1Election results do not necessarily reflect voters’ preferences. Condorcet was the first to argue this with his famous paradox, which is routinely tested in studies regarding voting patterns. [1] Here, however, we would like to examine a different discrepancy: that which exists between voter preferences for a particular candidate or party and the choice that they ultimately make at the ballot box. [2] Scholarly interest in this discrepancy between stated political preferences and voting choices has only recently been piqued, at a time when “cleavage votes” based on long-term social and religious affiliations have begun to carry less weight. The very meaning of electoral choice has changed, votes of support giving way to “negative” votes seeking to eliminate rather than select candidates.

2We shall demonstrate this phenomenon by taking the example of France’s 2012 presidential election. Our work was based on the answers provided regarding “voting probabilities” recorded in five pre-electoral surveys (from July 2011 to March 2012), conducted within the TriÉlec network’s research programme. [3] This data is particularly well suited to reconstituting the shifts in preferences and the crystallisation of choices over the course of this long election period.

3In the United States as in France, the seminal works on voting, in terms of electoral geography, [4] social and religious cleavages, [5] partisan identification [6] and political and institutional traditions [7] have painted voting choices as stemming from a permanent and exclusive adherence to a party or a camp that tends to intensify over a voter’s lifetime. Over the course of the past 30 years or so, however, numerous studies have highlighted the shortcomings of such interpretative frameworks. In this respect, France is no different than other Western democratic societies. A growing number of voters hesitate until the final moment, not knowing for whom to vote – even in the case of presidential elections, the major voting occasion of French politics. For example, in 1988 only 11% of voters said that they hesitated “until the last moment”, but in 2007, 22% admitted such ambivalence and in 2012, according to the TNS-Sofres TriÉlec exit poll, 19% of voters had made a decision during the last week of campaigning, and half of those had made it in the two days prior to the election. These levels of hesitation also mean greater electoral mobility. Voter participation has become irregular, fluctuating depending on the importance that voters bestow upon specific elections. [8] As a consequence of this electoral instability, some parties obtained double-digit percentages during one election and then found themselves below 5% in another. Faced with new empirical data such as this, voting models and academic interpretations of voters have been forced to change. A shift has occurred from cleavage voting to “issue-based voting”. [9] Many have declared that parties are now “without partisans”, [10] since they struggle to conserve their identity “in the eyes of the electorate”. Voters have begun to be perceived as reasoning actors, [11] updating their preferences during each election and selecting among different options: this is a significant departure from earlier perspectives, which depicted voters as faithful to their beliefs and political tendencies. For example, partisan identification in the United States is now deemed to be a “running tally”. [12] With this change in outlook, political campaigns – which generally were seen to have a minimal effect on voters [13] – have become a topic of study again, even if only through the effects of agendas, priming and framing. [14] Have we truly entered the age of the “circumstantial” voter, who is increasingly sensitive to each election’s context and inner logic?

4In order to understand how today’s voters make decisions, we must more than ever pay attention to their stated electoral preferences. Do some or all voters conform to the traditional model which emphasises positive preferences for a single party or candidate? Or do voters increasingly express multiple preferences? And in that case, how do they decide among their preferences? What kind of logic underlies their choice? This article will explore these questions with regard to 2012’s presidential election, following four different avenues of research that each shine a new light on this election and the voting preferences expressed therein. The first line of research investigates the traditional concept of the electorate, while demonstrating the value of an analysis in terms of candidates’ electoral potential. This potential is naturally constituted by long-time supporters, but also by more erratic voters whose political preferences are less marked (or at least not exclusive) and who make up their minds as the campaign unfolds. A longitudinal analysis allows us to see, for each candidate, how his or her potential evolves and finally, how s/he manages (or not) to convert this potential into actual votes. Our second line of research explores voter preferences. It addresses the electoral “space of possibilities”, [15] that is to say the entire group of candidates for which individuals could see themselves voting, thus addressing both issues of negative preference (demonstrated by Helena Catt [16]) and multi-preferences. Our third research avenue looks at what voting probabilities can teach us about the ideological reconfigurations currently taking place in France. Voters’ multi-preferences for candidates are highly structured, which has allowed us to establish a typology. The latter is very informative, revealing the tensions, complementarities and rivalries between various political oppositions, be they between Nicolas Sarkozy and Marine Le Pen or between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and François Hollande. A new vision of the political sphere has thus emerged: whereas votes (and voting intentions) divide and highlight cleavages, voting probabilities demonstrate how much various candidates are liked and disliked, and consequently the interactive dynamics of political forces. Finally, our fourth line of investigation cuts across all the aforementioned issues by questioning the sociological and political basis of these multi-preferences. Are they due to the political incompetence of ordinary citizens? In the past, studies have shown that a strong interest in politics correlates to a strong attachment to a particular political party. [17] As such, if some voters are more volatile, have less exclusive preferences and make choices by default, could this not be the result of their ignorance of the differences between parties and candidates? In this perspective, hesitant choices would be symptomatic of a weak relationship to politics, engendered by a lack of interest and knowledge. On the other hand, these new “political affinities” could be explained by a change in the relationship between citizens and the political sphere, provoked by cognitive mobilisation. [18] With a rise in education levels, the development of mass media and generational renewal, today’s voters apparently need parties less and less in order to make up their minds. [19] The preferences observed would thus be the manifestation of a more autonomous electorate, no longer dominated by politics. [20]

