their daily lives. [65]

41Moreover, the way in which respondents understand “modernity” serves as a basis for the “framing” of their storytelling, in the sense that it serves as a guide to determine how they can express themselves online.

Framing speaking on the Chinese web

42It is evident that the internet users questioned did not define the rules imposed on them. In particular, they respected the constraints imposed by censorship, of which they were keenly aware. Most of the respondents described it quite accurately, or at the very least outlined its main principles:

43

“If we break the laws of the country or if we say things on the internet which it’s forbidden to publish, if someone realizes it then it’s removed, and I think that there are many regulators and they are very efficient.” (Pan, F, 24 years old, office employee, 500 euros a month, 15 May 2007) “All sites are monitored by the government, and it’s the same for administrators, if someone realizes that there are a lot of negative things on their site, including things not favorable to the government, the government can force the administrator to remove them, that’s happened to me many times.” (Tian, H, 27 years old, 2 years of university, employed in a foreign business, 350 euros a month, 20 June 2007)

44Despite this very lucid awareness of censorship, the limits of the control exercised by the authorities are not always very clear. Neither the exact criteria of censorship, nor the consequences and the risks incurred are universally well understood. Web surfers must rely on their own intuition to understand these rules, or sometimes wait for other web surfers or moderators to warn them. For example, many respondents mentioned having been reprimanded by other web users when they expressed themselves in too aggressive or too critical a manner. The definition of norms is thus done by trial and error and collectively, depending on what people have written. The respect of these rules is guaranteed by social control as much if not more than by the actual or supposed surveillance to which people are submitted.

45Behavior from one person to the next can therefore vary greatly. Tian, who was the most political internet user in our sample, and who held the most critical position towards the government, considered that he risked nothing more than seeing his contributions removed. Conversely, the great majority of those interviewed adopted much more prudent behavior: they self-censored.

46

“You need to control yourself, if you express your own opinions on the internet. Where the government can exercise a certain amount of control, you cannot say certain things, and you shouldn’t just say anything because the internet has no limits.” (Yang, F, 32 years old, zhuanke, [66] automotive industry employee, 320 euros a month, 26 July 2007). “According to Chinese law, even if there is no firm limit, we might not be punished, but we also might be punished. For these kinds of things, nothing is clear, the consequences are not clear. It’s a question of personal opinion, and as an individual, it is necessary to accept the consequences of your opinions.” (Lin, H, 28 years old, zhuanke, sports coach, between 500 and 1000 euros a month, 24 October 2006)

47What interests me here is not so much the phenomenon of self-censorship itself as the subjective processes behind it, which are seen particularly clearly in the last quotation. Faced with no firm guidelines, web surfers are forced to incorporate the criteria of political control into a system of norms which is coherent enough to be operational when they want to speak out online. Here, the question of significance is central: web surfers use a “frame” in the sense that they construct, individually and collectively, an array of explanations which give meaning to the different constraints imposed on them.

48In so doing, they can draw on a number of argumentative repertoires. Certain internet users mentioned Chinese culture, which implies an unconditional adherence to the political regime. Many others adopted the vocabulary used in official ideology, which encourages citizens to support social order and thus political conformity, in the name of building a prosperous and modern society. Thus, faced with annoyances as diverse as disorder, vulgarity, fighting, and also censorship, web surfers value what they call “responsible” or “civilized” behavior, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the continued existence of different internet sites; consequently, insults, pornographic images and anti-governmental posts (among other things) are discouraged.

