Advent of non-official administrative employment within the neighbourhood communities

8As the local body for bureaucratic representation for the population, the residents’ committee has been a part of the history of the People’s Republic since its beginnings. Under the work unit regime, the residents who were members of the committee were responsible for supervising the individuals who did not belong to a work unit. When urban organisation ceased to be based on public-sector work units (danwei) the approach to population management that had prevailed between 1970 and 1990, in which the residents’ committees were responsible for groups outside the context of the danwei, was reconfigured. In the 2000s, the administrations sought to re-establish links with the population based on the “neighbourhood community” (shequ) concept, defined by housing units, which was intended to increase social connectedness. Since then, neighbourhoods have been managed at the level of local administration as part of community building (shequ jianshe). Since 2004 the discourse on social harmony has permeated the local policy of the neighbourhood communities through an emphasis on assistance to “weak and vulnerable groups” (ruoshi qunti). Local administration has been rationalised to include a street-level body at the same time as it is attempting to renew its popular image, concentrating on service provision and the satisfaction of needs. In theory, the notion of neighbourhood community represents an institutional innovation that combines public action with participative discourse. Concretely, the administrations have appropriated the shequ level in order to delegate tasks to the residents’ committees without actually integrating the committees into the administrative structure. My interviews with the officials on the committees show that they themselves do not question the ambiguity of their status; it is part of this “specifically Chinese” system (zhongguo de guoqing).

9In Beijing, the residents’ committees have been revitalised, professionalised and perform a combination of functions. Each office is situated within a neighbourhood community whose borders are drawn by the administration according to geographic and demographic criteria. The area of intervention has become progressively larger.

10

“We are moving towards a smaller number of residents’ committees in the town. The borders of neighbourhood communities take in larger and larger areas, which can be between 1000 and 3000 households.” [17]
“Now we must manage much more massive populations than before.” [18]

11The committee officials work in cooperation with the street bureaucracy (jiedao banshichu), to whom they provide field data.

12

“Normally, all levels should be aware of peoples’ economic and social problems. […] The residents’ committees work at the grassroots level. We are in direct contact with ordinary people [laobaixing]. We know what they think, how they behave.” [19]

13The use of plaques, official signs and logos for the “neighbourhood community” around the office indicates just how much these residents’ committees have become bureaucratised.

14

“We are more systematised [xitong] than before.” [20]

15Both the inhabitants and the members interviewed mention the improvement of working conditions, as well as the modernisation of infrastructure, financed by the town.

16

“In 2001, there were only seven of us, we were in the neighbourhood community office of the danwei and it wasn’t easy. But in 2002 we moved, and our working conditions improved. In 2003 there were 14 of us working for the shequ.” [21]
“The surface area is 310 metres square. Now the criteria are for at least 300 metres squared, and not 200 which dates back to 2005.” [22]
“Today, their abilities and their functions in this role have increased. Before, they were all old men.
Their offices were very small. Now they have better working conditions.” [23]

17Moreover, it is clear that there is a greater use of electronic equipment. Each office has computers that are connected to the internet and to the street office via an intranet system.

18

“Before, we didn’t have computers, we had to go and inform the residents in person. So we had to go and knock on all the doors, speak to everyone. We didn’t put up as many announcements.” [24]

19The reform accentuated the principles of efficiency, specialisation and qualification.

20

“Before, the members of the residents’ committees were elderly […]. Now, the state recruits employees who must be efficient.” [25]

21Since the community-building reform, residents’ committees have functioned on the basis of division and specialisation of tasks.

22

“It has become a much more honed, more meticulous job.” [26]
“Before, the residents’ committee didn’t have as much to do, compared with today. […] At the same time, before, they also had less work.” [27]
“Before, the working conditions were less practical. But we didn’t have so many different aspects to manage at the same time.” [28]
“The evolution of the residents’ committee has meant that we have become government agents [zhengfu jiguan]. Before that wasn’t the case. Now all the staff are subject to specific criteria.” [29] “Of course, before, there were residents’ committees, but they weren’t like now. They looked after everyday affairs. […] Before, we didn’t have any cultural activities, our residents’ committee didn’t have anywhere to organise them.” [30]

