CAIRN-INT.INFO : International Edition

1From one electoral campaign to another, disillusioned Moroccan citizens can often be heard criticizing political parties as “all the same”, “all corrupt”, or claiming that “there are no real political parties in Morocco” and that “they only represent their own interests”. This disaffection seems to extend to research on the subject as well: with a handful of exceptions, political parties have generally been perceived as an academically irrelevant topic. [1] And yet, observing this partisan phenomenon raises an enigma, as since its independence – a rare feat in the region – Morocco has witnessed a limited, but nevertheless complex form of partisan pluralism. If political parties inspire such disdain in Morocco, what characterizes those who get involved in them? Do they represent a homogenous elite out of synch with the rest of society, a segmented clientele driven by the quest for scarce resources, or a microcosm marked by the same cleavages that exist in society at large?

2In fact, three main competing analyses of political party membership in an authoritarian context have been proposed. 1) Some scholars have highlighted a deep rupture between “depoliticized” citizens and a political elite that shares very similar characteristics (educated, urban, at times even sharing a regional birthplace). [2] 2) Others have viewed political party membership through the prism of a segmental paradigm. [3] 3) Finally, some scholars have interpreted the social dividing lines that run through the partisan landscape from two different angles: social cleavages (centre-periphery, urban-rural, workers-owners, churchstate), [4] or generational renewal. [5]

3On another level, since the earliest references on the subject were published, [6] analyses of Moroccan political life have often remained biased, in that they reduce the institutional political game to a confrontation between the Palace and the political elite; such a framework leaves little room for producing a sociology of political party members. Working from different perspectives, John Waterbury and Rémy Leveau have emphasized the monarchy’s importance in structuring the political partisan landscape in the aftermath of independence. According to Waterbury’s segmental approach, the political behavior of the king and the elites has remained steeped in the traditions of the Makhzen [7] and of tribalism, despite the social upheavals provoked by the Protectorate. Used in a defensive manner to safeguard the “patrimony”, power was only preserved by dividing an already limited elite. The identity of political actors remained “situational” above all, and political parties had unstable clienteles rather than veritable partisans; hence the precariousness of alliances, which made it difficult to achieve any coherence of actions and coalitions with stated ideologies. From this point of view, there is “a constant jostling and rubbing of various political units, accompanied by an atmosphere of tension and crisis, that usually continues the maintenance of balance, or, if it is upset, tends towards its restoration”. [8] According to Leveau, the monarchy and the Mouvement national (National Movement), allied in the nationalist fight against the Protectorate, started competing with each other after independence. Consequently, the monarchy saw political pluralism and electoral mechanisms as instruments to control and fragment a polarized political landscape: it encouraged splits and gave rise to the emergence of “administrative parties”. [9] The electoral analysis conducted by Leveau during the 1960s revealed “solid blocks of opposing tendencies”, [10] which reflected geographical, social and cultural cleavages structured around a main dividing line separating the urban and rural worlds. At the time, cities only accounted for one-fourth of the population. The urban population was more responsive to the discourse of the opposition, which was composed of two components from the Mouvement national: Istiqlal, the party of the “old bourgeois guard”, [11] which was nationalist, urban, drawn from the merchant class and more traditionally educated; and the Union nationale des forces populaires (UNFP – National Union of Popular Forces), the party of the middle class, which was younger, more modest in means, overwhelmingly urban and included modern intellectuals. [12] The rural population was dominated by local elites, composed of landowners who were sensitive to the status of the land and who hoped to preserve their socio-economic position. This is the terrain where the Mouvement populaire (MP – Popular Movement) took root, acting as the representative for rural and Amazigh elites; the party endorsed strong monarchical executive competences while remaining wary of the Mouvement national’s hegemony. In order to counter the opposition, the first administrative party was created in 1963: the Front de la défense des institutions constitutionnelles (FDIC – Constitutional Institutions Defense Front) brought together members of the Rabat, Salé and Marrakech bourgeoisie, as well as old Makhzen families.

4The urban revolts in 1965, the emergence of far left-wing groups at the end of the 1960s, and the rise of Islamist movements starting in the 1970s all paved the way for generational analyses. [13] Nevertheless, other analyses persist. For Leveau, [14] the monarchy managed to achieve stability from the mid-1970s by employing repression as well as divide-and-rule tactics, while mobilizing the nationalist repertoire and launching the so-called democratic process. Henceforth, the recognition of the king’s hegemony, of Moroccan ownership of the contested territory of Western Sahara, and of Islam as the exclusive domain of the Commander of the Faithful established boundaries between the legal opposition, represented by the Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP – Socialist Union of Popular Forces), [15] and, on the other hand, the movements that were doomed to illegality (first far left-wing, then Islamist parties).

5The shift towards political liberalization that began at the end of the 1990s was accompanied on the one hand by the development of analyses highlighting the divide between the partisan elite and citizens, which tended to erect “civil society” as an alternative to political society. [16] On the other, liberalization went hand in hand with a resurgence of studies on electoral clientelism. [17] It is important to recall that this liberalization was reflected in the creation of the “consensual alternating government” under the auspices of the secretarygeneral of the USFP (1998) and in the integration of Islamists from the Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD – Party for Justice and Development) within the parliament. This marked the emergence of governmental coalitions that brought together former rivals: the left (USFP) and right (Istiqlal) wings of the Mouvement National, “national parties” born out of the Mouvement national – Istiqlal, USFP, Parti du progrès et du socialisme (PPS – Party for Progress and Socialism) – and parties that had been stigmatized by these same organizations for being “administrative” only a few years earlier. The proliferation of parties continued to broaden the horizon of the institutionalized political scene. [18] Certain elements of Moroccan political language remained structuring: from its creation in 2008, the Parti authenticité et modernité (PAM – Party for Authenticity and Modernity) had been denounced by its rivals as being a new administrative party; co-founded by a “friend of the king”, a former state secretary for the Ministry of the Interior, the party experienced soaring electoral progression, attracting many elected officials from former administrative parties. In the wake of the 2011 protest movements, a new threshold was reached. During the 2011 legislative elections, Islamists from the PJD – who until that point represented the main opposition in parliament – took the helm of a government that was more mixed than ever before: the patchwork coalition included Istiqlal, a nationalist party, the MP, still seen by some as an administrative party, and the PPS, a former Communist party that had spearheaded the fight to reform the personal status code at the beginning of the 2000s, which the PJD strongly opposed.

6After 50 years of accelerated social transformation, and in the face of an unclear institutionalized political context, marked by the “notabilization of parties of activists”, [19] the issue of clientelism remains central to most interpretations. My observation of electoral campaigns led me to interrogate the future of “the configuration defined by the opposition between rural local elites who were “defenders of the throne” and urban activists, heirs to the Mouvement national”. [20] The starting premise of this article is that, ever since the former opposition was transformed into governmental parties, the political partisan landscape has been characterized by two phenomena: first, certain parties are in competition to accumulate electoral and governmental mandates, while others consider that “seats don’t much matter”, or boycott elections altogether. Second, localized clientelistic mobilization is not the sole purview of parties of local elites and “notables”. From this starting perspective, how is the unclear boundary between “parties of activists” and “parties of notables” reflected in the composition of political party membership? [21]

Innovative fieldwork design [22]

7In order to identify, on the one hand, the characteristics and dividing lines that structure the political partisan landscape in terms of values, sociography, socialization and recruitment pools, and on the other hand, the linkages between individual, collective and organizational trajectories, we established a database of 4,127 congress delegates from ten Moroccan political organizations, surveyed between 2008 and 2012, [23] in tandem with other methods of data collection (observation, life story accounts, repeated interviews).

8The selection of political organizations was determined by historical and ideological criteria, on the basis of dynamics of crisis, fragmentation or unification, while ultimately being governed by the vagaries of national congress schedules. The sample includes parties of notables (such as the PAM and the MP), governmental parties, parliamentary opposition parties and non-parliamentary opposition parties (those calling for a boycott of the elections). These organizations represent a number of diverse orientations: nationalist (Istiqlal), (ex)-governmental left-wing (USFP, PPS), radical left-wing (Parti socialiste unifié – PSU – Unified Socialist Party; Parti de l’avant-garde démocratique socialiste – PADS – Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party) and far left-wing (Annahj addimocrati – Democratic Way). [24] In addition, we included an anti-globalization organization that promoted “a different way of doing politics”. In fact, members of ATTAC-CADTM Morocco tend to consider their involvement as an alternative to political party affiliation. Including these individuals in the database allowed us to examine closely the boundaries between the institutionalized political scene, protest arenas, and non-conventional politics, while investigating the particularities of partisan membership from the fringes.

