A community of philanthropists

8The financial resources generated by Wall Street are redistributed via foundation networks governed by a combination of “universal” interests and interpersonal contacts. One US-based foundation out of every six is based in New York. And they are richer here than anywhere else: 21.3% of charitable capital is concentrated in the city. [16] This situation is unparalleled: although the robber barons of yesteryear made their fortunes all across the United States (Andrew Carnegie in Pittsburgh, John D. Rockefeller in Cleveland, Henry Ford in Detroit…), all of them based their foundations in Manhattan. [17] The Protestant revivalism of the early nineteenth century made New York the national centre of a “benevolent empire”. [18] The philanthropic elite brings a major resource to the table: money. There can be no social programmes without philanthropic capital to fund them. Whether policies and measures receive funding from foundations alone, or from the combined efforts of foundations and government agencies, the use of philanthropic capital is widespread. [19] That being the case, Opportunity NYC still presents some peculiarities in this respect.

9Under the auspices of the mayoral office, only Opportunity’s pilot programme was public. Funding, administration and monitoring were all handled by the private sector. Bloomberg found himself at the crossroads of several local networks involving wealthy donors, businessmen, and political officials. As Bloomberg owns his own foundation, he was on equal footing with other philanthropists – hence the ease with which he raised funds for the programme. With an influential address book, a huge fortune and the power necessary to make decisions, Bloomberg’s numerous and varied social ties multiplied the kinds of capital that he could raise.

10Opportunity NYC received support from ten foundations, seven of which were based in Manhattan: American International Group (AIG Foundation), Bloomberg Family Foundation, New York Community Trust, The Open Society Institute, [20] The Rockefeller Foundation, The Robin Hood Foundation and The Starr Foundation. [21] Most of these foundations refused to disclose or remained vague regarding the amount they donated to the programme, and their fiscal declarations as contained on IRS 990 Forms do not make this information available. What is important is that, of the 26 million dollars attributed annually to the programme, 10 million came from the Rockefeller Foundation and another 10 from Michael Bloomberg’s personal foundation. Where these foundations are based is not without consequence. Funding from the Rockefeller Foundation was awarded under the auspices of a fund for local initiatives called The New York City Opportunities Fund. One of the fund’s executives described it as follows:

11

“The initiative was born from the realisation that we have a kind of special obligation to New York City. Because we’re based here and this is where we started out. It’s quite common for foundations to engage in this kind of backyard grantmaking or local grantmaking.” [22]

12Foundations not only maintain their social networks with face-to-face communication, but are also in direct contact with local poverty – hence the significant visibility of this particular social problem.

13How does this co-existence translate into concrete initiatives? Certain structures and types of events are designed to encourage these kinds of interactions. The nineteenth century’s charity balls and dinner parties have become today’s clubs and fundraising events. More than an activity, philanthropy is a marker of social status. [23] It represents and reaffirms the existence of an exclusive elite. Negotiations can take place among peers in a more informal setting, but also one that is behind closed doors and far from the public’s prying eyes. A foundation executive described one such social encounter as follows:

14

“The first thing that we did before starting the campaign was invite everyone to dinner at a Manhattan restaurant called ‘Artisanal’. The only reason I picked Artisanal as the restaurant was because they serve fondue. I thought that it might be really interesting to sit together and have to share the same food. That way we could discuss, create synergy by sharing things. I got a sizeable group of people together, including the deputy mayor (before she held that position), friends from Old National Bancorp and City Council finance, people from the mayor’s budget department, reporters and journalists, colleagues from my office who had one foot in academia and the other in the world of activism. We all sat around the table and I presented them with a vision of what we could do together.” [24]

15This configuration of people is light years from traditional deliberations or decision-making processes. This is not a conventional form of lobbying, taking place in an office by appointment only. It is a form of socialising where investors with a number of capital funds work side-by-side, without advisors or intermediaries, in an environment that is not luxurious, but rather exotic and internationalised.

16The city of New York is historically and socially a city of elites. [25] The many foundations located there redistribute wealth both locally and internationally. More than elsewhere, Wall Street feeds this “charitable industry”. International organisations, another kind of elite, also help to develop and raise awareness about social projects.

Internationalised lobbying

17The importance presence of international organisations in New York creates the convergence of a different type of elite, for whom poverty is a central issue. [26] Programmes and agencies such as UNDP and the ILO launched by the United Nations, whose headquarters is located in midtown Manhattan, attest to this interest in fighting poverty. In this sector, Opportunity NYC found a selected audience that was concerned with “human development” initiatives. These global actors – highly visible as donors as a result of their working groups, publications and conferences – bolster their reputations and act as driving forces for social policy.