5This article presents a preliminary overview of the research conducted on these important questions using the data provided by the TNS-Sofres TriÉlec barometer. We shall start by describing the history of the voting probability tool, as well as its guidelines and research value. Then we shall analyse the electoral potential of each candidate and what its evolution tells us about the political dynamics occurring between July 2011 and March 2012. Next, voters’ multi-preferences will be analysed; that is to say, all the candidates for whom a given voter would consider voting. Here the goal is to identify and examine the logic underpinning the “space of electoral possibilities”. Finally, the fourth part of this article will isolate six main combinations of voting preferences; analysing them will reveal the political dynamics latent in the ongoing reconfiguration of French political life.

Voting probability: the history and guidelines of an indicator

The dynamics of electoral potential

22The questions were asked five times: in July, October and December 2011, and in February and late March 2012. The TriÉlec polls thus allowed us to follow the evolution of the electoral potential of a number of different figures, several of whom ultimately became official presidential candidates. These observation points were chosen specifically to better follow campaign developments. July was thus an ideal starting point before the real onset of the campaign. October marked Hollande’s victory in the socialist primary, while February was the start of the incumbent president’s campaign and March saw the fallout from the Toulouse shootings (“l’affaire Merah”). This distribution over time thus facilitated a better understanding of some of the campaign’s effects via voting probabilities. We were hence able to follow the dynamics propelling each of the major candidates.

23We can also analyse the evolution over time of electoral potential in a variety of ways. Either we consider the answers given as indicators of support for a candidate: they are then treated as continuous variables. Or we consider them to be categorical variables, based on the principle that the scores given also express thresholds and various attitudes towards the candidate in question: rejection, neutrality or support, with variations of intensity in the positive or negative sentiment (absolute rejection, 0; excluded as a voting option, 1 to 4; neutrality, 5; possible voting choice, 6–7; and support, 8 or higher). [29]

Figure 1

The evolution of voting probability averages for eight candidates over the whole period studied

The evolution of voting probability averages for eight candidates over the whole period studied

How to read this graph: The average of the voting probabilities attributed to the different candidates between July 2011 and March 2012.

24All the candidates obtained relatively weak averages, ranging over the course of the five surveys from 0.90 for Nathalie Arthaud in July 2011 to 5.01 for Hollande just after he won the socialist primary. These averages correspond to very different types of answer profiles – some highly indicative of cleavages (lots of zeros and strong probabilities), others more consensual with few zeros, but also lots of average probabilities. In a highly polarised competition, these overall weak scores of support are not surprising, as even a candidate who was supported by half of all voters would see his or her average decrease as a result of being rejected by his adversaries (who would score him or her as a 0 probability). In order to better evaluate the degree of support garnered by each candidate, the averages must be recalculated; for example, in terms of the hope of seeing that person win the election. In the February and March polls, [30] the highest average went to Le Pen among voters hoping for her victory (8.78) and Mélenchon among his supporters (8.32). This average went down to 7.96 for Hollande, 7.82 for Sarkozy and 7.29 for Bayrou, in terms of their respective supporters. So the first significant result that emerges is that a minority of voters selected small-party, protest candidates, but their choices were the most positive and the most strongly expressed. Those supporting one of the two main presidential candidates averaged below an 8, which indicates a more reserved kind of support and a certain degree of scepticism even with regard to the candidate they hoped to see win.

