The socialist choice to ignore linguistic demands

28Although the cradle of the socialist movement – for which Brussels but especially Ghent provided a structure, a political party and an ideology – was Flemish, the movement was to develop later and less widely in Flanders than in Wallonia. Several reasons, including the absence of an industrial tradition (except in the textile sector) and the extension of liberal progressivism to the detriment of its socialist cousin, explain the feeble growth of socialism in Flanders. But the main reason for socialism’s failure to develop is due more to the Church’s containment efforts. In Flanders, the Church reacted in time to stop the socialist recruitment process, whereas in Wallonia the Church’s strategy was implemented too late. [30] The effectiveness of this move remains surprising to the extent that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Church did not really appear to be well-placed to respond to the expectations raised by industrialization and democratic advances, since it sought rather to slow down the expansion of the workers’ movement. This reluctance is evident in the repressive reaction to the movement to fight inequalities led by Adolphe Daens, a priest, which reveals that in their early understanding of social issues, the leaders of the Church were troubled by the demands to challenge the established order and rapidly adopted a solidly conservative position.

29Given this starting point, how did the Catholic world of the 1890s succeed in turning those social groups who enjoyed social and political power, especially in Flanders, away from the socialist appeal? The real question is rather, given the anteriority of their political and organizational structure, to understand “why the socialists failed to mobilize all segments of the Belgian working class, and why Catholicism emerged as socialism’s chief competitor”. [31]

30In reality, although the interruption of the progression of secular thought in Flanders was the work of the Church, this is nonetheless a cause that fed off failure, procrastination, and insufficient investment by the socialists in Flanders. The answer to the question is thus perhaps partly to be found in the strategy deployed by the socialist movement to recruit the greatest number of workers. Looking first at the industrialized zones, the leaders of the workers’ movement concentrated their efforts on Wallonia. The recruited workers were coal miners and metallurgists, of which there were many in the south of the country. Hence, in part, the use of French among the national leaders of the socialist workers’ movement to target the francophone constituency. The use of Dutch was also low, even non-existent, among the national authorities of the Parti ouvrier belge (POB) [Belgian Workers Party], as evidenced by its exclusively French-language publications. [32] Flemish workers were therefore less exposed to socialist discourse for linguistic reasons.

31Nevertheless, other elements underline the socialists’ efforts to include the greatest number of workers in their organizations, including those from the north of the country. The socialists’ declared anticlericalism did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the rallying of the working masses. Certain key figures, such as Emile Vandervelde, president of the POB, encouraged the recognition of free education and religious associations during the adoption of the Charter of Quaregnon in 1894. [33] This moderate approach, reflected in the dropping of the term socialist in the title of the new party in 1885, was conducive to bringing together all workers, in particular those in Flanders, most of whom had a religious affiliation. Nor did the difference with the Catholic approach in relation to the inclusion of Flemish workers in a dynamic of social and political mobilization lie in recruiting workers from a wider range of socio-economic levels: both the socialist unions and the Catholic unions later in the 1890s, enlisted workers from the same trades: weavers, mechanics, cotton workers. [34]

32However, in important contrast to the Catholic approach, was the socialist ignorance of the Flemish movement’s linguistic demands. This ignorance had long-term consequences in the sense that, ultimately, the socialists’ primary election base was Wallonia, whereas the social and political expression of Catholicism was strongly and above all rooted in Flanders. This situation was to be equally critical for the Flemish movement, as M. De Vroede notes.

33

“The fact that the Flemish movement missed its opportunity with the workers’ movement was of capital importance for how it subsequently developed. The workers’ movement first took shape within the socialist movement. Socialism was not, in principle, anti-Flemish, but it viewed social issues in a context broader than that of an exclusively cultural perspective, and gave priority to the improvement of workers’ material conditions. The socialists […] misunderstood the possibilities that the combination of language and class oppositions contained, when in fact they could be cumulated.” [35]

34There was certainly no antinomy between the socialist class struggle and the linguistic battle of the Flemish movement. The two even joined forces to challenge certain privileges of the dominant classes, which meant the bourgeoisie for the socialists, and the francophones for the Flemish-speakers. From 1830, those who held economic power and those who did not speak the people’s language were one and the same. They were the two faces of the same actor, the francophone bourgeoisie of Flanders, Brussels, and Wallonia, who could be blamed both for the precariousness of workers’ rights and the refusal to improve the status of Dutch. The socialists were even sensitive to the balanced use of the languages in public administration. There were few things to discourage them from supporting the demands of the Flemish movement, which would have added a cultural dimension to the struggle for material rights; and the Flemish movement could have benefited from the broad political base it lacked.