9National congresses constitute a fundamental event in the life of a political party. [25] Delegates from all over the country get together in the same place, for at least 48 hours, primarily in order to elect party leaders, comment on the ethical and financial reports of the out-going team, and, more broadly, to discuss fundamental political issues for the party. The classical unities of time, place and action embodied at national congresses thus make them an ideal opportunity for conducting surveys. While observation is itself worthy of interest, these events also provided simultaneous access to an important number of party members (between 100 and more than 5,000 delegates, depending on the size and wealth of the party) who were highly invested in the organization at the time of the congress. [26]

10Establishing a sample was quite a challenge. Faced with uncertainty regarding the parent population for national congress delegates, [27] and due to the unusual nature of this kind of study in Morocco, we opted for a reflexive approach towards both the survey negotiations and the implementation of mechanisms for distributing, administering and collecting the questionnaires. [28] Before, during and after each congress, we relied on “allies” to maximize the data collected concerning congress delegates’ profiles, the main issues being discussed, internal struggles, the material dimension of the organization, etc. Over the course of ten surveys, we tried to adopt comparable procedures, with a team composed primarily of students who had been trained ahead of time, while still adapting on the ground to the nature of the organization in question and how the study was welcomed by congress organizers. [29] Cognizant of the fact that such studies often tend to discriminate against the less educated and that Morocco’s rural population has very low rates of literacy, [30] we reinforced the survey procedure in parties that had a solid rural base (Istiqlal, MP, PAM). Despite our best efforts, however, the rates of return were still very low during these huge congresses (21% for the MP, 14% for Istiqlal and PAM), which is itself indicative. In three cases, we were able to slip questionnaires into congress delegates’ packs (PJD, PPS, PSU). During the ATTAC congress, organizers scheduled a break that was long enough for delegates to fill out the questionnaire en masse. Of course, these elements all had repercussions on the rates of return (see Appendix 1). The record rate obtained by the PJD (54%) was surpassed by the PSU (68%) and then ATTAC (98%).

11Two methods were employed to produce the first set of results. On the one hand, crosssorting allowed identification of the broadbrush characteristics of delegates, in particular by comparing them across party lines. On the other hand, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) helped to detect the underlying structures or structural factors, which were otherwise not visible when analyzing variable by variable. MCA brings together a number of variables, generally nominal. It visualizes similarities and contrasts. Its results are presented in the form of cloud plots of modalities and individuals, with the axes representing the factors. These analyses produced typologies or categories that describe the delegates’ profiles; the transformation of these exhaustive classifications into automated synthetic secondary variables in turn allows for a second cross-sorting.

12Preliminary results seem to indicate that the Moroccan political landscape, shown in miniature through our sample of delegates, is governed by selective logics. However, strong dividing lines differentiate parties of activists and parties of notables on the sociographic level. These divergences are partially reflected in relationships to politics and values. At an ideological and religious level, the main oppositions are structured within the same socio-professional and socio-demographic universe: that of the parties of activists.

Parties of activists, parties of notables: divergent profiles

13At first glance, the delegates seem to be overwhelmingly urban, college-educated, middle-aged [31] men [32] who are middle managers, senior managers or executives [33] in the public sector. [34] These data appear to corroborate the theory that political parties are a world unto themselves and not representative of the larger population, despite their best efforts to reach out to rural populations, [35] women [36] and young people. [37]

14At second glance, however, the partisan microcosm appears to be structured by a dividing line between two different universes: on one side, highly educated individuals, civil servants [“gens du public”], [38] mostly urban-dwelling, corresponding to radical left-wing and Islamist parties; on the other side, those with little or no schooling, working in the private sector [“gens du privé”], closer to the rural world and the parties of notables. This ideal-type opposition can be further be refined by interpreting axes 1 and 2 of the “education and employment” [39] factor map (Appendix 2) and the classes that can be deduced from them (Table 2).

Table 1

Distribution of delegates (survey data from 2008-2012) and of the overall population (2004 general census), [40] aged 20 and older, by age, [41] sex, urban/rural residence, education, occupation and socio-professional category (% in columns[42])

Table 1
Delegates 2008-2012 General Census 2004 20-30 years old 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 or over 13 22 29 22 6 18 14 11 7 8 Women Men 14 83 51 49 Urban Rural 77 17 58 42 Higher education 65 4 Executives, managers, liberal professionals 56 9

Distribution of delegates (survey data from 2008-2012) and of the overall population (2004 general census), [40] aged 20 and older, by age, [41] sex, urban/rural residence, education, occupation and socio-professional category (% in columns[42])

Table 2

Distribution of delegates by “education and employment” class (EE) and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012[43]

Table 2
Annahj ATTAC Istiqlal MP PADS PAM PJD PPS PSU USFP Total EE1 10 8 20 13 13 16 41 27 24 43 26 EE2 48 21 30 20 49 22 36 24 48 28 31 EE3 3 10 9 17 4 22 7 11 8 5 10 EE4 11 13 26 36 12 24 7 23 11 8 18 EE5 2 0 6 4 3 3 3 4 0 9 4 EE6 26 48 10 10 19 13 6 11 10 7 11

Distribution of delegates by “education and employment” class (EE) and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012[43]

15In the bottom-right quadrant, the first factor opposes the “no answer” category [44] (EE5 – class 5) and young people, either students or those having recently graduated (EE6 – class 6), to all the rest. The EE6 class is close to ATTAC and, to a lesser extent, the far left-wing (Annahj) and the radical left-wing (PADS). From the upper-right to the bottom-left quadrant, the second factor opposes two clusters, with education levels plotted along a continuum. [45]

16Around the private sector, the first cluster is close to the parties of notables (or those in the process of notabilization) and is composed of two sub-clusters. Class 4 (EE4) is associated with very low levels of education, with blue-collar workers and craftsmen, small and medium-sized farmers, [46] but also with informal and precarious workers: it displays a close affinity with the MP (Istiqlal, PAM and the PPS are also over-represented in this class). Class 3 (EE3) corresponds to entrepreneurs, large-scale farmers and family businesses, and is largely associated with PAM (but also with the MP).

17Around the public sector, the second cluster is close to the left-wing and the Islamists, revealing two different profiles. Class 1 (EE1) is characterized by the over-representation of individuals who have completed more than three years of higher education (a tiny percentage of whom did so abroad), those who speak foreign languages, senior managers and executives, liberal professionals and college professors. This class is closer to the ex-governmental left-wing, the USFP, and the PJD. Class 2 (EE2) combines those who completed between two and three years of higher education, middle managers, primary school teachers, permanent staff members of political parties, associations and trades unions; it is associated with the radical left-wing (the PSU, PADS) and the far left-wing (Annahj).

18The description of socio-demographic characteristics in relation to “education and employment” classes completes this picture (Table 3). The rural cluster (EE4 and, to a lesser extent, EE3) is marked by an even higher predominance of men and the over-representation of the elderly (EE4) and of 30- to 39-year olds (EE3). Its profiles are characterized by stability with regard to intergenerational professional trajectories, [47] whether combined or not with downward social mobility. The urban cluster (EE1, EE2, EE6) also presents two different socio-demographic profiles. At one end, those under 30, with a higher percentage of women and stable urban residential trajectories (EE6). [48] At the other end, 40- and 50-year olds whose residential trajectories were either firmly urban (EE1) or marked by rural exodus (EE1, EE2); the professional trajectories revealed mainly upward social mobility (EE1, EE2). In relation to the age groups that correlate with managers and executives, we should note that 40-year olds tend to be over-represented in the PJD (40%), while 50-year olds and those over 60 tend to correspond with the USFP (45%).

Table 3

Distribution of delegates by sex, age, urban/rural residence, residential trajectory (RT), intergenerational professional trajectory (IPT) and by “education and employment” class (EE) (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 3
EE1 EE2 EE3 EE4 EE5 EE6 Total Men 84 85 89 87 60 69 83 Women 14 13 10 11 8 28 14 Under 30 5 8 14 13 5 59 14 30-39 17 22 31 25 13 20 23 40-49 36 34 30 24 18 12 30 50-59 27 27 16 19 19 2 21 over 60 8 4 4 12 6 1 6 Urban 91 82 77 54 39 82 77 Rural 6 15 18 41 11 13 17 RT: stable urban 61 52 53 36 26 64 52 RT: stable rural 5 13 14 38 9 11 15 RT: rural r urban 25 25 19 15 8 14 21 IPT: stable 15 12 33 33 7 2 17 IPT: progression 65 53 47 24 5 1 43 IPT: regression 5 14 6 21 2 1 10

Distribution of delegates by sex, age, urban/rural residence, residential trajectory (RT), intergenerational professional trajectory (IPT) and by “education and employment” class (EE) (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

19Comparing the residential trajectories and the intergenerational professional trajectories across political organizations supported the trends discussed above (Table 4). Some political parties are characterized by stable rural residency (especially the MP and Istiqlal), alongside professional trajectories that are either marked by social stability or a downward social mobility (in particular for the parties of notables, the MP, PAM and Istiqlal). Other parties are associated with with stable urban residency or rural exodus and with upwardly mobile professional trajectories (particularly strong for the PJD, but also above average for the USFP and the PSU), characteristic of the first generations post-independence to have benefited from the massive expansion of education. Contrary to certain analyses that have been proposed, [49] upward social mobility does not characterize the trajectories of party members as a whole. According to our hypothesis, upward social mobility is more specifically linked with parties of activists and, within these parties, the 40- and 50-year olds who are “settled”, rather than young people more or less adrift with regard to social status. [50] The parties of notables, on the other hand, show the co-existence of two different profiles: the elites that reproduce themselves, and their pauperized “clients”.