25Even when calculated with the whole data set, these averages remain indicators of the overall electoral potential of candidates, thus allowing us to rank them. The ranking obtained is very different from that produced by the uninominal ballot of 22 April. [31] Hollande had the greatest potential (4.23 in March), ahead of Sarkozy (3.72). But Bayrou (3.19) stole the third-place spot away from Le Pen (2.15), who was likewise surpassed by Mélenchon (3.13). Bayrou’s third-place finish according to this metric can be explained by the weak distribution of probabilities concerning him: high probabilities were rare, but zeros did not surpass 39% over all five polls. [32] These answers reflect the relatively consensus-based nature of Bayrou’s MoDem party, as opposed to Le Pen, who was rejected by two-thirds of all respondents in every poll. Shifts in candidate support or electoral potential are the first indication of political dynamics and they naturally vary significantly among candidates: a consistent decrease for Joly (her average probability went from 2.67 to 1.30), a slight downward trend for Poutou, stability followed by a very slight bump for Pen at the end of the campaign (from 2.09 to 2.15 in March), an upwards trend from July (2.65) to February (3.43) for Bayrou, then a dip in March (3.19), sharp ups and downs for Hollande, who in March barely matched his score from July (4.23 compared to 4.24); finally, a consistent upward trend for Sarkozy, who went from 2.81 in July to 3.32 in February and ultimately 3.72 in March.

26A “categorical” analysis completes and nuances our analysis of averages by allowing the electoral “hard cores” of various candidates to be identified; we could likewise describe the nature of the rejections that occurred and account for the effects of celebrity or notoriety.

Figure 2a

Changes in voting probabilities for left-wing candidates (in %)

Changes in voting probabilities for left-wing candidates (in %)

Figure 2b

Changes in voting probabilities for right-wing and centrist candidates (in %)

Changes in voting probabilities for right-wing and centrist candidates (in %)

27The main result from this analysis is that the campaign helped to disseminate information, in particular about “minority” candidates. Questions about voting intentions assume that citizens are familiar with all their choices – and yet this was not the case here, especially at the beginning of the campaign period. Hence, in July 2011, 40% of voters did not know Poutou, 25% did not know Dupont-Aignan, 21% Arthaud, 15% Morin and 10% Mélenchon. The difference in recognition between the various candidates is connected to the issue of political competence. The more educated a voter, the greater his/her chances of knowing all the different candidates (or at least of giving the impression of knowing them), regardless of when the poll was carried out. 61% of those with no education or only a primary education did not know Poutou in July and 32% still did not know him in October. For these same dates, the other candidates’ percentages were as follows: 54% and 29% for Dupont-Aignan, 28% and 16% for Arthaud. On the other hand, among university graduates these percentages were much lower: 31% and 15% for Poutou, 25% and 18% for Dupont-Aignan, and 21% and 11% for Arthaud.

28This traditional social rationale of political incompetence was nevertheless rapidly compensated for by the catching-up effects of the electoral campaign. The proliferation of political messages and information in the media allowed even those usually the most distant from political life – or least endowed with cultural capital – to catch up to their more “sophisticated” brethren. For this presidential election, this phenomenon occurred relatively early on, since as soon as the socialist primary was over, most of the gap between those with few and those with many educational qualifications had evaporated. In July, the ignorance gap between the least educated (primary school at most) and the most educated (higher education) was 37 points higher for Dupont-Aignan, 30 points higher for Poutou, 16 points higher for Morin, 15 points higher for Mélenchon and 12 points higher for Arthaud. In October, these differences were only 15, 16, 7 and 8 points, respectively. In March, they were all between 10 and 5 points. [33]

29A detailed analysis of voting probabilities clearly revealed the strengths and weaknesses of each of the candidates, as well as the shift in their respective audiences over the course of the campaign. For example, the rejection of Eva Joly was expressed a number of different ways. The total exclusion of a Green Party vote increased by 19 points between July and late March, which placed Joly at 59%, close to Le Pen or minority far-left candidates. During the same period of time, her potential electorate (voters who rated her above 5 in terms of voting probability) shrank by two-thirds. In July, before she was officially confirmed as a candidate, 10% of interviewees stated their probability of voting for her as a 6 or a 7; 4% as an 8 or higher. In October, the first group was only 7%, in December 5%, and ultimately 3% in March. The second group remained more or less consistent between July and February, but dropped to 2% in March.

30Voting patterns do not respect the “communicating vessels” principle. This is another valuable insight contributed by the voting probabilities method. A drop in one does not necessarily entail a rise in another, contrary to what is assumed by traditional voting intention questions. Hence, Joly’s losses did not benefit Mélenchon for example, who only saw significant changes during February and March, when the proportion of voters who ranked him higher than 7 went from 6% to 12% (for 6 or 7, the proportion went from 6% to 9%). In July, his potential voters were at 7%, shooting up to 21% at the end of March.

31For Le Pen, few changes could be observed over the course of the campaign, even in late March after the Toulouse shootings. This can be explained by the fact that the Front National’s president is extremely well known and preferences regarding her positions have long been crystallised, both for and against. Moreover, her potential electorate was very close to the results she obtained on 22 April: according to the polls, between 8% and 11% of those polled gave Le Pen an 8 or higher, while between 6% and 4% gave her a 6 or 7. At the end of March, that would have represented a potential electorate of about 14%. One out of every ten voters was thus a hard-line supporter of Le Pen, while a non-negligible number of others were sympathisers.