18On 22 September 2009, Hillary Clinton chose the Westin Hotel in Times Square for the launch of the Inter-American Social Protection Network. [27] Run by the Organization of American States (OAS) – promoting the regional integration of the Americas since the nineteenth century – based in Washington, D.C., the network’s mission was to create “a community of practice for national social development ministries and agencies, in collaboration with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector and academia, to promote the exchange and transfer of experiences and knowledge on social protection”. [28] In her speech, the former New York Senator – Secretary of State at the time – combined both local chauvinism and a nod to multilateralism.

19

“New York City, of course, is a crossroads for the entire world. And the first conditional cash transfer program in the United States was launched by Mayor Bloomberg after he saw for himself the results in Mexico. Millions of Mexican families have gotten a boost toward better education, health, nutrition, and long-term stability. Opportunity NYC intends to do the same for the poor within our own city.” [29]

20By referencing a country of the global South, these remarks linked together IGOs and NGOs present in New York and visible on the international scene: a way of strengthening the “international knowledge networks” already established by philanthropic institutions. [30]

21The New York team solidified its networks and its connections with Washington, D.C. through relationships forged with the World Bank, an agency well known for its ability to promote the creation of “knowledge networks”. [31] “Conditional cash transfers” were listed among the World Bank’s “best practices”. The World Bank has also established itself as a primary channel for such transfers as well as “market mechanisms” for developing countries. [32] Stemming from the organisation’s stated goal of “eradicating poverty” as part of the Millennium Development Goals, the World Bank was one of the main sponsors of the three international conferences on conditional cash transfers which took place between 2002 and 2006. [33] In 2009, the World Bank published the first study entirely devoted to conditional cash transfers. [34]

22The Bank’s experts are known within New York circles. Laura B. Rawlings, an economist specialised in evaluation, human development and conditional cash transfers in Latin America, was one of the experts publically consulted and thanked by the MDRC. [35] She likewise played an active role in developing Opportunity NYC:

23

“Another really important resource was Laura Rawlings from the World Bank, who specialises in social protection in Latin America. She contributed a lot to disseminating the conditional cash transfer model throughout the community of public policy makers.” [36]

24The credit of Bloomberg’s project – in both the financial and political sense – was bolstered by its partnership with this transnational network of “transfer agents”, [37] who furthermore offered a privileged relationship with Washington, D.C. Opportunity NYC became a crucial component of consensus-building on the subject of conditional cash transfers. [38] One final element set things in motion: the contribution of experts, who helped to “objectivise” the project.

Reformist expertise

25Elaborating a public policy measure does not simply require money and networking skills. It also demands a kind of “objectivity” to lend a degree of credibility to a given project. Such experiments became “shadow institutions”, [39] an expression which refers less to specific content and more to a way of gaining legitimacy. As is standard practice in the United States, experts are recruited and receive contracts to elaborate evidence-based policies. How were contracting activities conducted in this case of Opportunity NYC?

26The office of the mayor created an ad hoc structure to manage, among other “innovative initiatives”, the launch and monitoring of Opportunity NYC, and placed experts at the helm. The Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO) [40] was led by Veronica White, who holds a doctorate in law. The Programs Manager Kristin Morse holds a Masters in urban policy and public administration from The New School, one of the most “liberal” New York-based universities. Her colleague in charge of monitoring obtained a doctorate in sociology from Columbia University. The research unit also co-opted two economists from The New School: Mark Levitan and Christine D’Onofrio. This team supervised the work of policy-makers, the latter being dependent on outside funding.

27A New York-based research institution ultimately received the contract. Not affiliated with any party, it specialises in social policy and enjoys national renown. It was consulted on account of its reformist expertise in relation to all the main reforms to social assistance: Community Action Program (CAP), Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN), Negative Income Tax (NIT), Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), etc. [41] For Opportunity NYC, its contract with CEO brought in 359,714 dollars. [42] The institution is not a think tank but a non-profit applied research enterprise, a status which allows it to receive public and philanthropic donations. [43] The MDRC was founded in 1974 through collaboration between the Ford Foundation and the government. From the outset, its mission was clearly articulated: establishing “reliable scientific evidence” to solve “crucial social problems”. Its stated goal was to get rid of the “cynicism” surrounding the government’s ability to act. The MDRC’s slogan asserts the academic nature of its enterprise: “Building knowledge to improve social policy”. [44] One of the firm’s executives highlighted this aspect:

28

“The mayor’s staff started to explore how incentives could contribute to the fight against poverty in New York. They consulted experts on the subject, and also about a Mexican programme. They got in contact with the MDRC, with other experts, and they talked with the World Bank and a number of academics, they were seduced by the idea. They took the issue very seriously and decided to set down a date in the calendar for a similar project’s launch.” [45]