23The director of the committee (zhuren) is in charge of overall coordination. He or she is supported by an assistant director (fuzhuren). Each staff member is responsible for a specific area. One such area concerns security and mediation (zhibao), in cooperation with the police (paichusuo). A second area of responsibility provides the link between the residents’ committee and another mass organisation, the Women’s League (fulian), which “defends and promotes women’s rights” [31]. A third concerns family planning and birth control, while a fourth focuses on neighbourhood entertainment. A fifth is responsible for social welfare; the managers are trained in civil affairs (minzheng), i.e. social welfare and support for the elderly or for “vulnerable” persons. Hygiene (weisheng) and the preservation of the environment constitute the sixth area of responsibility. [32] In concrete terms these areas overlap. Similarly, the relationship between the residents’ committees and the Chinese Communist Party is ambiguous; the office of the director of the residents’ committee is often shared with the secretary of the local branch of the Party.

24

“Here is our Party Secretary [shuji], he looks after members’ activities […]. Above all propaganda: education for communists. In our shequ, there are two leaders, the director of the residents’ committee and the secretary of the Party branch.” [33]

25In several of the neighbourhoods where this study was conducted, the directors of the residents’ committees were also Party secretaries. This accumulation of positions reveals the interconnectedness of these two institutions. [34] The residents are accustomed to this.

26

“A residents’ committee is not independent from the Chinese Communist Party, no state organisation can be separate from the Communist Party in this country, it’s a single party. It’s like that for the whole administration and the government. Officially they are not together. But in fact, not at all.” [35]

27As for the employees, the elderly volunteers of the old days (who essentially just performed surveillance and propaganda missions) have been replaced by a younger, more qualified team. Recruitment is more and more selective, and based on abilities and qualification levels.

Photograph 1

The residents’ committee team in a former industrial neighbourhood, 2011

The residents’ committee team in a former industrial neighbourhood, 2011

28

“Now, our work is much more in-depth. We are obliged to have a certain level of education, compulsory knowledge.” [36]
“Before, the employees in the residents’ committees were mostly retirees, but now it is mainly young people with a high level of education. We all generally have a bachelor’s degree. The lowest level is at least secondary qualifications.” [37]

29Moreover, in a context of high urban unemployment, finding jobs for young graduates is a problem in China today. The neighbourhood employment sector is thus a way for this generation to achieve the stability they seek.

30Mainly recruited through entrance exams, employees generally undertake several months of internships in the neighbourhoods and are trained to use new information and communication technologies. These officials are employed on three-year contracts, with a monthly salary varying between 1,000 and 1,800 yuan (figures for Beijing in 2008-2009 [38]), only barely higher than the minimum wage.

31The local role of this body remains ambiguous because it is also at the heart of participative discourse, as the “local democracy” slogans (jiceng minzhu) demonstrate. Theoretically, the shequ is an administrative zone managed by a threefold structure: the residents’ committee (jumin weiyuanhui), made up of members living in the neighbourhood and elected by the residents; the “work station” (shequ gongzuozhan), comprising employees recruited by the administration above; and the local branch of the Communist Party (dangwei zuzhi). [39] In reality these structures are porous and few residents’ committees are actually composed of locally elected residents. [40] Elections are held every three years and the municipalities say they are evolving towards the goal of direct suffrage by the residents. However, my study in Beijing in 2009 shows that the candidates remain pre-selected by the street office. Most local habitants are not interested in these elections. Most residents’ committees are composed of salaried individuals who are involved in both the work station and the committee. However, the accumulation of these two forms of recruitment – elections by the residents (minxuan) every three years, and recruitment via the civil servants in the street office who have pre-selected the candidates for election – is a further constraint on the residents’ committee officials and makes them all the more zealous.

32Officially the street office “provides guidance to” (zhidao) and does not “direct” (lindao) the work of the residents’ committees. But the street office is nonetheless an authoritative body.