49

“I find that limits are necessary, and I also find that they even have advantages. If we sent too many things, without them being managed, it would be chaos.” (Liu, F, 21 years old, benke, [67] 4^th year finance student, 16 November 2006)

50This definition of chaos does not just mean an outbreak of vulgarity or personal attacks online. It also includes certain forms of critical and political expression. For example, Zhang is relatively critical in terms of the government’s politics, while Zen supports it wholeheartedly. Nevertheless, both think that public confrontation of ideas is futile, because the interests of different societal categories are fundamentally contradictory. For them, bringing these contradictions out in the open would be irresponsible, “uncivil” behavior because that would ruin the foundations of living together. [68]

51

“No, we cannot necessarily talk about everything, I find that certain people can represent a group, that is to say that they represent a fixed group, like a professional occupation, maybe some people can represent manual laborers, and others can represent farmers, and others can represent white collar workers, but those who speak in the name of white-collar workers cannot represent citizens from lower classes in the society, that’s for sure, and citizens from lower classes cannot represent the upper classes like white-collar workers, and it is certain that they cannot represent each other.” (Zhang, H, 26 years old, benke, decorator, around 400 euros a month, 5 November 2006) “If I start to violently debate things with many people, I don’t believe that after the argument we could still come together and address shared issues peacefully.” (Zeng, H, 25 years old, benke, medical worker, 800 euros a month, 6 June 2007)

52It is important to understand to what extent the idea of “chaos” and the concept of civility, used here, are tied to the modernization discourse that is omnipresent in China today. To be a “modern” web surfer is to control one’s speech and to express oneself in a “civilized” manner, in order to avoid provoking any form of disorder. All deviant expressions, that is to say vulgar, conflictual or critical speech is thus systematically attributed to the assumed lack of education among certain categories of the population and is consequently disqualified. This idea is particularly evident in the comments made by Wu, one of the richest respondents in our sample :

53

“So people who post in forums today are of rather poor quality. […] We need to elevate the quality of the nation. – What does that mean? – For example, if someone starts a new site, they are obligated to control it very strictly. […] I find that internet sites hurt themselves when they don’t take their responsibilities seriously. In the end, the site is dirty, and as soon as it is dirty, a certain class of people will certainly no longer come to the site. They will think that what they see doesn’t apply to them, no? […] In cybercafés, some people chat, some play games, and the rest are there to insult people, yes or no? Their cultural levels are low, they don’t even have a middle-school diploma.” (Wu, H, 28 years old, benke, hotel sales and marketing, more than 1000 euros a month, 17 October 2006).

54In this discourse, it is the very existence of spaces of expression open to everyone which is threatened by the behavior of less educated and thus “less responsible” web surfers. This last quote is from a respondent who wasn’t at all critical of official discourse. Nevertheless, this manner of conceptualizing public order online was shared by the majority of the respondents, including individuals like Zhang, who were relatively critical of the government.

55

“[Ten years ago] on the internet, there was no one, there wasn’t this, well these rather lower class people, because they couldn’t afford the cost of the internet and social expenses. At that time, I found that people discussed things in a rather pure manner, because there were very few people, perhaps there wasn’t this kind of deception you’re talking about.” (Zhang, H. 26 years old, already quoted)

56In short, this suggests, in a rather iconoclastic manner, that certain Chinese internet users curb themselves, or at least apply certain limits to their freedom of expression online. They thus engage in “framing” of a sort, which consists of circumscribing speech within the limits they judge to be necessary to maintain public order online. In so doing, they align themselves with the official discourse which constantly warns them against the dangers of an uncontrolled internet. On the one hand, it is possible to see this as a protective reflex meant to guarantee the continuing existence of spaces of expression that have become very precious to them. On the other hand, it is remarkable that the principles of justification they use support the construction of a very conflicted and hierarchical society. Therefore, social control and self-censorship can be analyzed as the elements of a strategy of distinction among web surfers, many of whom claim to be members of the “middle class”.

Roles, scenes and hidden transcripts

57It is nevertheless important to approach the framing of speaking publicly in a nuanced manner. As Jean-Noel Ferrie has shown, in the case of Egypt, [69] we can consider these norms of speaking out (“civility”) as conventions, as ways of behaving oneself in public which allow interactions to happen smoothly. This does not necessarily imply the adoption of these same norms in other situations. Web surfers can adopt very anti-establishment opinions in certain circumstances, as long as they express themselves appropriately and on the right platforms. Criticism is thus not erased, but redirected towards spaces believed to be private, whether that means they have a smaller audience or a less official status.