29The process was thus begun. Just two steps from the Empire State Building on 34^th Street, 25 experts from the MDRC put Opportunity NYC on their schedules, either as full-time or part-time contractors (the total staff included approximately 200 employees and 40 executives). Let us look a little more closely at the paths that led these executives to the project. The majority had completed a Ph.D., [46] but had not wished to or been able to continue working in academia. The president of the MDRC, Gordon Berlin, is not an academic. After graduating with a Masters in Science, Technology and Public Policy from George Washington University in Washington, D.C., he began his career in the US Department of Labor as a research officer. He then became programme director at the Ford Foundation. After a brief stint in New York City’s social services (in human resources administration), Berlin was promoted to executive director of the Social Science Research Corporation before joining the MRDC management team. Finally, James A. Riccio, the director of the “Low-Wage Workers and Communities Policy Area”, holds a doctorate in sociology from Princeton University. [47]

30The MDRC helps in the decision-making process, or rather provides academic justification for the decisions made. What is the MRDC primarily focused on? Education, health, criminology, employment and social assistance are its five main areas of expertise. Between 1979 and 2010, [48] MDRC publications comprised 534 reports, articles and working papers. Education and social assistance were the two most prevalent topics. This focus was strongly correlated with political demand. Between 1993 and 2002 – in other words, under Bill Clinton’s mandate – the number of publications about social assistance and employment increased from 5 to 29 per year. After the election of George W. Bush, this number went back down to its original level (around 5 per year).

31Born out of the mutual desires of federal officials and philanthropists, the MDRC presents itself as the provider of “effective solutions” at different governmental levels. The publications of its former president attest to this. [49] We are dealing here with a sort of academic activism, which can be understood as a bridge between the local and the federal. [50] This intermediate position allows for practices and know-how to be circulated and disseminated. Nevertheless, it did not prevent Michael Bloomberg’s inner circle from developing its own strategy for transforming Opportunity NYC into a public policy model.

Gaining support

33In order to become an exemplary model, one must gain the following of one’s peers. [51] As soon as Opportunity NYC was launched, Michael Bloomberg and his team sought to make the programme into a model for other US cities. The limited size of this “governmental unit”, to use the terms of Baumgartner and Jones, meant an intense publicity campaign as well as stronger “selection pressure”. [52] Policy linkage was attempted from the very start of the programme. This was a far cry from the traditional situation of policy actors justifying possible support by pointing to results:

34

“I think that we would be happy to apply the experiment to other areas if the results are favourable.” [53]

35Emulation strategies were adopted well before statistical results were available. [54]

36In a joint press release with the Rockefeller Foundation dated 26 March 2008, [55] Michael Bloomberg divulged that he had met with a number of local authorities in the Eastern US. More specifically, he had invited a number of representatives to Gracie Mansion, his official residence. All those invited were Democrats: Michael Nutter (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Sheila Dixon (Baltimore, Maryland), Richard M. Daley (Chicago, Illinois), A. C. Wharton Jr. (Shelby County, Tennessee), Otis Johnson (Savannah, Georgia), with the exception of the Independent Manuel Diaz (Miami, Florida). These individuals represented mid- or large-sized urban environments. Their role in the policy learning process was not truly one of dialogue or negotiation. Acting as a decision-making centre, New York City defined the models as well as their channels of distribution. Municipal elites positioned themselves as reformists, no doubt in favour of imitation rather than innovation. Their ad hoc “learning network” clearly expressed this stance; the desire for a coalition unfettered by partisanship was also evident.

37

“We are in dialogue with other cities that have expressed interest in the programme. We have established what we call a learning network. We have invited representatives from other cities, mayors or members of their offices, to talk about Opportunity NYC. What came out of this is that, if they had more money, they would be interested in trying out the programme. But the local governments don’t have the necessary funds to invest. So we’re concentrating on the cities that are turning towards money donated by private foundations. The reason why we contacted them is that, if this works, we want to make it into public policy. The federal government won’t do it just because New York wants it to, because New York is such a special case. It will be more convincing if we can bring together different kinds of cities: small, midwestern, southern… So that if we prove it works, and that the initiative is supported by mayors, legislators and governors from all those states, we can build a coalition of support so that the federal government can make this investment for the country and for New York.” [56]

38On the occasion of what looked more like a press conference than a working meeting, deputy mayor Linda Gibbs had the following to say:

39

“We’ve learned a lot from other countries and other national experts. Recently, we had the opportunity to start giving back.”

40“Giving back” expresses a moral obligation and a sense of cohesion within the circles of social and philanthropic organisations. The phrase points to the duty of the wealthy to take care of the needy, thus expressing loyalty for a certain region or community.