33

“We have no power. […] The government guides [zhidao] our work […]. It is not our superior […].” [41] “The residents’ committee is under the influence of the government. […] But above all we adapt to the needs of the inhabitants, we help them. […] We represent the residents in their relationship with the government; they go through us to ask things of the government […]. We went to Japan to study the local system. It’s different. They really are autonomous [zizhi].” [42]

34A product of administrative decentralisation, the street office directs “community-building” (shequ jianshe) by coordinating the residents’ committees. Although the latter are theoretically responsible for organising local life, they are overwhelmed by administrative tasks. In Beijing, the work of residents’ committees is made up of two thirds administrative tasks and one third work on behalf of residents. [43]

35

“The local office directs us. If they introduce a new policy, the person responsible for that area in the residents’ committee is summoned to a meeting.” [44]

36The hierarchical relations between the residents’ committees and the administration are strict: far from encouraging autonomy, “neighbourhood community building” has made the committees administrative auxiliaries. The residents’ committees have no budget; the municipality provides all the basic materials (offices, working equipment).

37

“The residents’ committee has no money. It comes from the street office. We can never use money or give any to the residents. The money comes from above and what we get is intended for a specific task.” [45]

38Moreover, the civil servants in the street office regularly summon the committee employees to meetings and demand activity reports. In this hierarchical relationship the employees demonstrate concern and diligence. The fear that the officials of the residents’ committee have of being downgraded is similar to that of the “pettily uniformed” in the disadvantaged areas described by Hoggart: an employee who sets themselves apart from the masses but remains haunted by the risk of social regression. [46] This encourages the submission of officials to their hierarchy. The autonomy that is theoretically granted to them under organic law is limited in the neighbourhoods of Beijing by the administrative annexation of the community structure.

The social disqualification of the residents’ committee officials

39

“Harmonious society […], it’s simple to say, but difficult to do.” [47]

40Constrained by the bureaucratic relationship and by short-term work contracts, officials carry out orders “from above”. The participative bureaucratisation of the residents’ committee leads to a form of social disqualification according to Paugam’s definition. [48] This occupation is characterised by precarious conditions and extensible working hours. There is no path for promotion towards other levels of the administration. [49] The officials, who are not civil servants but casual workers, describe a job that is “tiresome” (xinku), underpaid, [50] and lacking in prestige. Certain tasks, in particular executing government policies, do indeed appear to be subject to significant pressure because they are associated with very high expectations. [51] These officials say they have no notion of time, their work is characterised by an elasticity that depends on the circumstances. It has a dual nature, being both routine (they never intervene outside their zone of responsibility and have their own offices), and unpredictable (they must be aware of and resolve any incidents). Their working hours are fixed [52] but they must remain available in case of emergency.

41

“If there is a fire in the night, I must go and assess the situation with the firemen.” [53] “Here we are always very busy.” [54]

42As a result there is significant fatigue due to overtime hours, low salaries, and the daily management of complaints and criticism. Some officials, with higher education degrees, see this as a drop in status and hope eventually to change jobs.

43Moreover, the direct contact with the inhabitants represents a significant difficulty because the social work sector is still not very developed in China.

44

“It isn’t easy, it’s very difficult in fact. […] We would not have believed it would be so difficult and that there would be so many things to manage. The most difficult thing is that we only have little problems to manage, but there are a lot of them. If you want to do it well, then it’s difficult. […] Because it’s human work, in direct contact with people.” [55]
“My salary is not very high, a little more than 1,000 yuan. The work is not valued very highly; our living conditions are quite low. We are very busy, there are many different functions, so it isn’t very gratifying. Personally, I would say that we have to take care of all the problems in peoples’ lives. You have to like being in contact with people.” [56]

45The introduction of administrative norms is not accompanied by in-depth training in public policy practice. Let’s take the example of a recent housing estate in which the residents’ committee comprised five employees to manage a population of more than 10,000 residents. In March 2007, my study traced the beginnings of the committee, founded barely ten months earlier without much attention from the residents. The few information sheets put up in the housing estate were not often read and the basement office was not very visible. Shortly afterwards, the committee director took maternity leave but was not replaced. The employees experienced enormous difficulties in carrying out their missions. The officials confessed that they did not feel like they had enough assistance, but they did not dare complain to their superiors.

46Participative bureaucratisation leads to the specific subjectification of employees, who describe their job as “acceptable” by default. However, this employment is suited to individuals over 40 years old who have low levels of qualification, particularly former public sector employees who were laid off (xiagang) during the reforms.

