The limits of Weithman’s proposition

15A first problem, which I will touch on just briefly, results from Weithman’s decision to present temperance as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition to reaching republican standards of social justice and political deliberation. That the more affluent develop such a disposition may certainly encourage more equal distribution of wealth and the development of more egalitarian mores, but to make these results even partially dependent on a variable so uncertain and contingent supposes an excessive trust in the good will of a particularly ambitious category of the population. Along with Pettit, who on this point echoes a multisecular tradition, it seems to me more prudent to consider the virtue of institutions as a better guarantee of social justice than the virtue of individuals – be they governors or governed, rich or poor, angels or demons. [28]

16A second problem concerns the articulation of perfectionism and axiological pluralism. Although Weithman argues that his perfectionist republicanism is perfectly compatible with such a principle, he nevertheless makes no statement about how he intends to achieve this in order to guarantee equal freedom for individuals. If he implies for example that the advantage of perfectionist republicanism is in not being dependent on a high level of citizen participation, [29] the corrections that he proposes are nevertheless accompanied in the political sphere by an “exhortation to be a good person”. [30] It is unclear how this will be framed in order to ensure that it does not lead to arbitrary interferences in the lives of individuals. In fact, his pluralism somewhat begs the question: Weithman supposes that his perfectionism is not in disagreement with pluralism, but he does not specify the means, particularly institutional, of preventing this. We can probably argue that Weithman overestimates the resources at his disposal for working with the fact of pluralism and for preventing paternalism and the tyranny of the majority. This is a notable regression in regards to Pettit’s vision of republicanism which aims to minimise the paternalistic threats which are potentially associated with the intervention of the public authorities. Indeed for Pettit, these powers play a primary role in the operationalisation of freedom and republican civility. However, these acts, which are more or less based on a certain discretionary power, are subject to conditions of constitutionality [31] and contestability [32] that are intended to ensure that the state does not become a source of domination. There are no such warnings or safeguards in Weithman’s approach.

17Weithman’s theory presents a third problem, more implicit this time, and its analysis will allow me to pursue my exploration of Pettit’s republicanism further. It seems to me that in Weithman’s presentation of Pettit’s theory, he underestimates the motivational resources of political republicanism in favour of the development of virtue. Among these potential resources, the most important come from the advantages that individuals find in a society where non-domination generally reigns. This is the object of the section of Republicanism where non-domination is presented as a personal good. [33] Pettit presents three advantages that, for a given individual, would found the superiority of a society based on freedom as non-domination rather than on freedom as non-interference: 1/ “it […] deliver[s] a person from uncertainty, and from the associated anxiety and inability to plan”; [34] 2/ “from the need to exercise strategy with the powerful, having to defer to them and anticipate their various moves”; [35] 3/ finally, it liberates an individual “from the subordination that goes with a common awareness that the person is exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference by another”. [36] With a minimum of hermeneutic generosity towards Pettit’s argument, we can no doubt consider these benefits of non-domination as so many encouragements to pursue and defend the republican ideal. The motives stemming from the recognition of these general advantages can be added to the personal desires that such a status would satisfy. In other words, because it is a primary good, in the sense of Rawls, [37] freedom as non-domination can rely on a broad spectrum of motives for action (including the quest for autonomy and self-mastery) which are eclipsed or rendered mundane in Weithman’s presentation. [38] All in all, even though Pettit does not explicitly present them in this light, the different advantages that he associates with non-domination in fact constitute powerful arguments in favour of the political approach to civic virtue.

