Innovative fieldwork design [22]

7In order to identify, on the one hand, the characteristics and dividing lines that structure the political partisan landscape in terms of values, sociography, socialization and recruitment pools, and on the other hand, the linkages between individual, collective and organizational trajectories, we established a database of 4,127 congress delegates from ten Moroccan political organizations, surveyed between 2008 and 2012, [23] in tandem with other methods of data collection (observation, life story accounts, repeated interviews).

8The selection of political organizations was determined by historical and ideological criteria, on the basis of dynamics of crisis, fragmentation or unification, while ultimately being governed by the vagaries of national congress schedules. The sample includes parties of notables (such as the PAM and the MP), governmental parties, parliamentary opposition parties and non-parliamentary opposition parties (those calling for a boycott of the elections). These organizations represent a number of diverse orientations: nationalist (Istiqlal), (ex)-governmental left-wing (USFP, PPS), radical left-wing (Parti socialiste unifié – PSU – Unified Socialist Party; Parti de l’avant-garde démocratique socialiste – PADS – Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party) and far left-wing (Annahj addimocrati – Democratic Way). [24] In addition, we included an anti-globalization organization that promoted “a different way of doing politics”. In fact, members of ATTAC-CADTM Morocco tend to consider their involvement as an alternative to political party affiliation. Including these individuals in the database allowed us to examine closely the boundaries between the institutionalized political scene, protest arenas, and non-conventional politics, while investigating the particularities of partisan membership from the fringes.

9National congresses constitute a fundamental event in the life of a political party. [25] Delegates from all over the country get together in the same place, for at least 48 hours, primarily in order to elect party leaders, comment on the ethical and financial reports of the out-going team, and, more broadly, to discuss fundamental political issues for the party. The classical unities of time, place and action embodied at national congresses thus make them an ideal opportunity for conducting surveys. While observation is itself worthy of interest, these events also provided simultaneous access to an important number of party members (between 100 and more than 5,000 delegates, depending on the size and wealth of the party) who were highly invested in the organization at the time of the congress. [26]

10Establishing a sample was quite a challenge. Faced with uncertainty regarding the parent population for national congress delegates, [27] and due to the unusual nature of this kind of study in Morocco, we opted for a reflexive approach towards both the survey negotiations and the implementation of mechanisms for distributing, administering and collecting the questionnaires. [28] Before, during and after each congress, we relied on “allies” to maximize the data collected concerning congress delegates’ profiles, the main issues being discussed, internal struggles, the material dimension of the organization, etc. Over the course of ten surveys, we tried to adopt comparable procedures, with a team composed primarily of students who had been trained ahead of time, while still adapting on the ground to the nature of the organization in question and how the study was welcomed by congress organizers. [29] Cognizant of the fact that such studies often tend to discriminate against the less educated and that Morocco’s rural population has very low rates of literacy, [30] we reinforced the survey procedure in parties that had a solid rural base (Istiqlal, MP, PAM). Despite our best efforts, however, the rates of return were still very low during these huge congresses (21% for the MP, 14% for Istiqlal and PAM), which is itself indicative. In three cases, we were able to slip questionnaires into congress delegates’ packs (PJD, PPS, PSU). During the ATTAC congress, organizers scheduled a break that was long enough for delegates to fill out the questionnaire en masse. Of course, these elements all had repercussions on the rates of return (see Appendix 1). The record rate obtained by the PJD (54%) was surpassed by the PSU (68%) and then ATTAC (98%).

11Two methods were employed to produce the first set of results. On the one hand, crosssorting allowed identification of the broadbrush characteristics of delegates, in particular by comparing them across party lines. On the other hand, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) helped to detect the underlying structures or structural factors, which were otherwise not visible when analyzing variable by variable. MCA brings together a number of variables, generally nominal. It visualizes similarities and contrasts. Its results are presented in the form of cloud plots of modalities and individuals, with the axes representing the factors. These analyses produced typologies or categories that describe the delegates’ profiles; the transformation of these exhaustive classifications into automated synthetic secondary variables in turn allows for a second cross-sorting.