35However the socialists made the decision to center their fight primarily on securing a change in the social situation of workers from an essentially material point of view. It also declared an anti-religious stance and an uncompromising vision of class struggle, which may have put off the Flemish petite bourgeoisie, which favored a more conciliatory vision of relations with the upper social classes. This may partly explain the lack of liaison between socialism and Flemish nationalism. But none of the above predetermined the missed opportunity. All throughout the nineteenth century, the Flemish liberals who had the most significant presence in the Flemish movement were the most visible proponents for the “restitution of [linguistic] rights”. [36] Anticlericalism was not an element unknown to the Flemish movement, which readily accommodated its anti-religious members so long as they contributed to the linguistic struggle.

36To a certain extent, the outcome of these dilemmas contradicts the prediction that the socialists would have found a natural ally in the Flemish movement to overturn the economic and linguistic privileges of the bourgeoisie. In doing so, it highlights the environment of contingency surrounding this choice. After the missed opportunity for the socialist workers movement and the Flemish movement came the successful blend of linguistic demands with the aspirations of the Christian workers’ movement.

The Catholics’ choice to support Flemish linguistic grievances

37In the race against the socialists to recruit the greatest number of workers, the Catholic unions, on the other hand, took up Flemish linguistic grievances. Unlike the socialist leaders who never, either in Ghent or, particularly, in Brussels turned to the issue of language equality – despite its popularity among certain workers – the Catholics managed to get hold of the issue and include it in their framework of demands. Even if, “in many ways it is paradoxical that the Catholics should outflank the socialists in this respect. The upper levels of the Catholic Church in Flemish areas were heavily Francophone, and the Church strongly identified with the Francophone national government that had given it both financial support and the freedom to run its own affairs”. [37]

38Faced with the transformation of the working-class landscape, the Church reacted strongly, attempting to hamper socialist progression within the working class. Putting an end to the ban on political activity in 1891 by issuing the Rerum Novarum encyclical, the Vatican simultaneously encouraged Catholics to form unions with the specific objective of undermining the socialist hold. In was in this context that the first – conservative and paternalist – Catholic unions took shape. Around 1891 in Ghent, Arthur Verhaegen, a renowned Catholic, took it upon himself to bring together certain neutral – that is to say non-socialist – unions, with groups of Catholic workers. This coming together absorbed the independent unions into the realm of the majority religion’s political activities. They became Catholic unions encompassed in the “Antisocialistische Werkliedenbond” (Antisocialist Workers’ League) created in December 1890. From the beginning, they positioned themselves in direct opposition to the socialists, in line with the Church’s policy of containing the expansion of anticlerical thought and protest against the established order. [38] They also worked to form unions constituted of workers whom the socialists had ignored: the workers in the suburbs, women, commuters from country villages, unqualified workers, and of particular interest to us, Flemish workers.

39It was on the language issue, which had been largely neglected by the socialists, that Christian unionism was able to set itself apart. Supported in their efforts by the lower-ranking clergy, which was closer to the people, the Catholics moderately but determinedly endorsed the linguistic struggle. The duality of the National Federation of Catholic Unions, comprised of two organizations, one Flemish and the other francophone, allowed for the regular organization of Flemish social weeks, to discuss not only social matters, but also the failures in terms of language rights. [39] The exclusively national structure of the Belgian Workers Party did not allow, on the other hand, for debates more specific to Flanders to blossom. In parliament, it was the Catholic deputies who most often introduced and voted on laws which brought linguistic advances, such as the law recognizing Dutch as the second national language in 1898. Using the linguistic issue as a medium, was also a way for the Catholic Party to become predominant. For instance, it opposed military service spread over several years, which, they claimed, as well as contributing to the catastrophic depopulation of the countryside by young people, posed the additional difficulty of professional development in a military body in which French, which most young people did not know, was the official language. [40]