47Moreover, there are a number of symbolic objects that help to bring this structure closer to the administration. The stamp used to issue certificates, the official logo with their name, or the plaque at the entrance to the office: all contribute to a feeling of responsibility. These elements play an important role in officials’ acceptance of constraints and their attachment to the job.

48Finally, the rewards bestowed by the administration as well as the politeness and respect afforded them by a section of the population may constitute additional factors in self-esteem. In spite of being very demanding and poorly remunerated, employees say that on the whole they are satisfied with the job. The assistant director of a recent neighbourhood committee recounts the details of the first time she organised a cultural event.

49

“Above all, don’t tell the others. If I came in at 8am this morning it’s because of the stress. I didn’t sleep a wink last night. I was afraid that there wouldn’t be enough participants. And then I had to find solutions in case there was a last minute problem. […] On that score, I feel above all that I succeeded, I feel that I am capable of organising events for so many people. I tell myself ‘you did it, you succeeded’ […] I am exhausted by this work, I do a huge amount of overtime. Sometimes I say to myself ‘Why do you do all that? You don’t even live in this neighbourhood’. But the idea of knowing that I can, that I can manage all these different things at once, it’s a very pleasant feeling.” [57]

50The participative bureaucratisation of the residents’ committees has allowed for the reintegration of a large number of people who were previously struggling. However, this professionalisation has not been accompanied by an integration of the committees into the administrative structure. It remains “below” the administration, confirming the disqualification of committee officials. Thus the participative bureaucratisation of the residents’ committees has introduced a form of unstable employment, and justified it through a discourse of autonomy and the “neighbourhood community”.

51Above all, this participative discourse enables the administration to place a (sacrificeable) intermediary between itself and the population. In keeping with the objective of a harmonious society, complaints and criticisms are attenuated by the establishment of a buffer body, an interface between the administration and the population. The public often complains that the administration “doesn’t manage” (bu guan) the problems. The residents’ committees, in the front line, are directly responsible for the residents. The participative bureaucratisation of the residents’ committees has turned out to be useful for the administration because it provides officials in the field who are not integrated into the administrative structure, and this unequal power relation is not questioned by the officials.

Participative bureaucratisation responsible for the lack of recognition

53The perception of the residents’ committees by the inhabitants of Beijing reveals a lack of legitimacy on the local level, although some inhabitants – often the elderly or those in difficulty – appreciated the assistance and cultural services they provide. The daily activities, services, and small gifts to the residents encourage favourable opinions among some of those in “weak and vulnerable groups” (ruoshi qunti).

54

“My residents’ committee looks after the residents better and better. For retired people over 80 years old, they celebrate our birthdays, they bring us a cake and small gifts.” [58]

55According to many elderly people who are present during the day and who interact with their committee, professionalisation has improved the quality of the services provided. Moreover, these more elderly residents, or those in social hardship, recognise the efforts of the officials to provide attention and entertainment.

56However, the main criticisms concern the non-official link with the administration – which distances the employees from the neighbourhood – and the inability to resolve problems or defend the residents. Most studies criticise the lack of independence of the employees in the management of local affairs, and accuse them of inefficiency: “they have no power”. A second criticism concerns professionalisation as a factor in distancing the neighbourhood. Since the officials are only rarely residents in the neighbourhood they manage – particularly in affluent areas, which more clearly distinguish their borders with other neighbourhoods – they do not really know (bu liaojie) the context.

57

“How can it be possible that our residents’ committee, which is supposed to represent us, could be made up of people from outside? It isn’t logical, they do not live here, they do not know this place. How dare they pretend to defend my interests?” [59]

58In the older neighbourhoods, the residents’ descriptions tend towards a certain nostalgia for the residents’ committees of the past, which were made up of residents who (inefficiently but voluntarily) helped resolve local problems.