The limits of Maynor’s proposition

26Because it is not directly related to the problem that concerns me here, I will only briefly touch on Maynor’s desire to distinguish republicanism from liberalism at all costs. In addition to overlooking the importance of instrumental approaches to civic virtue in the history of republicanism, [55] this research aiming to preserve republican identity from the vicissitudes of social, political, and intellectual history detracts significantly from the clarity of his presentation. His insistence on positive freedom, which seems to stem more from a concern for doctrinal distinctions than from substantiated reasoning, is a particular indication of this. [56]

27In addition, what are we to make of Maynor’s claim that a foundation of comprehensive conceptions would allow a greater openness to the voices of minority and/or marginalised individuals and groups? Of course, this approach has the advantage of indicating the limits of an overly rigid distinction between the public and the private, particularly from the perspective of participation in deliberation. It would thus, according to Maynor, provide support for Pettit’s ambition to welcome, transmit, and federate feminist, socialist, and multiculturalist claims. [57] But is the presentation of the republican project in a crepublicanism encourage marginalised individuals and groups to join in deliberations and to develop the aptitudes required to defend freedom as non-domination? In truth, it is easier to glimpse the risks that such a perspective casts over the equal freedoms of individuals than to see its genuine advantages on the motivation of actors to pursue the neo-republican ideal. [58] It falls to the person or entity intervening in the lives of individuals – even those in positions of vulnerability – to sufficiently justify their approach. In this, it is not enough to simply plead one’s good faith; there must be a demonstration as to how the promise of assistance will not become a source of domination.

28Of course, in his insistence on the need to consider his approach within the deliberative and contestatory perspective developed by Pettit, Maynor demonstrates his intention to not reproduce Weithman’s explicitly perfectionist deviations. However, by making self-mastery the veritable touchstone of moral and political evaluation, it is not certain that Maynor fully evaluates the risks he imposes on the individuals and groups he claims to save from exclusion. It seems to me that the advantage of Pettit’s political republicanism lies precisely in his ability to allow this integration of a plurality of voices and conceptions of the good life into civil conversation, whilst limiting the dangers of moralism, paternalism and perfectionism. Incorporating the means for partial adjustments, such as the addition of politics of recognition, [59] Pettit’s approach – which emphasises the identification of “vulnerability classes” [60] and the desire for increased political representation of the individuals and groups it covers [61] – seems able to escape from an overly rigid distinction between public and private, without posing a threat to individual freedom. [62]

29Finally, how can we evaluate the idea according to which a quasi-perfectionist approach would be necessarily more favourable to the development of civic virtue? We can see in Maynor the highly questionable assumption that there is necessarily a correlation between the “robustness” of the moral ideal promoted by the state and the effectiveness of the development of the corresponding civic virtues. This assumption, which has influenced and continues to influence many public policies, with clearly paternalistic traits, periodically receives support from various normative political theories. Rather than an argument, however, the correlation between these two variables appears to be a commonplace that is regularly mobilised without concern as to its relevance and the conditions of its appropriateness to social and political reality. It is in this form at least that this assumption appears in Maynor’s analysis. However, given the weight of its moral implications, it ought to be incumbent on whoever makes such an assumption to provide the proof of its theoretical and practical validity. Even supposing that such proof could be provided, there are good reasons to ask what institutional approach should be taken to avoid this requirement for virtue one day becoming a sword of Damocles over the heads of individuals who are uncooperative, passive, frivolous, or not sufficiently concerned about public affairs. Indeed, even in the hypothesis that such an eventuality could be avoided, Maynor’s wager seems overly adventurous. How does presenting republican freedom as an intrinsic good make it more attractive to those who do not identify, or only slightly, with the republican ideal?

30From a consequentialist approach, we might think (contrary to what Maynor implies) that it would be more judicious to prioritise the experience of non-domination itself and the means for extending it rather than insisting on the need to adopt republican values from the outset. If the objective is that a maximum number of agents ultimately consent to interiorise and defend the ideal of non-domination, it may well be counter-productive to make the deliberative experience’s threshold of moral admissibility too restrictive. Through its effects of dissuasion and exclusion, this constraint would run the risk of limiting the contribution of the deliberative process to the search for non-domination, and in particular its possible transformative effects on the preferences and interests of those who did not initially display an acceptance of republican values. In order to maximise non-domination, Pettit’s approach seems to be more appropriate. In presenting republican freedom as a primary good, we can hope to increase the attractiveness of the ideal to be pursued whilst protecting the diversity of perspectives expressed in deliberation. Through more pronounced respect for axiological pluralism, we can at the same time rely on a much broader range of motivations to support the development of capacities, aptitudes, and qualities of public spiritedness.