32For Bayrou, on the other hand, responses from the different polls showed a significant evolution. The beginning of the campaign was favourable to him, both in terms of a proportional drop in negative responses to him and an increase in the size of his potential electorate. In total, in July 2011, 71% of voters gave Bayrou a probability rating lower than 5 out of 10; in the spring of 2012, this figure had dropped to 51%. With regard to his potential electorate, it was primarily the “inner circle” (rankings above 7) that evolved during the campaign, going from 4% to 9%, while “sympathisers” (6s or 7s) represented about one-tenth of the sample population.

33Lastly, the two future finalists exhibited two very different profiles and evolutions. The incumbent president provoked a strong degree of rejection, if we measure the proportion of voters who completely excluded him as a voting possibility: 47% in July, 40% still in March; whereas the future president seemed to be the most widely approved candidate of all, even if he saw a growing degree of rejection over the course of the campaign: from 24% in July to 29% in March. With regard to “inner circle” voters – those ranking Hollande higher than 7 – they were consistently more numerous than those in Sarkozy’s base, until March when these two groups reached the same levels (around 22%).

34For a large number of voters, attitudes with regard to the major candidates seemed already to be quite consistent at the beginning of the campaign, whether positively or negatively. Many knew who they rejected and of whom they approved. For these voters, the campaign was in fact another way of strengthening their convictions. Following their voting probabilities also produced an unexpected result. Common sense would suggest that the campaign would have convinced voters to select a specific candidate, thus creating a positive relationship. In fact, this process of positive influence only occurred for Mélenchon on the left and Sarkozy on the right, between February and March. On the other hand, the campaign seriously penalised Eva Joly and other small-party candidates, who transitioned from anonymity into rejection, and it did not particularly help the socialist candidate. Therefore, it would be more apt to talk about campaigns in the plural, since the dynamics were significantly different from one candidate to another.

“The space of electoral possibilities”

35Until now, we have used voting probabilities separately. Taken all together, they allow us to understand the space of electoral possibilities experienced by voters: that is to say, all the candidates that a given voter might conceive of voting for. With this approach, we can identify not only “negative” voters, who, for lack of an attractive enough candidate, were forced to choose the lesser evil, but also voters with multiple preferences. The latter expressed true affinities for more than one candidate. Both groups of voters have generally been little studied, despite the fact that they would permit a better understanding of the logic behind a particular election (in this case, 2012’s), but also contemporary ideological and political reconfigurations.

Negativity on the rise and the persistence of multiple preferences

36In order to establish these two groups, we created an indicator that counted the number of times the interviewee gave a voting probability score higher than 5. Probability scores lower than 5 could be interpreted as a certain degree of distance from a candidate, at best, or rejection at worst. If we compare this scoring method with the school grading system, a 5 would thus be an average score, just passing. On the other hand, giving a score of 6 or higher expressed a preference for a certain candidate (or at least satisfaction), and possibly indicated that the individual was a sympathiser or even a true supporter. In order to establish our indicator, we only used the candidates that had officially declared their candidacy. However, Cheminade was only tested during the final poll. In order to consistently have the same number of candidates in our indicator, we thus included Morin in the first four polls. Consequently, the indicator always functioned on the basis of ten presidential candidates.

Table 1

The space of electoral possibilities: a comparison between 2012, 2004, 2007 and 2009 (in %)

P1-July P2-Oct. P3-Dec. P4-Feb. P5-March Reminder: EES-2004 Reminder: EES-2009 Reminder: Out of these candidates, whom would you vote for? (Cevipof 2007) None 30 26.5 31 27.5 23.5 16.5 18.5 12 One candidate 38 36 35.5 36 41 28 32 34 or party Two 19.5 22 21.5 22.5 20.5 32 23.5 27.5 Three 8 9 7.5 9.5 10.5 16 14.5 16 Four or more 4.5 6.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 7.5 11.5 10.5

The space of electoral possibilities: a comparison between 2012, 2004, 2007 and 2009 (in %)

How to read this table: In July, 30% of those polled did not have definite electoral preferences; that is to say, probabilities higher than 5. In March 2012, this figure was 23.5%. For both these dates, 19.5% and 20.5% respectively expressed preferences for two candidates.