41What about the rapport between New York City and the larger New York region? [57] Like many major cities in the United States, New York City maintains a contentious relationship with the state in which it is located. New York State has historically leaned towards supporting welfare in its policies: it included the fight against poverty under Article 17 of its Constitution. This is a rare feat in the United States, even if the largest budgetary item for most states is often social assistance, representing about one-third of the total budget. Since 1996, municipal social policy has become separate from federal funding and thus from national control. [58] The entirely private funding donated to Opportunity NYC also allowed it to gain freedom from all the competing bodies at city level: City Council, borough presidents, city agencies, etc. A member of the committee underlines this: “They had to face opposition from the City Council, but the City Council had no way of stopping them.” [59] This bypassing strategy allowed the programme to avoid any budget votes or formal debates. The question of timing was crucial here. [60] In order to have any hope of reaching Washington, D.C. within the deadlines imposed by his mandate, Mayor Bloomberg had to bypass numerous processes and negotiations. This is why his office called upon the services of private operators, even for projects that would traditionally have fallen under the purview of municipal services. This initiative thus banked on one-sided contractualisation rather than on local legislation, which was dominated by the Democratic Party. [61] Legislators would end up being involved, but through different means. The social events in which political authorities participated would play a crucial role:

42

“Linda Gibbs was very active in terms of participating in different forums and talking about Opportunity NYC in Washington, D.C., to groups like the National Governors Association or the National Conference of State Legislators… We provide a lot of education around this initiative. They can be interested in what we’re doing and we maintain targeted relationships with them.” [62]

43What is referred to as providing “public education” about a policy measure is a way to lay down guidelines and reference points. First and foremost, this mobilisation was about respecting certain principles. For example, it was hard to believe it was a “recent discovery” that cities like Baltimore and Savannah were lacking in funds. As for larger cities, they were structurally indebted and could not rely upon such a dense philanthropic network. Regardless of how these attempts at converting the public were translated into concrete action, a specific approach was consequently endorsed. New York-style welfare was publicised and mediatised, and this was enough to legitimise it in the eyes of the highest national authorities.

Winning Over Washington, D.C.

44For New York, as for any other local authority in the United States, winning over Washington, D.C. meant conforming to the imperatives of a federal government. Locally experimenting with an initiative in order to later generalise it across the United States is a tried and true federalist method. First envisioned in the realm of education but now spread to most sectors of public action, [63] this strategy has been used to put items on the national agenda. The different levels of government are so numerous that one often hears the word “intergovernmentalism” used to refer to relationships between the different rungs. [64] Moreover, representatives from each level act as lobbyists within federal policy circles. [65] Between countries, townships and other districts, almost 90,000 political entities share administrative duties. What we are interested in is not the various possible combinations of these authorities, but rather how a single political power can directly develop contacts and alliances with the federal government. The New York team would attempt just that: a vertical diffusion upwards towards the executive branch. In other words, New York would try to be heard by Washington, would try to “win” over Washington, in the sense of both attracting its favourable attention and penetrating its territory.

45The strategy was simple: send key individuals to be heard by federal officials; then mobilise networks and a credible form of experimental objectivity to attract the attention of decision-making authorities. This was literally the meaning of Gordon Berlin’s (the current president of the MDRC) hearing during preparatory meetings for Opportunity NYC. His congressional testimony offered representatives “solutions to poverty” designed by his research institute. [66] The central theme was the development of a new tool to measure poverty. Let us recall that the federal poverty line, an indicator of poverty designed under the Johnson administration, has been regularly criticised as being “inaccurate”. [67] The idea put forth relied on the joint development of a new tool to measure poverty and a new measure to fight it: in short, a combination of action and evaluation within the same government mechanism. One person interviewed expressed the link between data and political credit as follows:

46

“Bloomberg’s team emphasises the evaluation of Opportunity NYC. Whether they succeed or not will be crucial for determining the programme’s influence. […] If Opportunity NYC is a success, they will exert a lot of pressure to implement it on the national level.” [68]

47What was at stake thus gradually shifted: from reducing poverty in a given area to proving the exemplarity of the New York model on the national level.

48A second point of contact was crucial for Bloomberg and his entourage. At the federal level, a special agency was created in February 2009 by President Obama: the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. [69] Its mission followed the trend of strengthening federalism that had begun in the 1980s by multiplying private, community-based and faith-based initiatives. [70] Diane Baillargeon, the director of Structured Employment Economic Development Corporation (Seedco), a national non-profit with its headquarters in New York, was appointed to this office.