12Preliminary results seem to indicate that the Moroccan political landscape, shown in miniature through our sample of delegates, is governed by selective logics. However, strong dividing lines differentiate parties of activists and parties of notables on the sociographic level. These divergences are partially reflected in relationships to politics and values. At an ideological and religious level, the main oppositions are structured within the same socio-professional and socio-demographic universe: that of the parties of activists.

“Allies and adversaries” structured by attitudes towards the monarchy

23The “left” and the “right” are strong concepts that have been referred to so often that it is sometimes difficult to remember that they are in fact rooted in a well-defined semantic field. Since Morocco’s independence, the members of the opposition that clearly identify as being on the “left” [52] have constantly tried to locate their “right-wing” adversaries. Those on the left automatically associate the right wing with “traditionalism” and “conservatism”. Using a Marxist, and somewhat Third World vocabulary they lump together the “comprador” bourgeoisie, subjugated by the regime and “imperialism”, and “feudal” leaders: local elites supported by the monarchy to control and stabilize rural regions. As soon as Islamist movements gain in prominence, they are likewise described as “right wing’, and sometimes even “far right wing” by those on the left who see them as another one of the monarchy’s attempts to weaken the opposition. It was only at the end of the 1990s that Moroccan actors began to positively self-identify as being on the right, a phenomenon which was linked with the political rise of the “entrepreneur”, “as a metaphorical or archetypal figure […] using material […] and ideological mechanisms”. [53]

24Since 1998, electoral engineering and the emergence of party-list, proportional single-round elections have replaced ballot-box stuffing, with the result that no single party can obtain an absolute majority. One hypothesis is that the succession of several heterogeneous governments has perhaps erased the boundary between “us” and “them”, including among political party members. Consequently, how are we to establish indicators according to which delegates may position themselves? And from another point of view, how can respondents be asked to situate themselves in relation to key political actors who overshadow the institutionalized political scene or, on the contrary, who inhabit its fringes? Unable to use either a “classic” measure, such as the left-right spectrum, or a Moroccan tradition of political surveys, it was necessary to “cobble” something together. We thus asked a semi-open question: “Currently, as a member of party x, what are the organizations and actors that you consider as potential allies or adversaries?” [54] The respondents were instructed to check several boxes in a table that listed three options (ally, adversary, neither ally nor adversary [“neither/nor”]) and sixteen to seventeen variables: names of political organizations that were either part of, or excluded from, the institutionalized political scene, as well as a number of additional actors, such as “the king” or “the king’s entourage”.

25When we examine the factorial map of “allies and adversaries” [59] (Appendices 3 and 4) and the classes derived from it, ideal-type contrasts can be found on two different levels.

26From right to left, the map’s first two axes clearly contrast the “no answer” category (class 6 – AA6) with the rest of the positive modalities that designate actors as “allies”, “adversaries”, or “neither allies nor adversaries”. From one end of the spectrum to the other, we can see a continuum between the MP on one end, and the PSU (radical left-wing) and ATTAC on the other end (Appendix 3). Starting from this premise, a first hypothesis suggests itself: the main dividing line that runs through the population of Moroccan national political party delegates stems from their relationship to politics. It differentiates those who identify their allies and adversaries by looking at the national political landscape from those who have difficulty positioning themselves within this landscape, or refuse to do so. A second hypothesis posits that combining this factorial map with the one that synthesizes data regarding education, social status, sectors of employment and socio-professional categories will allow us to differentiate two clusters: the world of local politics, which is pragmatic and clientelist, associated with the parties of notables, the private sector, low levels of education and rural residency; and the world of national politics, structured by left-wing and Islamist ideological identities, on the basis of a logic of “political sophistication”, associated with public sector executives, highly educated young people and urban dwellers. This would corroborate the oppositions observed in Moroccan electoral history between, at one end, local, particular and patronized electoral campaigns that rely on individual social capital, and at the other end, nationally structured and modular electoral campaigns that rely on collective partisan capital. [60]