37Multi-preference voting is a growing phenomenon. 35.5% and 41% of voters envisioned only voting for a single candidate, whereas 20% of them could see voting for one of two candidates and 8% to 10% saw the possibility of voting for three different candidates. This phenomenon was not limited to this last presidential election, as we can see from the results of the last two European Electoral Studies that used the same measure. Voters who declared only one party as a possible choice represented 28% of the electorate in 2004 and 32% in 2009. The results obtained in 2012 were equally convergent with those obtained by 2007’s pre-electoral survey, where individuals were directly asked for which candidates they could see themselves voting: only 34% of them cited a single candidate, even though this election was touted as marking the re-bipolarisation of the French party system. [34] It is equally noteworthy that multi-preferences for three candidates or more remained relatively stable throughout this whole period, ranging between 12.5% and 15%.

38The 2012 campaign showed continuity with regard to the expression of multiple preferences but negativity, on the other hand, was on the rise. The percentage of voters who never gave a candidate a score higher than 5 reached its apex during the last presidential election. The level of negativity fluctuated between 26.5% and 31% during the first four TriÉlec polls in 2011 –2012, and although it dropped slightly in March it remained at 23.5%, or 5 points higher than in 2009 and 7 points higher than in 2004. [35] This indicator thus confirms what other studies have already shown: French citizens were invested in 2012’s presidential election (unlike 2002’s), but it took place in a context that was much less polarised than in 2007, where the two finalists both embodied a form of political renewal, each in their own way. In fact, this could also be observed in the most traditional indicators of politicisation: 73% of voters polled in March 2012 said that they were very or quite interested in the campaign, but only 40% of them felt that “the campaign addressed the true problems facing French citizens” and 44% that it “allowed for the different candidates’ positions to be known”. [36]

Voting probabilities and political reconfigurations in 2012

42The method used up until this point quickly reaches its limits in terms of accounting for the multiple ways in which voters express their preferences. A specific statistical method is well suited to solve this problem: principal component analysis (PCA). It reveals the structure of response profiles to questions about voting probabilities, [43] which it then organises around eight factorial axes. A mixed classification carried out in the space defined by the first four axes of the PCA allowed us to identify the partitions that optimise the grouping of respondents by preference: individuals from the same group must be as similar as possible and the groups must be as distinct as possible. The typology adopted defined six groups of voters. [44] It is an analysis tool based on the structure of electoral preferences that allows for a better understanding of the logic behind the shifting reconfigurations of electoral preferences, used in conjunction with traditional factors.

43Two groups (1 and 2) were formed by voters largely favourable to left-wing candidates but with different configurations of electoral preferences. Group 3 was composed of voters who split their preferences between Sarkozy and Bayrou. Group 4 was characterised by voters who were very firmly in support of Le Pen and, to a lesser degree, of Sarkozy. Voters from group 5 rejected all candidates except for Sarkozy, for whom they expressed a positive, though more reticent, preference (when compared with group 3). Finally, group 6 was comprised of voters whose preferences went to all candidates except Sarkozy. Figure 3 shows the profiles of the average probabilities obtained for all eight candidates represented in the six groups, over the course of the five polls. The star plot’s variations accurately illustrate the specificity of the structure of preferences for voters in each group.

44The transformation of a preference into an instance of voting behaviour seems fairly evident for the groups of voters that expressed a strong favourite – if not a sole preference, at least a strongly asserted one (group 2 for Hollande, group 4 for Le Pen). Nevertheless, this transition to action remains only probable and is subject to factors that could not be controlled for in this analysis. For the other groups, in particular the first, third and especially sixth group, the move from preference to ballot-casting is impossible to evaluate using our current data. In fact, this typology does not seek to predict voting outcomes, but simply to better understand the complex logic of choice – observed only with difficulty when using traditional tools – to which voters are subjected during the campaign and up until their final choice is made. Voters’ degree of indecision is an essential piece of information here. This classification allows us to follow this phenomenon by type of voters by taking as an indicator the number of probabilities between 7 and 10: one probability signifies a firm choice, two or more, strong hesitation, and none corresponds to an absence of preference. Figure 4 shows the frequency of these levels of indecision for each group at three different moments in the campaign (July 2011, fall 2011, winter 2012). [45] With the help of these analysis tools, let us now examine the six groups of voters.

Figure 3

Average of the voting probabilities for eight candidates, for the whole sample, and divided into six preference groups. In parentheses, the frequency of each group in July 2011 and March 2012

Average of the voting probabilities for eight candidates, for the whole sample, and divided into six preference groups. In parentheses, the frequency of each group in July 2011 and March 2012

Figure 4

For each group, the frequency of probabilities between 7 and 10 awarded to each of the eight candidates at three different moments in the campaign

For each group, the frequency of probabilities between 7 and 10 awarded to each of the eight candidates at three different moments in the campaign

How to read this graph: In July 2011, 46% of voters from group 1 and 19% from group 6 expressed a single probability equal to or greater than 7.