49Let us briefly describe the nature and function of this agency. What is called “action sociale” in France (social work) is not administered by government employees in the United States. Even when government services are in charge of certain tasks, it is always as merely one service provider among many. The fight against poverty likewise belongs to this realm of service provision. When City Hall decides to launch a social programme, the latter must rely on community agencies. However, the mayor does not maintain direct relationships with these agencies. In this specific case, the mayor delegated the task of hiring an intermediary agency to select local service providers and supervise their work to the MDRC. [71] Seedco applied guidelines and reported back information related to local implementation. From its corporate headquarters at 915 Broadway in Manhattan, Seedco managed a yearly budget of approximately 60 million dollars. As a non-profit, the organisation is funded two-thirds by the government (both local and federal) and one-third by private foundations.

50For a non-profit organisation, obtaining a contract with City Hall can be a particular boon – even more so when this entails funding from major philanthropic foundations, accompanied by more resources and greater visibility. Seedco’s director thus had every reason to emphasise the “large contracts” awarded to the organisation by local authorities. As a senior executive, Baillargeon thus became part of the informal networks of expertise and social decision-making. An element of personal loyalty must also be taken into account. Baillargeon must defend the project, and, in polite fashion, she explained that the social programme was not at the top of the agenda for federal authorities:

51

“In Washington, D.C., a certain interest exists, but I would say that right now, everyone is just waiting to see how things pan out. People are waiting for the results of the evaluation to make a decision regarding investing in this kind of initiative or not.” [72]

52Regardless of whether it was the result of activism or of the service commissioned, this strategy of diffusion revealed the ambitions of the New York-based policy entrepreneurs. Although municipal authorities were able to bypass local subordinates, the echo at the federal level remained relatively modest. The principle can seem inherently appealing: encouraging the poor to do “what’s right” to fight against poverty means relying on “common sense”, a tactic that cleverly conceals the political intentions behind it. It involves adopting a community logic to promote a supposedly shared goal. However, New York’s uniqueness can also hinder the translation of its models onto the national stage. Reproducing a model in other states requires significant resources, both in terms of funding and number of service providers. The fragmentary nature of the US administrative system and New York City’s global profile nevertheless consolidated the mechanisms of transmission, and internally reinforced the city’s value.

Setting an example

53The fact that a public policy measure comes from New York loosens the domestic political bonds in which sensitive issues are shrouded. Taking a “detour abroad” [73] has thus become a familiar strategy to achieve legitimacy. If Mayor Bloomberg’s office presented itself as being “inspired by” an outside measure, it was ultimately to better position itself as a source of exemplarity. The quest for legitimacy “outside of the territory” of New York emphasised pluralism, originality, an “objective” and “effective” experience from elsewhere – all elements of language which would be useful in legitimising the reform. Hence a third and final diffusion strategy: praising a model in the presence of elected officials and public policy experts from Great Britain and France.

54Whether for reasons of emulation or mistrust, Great Britain very often provides the entry point for US methods to reach Europe. We need only cite the welfare-to-work programme seized upon by New Labour, [74] which was itself the result of New York-based experiments. In a European context where the “activation of social spending” has become routine, Michael Bloomberg and Gordon Brown illustrated the sharing of “best practices”. In February 2008, the Prime Minister announced the launch of Opportunity Revolution and Contract Out of Poverty. [75] The New York City Council simultaneously published a press release applauding this adaptation of Opportunity NYC. The mayor said he was ready to welcome Employment Minister Stephen Timms when the latter next visited New York. [76] This “imminent” visit left no trace. In April, however, Gordon Brown visited the mayor and a few months later, the latter was photographed in front of 10 Downing Street, thus returning the favour. [77]

55Contact with France was made in a different fashion. In an admiring account of his meeting with Mayor Bloomberg, Martin Hirsch described their conversation as follows:

56

“I just spoke about the RSA [78] with Bloomberg […] during a whole night, this reform greatly interested him. Bloomberg was blown away.” [79]

57However, establishing this relationship went well beyond a mere social dinner engagement. In a book published in 2010, the French High Commissioner explained that he “learned of this experimental method […] thanks to one of [his] cousins, Judy Gueron, who was at the helm of a New Yorkbased foundation entirely devoted to social experimentation”. [80] The words were slightly altered to fit the circumstances: instead of a foundation, he was in reality talking about a research institute focused on evaluation and experimentation. Judith Gueron, a Harvard-trained economist, [81] was president of the MDRC between 1986 and 2004. She is also the author of a number of reports promoting the concept of workfare. [82]

58Though they may seem superficial at first glance, social meetings in fact helped to promote the diffusion of public policy practices and provided institutional support for the initiative. On 23 November 2007, Gordon Berlin, the current president of the MDRC, was invited to go to Grenoble. In the context of the launch conference for the “Grenelle de l’insertion” project organised by Martin Hirsch and his team, Berlin presented the New York method of fighting against poverty, not without, however, a number of convoluted formulas:

59

“It is an honour to be a part of this historical meeting […] As an American, it is also a humbling experience. France has been a trailblazer in social welfare policy […]. I also welcome the opportunity to learn from France’s experience.” [83]