Table 4

Distribution of delegates by residential trajectory (RT), intergenerational professional trajectory (IPT) and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 4
ATTAC Annahj PADS PSU USFP PJD PPS Istiqlal MP PAM Total RT: stable urban 58 50 59 59 56 54 48 52 44 45 52 RT: stable rural 6 10 6 12 11 8 16 21 32 15 15 RT: rural r urban 25 25 26 21 20 27 24 15 15 16 21 IPT: stable 10 6 12 15 16 11 18 21 25 22 17 IPT: progression 21 41 43 47 48 56 41 38 37 31 43 IPT: regression 11 9 10 11 8 9 10 12 12 13 10

Distribution of delegates by residential trajectory (RT), intergenerational professional trajectory (IPT) and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

20A sociographic analysis of the Moroccan political partisan landscape reveals several elements. First of all, although this microcosm is constituted by an elite, it nevertheless still reflects many of the dynamics at work in society at large. Despite the various reconfigurations of the Moroccan political scene, the opposition between parties of activists and parties of notables still remains structural, and appears to encounter strong socio-demographic and socio-professional dividing lines. In an ideal-type fashion, the parties of notables correlate with rural dwellers, the private sector, low levels of education, and stable or downwardly mobile socio-professional trajectories. Activist parties, on the other hand, are more closely associated with urban dwellers, the public sector, high levels of education, as well as a tendency for socio-professional ascension, stable urban residency, or a rural exodus trajectory. Second, PJD delegates are not marginalized citizens, and, from a sociographic point of view, the ex-governmental left-wing (the USFP) is much closer to PJD Islamists [51] than to the radical left-wing or the far left-wing. In fact, the highly educated, senior managers and executives, and those who experienced a great deal of social mobility are largely close to the parties that were part of the opposition before joining the government, with a 13-year historical gap, echoing the association of the USFP with 50-year olds and those over 60, and that of the PJD with 40-year olds. On the other hand, middle managers – also associated with those in their 40s and 50s – and young, highly educated individuals have a close affinity with political organizations that are on the fringes of the electoral contest. As for ATTAC, the association that hoped to do politics differently, its membership largely correlates with those currently pursuing a degree or having recently graduated. Third, although certain proximities appear across age brackets and political affiliation, at this stage in the research we cannot prove that a clear overlap exists between a political generation and an ideological family.

21Exploring the strategic positions and the normative universe of congress delegates reveals that the structural oppositions that exist from a sociographic perspective translate into different relationships to politics, without, however, explaining the differences expressed from the point of view of political and religious values.

National politics vs. local and patronized politics

22The main dividing line that runs through the Moroccan political partisan landscape as illustrated by the congress delegates stems from the relationship to politics: it separates the world of local, pragmatic and clientelist politics from the world of national politics, structured by ideological identities. This boundary does not only distinguish political parties from each other: in particular, it affects those parties whose image and identity were reconfigured when they moved from being part of the opposition to being part of the government. We shall examine these contrasts from three different angles: the strategic positions of delegates within the political landscape; the incentives and meanings attributed to their political involvement; and religious values.

“Allies and adversaries” structured by attitudes towards the monarchy

23The “left” and the “right” are strong concepts that have been referred to so often that it is sometimes difficult to remember that they are in fact rooted in a well-defined semantic field. Since Morocco’s independence, the members of the opposition that clearly identify as being on the “left” [52] have constantly tried to locate their “right-wing” adversaries. Those on the left automatically associate the right wing with “traditionalism” and “conservatism”. Using a Marxist, and somewhat Third World vocabulary they lump together the “comprador” bourgeoisie, subjugated by the regime and “imperialism”, and “feudal” leaders: local elites supported by the monarchy to control and stabilize rural regions. As soon as Islamist movements gain in prominence, they are likewise described as “right wing’, and sometimes even “far right wing” by those on the left who see them as another one of the monarchy’s attempts to weaken the opposition. It was only at the end of the 1990s that Moroccan actors began to positively self-identify as being on the right, a phenomenon which was linked with the political rise of the “entrepreneur”, “as a metaphorical or archetypal figure […] using material […] and ideological mechanisms”. [53]

24Since 1998, electoral engineering and the emergence of party-list, proportional single-round elections have replaced ballot-box stuffing, with the result that no single party can obtain an absolute majority. One hypothesis is that the succession of several heterogeneous governments has perhaps erased the boundary between “us” and “them”, including among political party members. Consequently, how are we to establish indicators according to which delegates may position themselves? And from another point of view, how can respondents be asked to situate themselves in relation to key political actors who overshadow the institutionalized political scene or, on the contrary, who inhabit its fringes? Unable to use either a “classic” measure, such as the left-right spectrum, or a Moroccan tradition of political surveys, it was necessary to “cobble” something together. We thus asked a semi-open question: “Currently, as a member of party x, what are the organizations and actors that you consider as potential allies or adversaries?” [54] The respondents were instructed to check several boxes in a table that listed three options (ally, adversary, neither ally nor adversary [“neither/nor”]) and sixteen to seventeen variables: names of political organizations that were either part of, or excluded from, the institutionalized political scene, as well as a number of additional actors, such as “the king” or “the king’s entourage”.

The king and the question concerning allies and adversaries

The “allies and adversaries” question was the only one to have been the topic of negotiations with representatives from certain political parties. The reactions that the question provoked were quite telling. When I asked the president of the committee, a former exiled journalist, in charge of organizing the 2008 USFP congress – the first organization surveyed – to express his reactions regarding the questionnaire, he answered by saying: “Well, I’m not going to act as a censor!” Then, when I talked to the PJD, its political bureau unanimously approved the survey (with one member absent) and proposed inserting the questionnaire into the packs given to the delegates, on one condition: “Take the king out of the survey”. [55] PPS leaders likewise welcomed the survey, while unknowingly making the same request as the PJD, asking for the removal of the variables “the king” and “the king’s entourage”. In both cases, leaders explained that constitutionally, the king was not a political actor like everyone else; that he was above all others and therefore could not be viewed as an “ally” or an “adversary”. Moreover, once the questionnaires were inserted into delegates’ packs, they became congress documents and the party was thus “responsible” for them. With regard to the MP, the organizers of the congress were not involved with distributing the questionnaires, but they likewise asked for “the king” to disappear from the document. This problem did not occur with any of the radical left-wing or far left-wing parties, even when these were in charge of distributing the questionnaires and of having their members fill them out. This is not truly surprising, as these parties were surveyed for the most part between 2011 and 2012, when the taboo of the king was being challenged. Contrary to my expectations, those with whom I spoke from Istiqlal and PAM did not express any particular reticence with regard to the subject. For Istiqlal, I only managed to secure authorization and access to the congress space at the very last minute, so I did not have time to discuss the content of the questionnaire. With regard to PAM, its extraordinary congress in 2012 hoped to give the party a new image, as it had been widely decried by activists in the February 20th Movement. [56] In addition, the party leaders wanted to seem more open, as they had previously refused the survey in 2009.
A number of reactions from Istiqlal and PAM delegates were noteworthy. During the nationalist party’s congress, some respondents complained that the questionnaire was “insolent”. The reaction of some PAM members reflected the 2011-2012 context: “You want to prove what we’re being accused of, you want to show, with data to back it up, that we are favourable to the king and the king’s friends.” Four years earlier, a delegate from the USFP had declared when posting his questionnaire in the “ballot box”: “I’m putting in a blank ballot out of protest! The name of Himma[57] should not be on this questionnaire.”
Listening to the “noise” and “anecdotal information” that “conventional political analysis tends to dismiss” [58] is not without merit, including when attempting to establish a database. Sometimes, the notes scribbled in a field notebook end up providing valuable insight later when interpreting statistical data.

25When we examine the factorial map of “allies and adversaries” [59] (Appendices 3 and 4) and the classes derived from it, ideal-type contrasts can be found on two different levels.

26From right to left, the map’s first two axes clearly contrast the “no answer” category (class 6 – AA6) with the rest of the positive modalities that designate actors as “allies”, “adversaries”, or “neither allies nor adversaries”. From one end of the spectrum to the other, we can see a continuum between the MP on one end, and the PSU (radical left-wing) and ATTAC on the other end (Appendix 3). Starting from this premise, a first hypothesis suggests itself: the main dividing line that runs through the population of Moroccan national political party delegates stems from their relationship to politics. It differentiates those who identify their allies and adversaries by looking at the national political landscape from those who have difficulty positioning themselves within this landscape, or refuse to do so. A second hypothesis posits that combining this factorial map with the one that synthesizes data regarding education, social status, sectors of employment and socio-professional categories will allow us to differentiate two clusters: the world of local politics, which is pragmatic and clientelist, associated with the parties of notables, the private sector, low levels of education and rural residency; and the world of national politics, structured by left-wing and Islamist ideological identities, on the basis of a logic of “political sophistication”, associated with public sector executives, highly educated young people and urban dwellers. This would corroborate the oppositions observed in Moroccan electoral history between, at one end, local, particular and patronized electoral campaigns that rely on individual social capital, and at the other end, nationally structured and modular electoral campaigns that rely on collective partisan capital. [60]

27It is only along the second and third axes that we can see an ideological continuum develop between two directly opposed poles (Appendix 4, Table 5); attitudes towards the king and his entourage are at the core of the various ally/adversary configurations. To the left end of the graph, the radical left-wing and the far left-wing are associated with configurations that designate the king and his entourage, the parties of notables, organizations like the PJD, Al Adl Wadl Ihsane[61] and Salafist organizations [62] as adversaries, while recognizing left-wing parties as allies (class 1 – AA1). To the right, in a sort of inverse reflection, the cluster associated with the PJD, the MP, PAM and Istiqlal identifies the left-wing and far left-wing as adversaries, while the king and his entourage, the parties of notables and/or other Islamist organizations are deemed allies (class 5 – AA5). The class of “neither ally nor adversary” is also in proximity with Istiqlal, the MP and PAM (class 4 – AA4). Between the two, the cluster close to the PPS (AA2) reveals an alliance that brings together the radical left-wing, the governmental left-wing and Istiqlal: in other words, all the parties stemming from the Mouvement national. Here, adversaries are much less easily identified, and the answer “neither ally nor adversary” was often selected. Finally, along the second and third axes, the “no answer” category is repositioned in the centre, thus suggesting that it would be fruitful to examine the distribution of delegates by strategic positions, education levels and socio-professional trajectories (Table 6).