45On average, voters from group 1 represented 15% of the sample population, but with some changes over the course of the campaign: from 12% in July, they rose to 17% in the fall and dropped back down to 13% at the end of March. They mainly split their preferences between the three “institutional” left-wing candidates who were represented in parliament. Hollande had the strongest average probability (7.12% the whole time), but Joly and Mélenchon better characterised this group. [46] Voters from this group had trouble choosing: in July, 46% of them only expressed one probability higher than 6; in February-March, 36% of them were still in the same situation. The comparison with voters from group 2 is quite interesting: the latter was the largest group, representing 21% of the sample population, having dropped by three points after July. Hollande was this group’s favourite candidate – not only did he have his highest average among these voters (7.22), but all the other candidates, even on the left, had lower group averages than across the sample as a whole. Only Mélenchon was able to maintain his average in this group. The decisiveness of these choices was clearly strengthened over the course of the campaign: in July, 45% only had one favourite choice, but this figure rose to 64% in October and 68% in February-March. This trend was accompanied by a hike in preference scores for the socialist candidate, who went from 6.38 in July to 7.40 in the winter, via a high of 7.52 in the fall. Here we can observe the dynamics that described the socialist candidate’s campaign: a strong upward trend in his potential up until the primary, following by a retreat throughout the electoral campaign and eventually a point of stability that remained one of the highest for all eight candidates. These first two groups share the fact that about three-quarters of their members consider themselves to be on the left (even firmly on the left) of the political spectrum, and that almost two-thirds of them can be characterised as “politically engaged”, as they are interested in both politics in general and the election at hand specifically (having answered “fairly” or “very” both times). Multiple preferences thus do not preclude a high level of politicisation, nor are they necessarily a sign of political incompetence. Both groups had 80% of members who found the socialist candidate fairly or very convincing, although adherence was slightly higher in group 2. But there were also slight differences between these two groups, and at times even stark contrasts that echoed their respective preference systems. Consequently, Hollande’s image was positive in both groups but slightly better in group 2; 38% of voters from group 1 positively assessed Joly’s positions and 58% of them liked Mélenchon’s arguments, compared to 18% and 49% respectively for group 2. Likewise, the latter were more numerous in supporting Hollande: 70% in October through March, compared with 56% for group 1 (where only 16% hoped for their favourite candidate’s victory). All these figures attest to a strong level of conviction in group 2. Logically, at the end of March, they were the group most likely to cast their ballots. [47] It is reasonable to believe that the majority of group 2 voted in both rounds of the presidential election for the socialist candidate. But it would be misleading to think that all these voters were steadfast supporters of the Socialist Party: in July 2011, 6% of them expressed two strong preferences. In February-March, this group was twice as large, and even within this group, at least one voter out of five still did not have strong preferences (above a score of 6).

46Group 6 was the one to exhibit the most significant progression from July to March: it doubled in proportion from 7% to 14%, ultimately reaching the same level as group 1. Politically rather mixed, this group still belonged to the left’s sphere of influence; 46% of its members identified as left-wing or centre-left, and the most extreme left-wing candidates obtained their highest potential scores here: 4.5 for Poutou, 5.08 for Arthaud and 5.3 for Mélenchon. Joly likewise did much better than her average score. Even though Hollande once again displayed the highest electoral potential, his level (5.6) was much lower than in the first two groups, and barely higher than Mélenchon’s, which translates the relative distance between these voters and their future president. The majority of voters in this group identified as centre, centre-right or right-wing (21.5%, 17% and 11% respectively). Consequently, Le Pen and Bayrou scored better with this group than average. Only Sarkozy had an electoral potential that was on par with his global average. In this group of voters, we find individuals both hostile to the incumbent president and wary of the governmental left. Uncomfortable with the dominant electoral offer imposed by the bipartisan nature of the presidential election and the Fifth Republic, these voters were largely unable to choose a favourite candidate. Far from helping them make up their minds, the electoral campaign only served to increase their uncertainty: while only 19% of these voters had a favourite in July and 18% in February-March, more and more of them defined their electoral space of possibilities with two or more candidates (42% in the summer, 49% in the fall and 54% in the winter, when only 28% of these voters expressed a firm preference). One-third of this group expressed no particular desire for any candidate to win, while 28% cited Hollande and 15.5% another more far left candidate. A tiny majority found Hollande’s ideas convincing (50%), while 42% felt the same way about Mélenchon’s propositions. This group of voters, predominantly young and working-class, included the highest proportion (31%) of individuals who were indifferent to the presidential election.