60In his speech, Berlin presented Opportunity NYC in rather sober terms as “New York’s conditional cash transfer program”, which was also a way of using “New York” as a brand name. Although the speech was written in English, Berlin’s briefcase contained documents translated into French. Once again, he advocated for “soft policy convergence”, [84] no doubt to avoid clashing with national traditions and prompting controversy. Berlin dealt with this issue paraliptically:

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“Because the context for policymaking in the two countries is very different, I’m not here to hold up the US as a model to be emulated. Instead, I want to describe how we have used social policy experimentation to tackle employment and welfare problems. It is a remarkable story. But only you can decide the relevance of that story for France.” [85]

62Such official events required that the situation be presented as a bilateral exchange of experiences, as public policy lessons are not given but drawn. [86] This stance reveals “control by consent”, to use Joan Roelof’s expression. [87] The central role played by the United States, and New York in particular, should not appear obvious, and one should not promote oneself as a model in order to gain position. Instead, the inherent virtues of a model are praised. And yet the result is the same: on the public policy market as everywhere else, competition is neither pure nor perfect. Even though France was “a trailblazer in terms of social welfare policy”, its representatives were not invited to preside over largescale international meetings or spearhead new programmes for the future. Not all products are created equal, nor are all those producing them. Much like a large firm, New York experts monopolised the social policy market by deliberately representing themselves as pragmatists, ultimately forming a veritable policy hub.

A city of “minorities”

64Michael Bloomberg was the mayor of a predominantly Democratic cosmopolitan city. Although New York City’s executive branch has experienced a Republican trend since the latter half of the 1970s, [89] its non-profit sector has remained staunchly liberal. The campaigns for the 2009 municipal elections highlighted this contrast. The outgoing mayor, weakened in the polls by his attempts to legalise his third term, was attacked on what had become his trademark. As a businessman, billionaire and philanthropist living in a palatial Upper East Side mansion, Bloomberg was depicted as being distant and even indifferent to the plight of poor families in the Bronx or Harlem. Nevertheless, his position also allowed Bloomberg to mobilise resources to put out the fires of controversy. [90] Known as “pork barrel politics”, this approach is rather common. Chronically indebted, New York’s non-profits could not refuse the funding offered by City Hall or the Bloomberg Foundation. One example of this is the Harlem Children’s Zone, headed by Geoffrey Canada and fervently opposed to the initiative, which nevertheless received a check for 500,000 dollars. Its president was put in charge of the Commission for Economic Opportunity, the organisation which had launched Opportunity NYC. [91] This electoral strategy forced the Democratic candidate, William C. Thompson, to give up on campaigning for the poor and minority vote and concentrate instead on the middle class (a more accessible, though rather limited constituency in New York). The fragmentary and incomplete nature of the Democratic campaign platform [92] left another constituency still in play: the Latino vote.

65On 24 April 2007, the mayor travelled to Toluca, the state capital of Mexico State: a city of 815,068 residents with a 5.25 per cent illiteracy rate. [93] The Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA – Education, Health and Nutrition Programme), renamed Oportunidades when it was expanded, [94] was presented as the blueprint for the New York project. Although the measure was implemented largely in rural areas, it was not in poor backwater Mexico that Bloomberg chose to appear. The photograph published in the New York Times does not depict a poor neighbourhood, but rather a well-manicured urban space. Bloomberg, briefcase in hand, is shown next to close colleagues and local political representatives. How do trips like these provide political clout? Bloomberg’s strategy consisted of touting Oportunidades as a model, even conserving the name for his project. This approach was surprising but ultimately appealing in a town divided by a “majority-minority” phenomenon. [95] Referencing a country like Mexico, whose proximity and wealth disparity create significant tensions with the United States, meant flipping the Republican orthodoxy as established by President Bush on its head. The trip to Mexico was the subject of an important political message and presented a way of displacing national cleavages, in favour of an over-whelmingly municipal strategy. The strength of this campaign coup stemmed less from the effectiveness of its “model” than its New York context, which emphasised distance from the Republican Party, of which Bloomberg had been a member during his first term in office.

66What were the effects of the Mexican programme? Preliminary studies have illustrated mixed results. [96] Nonetheless, one of our interviewees underscored that “the programme had a good reputation and the city used it as a model for Opportunity NYC”. [97] The symbolism of the message was clear: Bloomberg was no longer just a New Yorker, or even just a resident of the United States: he was an American, in the broader sense of the word. Any sense of superiority was to be rejected: this was a message not only directed at the general public. Bloomberg also flattered the approach of those organisations who were sensitive to North-South relations. “Our strongest relationship is by far the one we have with Mexico… Mexico and the World Bank”, [98] as a member of Bloomberg’s office liked to say. As a strategy used to distinguish the project, the reversal of North-South relations was intended as a pragmatic approach.