40In the wake of the successful union between the antisocialist workers movement and the Flemish movement many Flemish nationalists were drawn towards Christian democracy, which brought together Catholic workers’ organizations with progressive tendencies. Christian democracy thus became a pillar of the Flemish movement and its political expression, and definitively reinforced its Catholic component to the detriment of its liberal counterpart, despite the latter’s hold on power throughout the nineteenth century. [41] The deliberate inclusion of the linguistic dimension and the initiatives that accompanied this decision made Christian unionism “quantitatively more widespread in Flanders than in Wallonia […] better matching Flemish cultural identity: that will be its strength”. Better adapted to the economic, social, and cultural fabric of the north of the country, Flemish leadership was clear about this, while there simultaneously existed a ‘certain overlap between the Christian workers’ movement and the Flemish movement”. [42]

The power mechanism

51Explanations for institutional persistence based on power relations posit that the newly created structural framework inequitably distributes costs and benefits. Preserving institutional continuity is thus eminently contentious, as it is based upon the diverging interests of actors who do not identically profit from the new order. Certain actors gain strength from this change at the expense of other actors. The group with newfound advantage may previously have been less powerful, perhaps even dominated. But it will use its power gain to consolidate the institution and further destabilize the power relations with the disadvantaged group. Thus, the appearance of a new structural framework “alter[s] the power structure within society by strengthening previously subordinate actors at the expense of previously dominant ones”. [47]

52The advent of a series of new alliances, which allowed for the formation of a majority sociopolitical category in the two regions, led to a real change in the power structure in the sense described above. The formerly marginalized Flemish were able to make gains thanks to their recent connection with the Catholics, who tightened their grip on power, whereas previously they had alternated power with the liberals. From the last decade of the nineteenth century, the process of adoption of linguistic legislation consolidated and broadened its areas of intervention. [48] This period corresponds in its entirety to the Catholic Party’s accession to power in 1884, which it would hold onto, and would govern the country without sharing that power for thirty years.

53The dominant force – the francophone bourgeoisie – lost some of its power. In addition to the marginalization of the liberal party, which included a good number of leading figures of the traditional political elite, as a result of the establishment of universal suffrage in 1893, the majority of representatives of this francophone bourgeoisie were sidelined from the top levels of the Catholic Party after the First World War and the establishment of a uninominal voting system based on universal suffrage in 1919. Broadly speaking, the Flemish wing of the party was strengthened by the votes of supporters of the Flemish movement. Thus, in the 1921 elections, 46 of the 80 seats secured by the Catholics were attributable to the Flemish section. [49] The universalization of electoral suffrage magnified the effects of the structural framework. It boosted the Flemish issue and the popularity of actors who supported it, while penalizing those who countered it.

54In parallel, the emerging forces – namely the socialists – had to wait for decades before acceding to power. In the 1912 elections, liberals and socialists came together in the hope of putting an end to Catholic domination. But the cartel of the left, the majority in Wallonia, was defeated at the national Belgian level by a gap of only 75,456 votes, which was sufficient, however, to confer an absolute majority status on the Catholics once again. [50]

Shifting the axis of conflict: from class struggle to the territorialization of conflict

57In 1870 in Flanders and Brussels the francophone side took a defensive stance on the first laws introducing Dutch into the administration. These beginnings of the Walloon movement were instigated by francophone civil servants who had emigrated from Wallonia to Flanders. In Brussels in 1888, the Walloon Propaganda Society was founded, pursuing the objective of maintaining the predominance of French culture as the cement of national unity, and of defending the positions of Walloon civil servants which were threatened. The first public demonstrations by the Walloon movement pushed for a unilingual Belgium united around francophone culture. [51] The opposition subsequently won over the liberal socialist groups in Wallonia as a result of the Catholic dominance of the government from 1884. [52]

58It was the realization that “the Flemish national movement and Catholicism were, after all, indivisibly linked in the reality of political power and in the collective imagination” [53] which altered the support of the Belgian Workers Party (POB) for linguistic equality. In 1898, its deputies had voted overwhelmingly for the Coremans-Devriendt law recognizing language equality. The Catholics’ continued hold on power and close connection with the Flemish national movement convinced the POB, whose deputies were primarily from the Walloon constituencies, to omit language equality from its 1909 program. The legislative and provincial elections of June 1912 which saw the defeat of the POB-liberal cartel provoked an exasperated reaction in the face of the repeated marginalization of the smaller Wallonia. Strikes exploded in Hainaut. In Liege, incidents degenerated and four demonstrators were killed. In August 1912, Jules Destrée, socialist deputy for Charleroi, published his letter to the King expressing what is described as a dynamic of community differentiation in these terms: “In Belgium there are Walloons and Flemings, there are no Belgians.” [54]

59The linguistic law of 1932 was a vehicle for these reactions. It was inspired by the principle of regional homogeneity and the desire of the Walloons to sanction the principle of language territoriality out of fear of a generalized bilingualism. The reaction of the Walloon movement thus had several effects.