31Overall, it seems that Maynor has republicans running unnecessary risks. If we look for the real advantages that his approach would have over Pettit’s, instead we clearly see its potential disadvantages. Once again, we must bear in mind that to limit the risks of paternalism, it is not sufficient to simply declare that the affinities (be they partial and indirect) of republican theory are ultimately compatible with pluralism. It is also necessary to provide all means possible to contain the possible negative effects that certain theoretical configurations are liable to justify in the political space. Like Weithman, Maynor commits a “double mistake”, so to speak: on one hand he overestimates the ability of his theory to work with the fact of pluralism, and on the other he underestimates the motivational resources that political republicanism makes available to individuals to encourage their inclination to follow and defend freedom as non-domination.

The extent and fragility of republican virtues

33In the context of Pettit’s contestatory democracy, citizens are called on to play a crucial but limited role. Other than their participation in the election of their representatives they are also invited to remain vigilant and to resist all arbitrary interference that may emanate from the state. [63] However, the operationalisation of contestation itself is not due to direct or active participation of citizens in public affairs. If “contestatory citizenship” appears necessary, no additional participation is required to defend the ideal of non-domination. Pettit even demonstrates rare obstinacy in distinguishing his vision of citizenship from that which is traditionally associated with participative democracy. Contestatory democracy validates a division of labour that would allow for a break with the romanticism and lack of realism of a political culture inspired by Rousseau. As such, it is achieved through a broad range of channels for consultation and appeal, such as the courts, independent organisations and ombudsmen, as well as counter-powers and other organisations specialised in the defence of rights. Setting to one side the important question of the extent of popular participation in state institutions, [64] I would like to examine the internal coherence of Pettit’s theory, and question its capacity to provide the resources that are necessary for the development of the dispositions required for limited participation. Yet, even supposing that this restriction is accepted, political republicanism gives rise to significant issues that must be addressed.

34As minimalist as it might seem, this conception of republican citizenship calls on a series of habits and abilities that are apparent in different spheres of collective life. [65] Yet Pettit seems to underestimate their extent, and the significance of the requirement for their development and their diffusion. To take stock of this limit, it may be useful to return to the reasons, discussed above, that Pettit invokes in justifying the need to count on civic virtue in a republican context. For institutions to conform to the requirements of non-domination there must be, “people who are virtuous enough to press appropriate claims” and “to maintain the eternal vigilance that constitutes the price of republican liberty”. [66] Similarly we have seen that in order for interpersonal relations to line up with the spirit of non-domination, everyone must attempt to understand and honour the normative reasons for this mutual respect. In all likelihood, the republican ethos combines different components that express and fulfil themselves both in the political sphere and in the individual and social sphere. Taking certain liberties with the argument presented by Pettit, we could say that ultimately civic virtue articulates: a political disposition to defend free institutions, a social disposition to not dominate the other, and a personal disposition to regulate one’s own interest according to the common good of freedom.

35By all accounts, each of these aspects of republican virtue supposes the development of aptitudes and sensibilities. Somewhat characteristically, however, Pettit fails to propose a precise description of them. Having said that, we can no doubt hypothesise that in order to accomplish their political responsibilities, individuals must demonstrate critical thinking and a certain intellectual integrity. Similarly, to respect the requirements of non-domination in their relations with others, citizens must develop various qualities of listening, empathy, consideration, deliberation, and show a sense of justice that integrates the disposition to rationally justify their requirements. [67] Finally, on a personal level, individuals must develop a certain number of capacities that will enable them to determine their interests and the best ways of satisfying them in light of the common good of non-domination. Overall, even if the specifically political participation of citizens is limited, the realisation of political republicanism nevertheless requires dispositions that are more demanding than Pettit implies.