Table 5

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” class (AA) and by political organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 5
Annahj ATTAC Istiqlal MP PADS PAM PJD PPS PSU USFP Total AA1 Polarization: radical left, far left 68 77 0 1 71 4 0 1 82 31 19 AA2 Relative polarization: Mouvement National 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 62 1 25 12 AA3 Two responses or more 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 AA4 “Neither ally nor adversary” 9 10 36 25 5 27 10 10 4 16 18 AA5 Polarization against the left 0 0 26 29 0 29 56 0 0 3 21 AA6 No answer 23 13 37 44 23 38 33 26 12 25 30

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” class (AA) and by political organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 6

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” (AA) and “education-employment” (EE) (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 6
EE1 EE2 EE3 EE4 EE5 EE6 Total AA1 Polarization: radical left, far left 17 26 12 11 10 25 19 AA2 Relative polarization: Mouvement national 19 10 13 9 9 11 12 AA5 Polarization against the left 25 22 23 17 7 16 21 Polarization sub-total 61 58 48 37 26 52 52 AA3 Two answers or more 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 AA4 “Neither ally nor adversary” 14 15 24 27 8 16 18 AA6 No answer 25 27 28 36 65 31 30

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” (AA) and “education-employment” (EE) (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

28Once aggregated, the polarized and “ideologized” classes do in fact correlate with urban, educated, public sector, senior managers and executives (EE1), and middle managers (EE2), across all organizations. On the other hand, the “no answer” class (AA6) corresponds more to the “no answer” “education-employment” class (EE5), blue-collar workers and craftsmen, small and medium-sized farmers, those in precarious employment (EE4), and, to a lesser extent, young educated individuals (EE6). This category is also often associated with the parties of notables, the MP, PAM and Istiqlal (Table 5). In such cases, the “no answer” category indicates a certain amount of distance with regard to the ideological landmarks of national politics. [63] However, the slight over-representation of the PJD in class AA6 points to the fact that the “no answer” response may also be a sign of prudent or disdainful sophistication (see the text box below). With regard to respondents from the Islamist party, this answer seems to indicate an attitude observed during previous surveys: adhering to party discipline, which involves complying with decisions taken collectively (and/or hierarchically), and asserting the goodwill and openness of a new player on the institutionalized political scene who seeks to reassure other actors.

29The “neither/nor” class (AA4) also tends to express a certain distance with regard to the landmarks of national politics. On the one hand, it is associated with the parties of notables, Istiqlal, PAM and the MP (Table 5), and on the other, with the “education and employment” classes that correlate to the private sector, low levels of education and low socio-professional positions (EE4), or, on the flipside, the world of entrepreneurs and large-scale farmers (EE3). This description is corroborated by the fact that class AA4 moreover concentrates answers identifying well-known actors as allies, such as the king and the PJD.

“No answer”, “Neither ally nor adversary”, “Two answers or more” [64]

While the questionnaires were being administered, some delegates started by listening to the names of all the actors and organizations in the questionnaire and then indicated their selections. Others hesitated, or asked questions of the person administering the questionnaire, or the person accompanying them, regarding the symbol associated with each party. When a respondent clearly indicated that s/he did not know a political organization, s/he could choose to either mark the box as “neither/nor” or to leave it blank. During the Istiqlal congress, I observed that some individuals preferred to disguise their ignorance by selecting “neither/nor”, while others engaged in all sorts of mental gymnastics to try and reconcile the alliances that their party had at the national level with the local electoral arrangements elaborated during each political race.
The “two responses or more” category reflects different relationships to politics. One young shop owner, introduced to the PPS by a maternal cousin, expressed clear-cut opinions against the repression of unemployed graduates and journalists, and more broadly against attacks on political and civil liberties made in the context of the fight against terrorism. To the question concerning the meaning that he gave to his PPS membership, he responded: “None at all, nothing changes”. Then he proceeded to the question on “allies and adversaries” and carefully drew a checkmark through every single box; he thus belongs to the micro-class, AA3. A 40-something university professor from the same party also belongs to this class; a son of a smallholder farmer, he explained his involvement with the party in relation to his desire to defend the lower classes. After crossing things out and making numerous corrections, he finally developed four positions (instead of the three proposed): one answer for allies (parties stemming from the Mouvement national) or adversaries (Islamists that were excluded from the political stage, in particular); two answers for intermediary alliance positions (far left-wing) or intermediary adversary positions (administrative parties and the PJD), combined with the “neither/nor” answer.
The sophistication of certain respondents was visible even in the use of the “no answer” category. During the USFP congress in 2008, a 60-year old lawyer worked through his positions out loud. He identified some parties as “unquestionably” adversaries (Islamists and the administrative parties), and then differentiated the “real” allies on the left, which were not part of the 2007-2011 governmental coalition, from the circumstantial allies (“neither/nor”). He refused to even dignify the small parties with a checkmark: “They’re not worth including in the final result.”

30These results illustrate the different forms of politicization at work in an authoritarian context. More significantly, they also show that it would be rather hasty to oppose “politicized” professionals and “depoliticized” ordinary citizens, as different relationships to politics coexist within the partisan microcosm, and even at times within a single political party. In fact, lack of interest in partisan and national politics was even expressed by some congress delegates of the parties surveyed. Ultimately, the main dividing line between Moroccan national political party delegates is not ideological, but reflects a relationship to politics: on one side, pragmatic, localized politics, embedded within a clientelist network that stretches beyond the rural community, and on the other, national politics, structured by political identities that seem to have been left untouched by recent political reconfigurations. Ideological polarization only appears at a second level, within the worlds of 40- and 50-year old urban dwellers, educated executives working in the public sector, as well as some young, highly educated individuals. It is structured around a position towards the monarchy, which presents a paradox. Access to the institutionalized political scene can only be granted once a political organization rejects the possibility of directly confronting the king; and yet pockets of resistance against the monarchy still exist, even within parties whose leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their reconciliation with the monarchy. [65] Exploring the incentives and meanings behind the commitments expressed by delegates will help us to nuance these findings.

Conceptions of party membership: between pragmatism and ethical declarations

31In order to identify the social and political values of delegates, we included two open-ended questions on the questionnaire: “What led you to become a member of party or organization x?” (at the beginning of the questionnaire); and “Today, what does it mean to you to be a member of party or organization x?” (in the middle of the questionnaire). Rejecting a restrictive view of politicization, [66] centred on the relationship to institutionalized politics and the logic of “political sophistication”, we chose to word the questions (in Arabic) in such a way as to encourage both an “increase in generalization” and the recounting of specific, biographical narratives to explain the circumstances of enrolment. [67] The highly granular coding of the responses [68] highlights differences in how members joined a political party, what belonging to a political organization means to them, the view they have of their organization, frames of reference, values and goals, action targets and scales, perceptions of their relationship to citizens, and the material and non-material rewards of their involvement (Table 7). Simple sorting and auto-generated classifications presented three ideal-type clusters: local, pragmatic and clientelist politics; national politics structured according to political identities (nationalist, Islamist, left-wing); “a different way of doing politics” (ATTAC). However, we should note that some parties span the first two clusters (Istiqlal, the PPS).

32The pragmatic and clientelist cluster is characterized by very few references made to political values and identities, with respondents instead emphasizing individual and biographical elements: family affiliations, local interpersonal relationships, a desire to “assert oneself”, “to gain experience”, to “realize political ambitions”, and to participate in elections. A party’s reputation did not leave respondents indifferent, either, whether its image was of being “large and established” (the MP) or “young and dynamic” (PAM). Moreover, during the interviews, certain rural elected officials stated their clear preference for governmental parties, which were likely to bring their region closer to the capital. When values and goals were expressed, they often involved defending the rural and Amazighity (the MP), even the “foundations of the regime: God, Country, King” (the MP, Istiqlal). On the local scale, respondents described themselves as mediators between political authorities and the local population. While some expressed pride at belonging to a party, others articulated specific expectations: they hoped for money and, more importantly, a job; or to solve a particular problem; to access funding for their association; to operate under a “political umbrella”; to enjoy protection against local authorities; and gain contacts in high places, etc.