601/ The axis of conflict shifted. The principle battle fought by the Flemish movement was oriented towards the francophone Flemish elite, the “fransquillons”, essentially a class struggle within Flanders. The socialists were initially favorable to linguistic advances. But the concretization of the alliance between Catholics and the Flemish nationalist movement during the critical juncture and its control over the exercise of power changed the situation, and provoked a Walloon and socialist reaction, resulting in an association with the francophone center against the extension of Dutch. The Walloon rejection triggered by the structural framework and its consequences evolved from integral unilingualism to a defense of bilingualism in Flanders, and finally to the recognition of the unilingualism of both regions.

612/ Simultaneously, the conflict became territorialized. The linguistic boundary was enacted in 1932, while the Brussels district became bilingual. From then on, Flemish and Walloon nationalists sought to defend the cultural and linguistic integrity of each region. “This choice for territorial unilingualism set the country on course for territorial rather than group conflict”, [55] announcing from the outset the shape of future reforms, and signposting a federal state.

The Royal Question

64The Royal Question refers to the political crisis provoked by the nagging issue during the post-war years of the return of King Leopold III to Belgium at the end of his captivity in Germany. The referendum on the return of the king organized in March 1950 led to the emergence of a double majority, but with opposing results: 72.2% of Flanders voted in favor of the king’s return, whereas 58% of Wallonia and 52% of Brussels voters rejected his re-accession to the throne. But the overall outcome of the referendum was favorable, on the national level, to the lifting of the impossibility of sovereign reign and to the return of the king. Riots immediately broke out in Wallonia, with incidents leaving several dead. When the king returned to the country, he finally renounced the throne and abdicated in favor of his son.

65Although the Royal Question unfolded at the intersection of cleavages, its conclusion – which sparked a rebellion in Wallonia and trauma in Flanders – had to do with the cumulative effect of the superimposition of two cleavages: the philosophical and the communitarian. During the crisis, in effect, “little by little, the traditional cleavages of Belgian politics and those that were revealed by the royal question started to coincide, such that the conflict began to resemble a confrontation between a Catholic and conservative Flanders and a secular and leftist Wallonia”. [58]

66Sometimes described as a typical case of cleavage intersection, [59] the Royal Question was concluded in reality on the basis of a cumulative effect that rendered ineffective this very real intersection’s power to limit tensions. Prior to the referendum, the Catholics favored the return of the king while the socialists opposed it. Here we have a Catholic/secular cleavage dividing the two communitarian sides (intersection of cleavages). The conflict was still contained, among the elite, by the left- and right-wing parties (conflict regulation). After the referendum and the clarity of the results, the cumulative effect of the two cleavages, activated both in terms of political domination by a simultaneously communitarian and philosophical majority and in terms of collective representation, played out to its full potential (conflict intensification). This then became a Flemish/Walloon cleavage on which the philosophical cleavage was traced.

67From the outset, the outcome of this historical episode begged the question of greater regional autonomy. In effect, “the royal question seems to end with a Walloon left victory which succeeds in preventing the return of Leopold III as desired by the Flemish. For the latter, getting rid of the king, experienced as a humiliation, revived their claims in favor of structural reforms”. [60]

The general strike of winter of 1960-1961

68The general strike followed the Eyskens administration’s decision, against a background of decolonization, to implement a significant austerity program which was introduced in a legislative text called the Loi unique (Single Law). This particularly uncompromising strike was undertaken primarily in Wallonia by the General Belgian Workers Federation (FGBT), under the iron rule of union activist André Renard. Although this social uprising was a failure in relative terms, its impact on community relations is notable.