47Groups 1, 2 and 6 represent most of the voters leaning to the left. They allow us to better understand the changes in electoral scores within this segment of the political spectrum. Group 2 likely explains why the Socialist Party remained the dominant left-wing party, as the majority of its voters included only Hollande in their possibilities (even if Mélenchon was tempting to some of them as well). On the other hand, groups 1 and 6, whose combined weight was much greater than group 2’s, showed how important multiple preferences were for the left of the political spectrum taken as a whole (some, however, argue that the left and the extreme left should be viewed as two different segments). However, in addition to Hollande, many voters in group 6 included Mélenchon and even his Trotskyist rivals among their possibilities – and the Front de gauche candidate was not rejected in groups 1 and 2, either. Consequently, we can confirm in 2012 what had already been observed in 2002 and 2007: [48] from the voters’ point of view, there was not necessarily a major difference between establishment left-wing candidates and their radical contenders. This was also the case for Bayrou. In 2007, a group of “ségo-bayrouistes” [49] had emerged, which was composed of individuals planning to vote for Ségolène Royal and Bayrou, but also for Besancenot and Voynet. The fact that we found a second group very close to this one five years later confirms that the boundary between left and centre remains blurred. In short, the left has become a playing field with more and more competitors, which explains why winning an election is oftentimes a short-lived victory for parties such as the NPA or the EELV. Save for the Socialist Party – and only to a certain degree – none of the parties on the left have their “own” steadfast voters.

48Group 3 was comprised of centrist (27%), centre-right (32%) and right-wing voters (18%), whose preferences were split almost evenly between Bayrou and Sarkozy: both candidates obtained their best electoral scores in this group, 5.63 and 5.53 respectively. The size of this group increased from 17% of the electorate in July to 22% in February-March, ultimately weighing a little more heavily than group 2 (favourable to Hollande). But this upward trend did not allow the UMP candidate to take the lead from Bayrou’s MoDem: in February-March, Sarkozy’s score was 5.68, while Bayrou was ahead at 5.88. The MoDem candidate’s lead was reflected in the perception voters had of his platform: 60% of them found his claims convincing, while they rated Sarkozy four points lower. This group illustrates the important discrepancy that can exist between the expression of preference for a candidate and the ultimate decision made at the ballot box. In terms of preferences and opinions, competition seemed close between Sarkozy and Bayrou, whereas on voting day Sarkozy won almost 6.5 million more votes than Bayrou. This discrepancy can also be seen in our polls when, for example, in February-March only 16% of voters hoped for Bayrou’s victory, compared with 31% for Sarkozy. The bipartisan nature of the election, the belief (or not) that a candidate could win and the notion of a “useful” vote all clearly played their part in producing this discrepancy between intention and reality. Above all, the incumbent effect played an important role. [50] In addition, the sociology of this group was clearly susceptible to this effect. It included the largest number of practising – whether frequent or infrequent – Catholics (34% compared to 22% on average) and the lowest number of non-religious voters (23% compared to 37% on average). Likewise, this group had the lowest proportion of young voters between 18 and 24 years old (5%, compared with 13%) and older voters were proportionally overrepresented (31%, compared with 23%). And in fact, for elderly Catholic voters, political experience and the legitimacy of the incumbent right-wing candidate were important criteria informing their voting decision: between two contenders on the (centre-) right, they overwhelmingly voted for the incumbent. [51]

49Group 4 comprised right-wing voters (37%, 20% of whom considered themselves to be far-right) who picked Le Pen as their favourite candidate. While her electoral potential was on average 1.79 for the general sample population, Le Pen averaged 7.38 over the entire period in this group, exhibiting a small progression from July (7.36) to February-March (7.54). But although the intensity of preferences for this candidate seemed to grow, the size of this group, on the other hand, diminished between July (16%) and February-March (13%). Sarkozy obtained his third-best score with this group: 3.61 on average, 3.39 in July and 3.80 at the end of the campaign. Much like those in group 6, voters in this class were among the least political: in February-March, 45.5% of them expressed an interest in politics and the election (compared to 53% on average), while 31% of them remained indifferent (compared to 24% on average). This attitude can be linked to the professional sociology of this group, which, like group 6, primarily comprised working-class individuals (31%) and employees (28%), while executive and white-collar professions only represented 10% (compared to 22% to 25% in groups 1, 2 and 3). Le Pen’s proposals hit the bull’s-eye for these voters: 74% of them found her ideas convincing, even if only 34% of them hoped that she would win. Similarly, 44% were also convinced by Sarkozy’s ideas, and 23% hoped for his victory. All these elements illustrate the fact that the marked preference for the far right exhibited by these working-class voters was also compatible with a preference for Sarkozy. Hence, the permeability between moderate right-wing voters and part of the FN’s electorate continued well beyond 2007, just as other studies have already shown. [52]