Asked to fill out a questionnaire, one delegate from PAM said to me: “You’re conducting a survey on political parties! Do you really believe that there are political parties in Morocco?!” Later, this local elected official, a notary in his 40s from a small provincial town, told me about his “leftist” past as a student in Marrakech, followed by his involvement in local sporting associations. Feeling “unfairly” impeded in his activities by the president of his municipality, he defied the latter and ran for election to try to block his path. According to my respondent, it was thanks to his reputation as a good and generous man that he managed to collect votes. In his mind, a party “is just a label to present oneself during elections and to build alliances”. He thus changes “labels” without any scruples, depending on the opportunities presented to him at any given moment. With humour and pride, he told the story of how, when he informed his wife that he was going to the “tractor” congress (the tractor being the symbol of PAM), she remarked that if he kept changing “labels”, he would confuse “the neighbourhood kids” (“wlad ad-derb”). Supposedly he responded by saying: “My supporters vote for me and not for a party […] These parties don’t give me anything, I’m the one bringing in votes for them […] Yesterday, I was with the dove, today I’m with the tractor and tomorrow, why not, with the apple or even the banana.” [69]

33The two clusters of “national politics” (Islamist, left-wing, and, to a lesser extent, nationalist parties) and “a different way of doing politics” (ATTAC) tend to favour the expression of altruistic values, a political identity and objectives based on generalizations that transcend the individual and the biographical. In fact, the “frame of reference” or “ideological orientations” indicated were consistently Islamic for the PJD; modernist, progressive and “left-wing” for Annahj, PADS, the PPS, the PSU, and the USFP (varying between Marxist-Leninist, socialist and social democratic leanings); and anti-globalization for ATTAC. The championed values and causes were likewise referred to over and over again. Although the fight against corruption was an objective shared by both the left-wing and the Islamist party, the PJD’s vision was reformist, aiming to raise moral standards in politics, while for the left (and ATTAC), this was part of a greater fight against tyranny and injustice and for democracy, equality, freedom and social justice. The left-wing parties sought to “represent” citizens, while ATTAC emphasized “raising awareness”. The desire to serve one’s country or the common good was a relatively trans-partisan one, as only ATTAC favoured a scale of action that went beyond national borders; much like the left-wing parties, however, ATTAC also claimed to defend the “popular classes”. With regard to party membership, being a member meant setting an example: being a “patriot” for nationalist parties, “a committed activist” for the left and ATTAC, and, for the Islamist parties, “having a strong moral code” and possibly even “sacrificing oneself” by putting the party’s objectives first. The rewards gained were first and foremost intangible and non-material. Some individuals expressed a strong attachment to their party, like one USFP member who associated the party with “the blood that ran in his veins”. Although certain descriptions of the party individuals belonged to were relatively close to those associated with the pragmatic and clientelist end of the spectrum – “a major historical party” (Istiqlal, USFP), “dynamic and moderate” (Istiqlal, PJD) – other attributes were more specific: the party was described as “virtuous” (PJD, PPS), “credible”, possessing internal democracy, with highly qualified members and leaders (PJD), or committed (the left, ATTAC), with many “sacrifices” in its past (USFP, PADS, Annahj, PPS). Finally, when delegates explained why they joined their party, they often referred to a particular political context or their exposure to certain political organizations while at university, in their professional lives, or in associations or trades unions.

34Like the positions adopted within configurations of allies and adversaries, the incentives and meanings attributed to membership in a given party reveal the ideological polarization of those delegates who situate themselves on a national political scale. This polarization appears to be underpinned by differing relationships to religion and religious values.

Table 7

Ideal-type presentation of incentives and meanings attributed to political engagement expressed by respondents – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 7
Local, pragmatic, clientelist politicsC……cNational politics, structured by political identities A different way of doing politics Nationalist Islamist Left-wing Organizations in close proximity to MP PAM Istiqlal PJD Far left-wing, radical left-wing ATTAC Enrolment circumstances Family affiliations, local interpersonal relationships Local interpersonal relationships Family affiliations, local interpersonal relationships --- Exposure to politicizing contexts and events Exposure to politicizing contexts and events Being and doing Running for office, realizing political ambitions Running for office, gaining experience, realizing political ambitions Being an active citizen, being patriotic, running for office, realizing political ambitions Being an active, virtuous, exemplary citizen, achieving the party’s goals Being a committed, exemplary activist, true to oneself, achieving the party’s goals Being a committed, exemplary activist, gaining experience, achieving the organization’s goals Characteristics and view of party Major historical party Young and dynamic party Major historical party, moderate, dynamic Virtuous, credible, moderate and dynamic party, high quality members and leaders, internal democracy Activist, committed party (sacrifices) Activist, committed organization Frame of reference --- --- (Modernist) --- Islamic Left-wing, modernist, progressive Anti-globalization Values and goals Defending the rural, Amazighity, foundations of the regime (Raising moral standards in politics) Defending the nation, identity, the foundations of the regime Raising moral standards in politics, defending identity, change, development Anti-corruption For equality, freedom, social justice, democracy Against injustice, tyranny, corruption For equality and social justice Against the evils of globalization, injustice and tyranny Action targets and scales Region, local area All social classes Region, local area All social classes Country All social classes Country --- Popular classes Transnational Popular classes Relationship to citizens Mediation Mediation Mediation --- Representation Representation Rewards Individual and non-material Individual and non-material Individual and non-material Non-material Non-material Non-material

Ideal-type presentation of incentives and meanings attributed to political engagement expressed by respondents – survey data from 2008-2012

The religious foundations of ideological polarization

35According to prevalent analyses within political sociology, religious values polarize the political partisan landscape. [70] With regard to research conducted in Morocco, scholars have emphasized the tension between multi-faceted attachment to religious values and the process of individualization. [71] The hypothesis proposed here is that the process of individualization shapes – in different ways – the relationship to the sacred of both those individuals who advocate for the “privatization” of religion and those who, on the contrary, wish to see society regulated by religious norms. Much like ideological cleavages, polarization regarding religious matters largely plays out on the urban stage, the main actors being the most educated members of society: middle managers, senior managers and executives, students and recent graduates.

36This study does not seek to reconstitute either the scope or the depth of the religious dynamics at work, but concentrates instead on a few questions on the basis of in-depth studies that had been conducted previously. After investigating the links between normative variables (religious practices, whether the veil was worn by the female respondent or by the (male) respondent’s wife, opinions on veil wearing, opinions on homosexuality [72]), creating a composite index allowed us to measure levels of adherence to “conventional” religious values [73] or autonomy with regard to said values. We are aware that some responses primarily reflect the image that respondents wished to give of their organization. Moreover, additional exchanges demonstrated to what extent the questions could be subject to different interpretations and self-presentations. Even the meaning to be attributed to the word “hijab” [74] prompted questions: “Can the traditional headscarf be considered a hijab?”, “What about full-face veils?”. There are therefore many angles that should be considered in future studies. Nevertheless, such issues do not completely invalidate the results presented here.

Some reactions to the question concerning homosexuality

This question did not provoke any specific comments in the left-wing parties or the PJD. However, during the Istiqlal and MP congresses, respondents expressed reticence and shock, even going so far as to question the “academic” nature of the study and the “morality” of the professor leading it. One anecdote was particularly revealing: an elected official for the MP, in his forties and from a rural background, dressed in a suit and tie (unlike many MP delegates, who preferred to wear clothing that reflected their rural background), first appeared to be quite honoured that a Moroccan professor from a foreign university was administering the questionnaire herself. As soon as the question regarding homosexuality came up, however, he got up abruptly and put an end to the exchange. The symbolic violence provoked by this question was doubtless linked to the effect of surprise, and exacerbated by the fact that a female professor was asking a man for his opinion regarding a – taboo – sexual practice.

37Among the sample population, respondents predominantly adhered to religious values (65%). However, the normative positions that distanced themselves from the “conventional” model – either a high level of autonomy (17% of the sample) or a high level of adherence (22%) – were generally espoused by men, urban dwellers, the highly educated and executives (“education and employment” classes EE1 and EE2), rather than women, rural dwellers and those in the private sector (EE4, EE3).

Table 8

Distribution of delegates by sex, urban/rural residence, “education-employment” class and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 8
High autonomy Relative autonomy “Conventional” adherence High adherence Total Men 87 86 80 87 83 Women 12 11 17 13 14 Urban 85 81 74 81 77 Rural 9 14 23 17 17 EE1 30 26 21 33 26 EE2 35 31 27 39 31 EE3 8 12 11 9 10 EE4 9 15 25 13 18 EE5 3 3 3 1 4 EE6 15 13 12 5 11

Distribution of delegates by sex, urban/rural residence, “education-employment” class and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

38At the party level, a continuum stretches between one end characterized by high levels of autonomy with regard to religious values, centred on ATTAC and the far left-wing party (Annahj), and another end marked by a high level of adherence to those same values, centred on PJD Islamists. The high score of “conventional” adherence is attained by the MP, the party of notables, closely linked with the rural world (Table 9).

Table 9

Distribution of delegates according to an index of adherence to religious values and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 9
ATTAC Annahj PADS PSU USFP PPS PAM MP Istiqlal PJD Total High level of autonomy 76 76 52 50 27 17 7 2 2 17 Relative autonomy 13 17 23 26 24 20 17 8 11 1 15 “Conventional” adherence 10 5 25 19 43 54 58 70 58 26 43 High level of adherence 1 1 5 4 8 15 17 24 72 22

Distribution of delegates according to an index of adherence to religious values and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

39It remains to be seen which avenues should be taken to interpret this polarization on the normative level between the far left-wing and the radical left-wing, on the one hand, and the PJD Islamists on the other. In the case of Morocco, a generational reading underscores the particularity of the bilingual elites educated under the Protectorate, and then in the wake of independence, before access to education was expanded. [75] Other interpretations have pointed out that the policy of Arabization, implemented at the end of the 1970s and which produced the first “Arabized” graduates in June 1990, [76] in conjunction with the replacement of philosophy classes by Islamic studies starting in 1981, aimed to overthrow left-wing values. [77]

40However, it would be premature to establish a relationship of cause and effect between the specific type of education received (elitist and bilingual vs. mass and Arabized), individual perspectives on religion, and ideological adherence. The distribution of the religious adherence index by age highlights the fact that age brackets are linked with specific organizations, rather than displaying a generational relationship to religion (Table 10).