58Here, the theatrical metaphors proposed by Goffman [70] are useful to try and capture the nuances that this public dimension of speaking out implies. Goffman effectively suggests that a theatrical dimension exists in interactions between individuals. People play roles, they adopt fronts, [71] and they work on the image of themselves that they want to show. These roles can change depending on the stage where the individuals find themselves, on the nature of their interlocutors, and on the types of relationships that connect them. This suggests that in speaking out in an online space, web users play a role which they deem to be the most appropriate to the situation. This is exactly the vocabulary used by the young man below:

59

“The internet is like a stage. A stage? – Yes, it is like a stage, people play different roles, a little like a TV series, or a play. Whatever you say, whether it’s true or false, it’s nothing but the true psychological reaction and expression of someone in at a certain moment in a given context. It’s neither true nor false.” (Lin, H, 28 years old, already quoted)

60Essentially, there exists a representative dimension in the manner in which web surfers justify the limits they put on themselves. For example, this might be a question of expressing oneself “as Chinese” which, in the next quote, amounts to giving a positive image of one’s country:

61

“For example, when there are [annoying] things, of course I personally think that the government has a problem, and that you shouldn’t limit people’s freedom. But when I look at things as a Chinese person, I hope that this type of thing doesn’t happen too often, meaning things that are not good for the country. We should not make too much of it because if everyone pays attention to this aspect, I think that all in all it won’t have a good influence.” (Cai, F, 30 years old, secretary in a factory, 450 euros a month, 25 July 2007).

62As this quote shows, we should not exclude the hypothesis that web surfers keep a certain distance with respect to the roles they play on different platforms. If Chinese web surfers do not allow themselves to speak about very sensitive subjects on the most public online platforms, that does not mean that they are disinterested. Rather, they move these discussions to spaces which seem to them to be more private, where they can apply more lenient rules to their expression. These reflections explain the initial observation of the supposed apathy of Chinese internet users. As in the case of the American associations observed by Nina Eliasoph, [72] the relative absence of political questions in public discussions does not always signify real indifference. Rather, it is often indicative of a public code of conduct, a way of “playing the game”, which rejects conflict and public criticism.

63And yet, the norms imposed can vary considerably depending on the type of “stage” concerned and the “position” [73] or the status of the people involved in the action. The web is never considered to be a single, monolithic space where the same norms of behavior always apply. It is composed of a number of large portals, which are relatively controlled public showcases, but also of a string of blogs and discussion threads, many of which are a fortiori considered to be personal and private sites by their users, despite their theoretical visibility. These aren’t directed at the public at large, but more often at friends or those in the know.

64

“In general, small forums are pretty lax. We use them mostly to chat with friends. There might be 20 people on the site, always the same. However, on more commercial forums, everything is standardized; people go to the largest sections. – What do you mean by standardized? – Standardized, that means larger forums. They are more controlled, more specialized. They are less personal.” (Zhang, H, 26 years old, already quoted.)

65In such niches, information can circulate more freely, without being controlled by the government or users themselves. From this point of view, the ambiguity of numerous web pages allows for an extraordinary circulation of information, and the majority of web surfers interviewed are pleased about this.

66

“Therefore we often suppress information, and then the same information will not be discussed from the same position. We look at things from a certain angle; we analyze them from a certain angle. It’s national interest that counts the most. But on the internet, there is a lot of other information, which comes from the SINA portal, or from any blog or review, that lets you hear different things”. (Xu, H, 33 years old, construction worker, 200 euros a month, 24 July 2007)

67In addition, it is possible to show that, even in the most public forms of online speech, framing can provide the resources required to elaborate the publication strategies of antiestablishment ideas. In effect, the same points of reference used by certain people to determine their limits are used by others to circumvent censorship in a strategic manner. It is necessary to take into consideration the “tactical” aspect of respecting social norms. [74] For example, when they have a sensitive message to post, web users often choose more restrained spaces or ambiguous formulations. Zhang, who once had to defend a cause which concerned him personally, recounts his strategy as follows:

68

“Everything depends on how you present your comments and everything depends on the subject. Depending on the level of freedom of the subject, we choose the way to say it and also the place.” (Zhang, H, 26 years old, already quoted)

69These strategies are largely used by web users who are heavily engaged in the circumvention of norms of public expression. Humor, irony, plays on words, and allusion are so many “hidden transcripts” [75] which allow individuals to avoid authoritarian control and reprobation from other web users.