27It is only along the second and third axes that we can see an ideological continuum develop between two directly opposed poles (Appendix 4, Table 5); attitudes towards the king and his entourage are at the core of the various ally/adversary configurations. To the left end of the graph, the radical left-wing and the far left-wing are associated with configurations that designate the king and his entourage, the parties of notables, organizations like the PJD, Al Adl Wadl Ihsane [61] and Salafist organizations [62] as adversaries, while recognizing left-wing parties as allies (class 1 – AA1). To the right, in a sort of inverse reflection, the cluster associated with the PJD, the MP, PAM and Istiqlal identifies the left-wing and far left-wing as adversaries, while the king and his entourage, the parties of notables and/or other Islamist organizations are deemed allies (class 5 – AA5). The class of “neither ally nor adversary” is also in proximity with Istiqlal, the MP and PAM (class 4 – AA4). Between the two, the cluster close to the PPS (AA2) reveals an alliance that brings together the radical left-wing, the governmental left-wing and Istiqlal: in other words, all the parties stemming from the Mouvement national. Here, adversaries are much less easily identified, and the answer “neither ally nor adversary” was often selected. Finally, along the second and third axes, the “no answer” category is repositioned in the centre, thus suggesting that it would be fruitful to examine the distribution of delegates by strategic positions, education levels and socio-professional trajectories (Table 6).

Table 5

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” class (AA) and by political organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Annahj ATTAC Istiqlal MP PADS PAM PJD PPS PSU USFP Total AA1 Polarization: radical left, far left 68 77 0 1 71 4 0 1 82 31 19 AA2 Relative polarization: Mouvement National 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 62 1 25 12 AA3 Two responses or more 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 AA4 “Neither ally nor adversary” 9 10 36 25 5 27 10 10 4 16 18 AA5 Polarization against the left 0 0 26 29 0 29 56 0 0 3 21 AA6 No answer 23 13 37 44 23 38 33 26 12 25 30

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” class (AA) and by political organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

Table 6

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” (AA) and “education-employment” (EE) (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

EE1 EE2 EE3 EE4 EE5 EE6 Total AA1 Polarization: radical left, far left 17 26 12 11 10 25 19 AA2 Relative polarization: Mouvement national 19 10 13 9 9 11 12 AA5 Polarization against the left 25 22 23 17 7 16 21 Polarization sub-total 61 58 48 37 26 52 52 AA3 Two answers or more 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 AA4 “Neither ally nor adversary” 14 15 24 27 8 16 18 AA6 No answer 25 27 28 36 65 31 30

Distribution of delegates by “ally-adversary” (AA) and “education-employment” (EE) (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

28Once aggregated, the polarized and “ideologized” classes do in fact correlate with urban, educated, public sector, senior managers and executives (EE1), and middle managers (EE2), across all organizations. On the other hand, the “no answer” class (AA6) corresponds more to the “no answer” “education-employment” class (EE5), blue-collar workers and craftsmen, small and medium-sized farmers, those in precarious employment (EE4), and, to a lesser extent, young educated individuals (EE6). This category is also often associated with the parties of notables, the MP, PAM and Istiqlal (Table 5). In such cases, the “no answer” category indicates a certain amount of distance with regard to the ideological landmarks of national politics. [63] However, the slight over-representation of the PJD in class AA6 points to the fact that the “no answer” response may also be a sign of prudent or disdainful sophistication (see the text box below). With regard to respondents from the Islamist party, this answer seems to indicate an attitude observed during previous surveys: adhering to party discipline, which involves complying with decisions taken collectively (and/or hierarchically), and asserting the goodwill and openness of a new player on the institutionalized political scene who seeks to reassure other actors.

29The “neither/nor” class (AA4) also tends to express a certain distance with regard to the landmarks of national politics. On the one hand, it is associated with the parties of notables, Istiqlal, PAM and the MP (Table 5), and on the other, with the “education and employment” classes that correlate to the private sector, low levels of education and low socio-professional positions (EE4), or, on the flipside, the world of entrepreneurs and large-scale farmers (EE3). This description is corroborated by the fact that class AA4 moreover concentrates answers identifying well-known actors as allies, such as the king and the PJD.