Table 10

Distribution of delegates by age and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 10
High autonomy Relative autonomy “Conventional” adherence High adherence Total Under 30 20 15 17 4 14 30-39 17 27 23 22 23 Under 40 37 42 40 26 37 40-49 26 26 27 40 30 50-59 27 20 20 24 21 60 and older 6 7 7 5 6

Distribution of delegates by age and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

41Taken as a whole, the “products” of Arabization policies – in this case, individuals under 40 years old – tend to position themselves in close affinity to the “conventional” order (relative autonomy and conventional adherence), much like those aged 60 and over. With regard to high levels of adherence, these are over-represented among those in their 40s (who are associated with PJD respondents) and, to a lesser extent, among those in their 50s. Finally, high levels of autonomy are equally associated with those in their 50s (closer to UFSP respondents) and those under 30 (closer to ATTAC respondents).

42* * *

43Ultimately, how should the Moroccan political partisan cast list be described? As a selective club cut off from the rest of society, an elite chasing after scarce resources, or as a microcosm marked by the major social cleavages that run throughout the society as a whole? The Moroccan political partisan landscape, illustrated in miniature by our sample of delegates from ten different political organizations, is indeed a small world dominated by urban dwellers, largely well-educated middle-aged men with economic resources. Far from being cut off from ordinary citizens, however, this world is subject to the same dynamics at work in society as a whole. Although it cannot be reduced to a segmented clientele, it nonetheless remains shaped by an ideal-type opposition between the parties of notables and the parties of activists.

44In fact, the most significant dividing line within our panel is not ideological, but stems from a relationship to politics: on one side, pragmatic, localized politics, embedded within close, clientelist networks; and on the other, national, at times even transnational politics, built upon political identities that have survived the many reconfigurations of the Moroccan political partisan landscape. This contrast overlays important sociographic differences: at one end of the spectrum, private sector employees with interdependent profiles – entrepreneurs and large-scale farmers versus the poorest and least educated, associated with rural environments; and at the other, middle managers, senior managers and executives, highly educated, largely employed in the public sector and having often experienced upward social mobility, as well as young university students and recent graduates.

45As for ideological polarization, that phenomenon tends to be limited to the most educated individuals. It differentiates Islamists in the PJD from members in radical and far left-wing parties and is underpinned by the struggle to define the role of religion in politics and by different attitudes towards the monarchy. Although access to the institutionalized political scene is officially dependent on recognizing the “foundations of the nation” – God, country, king – these results illustrate that the Moroccan political partisan landscape includes a number of more or less latent zones of dissidence. At the very heart of the former oppositions that ultimately reconciled themselves – hastily and with much fanfare – with the monarchy, adherence to the Moroccan monarchical “model” is neither fully embraced nor irreversible: this manifests itself through individual resistance, internal crises and even sometimes in connection with the protest arena, as seen in 2011 in the context of the February 20th Movement.

46Narrowing the focus to the cluster structured by ideological identities allows us to observe contrasts that are correlated with different strategies with regard to the electoral scene, while confirming that Islamism is not necessarily the refuge of marginalized individuals. Senior managers and executives who have experienced upward social mobility are associated with the ex-governmental left-wing (the USFP) and the PJD, two parties that, at different times, embodied parliamentary opposition, before their gaining access to government was hailed as a historical turning point. Middle managers, university students and recent graduates are closer to organizations on the fringes of electoral competition, such as the radical and far left-wing parties. As for the “different way of doing politics” adopted by ATTAC, this tends to attract highly educated young people. Nevertheless, a generational interpretation is far from providing conclusive answers at this stage in the research.

47Let us once again note the extent to which the political party members polled are not “all the same”: their sociographic diversity, as well as their differences with regard to values, their relationship to politics, and their strategic orientations represent some of the most illuminating discoveries of this study. Behind the burgeoning of new parties and numerous political reconfigurations, certain elements persist: the “notabilization” of the former opposition groups does not prevent some members from clinging to their past as rebels, nor does it stop new activist parties from emerging. And it is within the very heart of the organizations which are the most involved in participatory strategies that the shifting borders between parties of notables and parties of activists become blurred. This worrying possibility was broached as early as 2008, when PJD delegates asked me: “Do you think we’ll end up like the USFP?”

48Beyond this first overview, analyzing the data by cohorts, different forms of socialization, recruitment pools and activist careers could shed further light on the processes behind the bifurcations observed on the normative and ideological levels, while also allowing for an in-depth analysis of the reconfigurations of Moroccan political party membership. [78]


The following groups and individuals contributed to this study:
The Fonds national de recherche suisse (FNRS – Swiss National Science Foundation) funded the research project and the team, as did the Université de Lausanne during the start-up phase; Philippe Blanchard provided training in statistical methodology for the Swiss team and the author, methodological strategy for establishing the database and the coding documents, supervision of data input and coding, and multivariate and sequential statistical processing; Mohamed Jeghllaly participated in collecting data, and was jointly responsible for the surveys conducted at two congresses, and the translation and coding of answers to open and semi-open questions; the survey team was largely composed of students from the CM2S (Casablanca) and the Université de Mohammedia; the student team from UNIL undertook data input: Yassin Boughaba, Pablo Diaz, Fiona Friedli, Andrea Lutz, Maeva Mouton, Sarah Ridet-de-Beausacq, with a major role played by Vanessa Monney and Grégory Patthey at the beginning of the project; Nawal Khattabi and K. T. input the answers in Arabic; Mostafa Naoui translated the first version of the questionnaire into Arabic; Jean-Pierre Müller supplied supplementary methodological training to the author; and Marie-France Oliva managed the budget.
I wish to thank all of them for their invaluable help.
Appendix 1
tableau im11
Organizations Officially est. Legis. elected 2007/2011 Declared number of members at congress date Congress Study Congress delegates present Returns % rate of return Distribution* Historical parties Istiqlal party Nationalist. Governmental party until 2013. 1944 52/60 300,000 15th congress 9 to 11 January 2009, Rabat 5,140 745 14 N Mouvement populaire (MP) Links with the resistance. Rural and Amazigh roots (fusion process after splits). Governmental party. 1959 39/32 ? 11th congress 11 to 12 June 2010, Rabat 1,685 355 21 N Governmental left Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP) Emerged from a split from the Mouvement national, embodied the parliamentary left-wing opposition until 1997. Within the framework of the Koutla (bloc composed by the UFSP and the heirs to the Mouvement national), it became a governmental party between 1998 and 2011. Its history is littered with splits. 1975 (1959) 38/39 60,000 8th congress, 2nd phase, 13 to 15 June 2008, Bouznika 7 to 9 November 2008, Rabat 1,356 451 33 N Parti du progrès et du socialisme (PPS) Heir to the Moroccan Communist Party (1943). Became a governmental party within the Koutla in 1998. Remained in government after 2011. 1974 17/18 40,000 8th congress 28 to 30 May 2010, Bouznika 1,845 612 33 0
tableau im12
Organizations Officially est. Legis. elected 2007/2011 Declared number of members at congress date Congress Study Congress delegates present Returns % rate of return Distribution* Islamist party Parti justice et développement (PJD) After a long process of unification and legalization, it represented the main opposition power in parliament until 2011. Main beneficiary of the “Arab Spring”, at the head of the government since 2011. 1998 46/107 16,000 6th congress 19 to 20 July 2008, Rabat 1,370 741 54 0 The “king’s” parliamentary opposition Parti authenticité et modernité (PAM) Created by a “friend of the king”, this party was quickly seen as a new “administrative” party. During the February 20th Movement, it was at the centre of the debate and was one of the protesters’ main targets. (After refusing to take part in our research during the 2009 congress, permission was granted to undertake the survey during an extraordinary congress in 2012). 2008 N/47 ? 2nd extraordinary congress: 17 to 19 February 2012, Bouznika 3,057 429 14 N Non-governmental parliamentary left-wing (until 2011), belonging to the Alliance de la gauche démocratique (Alliance for the Democratic Left) Parti socialiste unifié (PSU) Established after the unification of the non-governmental left, its stems from the Mouvement national and the Marxist movements of the 1970s 2005 6/boycott 4,000 3rd congress 16 to 18 December 2011, Bouznika 572 390 68 0
tableau im13
Organizations Officially est. Legis. elected 2007/2011 Declared number of members at congress date Congress Study Congress delegates present Returns % rate of return Distribution* Parti de l’avant-garde démocratique socialiste (PADS) Emerged from a split from the USFP in 1983 1993 6/boycott 1,100 7th congress 30 March to 1 April 2012, Rabat, Harhoura 584 231 39 N Non-parliamentary far left-wing Annahj addimocrati Said to follow in the footsteps of Ila Al Amam, a Marxist-Leninist movement from the 1970s 2004 (1995) Boycott 1,000 2nd congress 18 to 20 July 2009, Casablanca 310 102 33 N Non-conventional political organization ATTAC-CADTM Anti-globalization organization that is part of an international network organized in coordinating groups around a shared platform. Since 2005 it has experienced restructuring which has translated into the significant presence of the Almounadil-a (Trotskyists) in its midst. 2000 ---- 500 4th congress 27 to 29 January 2012, Rabat 72 71 98 N 15,991 4,127
* 0: Questionnaire was inserted by congress organizers into the packs distributed to delegates.
N: Questionnaire was not inserted.
Appendix 2