69Following this social struggle, Flemish politicians came out “frightened by the perspective of a ‘collectivist’ Wallonia”. [61] The impression left by the isolation of the Walloon mobilization was accentuated by Cardinal Van Roey’s message to the workers of the Confederation of Christian Unions/Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond, dissuading them from joining the strike. The leaders of the Christian unions were also closely linked to certain socio-Christian ministers. These ministers were about to succeed in eliminating the linguistic section of the census, hence the willingness of the Catholic world, which strongly supported this Flemish demand, to avoid destabilizing the government by supporting the strike. [62]

70At the very moment when Catholic workers seemed convinced by the action taken by their socialist colleagues, the nature of the link between the Christian unions and the Flemish political world played a role that would impede the social mobilization of Catholics even around causes they did support, leaving the Walloon part of the FGTB to face the government alone. It was in this context that André Renard judged that “the Loi unique is yet another law imposed by one part of the country on the other part of the country”. [63]

71In the aftermath of the social uprising of the winter of 1960-1961, André Renard created the Walloon Popular Movement aiming to “deliver Wallonia from the yoke of clerical Flemish conservatism. It seemed to him that it would not be possible to realize salutary economic and political structural reforms for Wallonia in a state dominated by a Flemish majority who self-identified as conservative. Federalist tendencies would come to express themselves increasingly vigorously in Wallonia”. [64] Under the effects of the constraints imposed by the nature of the alliances between the Christian workers’ movement and the Flemish movement, a growing awareness of the need for structural reform developed among the Walloons.

The increasing autonomy model

74The gradual completion of the process of federalization begun in 1970 established a system of progressive autonomy which is still in force in Belgium. Multiple factors play a role in the dynamic, synonymous with continual change, which underlies increasing autonomy. The formation of the political elite in particular, and its election at regional level, means that the legitimization of the decision-making process operates within the public opinion of each community. Given that “Belgian general interest” has no representatives in the absence of federal constituencies, centrifugal tendencies are part of the rationale of the electoral system. In certain respects, there is reason to think that institutional reforms will continue in the absence of communitarian mobilization, given that the success of regionalization has institutionalized the dynamic of power transfer towards the federated entities. [65]

75As the result of actors’ response to opt for community differentiation when faced with the critical juncture, these different elements, which regularly challenge the prerogatives of the federal state, constitute recurring sources of blockages in the formation of governments or in the resolution of certain current issues. Thus, it took over a year and a half of negotiations following the June 2010 elections for the federal government to finally be constituted. The dispute that shook Belgian political life for decades was primarily related to the elimination, in Flemish territory, of an electoral and judicial district, Bruxelles-Halle-Vilvorde, which comprised a majority of francophones. Elected on a community basis, like the francophone parties, the Flemish parties pushed for the principle of territoriality to be respected, and in the end triumphed over the former, who accepted the compromise in order to preserve the federal state’s powers to reallocate wealth. Other contentious issues, such as economic reforms, have seen a majority right-wing Flanders oppose a majority left-wing Wallonia. In the background, we can clearly identify the cause of current conflicts. These are always linked back to the trajectory of Belgian political development, which pursued territorial differentiation based on divergent ideological constructions.

76In sum, this progressive autonomy model follows its course. Set in motion by the resolution of conflicts in the post-critical juncture period, situated between the beginning of the twentieth century and the 1960s, this course was in turn subjected, in many ways, to processes of self-reinforcement that with each step brought about further advances down the same path. By creating situations in which incompatible interests are likely to be expressed, increasing autonomy fuels current communitarian conflicts – which, analytically, appear as the epiphenomena of this model.

77*

78* *

79The approach taken throughout this analysis has been to apply the concept of path dependence in order to evaluate the role of the past in Belgian community relations. By reconsidering the Belgian case in light of the historicity of the communitarian conflict between Flemish-speakers and francophones, I have demonstrated the usefulness of this approach as a relevant analytical angle for understanding the emergence of communitarian groupings and the institutional trajectories that ensue. More specifically, the identification of a critical juncture, crucial for the future development of community relations, helps us to grasp that the conflict between francophones and Flemish-speakers was not inevitable in terms of historical development.