36Moreover, Pettit tends to underestimate the fragility that is at the heart of republican virtue, and the gravity of the threats that it faces today. It is important to emphasise that the development of republican dispositions has to contend with intrinsic fragility. Like any virtue, civic republican qualities are not innate; they are the result of a delicate learning process and require the support of a favourable environment. Sociologists continue to repeat just how much the development of democratic competence and other abilities supposes a complex long-term learning process that is only possible in a supportive social, economic, and cultural environment. [68] They also demonstrate the importance of the institutional context and the concrete political opportunities that must be available to the individual for these qualities of public spiritedness to develop durably and effectively. [69] Overall, even if it is instrumental, civic virtue appears to be so fragile that it requires the ongoing support of institutions. Moreover, we could add that, as a disposition that implies active awareness of its own vulnerability and that of the other, republican virtue presents a further degree of fragility and, because of this, depends even more on external circumstances in order to emerge, consolidate, and spread itself in the social body.

37Yet at the very least we can say that the current context is hardly favourable to the development of republican civic virtue. The symptoms of this difficulty are as diverse as they are unequivocal. Numerous empirical studies in recent decades have drawn attention to the fact that most individuals have a limited comprehension of the problems and functioning of political institutions [70] and that they have a marked inclination to de-politicisation and indifference when faced with various important social issues. [71] However, as certain sociologists have shown, particularly regarding apathy, it is not so much the individuals themselves that are to blame, as the social context and diffuse political culture. [72] It is the same for certain forms of action that overlook the common good and that cannot be understood independently of the existence of an economically inspired hegemonic rationality in which the maximisation of self-interest and individual responsibilisation appear as the alpha and omega of ordinary morality. Once we attempt to consider the conditions for the formation of republican virtues, it is important to pay scrupulous attention to the dynamics and other social phenomena that may influence the behaviour of individual and collective agents.

38Of course, Pettit is aware of the decisive importance of context in the development of republican mores and institutions. This is what leads him to emphasise the role played by institutions in bringing together and protecting the conditions to encourage large-scale non-domination. This is also why he declares that contestatory democracy supposes the existence of a “contestatory culture” which renders individuals inclined to resist any form of abuse. [73] His approach appears very limited however in accounting for the fragility that is constitutive of republican virtue and the structural, institutional, and informal interferences that it is liable to encounter in the current context. In a period when neoliberal positions seem to prevail and spread irresistibly, new obstacles, coming from the state as well as from the market, risk impeding or penalising the establishment of social and political relations in keeping with non-domination. Increasing socio-economic inequalities, the crumbing of public solidarity institutions, increasingly precarious working conditions, and the free reign of financial capitalism are just some examples of the general trends that accentuate the fragility of republican virtue. Yet by his almost exclusive attention to institutional issues, Pettit’s approach risks preventing our recognition of other elements of context which the republican project is obliged to cope with today and which should encourage us to be more vigilant. [74]

39Political republicanism must acknowledge the intrinsic and contextual fragility of republican virtue. By neglecting this problem, or by approaching it with excessive optimism, perfectionist opponents are given an unjustified monopoly on the critique of the social phenomena that feed the inclination of individuals and groups to maximise their own interests at all costs and at the expense of the common goods of freedom, equality, and solidarity. Can we address this flaw and still resist the temptation of perfectionism or quasi-perfectionism? An affirmative answer seems possible on the condition that the theory of citizenship which underlines Pettit’s republicanism is revised.

The hypothesis of a convergence between republicanism and associative democracy

40To address the shortcomings of Pettit’s approach without altering the nature of his political republicanism, it may be useful to examine the possibility of opening up Pettit’s model of contestatory democracy to infra or extra-state spaces of citizenship. It would then be opportune to ask whether these spaces provide additional resources which might support the development of the republican ethos.