MCA Employment-Education + Classification in 6, axes 1 and 2

49The party to which respondents belonged, their education levels, the foreign languages they spoke, their sector of employment (public administration; public and semi-public companies; private sector; permanent staff of political parties, associations, trades unions; legislative body) and their socio-professional category are active variables, with sizes proportional to their contribution to the factorial design. The classes are projected with a size proportional to their weight.

figure im14
Appendix 3

MCA Allies and Adversaries + Classification in 6, axes 1 and 2

50All modalities are represented. The strategic positions are active variables, with a size proportional to their contribution to the factorial design. Parties and classes are projected with sizes proportional to their weight. [All = allies, Adv = adversaries, nor.nor = neither ally nor adversary, na = no answer, nc = not applicable, 2rep = two responses]

figure im15
Appendix 4

MCA Allies and Adversaries + Classification in 6, axes 2 and 3

51All modalities are represented. The strategic positions are active variables, with a size proportional to their contribution to the factorial design. Parties and classes are projected with sizes proportional to their weight. [All = allies, Adv = adversaries, nor.nor = neither ally nor adversary, na = no answer, nc = not applicable, 2rep = two responses]

figure im16


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    Myriam Catusse, Karam Karam (eds), Returning to Political Parties? Political Party Development in the Arab World (Beirut: Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2010). See also Jean-Claude Santucci, “Le multipartisme marocain entre les contraintes d’un ‘pluralisme contrôlé’ et les dilemmes d’un ‘pluripartisme autoritaire’”, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 111-112, 2006, 63-117.
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    Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Thomas Carothers, “The end of the transition paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 2002, 5-21; Michel Camau, Vincent Geisser, Le syndrome autoritaire. Politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003).Online
  • [3]
    According to the main advocate of this approach, in the absence of centralization or any particular political institution, the “structural equilibrium” of the tribal world can primarily be explained by rivalry between tribes and between each of their segments, and by the role of arbitrators played by the saints. Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
  • [4]
    Pierre-Robert Baduel, “Les partis politiques dans la gouvernementalisation de l’État des pays arabes. Introduction”, in “Les partis politiques dans les pays arabes. 1. Le Machrek”, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 81-82, 1998, 9-51.
  • [5]
    For a critical approach to the generational perspective on Islamism, see Alain Roussillon, “Les islamologues dans l’impasse”, in “À la recherche du monde musulman”, Esprit, 8-9, 2001, 93-115.
  • [6]
    Rémy Leveau, Le fellah marocain défenseur du trône (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1985 [1st edn 1976]); John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political EliteA Study in Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
  • [7]
    In Morocco, the “Makhzen” represents the Royal House – both the territory over which it exerts its power and its administrative extensions.
  • [8]
    J. Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful, 6.
  • [9]
    Designated by this name because of the direct or indirect administrative support they received, and their close ties with the Palace.
  • [10]
    Paul Chambergeat, “Les élections communales marocaines du 29 mai 1960”, Revue française de science politique, 11(1), 1961, 89-117 (117). [All quotations from the French are by the translator of this article, unless an English-language source is given in the footnotes.]Online
  • [11]
    P. Chambergeat, “Les élections communales marocaines du 29 mai 1960”.
  • [12]
    P. Chambergeat, “Les élections communales marocaines du 29 mai 1960”.
  • [13]
    Mohammed El Ayadi, “Les mouvements de la jeunesse au Maroc. L’émergence d’une nouvelle intelligentsia politique durant les années soixante et soixante-dix”, in Didier Le Saout, Marguerite Rollinde (eds), Émeutes et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb (Paris: Karthala, 1999), 201-30; François Burgat, L’Islamisme au Maghreb. La voix du Sud (Paris: Karthala, 1988).
  • [14]
    R. Leveau, Le fellah marocain défenseur du trône, afterword.
  • [15]
    The party split off from the UNFP. The various organizations and study data are presented in Appendix 1.
  • [16]
    For a critical approach, see Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, “Jeux de miroir de la ‘politisation’: les acteurs associatifs de quartier à Casablanca”, Critique internationale, 50, 2011, 55-71. Online
  • [17]
    The term clientelism refers to vertical, asymmetrical, particularist relations based on the exchange of goods and services, which may be social and not merely financial. For an overview of the debate regarding political clientelism, see Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, “Introduction: Représenter et mobiliser dans l’élection législative au Maroc”, in Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Myriam Catusse, Jean-Claude Santucci (eds), Scènes et coulisses de l’élection au Maroc. Les législatives 2002 (Paris: Karthala, 2004), 15-53 (39ff). On Morocco, see also the other contributions to the aforementioned volume, as well as Lamia Zaki (ed.), Terrains de campagne au Maroc. Les élections législatives de 2007 (Paris: Karthala, 2009); and Myriam Catusse, Lamia Zaki, “Gestion communale et clientélisme moral au Maroc: les politiques du Parti de la justice et du développement”, Critique internationale, 42, 2009, 73-91.
  • [18]
    In the same fashion, the number of parties represented in the House of Representatives grew continuously (3 in 1963; 6 in 1977; 8 in 1984; 11 in 1993; 15 in 1997; 21 in 2002; 24 in 2007), before seeing a drop in 2011 (18).
  • [19]
    Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, “‘Businessmen’ versus ‘Professors’: the parliamentary ‘notabilization’ of a party of militants in Morocco”, in Returning to Political Parties? (Beirut: The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2010 [online]). URL:
  • [20]
    M. Bennani-Chraïbi, “Introduction: Représenter et mobiliser dans l’élection législative au Maroc”, 23ff.
  • [21]
    We treat these two categories as ideal types that echo the distinction between two repertoires of action: one parochial, patronized and particular; the other cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous of local authority figures: Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). In activist parties, partisan organization and altruistic dedication often compensate for the lack of proper social resources by providing “collective partisan capital”: a political brand, emblems, etc. On the other hand, notables rely on their social and individual capital and on mediators whom they reward with material goods: their actions are above all “personal, disrupted and local [rather than] anonymous, persistent and national”: Michel Offerlé, Les partis politiques (Paris: PUF, 2002), 20 and 24.
  • [22]
    See p. 108 for the important contributions made to this group project.Online
  • [23]
    The timing of the study should be taken into account when analyzing data that is sensitive to political circumstances, such as the answers given to the question regarding “allies” or “adversaries”.
  • [24]
    According to a PSU leader (interview, 6 June 2013), the radical left-wing opted for “the reformism of the democratic left” and for “parliamentary monarchy”, whereas the far left-wing “did not break with its traditional revolutionary ideas”.
  • [25]
    Legally, a party must hold its national congress at least once every four years (Official Bulletin no. 5992 dated 3 November 2011, <>).
  • [26]
    Such study conditions are favourable to the production of snapshots and thus do not grant access to exmembers.
  • [27]
    After the congresses, we obtained data concerning the congress delegates as a whole from the USFP and the PJD (distribution by sex, age, socio-professional characteristics and regional origin).
  • [28]
    Delegates had the choice of filling the questionnaire out on their own, or having it administered to them.
  • [29]
    On the subject of researching political parties, see in particular the special issue edited by Myriam Aït-Aoudia et al., “Enquêter dans les partis politiques. Perspectives comparées”, Revue internationale de politique comparée, 17(4), 2010.
  • [30]
    According to the 2004 general census, the rate of illiteracy was 60.5% in rural areas and 29.4% in urban areas. Haut Commissariat au Plan, Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat 2004. Caractéristiques démographiques et socio-économiques de la population. Rapport national (Rabat: Direction de la statistique, 2004, 23).
  • [31]
    In 2008, 79% of USFP delegates and 61% of PJD delegates were 40 or older (statistical data provided by both parties).
  • [32]
    The data available regarding the delegates’ parent population corroborates the low level of female representation: 10% for PADS, 15% for ATTAC and the PJD, 29% for the USFP.
  • [33]
    Only the PJD recorded the proportion of middle managers, senior managers and executives within its delegates in 2008 (70%). In our sample, this category was slightly over-represented for the PJD (74%).
  • [34]
    Forty-three per cent of the delegates in our panel were employed in the public and semi-public sectors (compared with 32% in the private sector). By contrast, within the Moroccan labour force, only 8.7% worked in the public and semi-public sectors in 2011: Haut Commissariat au Plan, Activité, emploi et chômage (Rabat: Direction de la statistique, 2012 <>). However, a cohort analysis should show that the reconfigurations of the Moroccan labour market are reflected in the broad strokes of our sample population.
  • [35]
    It should not be forgotten, however, that rural areas were the preserve of the monarchy under Hassan II.
  • [36]
    Yasmine Berriane, Femmes, associations et politique à Casablanca (Rabat: Centre Jacques Berque, 2013), ch. 4.
  • [37]
    According to Article 26 of the organic law concerning political parties, “all political parties must strive to expand and generalize the participation of women and young people in the political development of the country”.
  • [38]
    On the polarizing nature of employment sectors, see in particular François de Singly, Claude Thélot, Gens du public, gens du privé. La grande différence (Paris: Dunod, 1988); Florence Haegel, Les droites en fusion. Transformations de l’UMP (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2012).
  • [39]