80This assessment is clearly distinct from the most often-repeated reading of the communitarian conflict, which finds a reflection not just in everyday understanding of the situation but also in numerous political speeches. [66] This reading suggests that the opposition between Flemish-speakers and francophones concerning the incessant redefinition of the perimeter of the common state structure that constitutes the federal state is the outcome of the cohabitation of two distinct cultures within a shared political space. The cultural disparities, which imply deep divisions, represent the primary explanatory factor for the crises experienced by Belgium. The emphasis placed on these tensions echoes the vision that plural societies are primarily “defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict”, [67] the inevitable emergence of which arises from the diversity of “values, […] a profound source of instability”. [68] This perspective, essentialist in overtone, holds the original cultural differentiation of a political collectivity responsible for the appearance of incompatible objectives among its components, laying the foundations for a conflict that would unfold, in the Belgian context, “between natural objective entities” shaped by an implacable deep-seated opposition. [69]

81However, the quantitative studies that examined the correlation between social heterogeneity and conflict highlight in certain cases the absence of a relationship between the two phenomena. [70] Yet, they do emphasize the role of external factors that seem to further increase the probability of conflicts in societies split by communitarian cleavages, than in less fragmented societal configurations. [71] The analysis developed here proceeds in the same direction. It indicates that initial linguistic diversity only becomes a decisive political issue when cultural markers are politicized by factors not inherent to pluralism. The changing perception of these markers may be due to the intervention of exogenous historical factors, such as ideology, or even the contingency of events, which makes the cultural scope of diversity more complicated. In other words, the presence of cultural pluralism, in itself, has no contentious effect. The two identity and politico-geographical referents that are Flanders and Wallonia did not pre-date the political entity which oversaw their emergence: they are the fruit of a specific interaction that only happened after the creation of Belgium. Following this line of thought, this article highlights the fact that linguistic groups were crystallized at the end of the nineteenth century only through a process marked by relatively contingent choices regarding how to integrate the different emerging actors of the period into the political sphere. The boundaries of linguistic groups, their symbolic systems, their repertoires of collective action, were thus not fixed from the beginning by the existence of two cultural spheres, of Latin or Germanic origins, within Belgium.

82Thus the perspective adopted restores the influential role of collective orientations against the vision that perceives the conflict as a consequence or extension of linguistic difference. Furthermore, it re-establishes the contingency of identity formulations against “primordialist” visions which lend credence to the idea of the natural character of community groupings; and argues for the importance of actors’ collective choice over the course of history, as opposed to progression supposedly historically predetermined by cultural differences. [72] In the words of Flemish historian L. Wils, it should be noted that “the ethnic opposition between Walloons and the Flemish arises from ideological opposition”. [73] After untangling the contingency of choices from the intricate web of relations built around workers’ issues, the resulting order is immediately subjected to reinforcement mechanisms. These mechanisms re-establish a determinism that is visible when we attribute to the course of history an almost irreversible objective of increasing autonomy.

83By also articulating the varied dynamics of political development, path dependence theory reveals itself to be particularly fruitful for explaining the evolution of plural societies. When we account effectively for contingency, this allows us, for instance, to recognize the phases of “identity uncertainty” that these societies have experienced. Without this account, the history of political communities would lose sight of the unnecessary and constructivist nature of the genesis of sociopolitical actors, and consequently of the particular historical process through which pluralism is organized within state structures. Moreover, in the context of plural societies, this process appears strongly to depend on the consequences of periods of politicization of identities during the early phases of state consolidation. This moment, which witnesses the development of the shape of national groups, is unique in that it produces effects that have a pronounced impact on a community’s later development.

84Therefore, the type of power relation established as a consequence of identity politicization can determine the trajectories of political change in the long run, giving rise, depending on the configuration of relations which develop between dominants and subordinates, to unstable and contentious institutional models or practices. In particular, as A. R. Zolberg remarks, “Where there has existed a long history of cultural inequality, its consequences are so deeply imbedded in the general culture of the relevant society […] that the process of rectification of wrongs is almost endless”. [74] In other words, when conflicts start from a situation of power imbalance which is, moreover, established simultaneously with the development of communitarian categories, the resulting struggle between the relevant actors persists beyond its social or economic causes; it becomes part of the rationale of perpetuation of symbolic systems and internal networks of solidarity. To this perceptual origin of conflicts is added the role of formal institutions that plural societies often inherit from their past identity politicization. Institutional characteristics (the distribution of power among groups, political economy, etc.), by creating a unique sociopolitical environment which contributes to the definition of actors’ preferences, shape the collective orientations that may then develop in a direction which fosters processes of instability or, on the contrary, political immobility.

85The “conflictual” trajectory that may emerge is not, however, inevitable, as other paths leading to lower-intensity conflict are generally possible alternatives. The trajectory is not definitive either, because although it is maintained by deterministic development, the advent of other historical conditioning can put an end to it, leading to a re-composition of the identity landscape and the reactivation of a new institutional sequence.