67

“One of the biggest differences is that this is a model that comes from developing countries […] I think that’s not very common, it’s not the standard way that measures are designed.” [99]

68But just where did the conditional cash transfer model come from, in fact? Along with the Mexican Oportunidades, the Brazilian programmes Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Família are usually presented in international research as pioneering innovations. But the need to legitimise a new programme nevertheless hinders the choices made, and we must thus question the true origin of these conditional cash transfer programmes – which leads us to the discovery that the true birthplace of this social policy was none other than New York City.

The city as laboratory

69The pioneering nature of New York with regard to the rest of the United States should not be overlooked. It is the subject of local pride: the city purports to be a “social laboratory for the new society”. [100] By launching pilot programmes in housing, health and social assistance, New York elites became stakeholders in national-scale reform measures. [101]

70In 1969, with the help of his advisor Mitchell Ginsberg (formerly of the New York City Welfare Department), President Nixon proposed a welfare reform programme. Two years later, John Veneman, Under-Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, announced the launch of two provisional measures designed to pilot the Family Assistance Program in the hopes of expanding it nationwide. One experimental state was selected: New York. Public Services Opportunities required unemployed mothers who received social welfare to be employed by the government. Incentives for Independence was based on a more complex mechanism: a “points incentive system” listed behaviours that could lead to rewards. Signing one’s kids up for Scout camp or getting them vaccinated became income-generating activities. Single mothers could obtain one point by telling social services the whereabouts of their child’s father. The points were cumulative, to the tune of 12.50 dollars for each point. [102] The initiative was highly controversial, but it laid the groundwork for rewarding “virtuous” behaviour instead of giving public handouts. [103] In the same vein, Nelson Rockefeller, governor of the state of New York from 1959 to 1974, offered “bonuses” to the recipients of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programme, whose numbers had quadrupled during the two previous decades. This supplement was dependent on school attendance and good faith attempts at finding employment. [104] Despite its reformist stance, the Senate thwarted Nixon’s project in October 1972. [105] This failure did not, however, signal the end of a policy era. However, it illustrates the fact that the principles of conditional cash transfers had not been invented in Latin America, but were first tried out in the United States, and more specifically in New York City, at the beginning of the 1970s.

71A brief socio-historical detour here will allow us to focus on the specific relationships which connect the city, the federal government and the transformation of social policies. These links have been confirmed across decades and political allegiances. President Clinton signalled a turning point in the history of the welfare state when he passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996. By limiting how long individuals could receive social assistance for, the AFDC became the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families programme (TANF). This reform was in turn adopted in two states before being ratified. California’s Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) and New York’s Work Experience Program (WEP) inaugurated the “workfare state”. [106] The latter programme was in fact the most significant workfare measure adopted throughout the country. [107] Introduced in 1995, the measure made low-skilled public service employment mandatory rather than having individuals receive basic welfare assistance (the AFDC programme). As in the case of the Rockefeller-led experiments, Republican Mayor Rudolph Giuliani had anticipated what would become a federal-level reform. According to Giuliani, making employment a necessary condition for receiving public assistance was the way to reduce the number of people dependent on benefits. In fewer than ten years, nine million people were struck from the “welfare rolls”: 600,000 of those were in New York City alone. [108] This development displays two related characteristics: the end of social assistance as a right (entitlement cuts), and the federal public sector’s retreat from social assistance administration (retrenchment). [109] In addition, the role of the urban laboratory was recognised as such: “as a high-profile jurisdiction, New York was inevitably tied up with politics and the media management of workfare programmes”, thus devoting “much institutional energy […] on the marketing and packaging of workfare policy as a political platform”. [110]

72On this occasion, due to different national circumstances, this experimental project launched in New York was able to find a sympathetic ear at the federal level. It is true that whether or not such measures are implemented or disappear entirely has little impact on New York’s reputation. Its dense networks and capital ensure that it will retain its leadership position on the policy market, thanks in large part also to the media.

A media capital

73The role of the media in public policy information is a well-known and analysed phenomenon nowadays. [111] Home to the largest publishing houses, television networks and advertising agencies, New York City can’t help but magnify its impact. It is logically considered to be an epicentre of communications, and even perhaps the media capital of the United States. [112] Throughout its lifetime, Opportunity NYC benefited from the unwavering support of The New York Times, a New York-based newspaper with – one must stipulate even at the risk of sounding redundant – an international audience. [113] From the outset, and at regular intervals, the daily paper devoted special articles to the programme, including “City to reward poor for doing right thing” (30 March 2007), and “A payoff out of poverty?” (21 December 2008).