50Finally, for voters in group 5, no candidate got their approval. All the candidates obtained weak probability scores, significantly lower than their general averages (with the exception of Sarkozy, who received his second-best score). Figure 4 illustrates the oddity of this group: between 26% of these voters in July and 36% in the winter expressed a preference for one candidate, but between 73% and 60% did not grant any candidate a score above a 6. The absence of favourites is the hallmark of this group. Sarkozy did better here than his global average, but he remained a choice made “for lack of anyone better”. His probability score remained weak, even if it regularly rose, going from 3.77 in July to 4.37 in the fall and 4.41 in February-March. Similarly, the size of this group decreased from 24% in July to 19% in the winter. These observations show us that even for this largely apolitical group (30% were indifferent to the election), with uncertain political orientations (12% did not position themselves on the political spectrum, compared with 4.5% globally), the campaign had a significant mobilising effect that benefited the incumbent. In a somewhat surprising turn of events, voters in this group came from all different socio-economic segments of the population, and their ages and occupations were astonishingly representative of the sample population as a whole. Executives and white-collar professionals made up 21% of this group, compared to an average of 19%; the only important discrepancy concerned those aged 65 or older, who were somewhat over-represented (29.5%) in this group compared to the sample as a whole (23%). These voters were the most distant from political life and electoral competition, without this attitude being explained by the effects of class-based domination.

51It may seem tempting to interpret our groups – or at least those that converged on a clear preference – as so many different electorates. This temptation becomes even stronger if we consider that their relative weight in the polls came very close to matching the results of the first round of the presidential election. For example: group 2 favouring Hollande accounted for 21% in the March poll and similarly 22% of registered voters, while group 4 which preferred Le Pen accounted for 13% in March and for 14% of registered voters. But even in seemingly favourable cases, the connection between preferences and actual votes has not been well established. It depends on a number of factors associated in particular with the campaign and political circumstances which, at the very moment of casting their ballot, cause voters to make a different decision: voting for Sarkozy instead of Le Pen or vice-versa.

52The goal of this analysis of voting probabilities is not to try to obtain what was ultimately the final result of the election, but instead to provide some insight into the political dynamics that produced this result. From this point of view, it is particularly interesting to observe that as he had not gained a strong following in his own right, Sarkozy appeared in no group with a high voting potential, which evidently presented an important obstacle to his re-election during the second round. Support for the UMP candidate appears to have been largely by default, according to our analysis: among centre-right legitimists who appreciated Bayrou, among a portion of apolitical voters who shunned the election and among some Front National supporters. On the other hand, Hollande was able to rely on an electoral base that had chosen him as their preferred candidate. But our analysis of voting preferences also showed that other candidates disputed his leadership of the left. For an important percentage of voters, especially those in groups 1 and 6, voting for the socialist candidate in the first or even the second round was also probably a vote by default. The analysis of voting probabilities and electoral preferences works better than traditional methods to allow us to understand the complex decisional logic voters experience over the course of an electoral campaign. Thanks to this logic, we can account for the role of votes in support of a candidate as against votes cast for lack of a better option, thus obtaining a more nuanced picture of the meaning of electoral choices.

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55These analyses invite us to revisit the traditional notions used to understand voting choices. It is a mistake to see in a ballot cast merely a positive preference for a candidate or party. Helena Catt has already suggested this fallacy: here we were able to confirm it, with a situation in which almost one out of every four voters chose the least worst option. Negative votes are a reality, and they seem to have never been more prevalent than in 2012’s election. It is likewise a mistake to insist on exclusive preferences. Almost one out of every three voters polled described a space of possibilities that included two or three candidates. Most importantly, both negative voters and those with multiple preferences are likely to represent larger swathes of the electorate if the phenomena that we have identified are in fact due to generational renewal and not merely due to life cycle effects. Let us not forget that the “traditional” voters who had only one preferred candidate were the oldest among our sample population.

56Regardless of what is causing these phenomena to occur, voter participation is becoming increasingly dependent on context and the issues at stake in a particular election. Judging from our analysis, we can likewise speculate that the same will be true for parties’ electoral results. The elections that have taken place since the beginning of the 2000s can also be seen as a consequence of greater and greater numbers of multi-preference voters. This is particularly the case because political boundaries are shifting, both between the left and centre and between the right and the far right. Additionally, electoral campaigns are now exhibiting multiple effects on voting choices, at times strengthening or reawakening convictions, while at other times weakening existing preferences. Consequently, elections to come are likely to become much more unpredictable.