70

“Do people often talk about politics? – Yes, a lot. But they talk about it indirectly. – Do you have an example? [laughter] – Uhm… [clears his throat]. It’s difficult. For example, in every country, people make jokes about their leaders”. (Ren, H, 25 years old, benke, marketing employee, more than 1000 euros a month, 1^st August 2006)

71Additionally, satirical content in the form of comic strips and videos cut across the barriers of censorship and of self-censorship, thanks to their informal nature. In such videos, mascots are given indecent names like Caonima, the “horse of grass and mud”, which sounds just like “fuck your mom”. Such techniques are technically difficult to detect and interpret, and thus to censor.

72As Ashley Esarey and Xiao Qiang have highlighted, these tactics are a means of “speaking the truth” with each other but also in front of the authorities. [76] Moreover, the provocative tone of their increasingly virulent satirical content seems to indicate that the acceptability of censorship is in decline. This does not, however, necessarily contradict the dimensions of the framing of speaking out online as described above. In fact, Chinese internet users mock censorship by showing its archaic nature, and by revealing how it restricts the ordinary activities of modern Chinese citizens, even when they are just looking to be entertained. Censorship becomes all the more intolerable when it ultimately denies their ability to present themselves as “responsible” by exercising their own regulation of public speech. [77]

73This highlights the fact that “framing”, which often contributes to limiting the free speech of internet users, may on occasion become a rhetorical tool to justify breaching the limits set up by the authorities.

Battles of representation

74In this light, it is important to emphasize the fact that normative frames are easily blurred, constantly changing and subject to misunderstandings and permanent renegotiations. Despite an apparent consensus on the necessary modernization of the country, numerous debates arise every day around the meaning of this modernization and its implications for daily life. When a problem arises, each protagonist can propose an interpretation of the norms and of their meaning, and attempt to get others to agree with them in order to win the day. Thus we can view a proportion of online movements as fights over representation, during which different actors employ storytelling tactics.

75In this context, the official discourse, in which the government defends values such as transparency, honesty and the good management of public resources, provides arguments which web users can exploit to air their grievances. Every new official doctrine thus becomes a new opportunity which some web surfers never fail to exploit. Authorities often find themselves trapped by the very same discourse they engendered. [78]

76Zhang helped me to better understand this dimension. He has a Labrador retriever, which is illegal because a municipal regulation bans dogs larger than 35 cm inside the city. He decided to use the internet to make his situation known and plead the case of dogs in the court of public opinion. To this end, he decided to present his message in the most consensual manner possible, by playing on the different meanings of the concept of public interest.

77

“First, you can’t compete with the government’s policies, no. What we have to do is to explain to ordinary people around us why we think that raising a dog won’t bother other people’s lives, and why we think that, even for things like rabies, the question of control is not really about the dogs, it should be about the people, and why we think that what people say about dogs in regard to pollution, in reality it’s a problem of city management, not dogs. When I said this, I just basically said that we can discuss this with our friends, our neighbors, and we can tell them that people who raise dogs have rules, and that we would not disturb the public interest.” (Zhang, H, 26 years old, already quoted)

78By mentioning his willingness to preserve the public interest, this web user operated within a frame, formulating his problem using the vocabulary of the authorities, in the hopes of increasing the chances of his speech being both heard by other web users and authorized by those who censor.