30These results illustrate the different forms of politicization at work in an authoritarian context. More significantly, they also show that it would be rather hasty to oppose “politicized” professionals and “depoliticized” ordinary citizens, as different relationships to politics coexist within the partisan microcosm, and even at times within a single political party. In fact, lack of interest in partisan and national politics was even expressed by some congress delegates of the parties surveyed. Ultimately, the main dividing line between Moroccan national political party delegates is not ideological, but reflects a relationship to politics: on one side, pragmatic, localized politics, embedded within a clientelist network that stretches beyond the rural community, and on the other, national politics, structured by political identities that seem to have been left untouched by recent political reconfigurations. Ideological polarization only appears at a second level, within the worlds of 40- and 50-year old urban dwellers, educated executives working in the public sector, as well as some young, highly educated individuals. It is structured around a position towards the monarchy, which presents a paradox. Access to the institutionalized political scene can only be granted once a political organization rejects the possibility of directly confronting the king; and yet pockets of resistance against the monarchy still exist, even within parties whose leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their reconciliation with the monarchy. [65] Exploring the incentives and meanings behind the commitments expressed by delegates will help us to nuance these findings.

Conceptions of party membership: between pragmatism and ethical declarations

31In order to identify the social and political values of delegates, we included two open-ended questions on the questionnaire: “What led you to become a member of party or organization x?” (at the beginning of the questionnaire); and “Today, what does it mean to you to be a member of party or organization x?” (in the middle of the questionnaire). Rejecting a restrictive view of politicization, [66] centred on the relationship to institutionalized politics and the logic of “political sophistication”, we chose to word the questions (in Arabic) in such a way as to encourage both an “increase in generalization” and the recounting of specific, biographical narratives to explain the circumstances of enrolment. [67] The highly granular coding of the responses [68] highlights differences in how members joined a political party, what belonging to a political organization means to them, the view they have of their organization, frames of reference, values and goals, action targets and scales, perceptions of their relationship to citizens, and the material and non-material rewards of their involvement (Table 7). Simple sorting and auto-generated classifications presented three ideal-type clusters: local, pragmatic and clientelist politics; national politics structured according to political identities (nationalist, Islamist, left-wing); “a different way of doing politics” (ATTAC). However, we should note that some parties span the first two clusters (Istiqlal, the PPS).

32The pragmatic and clientelist cluster is characterized by very few references made to political values and identities, with respondents instead emphasizing individual and biographical elements: family affiliations, local interpersonal relationships, a desire to “assert oneself”, “to gain experience”, to “realize political ambitions”, and to participate in elections. A party’s reputation did not leave respondents indifferent, either, whether its image was of being “large and established” (the MP) or “young and dynamic” (PAM). Moreover, during the interviews, certain rural elected officials stated their clear preference for governmental parties, which were likely to bring their region closer to the capital. When values and goals were expressed, they often involved defending the rural and Amazighity (the MP), even the “foundations of the regime: God, Country, King” (the MP, Istiqlal). On the local scale, respondents described themselves as mediators between political authorities and the local population. While some expressed pride at belonging to a party, others articulated specific expectations: they hoped for money and, more importantly, a job; or to solve a particular problem; to access funding for their association; to operate under a “political umbrella”; to enjoy protection against local authorities; and gain contacts in high places, etc.