41The existing literature in social sciences is rich with instructions on the role that different citizen practices and initiatives might play in the formation of aptitudes and other democratic capacities. For example, recent studies on different participative budgeting experiments in Europe and South America have shown how opening up shared institutions to direct citizen participation was able to contribute in certain cases to the development of civic attitudes among sectors of the population that have been traditionally marginalised. [75] A similar observation runs through studies on various recent deliberative experiences, such as citizens’ juries and deliberative opinion polls. [76] In these different cases, a broad range of civic virtues is stimulated without it being necessary to promote a given way of life or set of moral values in particular.

42The development of civic virtue also appears to be one of the main issues linked to associative democracy. As Mark E. Warren has noted in a book entitled Democracy and Association, there is a remarkable consensus today in democratic theory around the Tocquevillian idea that the virtues and the viability of a democracy are dependent on the health of its associative sphere, which is seen as a “school for democracy”. [77] Among other benefits, associations are said to contain precious resources for the formation and consolidation of the capacities and dispositions of democratic citizenship. [78] At odds with the multisecular mistrust of Rousseau or Madison regarding a sphere of action associated with factions and considered as a potential threat to the unity needed for the defence of shared institutions, most contemporary political theories see civic associations as fertile ground for the growth of a democratic ethos. [79] It is curious that political republicanism has not shown any particular interest in these practices; it has left the way clear for its communitarian opponents, who have since made community life and associations the prerogative of perfectionist republicanism. [80]

43To my mind it is therefore worth re-examining this position. Of course, associations are liable to real diversions and excesses; [81] sometimes their virtues are extolled with unjustified enthusiasm. Must political republicanism deprive itself of resources, however, below Grand Politics and above the sphere of family and friends, which could contribute to instilling in the individual a taste for freedom as non-domination and the desire to develop abilities that support this common good? This is far from certain, given how promising the convergence with associative democracy seems. By making various opportunities and frames of action more available and accessible, associative democracy could undoubtedly contribute to increasing the resources that political republicanism could use to encourage non-domination in different spheres of life, without succumbing to the temptation of perfectionism. At the same time, these resources could help increase the ability of republican antibodies to fight against corruption in institutions and mores.

44In order to test such a hypothesis it would be necessary to complete the programme proposed by Pettit. An initial research project would set out to think about the institutional conditions that would allow us to experience freedom in these contexts of cooperation and solidarity. As associations could potentially be vectors of domination, this would aim on one hand to identify the requirements that they must satisfy to participate in the pursuit of the republican ideal. On the other hand it would mean asking how institutions should intervene in this area both to encourage the creation of networks where non-domination is felt as a concrete individual and collective experience and to reinforce the existing networks which often fall prey to significant structural threats.

45Complementary to this, the research programme that I advocate would seek to specify how the community sphere would benefit from greater proximity with political republicanism. If the latter is likely to benefit from associative democracy in extending support for non-domination, the former may also be reinforced by an articulation with Pettit’s political grammar. In referring to the primary common good of non-domination, republicanism can work to federate, on the discursive, normative, and political levels, individual and collective actors who are involved in the combat against what increases individuals’ vulnerability and limits the equal development of their capacity for autonomy. This shared orientation exists in latent form between different sectors of “civil society” and it seems to me that political republicanism is well-equipped to reveal and reflect on the conditions that make such a convergence possible. It is able to do so without detracting from the irreducible plurality of motives for action that are compatible with non-domination. Up to a certain point, the use of normative republican language may also contribute to limiting the centripetal tendencies of the associative sphere and the various risks of instrumentalisation to which the market and the state expose it. It would therefore be useful to think about the institutional conditions that are required for these different agents to recognise their common goal and work together with concerted effort to implement the ideal of non-domination.