79This space for interpretation at the heart of official discourse even gives rise to negotiations with the people in charge of the censorship. The law obliges blog and forum moderators to take responsibility for the contents published on their sites. This means that moderators must hire workers to monitor what’s published, and it’s at this level that the majority of censorship occurs. Zhang can thus discuss with them how to interpret these rules.

80

“Also, since I spend a lot of time on the internet, and I often go on forums, I have a lot of friends online. Moderators are very often forced to reflect on the personal and collective points of view, for them it’s a kind of pressure. People like us are often, are surely the backbone of a forum’s activities, thus our views often get a lot of attention, and if they don’t include politics, if they don’t target governmental departments, if they’re only about the activities of the forum, we can say first of all ‘I didn’t do anything violent, I didn’t say anything violent’. Under such conditions, our speech is not in principle limited, no one limits us in an inflexible manner, in principle at least”.

81This approach to negotiation is thought out and rests on a very calculating analysis of the authorities’ agenda and the propaganda techniques used to impose it.

82

“There are still things we can discuss, […] because in reality this control depends on the specific timing. There is a certain kind of coordination with the government. When we don’t coordinate with the government, let’s take an example; today for instance it’s very complicated to have a dog in Beijing. Right now, the government does not allow stories talking about the advantages of house pets to appear in the press, like the idea that dogs are our friends, and all sorts of articles that might discuss this type of question. Why? Because right now they want everyone to know about the dangers of rabies.”

83As he emphasizes, circumstances and timing are very important. In the case of the 2008 Olympic Games, the question of dogs took on a particular dimension: for the authorities, it was about eradicating dogs likely to spread rabies, which resulted in the euthanasia of tens of thousands of so-called “stray” dogs. It was nevertheless necessary to avoid prompting the indignation of citizens championing the cause of domestic animals and who had already organized protests in 2006. This specific case opened a window of opportunity allowing for more open discussions on this subject, which at times exploited the contradictions of this policy with the promise of a “modern” lifestyle.

84This quote also shows the importance of the role of the media in web users’ understanding of a situation. The press generally channels the official political position to the population at large, thus indicating the sensitivity of a subject at any given time.

85Nevertheless, the press is also in an ambivalent position. As Zhang’s negotiations with moderators would seem to indicate, the main objective of website editors is to retain the web users who participate the most, since the content they produce attracts more traffic. Similarly, print media seeks to increase profitability by attracting new readers, which drives them to discuss increasingly sensitive subjects. In this context, an increase in online conversations gives journalists the opportunity to publish otherwise unpublishable articles, since it prevents the authorities from covering up these matters. [79] As such, internet users, journalists and the authorities (and others still) send each other signals which help to shape how speech is framed on both sides. This reciprocity works like an echo chamber and amplifies certain themes which can sometimes then lead to real online movements, often in a relatively unexpected manner.

86Nevertheless, we should not forget that the same phenomenon also creates a “spiral of silence”, [80] which means that a rarely discussed subject will be very rapidly drowned out by other, more popular topics, or confined to places not often visited. [81] The framing which drives this has numerous dimensions. The directives of the Party at the national or local level have a relatively structuring effect which prevents the most sensitive subjects from being transmitted. In addition, the growing commercialization of newspapers has driven the media to increasingly orient themselves towards subjects deemed interesting by their wealthier audiences. [82] Similarly, the fact that the most favored social classes are the best represented among Chinese internet users induces a kind of social control which does not encourage the more marginal to speak out, in line with the image of a “modern” Chinese society. Social stratification, which has never been as important in China as it is today, thus proves to be a crucial dimension for understanding online movements in this country.

87*

88* *

89Because it takes into account the representations and reasons for speaking out online, the notion of “framing” offers a new tool to understand the constraints imposed on web users. In an authoritarian context, framing does not elude the question of censorship, but it situates it within a larger mechanism of social control. Unlike earlier works on this subject, my approach has attempted to consider how internet users might participate in activities of limitation, by considering power in a relational sense. On one hand, this has allowed me to relativize the effectiveness of state surveillance stricto sensu, by showing the existence of spaces and forms of expression where critical discourse can take place. On the other hand, it has permitted us to understand the emergence of movements in a dynamic manner, by demonstrating that the norms defining what can and cannot be said are sometimes quite fluid, subject to change and a fortiori capable of becoming the object of a battle of representation.