33The two clusters of “national politics” (Islamist, left-wing, and, to a lesser extent, nationalist parties) and “a different way of doing politics” (ATTAC) tend to favour the expression of altruistic values, a political identity and objectives based on generalizations that transcend the individual and the biographical. In fact, the “frame of reference” or “ideological orientations” indicated were consistently Islamic for the PJD; modernist, progressive and “left-wing” for Annahj, PADS, the PPS, the PSU, and the USFP (varying between Marxist-Leninist, socialist and social democratic leanings); and anti-globalization for ATTAC. The championed values and causes were likewise referred to over and over again. Although the fight against corruption was an objective shared by both the left-wing and the Islamist party, the PJD’s vision was reformist, aiming to raise moral standards in politics, while for the left (and ATTAC), this was part of a greater fight against tyranny and injustice and for democracy, equality, freedom and social justice. The left-wing parties sought to “represent” citizens, while ATTAC emphasized “raising awareness”. The desire to serve one’s country or the common good was a relatively trans-partisan one, as only ATTAC favoured a scale of action that went beyond national borders; much like the left-wing parties, however, ATTAC also claimed to defend the “popular classes”. With regard to party membership, being a member meant setting an example: being a “patriot” for nationalist parties, “a committed activist” for the left and ATTAC, and, for the Islamist parties, “having a strong moral code” and possibly even “sacrificing oneself” by putting the party’s objectives first. The rewards gained were first and foremost intangible and non-material. Some individuals expressed a strong attachment to their party, like one USFP member who associated the party with “the blood that ran in his veins”. Although certain descriptions of the party individuals belonged to were relatively close to those associated with the pragmatic and clientelist end of the spectrum – “a major historical party” (Istiqlal, USFP), “dynamic and moderate” (Istiqlal, PJD) – other attributes were more specific: the party was described as “virtuous” (PJD, PPS), “credible”, possessing internal democracy, with highly qualified members and leaders (PJD), or committed (the left, ATTAC), with many “sacrifices” in its past (USFP, PADS, Annahj, PPS). Finally, when delegates explained why they joined their party, they often referred to a particular political context or their exposure to certain political organizations while at university, in their professional lives, or in associations or trades unions.

34Like the positions adopted within configurations of allies and adversaries, the incentives and meanings attributed to membership in a given party reveal the ideological polarization of those delegates who situate themselves on a national political scale. This polarization appears to be underpinned by differing relationships to religion and religious values.

Table 7

Ideal-type presentation of incentives and meanings attributed to political engagement expressed by respondents – survey data from 2008-2012

Local, pragmatic, clientelist politicsC……cNational politics, structured by political identities A different way of doing politics Nationalist Islamist Left-wing Organizations in close proximity to MP PAM Istiqlal PJD Far left-wing, radical left-wing ATTAC Enrolment circumstances Family affiliations, local interpersonal relationships Local interpersonal relationships Family affiliations, local interpersonal relationships --- Exposure to politicizing contexts and events Exposure to politicizing contexts and events Being and doing Running for office, realizing political ambitions Running for office, gaining experience, realizing political ambitions Being an active citizen, being patriotic, running for office, realizing political ambitions Being an active, virtuous, exemplary citizen, achieving the party’s goals Being a committed, exemplary activist, true to oneself, achieving the party’s goals Being a committed, exemplary activist, gaining experience, achieving the organization’s goals Characteristics and view of party Major historical party Young and dynamic party Major historical party, moderate, dynamic Virtuous, credible, moderate and dynamic party, high quality members and leaders, internal democracy Activist, committed party (sacrifices) Activist, committed organization Frame of reference --- --- (Modernist) --- Islamic Left-wing, modernist, progressive Anti-globalization Values and goals Defending the rural, Amazighity, foundations of the regime (Raising moral standards in politics) Defending the nation, identity, the foundations of the regime Raising moral standards in politics, defending identity, change, development Anti-corruption For equality, freedom, social justice, democracy Against injustice, tyranny, corruption For equality and social justice Against the evils of globalization, injustice and tyranny Action targets and scales Region, local area All social classes Region, local area All social classes Country All social classes Country --- Popular classes Transnational Popular classes Relationship to citizens Mediation Mediation Mediation --- Representation Representation Rewards Individual and non-material Individual and non-material Individual and non-material Non-material Non-material Non-material

Ideal-type presentation of incentives and meanings attributed to political engagement expressed by respondents – survey data from 2008-2012

The religious foundations of ideological polarization

35According to prevalent analyses within political sociology, religious values polarize the political partisan landscape. [70] With regard to research conducted in Morocco, scholars have emphasized the tension between multi-faceted attachment to religious values and the process of individualization. [71] The hypothesis proposed here is that the process of individualization shapes – in different ways – the relationship to the sacred of both those individuals who advocate for the “privatization” of religion and those who, on the contrary, wish to see society regulated by religious norms. Much like ideological cleavages, polarization regarding religious matters largely plays out on the urban stage, the main actors being the most educated members of society: middle managers, senior managers and executives, students and recent graduates.