46For the hypothesis of a convergence between political republicanism and associative democracy to be conceivable, it is important to review in detail the conception of citizenship upon which Pettit’s theory is implicitly based. Of course, the complementarity of these institutional and extra-institutional spheres of citizenship is evoked here and there in his work. He takes care, for example, to note that the “channels of contestation” that he defends “will be more effective to the extent that there are social movements, such as the green movement, the women’s movement or the consumer movement”. [82] From Pettit’s perspective, these movements have two main qualities: on one hand they “help keep the channels of complaint free of noise since they can serve as an initial clearing-house where complaints are sifted and consolidated”; on the other hand they can “be very effective in pressing those complaints that they do take up, since they command an audibility which individual citizens cannot hope to match”. [83] Pettit also emphasises in passing the proximity between his theory and the studies in social sciences that insist on the beneficial effects of trust connections in civil life. [84] Finally he tries to demonstrate that the “overtures of personal trust” that are made at different levels of social life are not incompatible with his theory because it is only in a context of non-domination that they are likely to encourage equal freedom between individuals. [85] But it is ultimately only in excessively general and abstract terms that Pettit addresses these infraor extra-state spheres of citizenship.

47This shortcoming can be explained by a characteristic difficulty conceiving of these spheres outside of the antinomy between the institutional and global approach that Pettit says he defends, and the strategies of “decentralized pursuit of non-domination” that would in his eyes necessarily make the mistake of cutting individuals off from the support of shared institutions. [86] This difficulty in conceiving of complementary relations between the different spheres of citizenship can be more fundamentally explained by Pettit’s marked tendency to limit himself to the statutory dimension of citizenship. The risks of a near-exclusive attention to the legal and/or political status of citizenship are well documented today. [87] In particular, this leads us to overlook certain crucial aspects of citizenship, including a fundamental horizontal dimension that covers not only practices (social, political, cultural, symbolic, etc.) but also “acts”, often neglected by political theory and social science, which play a crucial role in citizen subjectification. [88] To support the convergence between political republicanism and associative democracy, it is also important to free up the traditional analysis of citizenship, so that its historicity, its contingency, its exposure to conflict, and the diversity of its manifestations can all be taken into account. Ultimately, this change in approach seems to be indispensable as a way to mobilise and optimise the catalysts of civic virtue that are compatible with non-domination, which contain the different experiences to be drawn from infra- or extra-state spheres of citizenship.

48* * *

49Is Philip Pettit’s republicanism able to ensure the contemporary development of the civic virtues it supposes, in order to maximise non-domination? This is the question that underpins the reflection in this article. Having sought to demonstrate that this theory contains many more resources to achieve this than its perfectionist and quasi-perfectionist detractors suggest, I have argued that theoretical complements are necessary to extend support for non-domination and to meet the challenge of its implementation in a context that is recalcitrant to say the least. I have defended the hypothesis that, instead of succumbing to the temptation of moral perfectionism, a perspective that is far from presenting the political advantages its defenders claim, it would be better to encourage the emergence and the protection of diversified frames of action that are favourable to republican freedom.

50Rather than giving the state the role of instructing citizens in virtue, by promoting a particular way of life, it would be preferable to encourage political, social, cultural, and probably also economic, contexts in which individuals can experience and learn cooperation, solidarity, deliberation, and contestation in a spirit of non-domination. As well as guaranteeing the rights of each other and ensuring the empire of laws, and not of men, republican institutions would aim to provide individuals and groups with the symbolic and material resources to overcome the obstacles that detract from the development of democratic passions and inclinations that they have in reserve. It is with a view to considering the conditions of complementarity of these different contexts of civic action and subjectification that the hypothesis of the convergence of political republicanism and associative democracy has been put forward.

51Through the reformulation of Pettit’s republican project that I have proposed here, the point is to minimise domination through maximising the opportunities available to agents to exercise their republican freedom in extra- or intra-state spheres of citizenship. This orientation would enable a reconnection with the republican tradition’s requirement relating to the conditions of development of civic virtue which has tended to become atrophied in Pettit’s work: virtue needs to be practised to exist. Associative democracy can contribute to affirming and reactualising this requirement, which republicanism has long borne within itself. It is not because a virtue has an instrumental value that its conditions of expression and exercise must be left to chance. Reflecting on the way in which institutions can provide individuals with the resources necessary to exercise their freedom and resist domination, without compromising their equal freedom, should be a top priority for political republicanism.