    The party to which respondents belonged, their education level, the foreign languages they spoke, their sector of employment (public administration; public and semi-public companies; private sector; permanent staff of political parties, associations, trades unions; legislative bodies) and their socio-professional category were active variables, proportional in size to their contribution to the factorial design. The classes were projected with sizes proportional to their weight.
  • [40]
    In order to compare this sample with data from the general census, we excluded 18- and 19-year olds from the panel (1%) and those under 20 from the census data (Haut Commissariat au Plan, Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat 2004…).
  • [41]
    The age of respondents was calculated on the basis of 2010 data.
  • [42]
    In all the simple sortings presented in this article, percentages are rounded up, and the “no answer” and “other” categories are not indicated.
  • [43]
    The dark grey indicates percentages that are much higher than the overall average, and the light grey indicates those that are slightly higher.
  • [44]
    The “no answer” category should be addressed separately in future publications.
  • [45]
    The subtle contrasts within each cluster become sharper when plotted against axes 2 and 3. We have retained the class descriptions as they provide an overview of the most significant associations.
  • [46]
    Farmers represented 9% of the sample (in 2004, 32.1% of the labour force was employed in agriculture, according to the general census, p. 36). According to data on the parent population of UFSP delegates in 2008, 6% were farmers (the same proportion can be found in the sample population). This category is not mentioned in the data collected by the PJD on the parent population of its delegates in 2008, but it accounted for 2% of our sample.
  • [47]
    Intergenerational professional trajectories (IPT) were elaborated by comparing the occupation and socioprofessional category of the respondent and that of his (or her) father. In 30% of cases, we were unable to implement the comparison; this was the case for those who declined to answer and young people who were still studying: the question of social mobility requires further investigation due to its complex nature.
  • [48]
    Residential trajectories (RT) were elaborated by comparing the birthplace and current residence of respondents.
  • [49]
    Daniel Boy, François Platone, Henri Rey, Françoise Subileau, Colette Ysmal, C’était la gauche plurielle (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), 36.
  • [50]
    Their profile is quite similar to that of the 2002 recruits for the LCR (Ligue communiste révolutionnaire – Revolutionary Communist League). See Florence Johsua, “De la LCR au NPA (1966–2009). Sociologie politique des métamorphoses de l’engagement anticapitaliste”, doctoral dissertation in political science, Paris, Sciences Po Paris, 2011. Online
  • [51]
    M. Bennani-Chraïbi, “‘Businessmen’ versus ‘Professors’…”.
  • [52]
    See the special issue edited by Didier Monciaud, Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, “Les gauches en Égypte. 19e-20e siècle”, Cahiers d’histoire, 105-6, 2008; and Hamit Bozarslan, “De quoi la révolution est-elle le nom? Post-scriptum pour poursuivre la réflexion”, in Hamit Bozarslan, Gilles Bataillon, Christophe Jaffrelot, Passions révolutionnaires. Amérique latine, Moyen-Orient, Inde (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 2011), 169-82.
  • [53]
    Myriam Catusse, Le temps des entrepreneurs? Politique et transformations du capitalisme au Maroc (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2008), 253. These changes likewise occurred within the governmental left. On this topic, see M. Bennani-Chraïbi, “‘Businessmen’ versus ‘Professors’…”.
  • [54]
    This question was subject to slight rewordings.
  • [55]
    The PJD likewise insisted on rewording the question by referring to “mutual help” rather than alliances.
  • [56]
    On this subject, see Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Mohamed Jeghllaly, “The protest dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th Movement”, Revue française de science politique (English) 62(5), 2012, 103-30.
  • [57]
    This is the name of the “friend of the king” who co-founded the PAM. For the congresses surveyed in the summer of 2008, the questionnaire included the category “Movement for all Democrats (Himma)”; this was the association from which PAM was born. Online
  • [58]
    Javier Auyero, Lauren Joseph, “Introduction: politics under the ethnographic microscope”, in Lauren Joseph, Matthew Mahler, Javier Auyero (eds), New Perspectives in Political Ethnography (New York: Springer, 2007), 1–13 (3, 5).
  • [59]
    Strategic positions are active variables, whose size is proportional to their contribution to the factorial map. Parties and classes are projected with a size proportional to their weight.
  • [60]
    Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, “Mobilizations électorales à Derb Soltan et à Hay Hassani (Casablanca)”, in M. Bennani-Chraïbi, M. Catusse, J.-C. Santucci (eds), Scènes et coulisses de l’élection au Maroc, 105-62 (123ff).
  • [61]
    One of the main Moroccan Islamist organizations, which came into being during the 1970s. It is characterized by its non-recognition of the king as the Commander of the Faithful and by the importance it attaches to spiritual education.
  • [62]
    Groups that aspire to follow the purity of the earliest Muslims, and who were subject to large-scale repression after the May 2003 Casablanca bombings.
  • [63]
    The “no answer” category has been the topic of debate in the relevant literature. One classic study is that by Guy Michelat and Michel Simon: “Les ‘sans réponses’ aux questions politiques: rôles imposés et compensation des handicaps”, L’Année sociologique, 32, 1982, 81-114.
  • [64]
    The micro-class AA3 (0.51%) represents those cases where the same variable received two or more answers. This class is relatively trans-partisan, can be found in different “education and employment” classes, and seems to indicate hesitation or ambivalence.
  • [65]
    In our sample, in 2008, one out of every five USFP respondents expressed a position that was adversarial to the king. The contemporary political climate (in 2011–2012) only exacerbated the anti-monarchist trend that was already visible when processing data from the first part of the survey (six congresses between 2008 and 2010).
  • [66]
    For an overview of the debate on this topic, see: Michel Offerlé, “Capacités politiques et politisations: faire voter et voter, 19e-20e siècles”, Genèses, 67, 2007, 131-49, and Genèses, 68, 2007, 145-60; Myriam Aït-Aoudia, Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Jean-Gabriel Contamin, “Indicateurs et vecteurs de la politisation des individus: les vertus heuristiques du croisement des regards”, Critique internationale, 50, 2011, 9-20.
  • [67]
    Camille Hamidi, “Éléments pour une approche interactionniste de la politisation. Engagement associatif et rapport au politique dans des associations locales issues de l’immigration”, Revue française de science politique, 56(1), 2006, 5-25. Online
  • [68]
    Almost 90 codes were produced. Online
  • [69]
    In order to help illiterate voters identify the different parties, electoral lists use symbols. The dove is the symbol of the Rassemblement national des indépendants (National Rally of Independents), a former administrative party. The apple and the banana are the fruits of my respondent’s imagination.
  • [70]
    See in particular Guy Michelat, Michel Simon, Classe, religion et comportement politique (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1977).
  • [71]
    See these two major studies: Rahma Bourqia, Mohamed El Ayadi, Mokhtar El Harras, Hassan Rachik, Les jeunes et les valeurs religieuses (Casablanca: EDDIF, 2000); Mohamed El Ayadi, Hassan Rachik, Mohamed Tozy, L’islam au quotidien. Enquête sur les valeurs et les pratiques religieuses au Maroc (Casablanca: Éditions Prologues, 2007).
  • [72]
    Respondents were offered two choices (homosexuality as a “private matter” or as a “practice contrary to morality and against the law”) on the basis of the fierce debates provoked by the “Ksar El Kebir scandal”. The PJD used this occasion to position itself as defending “the country’s moral values”.
  • [73]
    Note that we are aware that religious values are first and foremost part of a pragmatic approach to “conventional” reference points (on this topic, see Jean-Noël Ferrié, La religion de la vie quotidienne. Rites, règles et routine chez les Marocains musulmans (Paris: Karthala, 2004)) and that their “established” or “conventional” nature evolves over time and depends on location.
  • [74]
    For a critical approach to the reification of the veil, see Fariba Adelkhah, “Islamophobie et malaise dans l’anthropologie. Être ou ne pas être voilée en Iran”, Politix, 4(80), 2007, 179-96.
  • [75]
    For instance, the number of baccalaureates awarded (the diploma marking the end of high school and granting access to higher education) saw a 48-fold rise between 1955 (164) and 1972 (7,899), and was again multiplied by 5 between 1972 and 1986 (41,182). Data from the Annuaires statistiques du Maroc cited by Mekki Zouaoui, “L’enseignement supérieur depuis l’indépendance. La dégradation de la qualité était-elle inéluctable?” – Thematic issue: “Système éducatif”, Rapport50 ans de développement humain au Maroc et perspectives pour 2025”, 2005, 159-95: <>. Online
  • [76]
    Gilbert Grandguillaume, “L’arabization au Maghreb”, Revue d’aménagement linguistique, 107, 2004, 15-40 (260).
  • [77]
    Driss Bennani, “Azzeddine Laraki. L’arabization c’est lui”, Tel Quel, 410, 6-12 February 2010, 26–27 (27): <>.
  • [78]
    I would like to express my gratitude to all the delegates who acted as “allies” within the organizations polled. In addition, I would like to thank the following individuals for their support and advice at various points during the research, and for their attentive reading of an early version of this article: Abdelaziz Bennani, Myriam Catusse, Jean-Gabriel Contamin, Olivier Fillieule, Florence Haegel, Khalid Hariri, Mohamed Jeghllaly, Florence Johsua, Driss Ksikes, Michel Offerlé, Florence Passy, Bouchra Zryouil.
Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi
Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi is an associate professor of comparative politics and the sociology of mobilizations in Northern Africa and the Middle East at the Institut d’études politiques et internationales de l’Université de Lausanne (Institute of Political and International Studies at Lausanne University) and a member of CRAPUL (Centre de recherche sur l’action politique de l’Université de Lausanne – Centre for Research on Political Action at Lausanne University). A list of her research interests and publications is available on the UNIL’s website:
(Université de Lausanne, IEPI, Géopolis, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland).
Translated by
Sarah-Louise Raillard
Uploaded on on 19/02/2015
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