74On 21 September 2009, a full-page feature was titled “Cash incentive program for poor families is renewed”. The media visibility was real; to say nothing of the local press, which devoted numerous columns to the programme, albeit generally more sceptical in tone. The reach of The New York Times allowed Bloomberg’s team to rise above the programme’s backlash and consolidate its political significance.

75On 30 March 2010, Opportunity NYC’s story experienced a new twist. During a press conference, Michael Bloomberg publicly announced the end of the programme. The stated reason: unsatisfactory results. [114] The location chosen was not unintentional: the community agency BronxWorks, a service provider for the sub-programme Family Rewards, which is situated in one of the city’s poorest neighbourhoods. The mayor’s words, as reported by The New York Times, were also carefully chosen:

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“I don’t know that this is a failure. I think it is, some things worked, and some things didn’t, and some things the jury’s still out on. And anything new you’re going to have that diversity of results.” [115]

77This predictable verdict also paved the way for new funding to be directed towards those evaluating the programmes. [116] The mayor was praised for his “willingness to try innovative approaches to fight against poverty”. As a proof of legitimacy and pragmatism, the words used reinforced the mayor’s position as an independent. Devoid of partisanship, the rhetoric was better suited to describing the evaluation process than to actually conducting an evaluation. [117]

78Others interviewed for the piece mentioned the outline and limits of the measure. Among them was Bloomberg’s number two, Linda Gibbs (who was apparently behind the conditional cash transfer idea from the beginning); an executive from the Rockefeller Foundation, Margot Bradenburg; and a family of Brooklynites for whom the programme had been helpful. “Too complicated” was how Linda Gibbs summed up the programme. “Confusing” and it “sounded too good to be true”, the associate director of the Rockefeller Foundation added. The Brooklyn family, on the other hand, lamented the end of Opportunity NYC. The press coverage effectively showed a “philosophical” Bloomberg pondering the difficulties of fighting poverty. In reality, the project had been a failure. But by carefully insisting on the sincerity of its organisers, the virtues of pragmatism and the desire to “do good”, the final picture appeared almost positive. The effect of the media construction was to provide justification of the city’s leadership – correlating innovation and risk, accountability and responsibility.

79This “policy narrative” [118] would later incorporate a few plot twists. In December 2010, a new initiative was launched. The local specialist press was the first to report this. [119] The new programme was called SIF-Family Rewards Program (FRP). [120] The description of the FRP heeded Linda Gibbs’ criticism from a few months earlier in The New York Times: the programme would be “simpler” and “easier to understand”. [121] The previous programme’s failure became a reason to conserve the same basic principles and even to extend funding for the organisations that chose to implement these principles. The New York Times explained:

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“Academics and advocates for the poor have called the results disappointing – but that has not deterred the administration. The city recently received a $5.7 million grant from the Corporation for National and Community Service to expand the program.” [122]

81This was evidenced by the fact that when the results of Opportunity NYC were announced in March 2010, this did not prompt the programme’s termination. As is often the case with regard to evaluation and assessment, political officials retained a certain degree of freedom [123] – no doubt because while the evaluators reduced the programme to a series of numbers, politicians use it to pursue other goals. They were concerned with the non-objective added value of the programme: getting people to talk about them, agreeing a timetable, bringing different actors together, lending credibility to certain approaches, weakening adversaries… After all, from a political point of view, appearing to submit to the results of an evaluation and then going beyond them by drawing relevant lessons is a way of positioning oneself in the best possible light, appearing as a wise and enlightened leader in the realm of public policy. This is a stance that was bolstered by an influential media, both locally and internationally

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83The circulation of public policy models is a process which calls for cross-boundary thinking. In order to understand what was at stake in this policy-making metamorphosis, this article analysed issues in various different domains. Epistemic communities, coalitions of causes, styles, teachings, and transfers: the analysis of public policy offers many specific tools. But describing the international circulation of ideas belongs to a complementary field of research which has been the subject of important developments in the past few years, hence the interest in examining actors who have made such international circulation their job: in this case, philanthropic organisations and international institutions. These transnational actors gain visibility because of their actions, but also because of the research conducted on those actions. As political science has become an increasingly international discipline, [124] its subjects have also undergone the same transformation. It is obvious that public policies must be analysed differently in an internationalised world, as evidenced by the resurgence of comparative studies in political science, [125] but also by the introduction of concepts like “soft power” from the field of international affairs. Has the circulation of social policy models produced a paradigm shift? [126] It is ultimately hard to say, as this would require a belief in global convergence. In any case, the process has significantly expanded the public policy market. The relationships which have polarised the world for several decades have not vanished yet. However, from east to west and north to south, the lines of perspective of this panorama draw our attention towards a nodal production point, if not of legitimacy, than certainly of social policy: the urban laboratory that is New York.