36This study does not seek to reconstitute either the scope or the depth of the religious dynamics at work, but concentrates instead on a few questions on the basis of in-depth studies that had been conducted previously. After investigating the links between normative variables (religious practices, whether the veil was worn by the female respondent or by the (male) respondent’s wife, opinions on veil wearing, opinions on homosexuality [72]), creating a composite index allowed us to measure levels of adherence to “conventional” religious values [73] or autonomy with regard to said values. We are aware that some responses primarily reflect the image that respondents wished to give of their organization. Moreover, additional exchanges demonstrated to what extent the questions could be subject to different interpretations and self-presentations. Even the meaning to be attributed to the word “hijab” [74] prompted questions: “Can the traditional headscarf be considered a hijab?”, “What about full-face veils?”. There are therefore many angles that should be considered in future studies. Nevertheless, such issues do not completely invalidate the results presented here.

37Among the sample population, respondents predominantly adhered to religious values (65%). However, the normative positions that distanced themselves from the “conventional” model – either a high level of autonomy (17% of the sample) or a high level of adherence (22%) – were generally espoused by men, urban dwellers, the highly educated and executives (“education and employment” classes EE1 and EE2), rather than women, rural dwellers and those in the private sector (EE4, EE3).

Table 8

Distribution of delegates by sex, urban/rural residence, “education-employment” class and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

High autonomy Relative autonomy “Conventional” adherence High adherence Total Men 87 86 80 87 83 Women 12 11 17 13 14 Urban 85 81 74 81 77 Rural 9 14 23 17 17 EE1 30 26 21 33 26 EE2 35 31 27 39 31 EE3 8 12 11 9 10 EE4 9 15 25 13 18 EE5 3 3 3 1 4 EE6 15 13 12 5 11

Distribution of delegates by sex, urban/rural residence, “education-employment” class and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

38At the party level, a continuum stretches between one end characterized by high levels of autonomy with regard to religious values, centred on ATTAC and the far left-wing party (Annahj), and another end marked by a high level of adherence to those same values, centred on PJD Islamists. The high score of “conventional” adherence is attained by the MP, the party of notables, closely linked with the rural world (Table 9).

Table 9

Distribution of delegates according to an index of adherence to religious values and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

ATTAC Annahj PADS PSU USFP PPS PAM MP Istiqlal PJD Total High level of autonomy 76 76 52 50 27 17 7 2 2 17 Relative autonomy 13 17 23 26 24 20 17 8 11 1 15 “Conventional” adherence 10 5 25 19 43 54 58 70 58 26 43 High level of adherence 1 1 5 4 8 15 17 24 72 22

Distribution of delegates according to an index of adherence to religious values and by organization (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

39It remains to be seen which avenues should be taken to interpret this polarization on the normative level between the far left-wing and the radical left-wing, on the one hand, and the PJD Islamists on the other. In the case of Morocco, a generational reading underscores the particularity of the bilingual elites educated under the Protectorate, and then in the wake of independence, before access to education was expanded. [75] Other interpretations have pointed out that the policy of Arabization, implemented at the end of the 1970s and which produced the first “Arabized” graduates in June 1990, [76] in conjunction with the replacement of philosophy classes by Islamic studies starting in 1981, aimed to overthrow left-wing values. [77]

40However, it would be premature to establish a relationship of cause and effect between the specific type of education received (elitist and bilingual vs. mass and Arabized), individual perspectives on religion, and ideological adherence. The distribution of the religious adherence index by age highlights the fact that age brackets are linked with specific organizations, rather than displaying a generational relationship to religion (Table 10).

Table 10

Distribution of delegates by age and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

High autonomy Relative autonomy “Conventional” adherence High adherence Total Under 30 20 15 17 4 14 30-39 17 27 23 22 23 Under 40 37 42 40 26 37 40-49 26 26 27 40 30 50-59 27 20 20 24 21 60 and older 6 7 7 5 6

Distribution of delegates by age and according to an index of adherence to religious values (% in columns) – survey data from 2008-2012

41Taken as a whole, the “products” of Arabization policies – in this case, individuals under 40 years old – tend to position themselves in close affinity to the “conventional” order (relative autonomy and conventional adherence), much like those aged 60 and over. With regard to high levels of adherence, these are over-represented among those in their 40s (who are associated with PJD respondents) and, to a lesser extent, among those in their 50s. Finally, high levels of autonomy are equally associated with those in their 50s (closer to UFSP respondents) and those under 30 (closer to ATTAC respondents).