90In China, the idea of “modernity” crystallizes a large part of these battles of representation. This idea, as it is presented in Party doctrine, represents a form of compromise, in whose name the population is invited to not publically question the political regime, in exchange for a stability that is favorable to the economic development of the country.

91The ultimate problem for the government is demonstrating that it can keep its promises by not only guaranteeing the improvement of the quality of life, but also by guaranteeing the ability to attain a more “modern” lifestyle. It is not just a question of maintaining a double-digit growth level, even if that is important: it is also a matter of proposing a constantly evolving narrative of what this “modern” lifestyle should mean, and publicizing policies consistent with this speech.

92Internet access and the possibility of expressing oneself in an entertaining, creative and even critical way are thus essential attributes of this “modernity”. Consequently, criticisms of “old” censorship are becoming more and more virulent. [83] At the same time, these spaces of expression serve as new venues of protest open to Chinese internet users, in a country where other channels of public expression remain almost inaccessible. This represents a considerable obstacle for the authorities who must now keep track of such protests. In a sense, the tolerance of the authorities towards this relative increase in freedom of expression is the condition required to maintain their own legitimacy. [84]

93Still, this increase in the freedom of expression has its limits, which are not only imposed by authorities but also to a certain extent by internet users themselves. The prevalent discourse on modernization is inseparable from an unprecedented growth in social stratification in China. [85] This stratification has created a fear of instability and chaos, which plays a determining role in the social control exercised by web surfers. For the moment, I have only been able to study a category of internet users whose living conditions are relatively comfortable. [86] For them, the last 30 years have brought very real yet still fragile improvements. All mentioned a fear of being left behind in an extremely competitive environment where social insurance systems are poor. The care that those surveyed took to distinguish themselves from other groups (farmers, migrant workers, the less educated, etc.) was also obvious. This translates into the marginalization of certain themes or the delegitimization of certain types of speech, in particular when most critical of the regime. In other words, internet users are not always the most fervent champions of freedom of expression for everyone.

94It is therefore insufficient to raise the question of the “digital divide” in the form of internet access, but one must first and foremost be able to understand the ability of different groups to rally concerned individuals to their causes. Different categories of the population are not equal in this high-stakes game, whether in terms of technical competence, cultural capital, rhetorical resources or even political opportunities. For the moment, it would therefore seem that in China, the greatest room for maneuvering is awarded to individuals hailing from the most favored categories, who are also the most likely to support the notion of political stability. [87]

95Consequently, from the point of view of the political regime, the most dissident stances are not necessarily the most dangerous in the short term, as they are generally removed by censorship or by the effects of framing public expression. In a broader sense, this logic leaves little place for pluralism. However, subjects that preoccupy the largest and most influential categories of internet users can genuinely challenge the regime, to the extent that they erode the credibility of the tacit agreement on which adhesion to these categories rests. Access to housing, jobs for young graduates, and, increasingly, environmental questions are some of the subjects which particularly illustrate the contradictions of the discourse about the modernization of the country.

96Here we thus observe the fragility of an equilibrium that rests on shifting pillars such as the credibility of the modernization discourse, or the perceived risk of political instability by groups of very diverse actors interacting with one another. The speed with which scandals can emerge on the internet leads us to believe that different elements of this framing, and with them their participants” calculations, can change in a very short space of time.

97These remarks support the idea that that which is essential is found neither in cultural explanations nor in simple technical determinism. It is not a question of negating the material properties of forums and blogs, which, among other things, have granted internet users new venues for protests, have sped up the process of the formation of movements, and above all, have awarded them a national audience. Nevertheless, these dimensions cannot replace an analysis of the political context of the societies in question; that is to say, more generally, they cannot replace the traditional tools of political sociology. [88]