42* * *

43Ultimately, how should the Moroccan political partisan cast list be described? As a selective club cut off from the rest of society, an elite chasing after scarce resources, or as a microcosm marked by the major social cleavages that run throughout the society as a whole? The Moroccan political partisan landscape, illustrated in miniature by our sample of delegates from ten different political organizations, is indeed a small world dominated by urban dwellers, largely well-educated middle-aged men with economic resources. Far from being cut off from ordinary citizens, however, this world is subject to the same dynamics at work in society as a whole. Although it cannot be reduced to a segmented clientele, it nonetheless remains shaped by an ideal-type opposition between the parties of notables and the parties of activists.

44In fact, the most significant dividing line within our panel is not ideological, but stems from a relationship to politics: on one side, pragmatic, localized politics, embedded within close, clientelist networks; and on the other, national, at times even transnational politics, built upon political identities that have survived the many reconfigurations of the Moroccan political partisan landscape. This contrast overlays important sociographic differences: at one end of the spectrum, private sector employees with interdependent profiles – entrepreneurs and large-scale farmers versus the poorest and least educated, associated with rural environments; and at the other, middle managers, senior managers and executives, highly educated, largely employed in the public sector and having often experienced upward social mobility, as well as young university students and recent graduates.

45As for ideological polarization, that phenomenon tends to be limited to the most educated individuals. It differentiates Islamists in the PJD from members in radical and far left-wing parties and is underpinned by the struggle to define the role of religion in politics and by different attitudes towards the monarchy. Although access to the institutionalized political scene is officially dependent on recognizing the “foundations of the nation” – God, country, king – these results illustrate that the Moroccan political partisan landscape includes a number of more or less latent zones of dissidence. At the very heart of the former oppositions that ultimately reconciled themselves – hastily and with much fanfare – with the monarchy, adherence to the Moroccan monarchical “model” is neither fully embraced nor irreversible: this manifests itself through individual resistance, internal crises and even sometimes in connection with the protest arena, as seen in 2011 in the context of the February 20th Movement.

46Narrowing the focus to the cluster structured by ideological identities allows us to observe contrasts that are correlated with different strategies with regard to the electoral scene, while confirming that Islamism is not necessarily the refuge of marginalized individuals. Senior managers and executives who have experienced upward social mobility are associated with the ex-governmental left-wing (the USFP) and the PJD, two parties that, at different times, embodied parliamentary opposition, before their gaining access to government was hailed as a historical turning point. Middle managers, university students and recent graduates are closer to organizations on the fringes of electoral competition, such as the radical and far left-wing parties. As for the “different way of doing politics” adopted by ATTAC, this tends to attract highly educated young people. Nevertheless, a generational interpretation is far from providing conclusive answers at this stage in the research.

47Let us once again note the extent to which the political party members polled are not “all the same”: their sociographic diversity, as well as their differences with regard to values, their relationship to politics, and their strategic orientations represent some of the most illuminating discoveries of this study. Behind the burgeoning of new parties and numerous political reconfigurations, certain elements persist: the “notabilization” of the former opposition groups does not prevent some members from clinging to their past as rebels, nor does it stop new activist parties from emerging. And it is within the very heart of the organizations which are the most involved in participatory strategies that the shifting borders between parties of notables and parties of activists become blurred. This worrying possibility was broached as early as 2008, when PJD delegates asked me: “Do you think we’ll end up like the USFP?”

48Beyond this first overview, analyzing the data by cohorts, different forms of socialization, recruitment pools and activist careers could shed further light on the processes behind the bifurcations observed on the normative and ideological levels, while also allowing for an in-depth analysis of the reconfigurations of Moroccan political party membership. [78]