59

“Before, it was better, the committee members didn’t have salaries, they did it out of personal interest.” [60]
“Before, the members lived here, they were residents. The inhabitants all knew how to find them to resolve their problems, even at night, after work.” [61]
“Before, the members of the residents’ committees didn’t earn any money, they didn’t have a salary until the 1990s. They were people who had no work, or retirees who took on this activity for the sake of the community, the residents. I have a lot of respect for these people, who really knew all the families in their neighbourhood and their situations. They were very close to the inhabitants and ensured order was maintained. For example, I remember that I accompanied my mother to help in the collection of hygiene fees. It was a very tiring task, but these people accepted it and took it seriously. They really wanted to help the residents, to resolve their problems. They knew their situations and yet they didn’t have the means they have now. Now, the name has changed, and the residents’ committees have been absorbed into the shequ. It’s really not as good. Before, we had neighbourly relations, because the members of the residents’ committee were also long-term residents, so they knew the situation in the neighbourhood. Here, they are no longer residents because they have a good salary so they obviously live in a block of flats […]. They have good working conditions but we don’t have the same relationship with them. There is a relationship of unequal authority, they are like bosses and we’re lower down, they are part of the administration. They get their salary from the local office, so they’re also part of this administration.” [62]

60Thus, in spite of the bad press residents’ committees had as spies in the socialist system, these former committees, made up of long-term residents, had social links with their neighbours. Today, the inhabitants discredit the committee officials since they have become paid employees.

61There is also the vague role of “managing people” (guan ren). The poor recognition by residents contributes to an indifference and functions that are difficult to specify.

62

“The residents’ committee does all sorts of things.” [63]
“The residents’ committee looks after peoples’ lives, peoples’ problems.” [64]
“The residents committee looks after ordinary issues […]. It must be useful to the residents. For any issue, we ask them […] If they can’t help, they refer us higher up.” [65]

63Strongly stigmatised as bureaucratic, under-recognised and despised for not being efficient, officials concentrate their contact efforts on a specific part of the population – the “weak and vulnerable” – in order to legitimise their participative role. The search for contact contributes to a role that is marginal and vague, but thanks to which the committee officials are not solely perceived as administrators. Moreover, generally speaking, the residents rarely question the existence of this body; they consider it “useful, if problems arise”.

How to encourage residents “to participate”?

64The resident committee officials are supervised by the civil servants of the Chinese administration, but must also maintain connections with the residents, according to the committee status as a grassroots organisation.

65The residents’ committee is not a body that the population truly demands. Indifference appears to be the general attitude of residents towards it. This is linked to a difference of rhythm for residents with jobs, who are rarely brought into contact with the committee officials during the day. Most of the residents attest that they solicit the officials only for administrative formalities (residence certificates, nulliparity certificates). This encourages officials to seek out contact as part of a participatory process (canyu). The dress of the officials reflects this; unlike the administration offices in which civil servants wear suits or uniforms, the residents’ committee employees do not follow any particular dress code.

66Without a “service counter” the daily tasks of the officials take place inside the office (answering the telephone or calling other members about a problem to be resolved, issuing certificates) and outside, in direct contact with residents (frequent door-knocking to enquire after a worrying situation, proposing assistance and service to elderly and handicapped people).

67

“You have to get out. The people aren’t in the office, they’re outside.” [66]

68Outreach requires the de-politicisation of ordinary conversations. Conversations in the streets with residents are about health, the weather, children’s studies, or gossip.

69Officials try to cultivate personal relationships with the residents and rely on the network of “volunteer” residents (zhiyuanzhe) to organise their work, particularly in the old neighbourhoods. The volunteers have surveillance and security tasks or are involved in entertainment. Continuing the tradition of activism, calls for volunteers by the committee officials maintain the illusion of a participatory system. According to my fieldwork, residents rarely propose their services of their own accord: officials call on people who have been identified for these tasks. The volunteers come from “weak and vulnerable groups” (ruoshi qunti), particularly the elderly, who are present in the neighbourhood during the day. They rarely refuse the position because it is in keeping with socio-psychological motivations: attachment to the neighbourhood, and social status conferred by the red armband they wear. Those who receive state benefits are “obliged” to become volunteers in return for this assistance. The participative action that brings together the committee officials and their volunteers can be understood from a Goffmanesque perspective. On the one hand, the officials “play their part”, relaying the administration to the inhabitants, and on the other some residents participate in the game, sometimes by “acting as if”, [67] whilst others remain indifferent to these attempts at appropriation. This theatre of local participation presents an image of the “harmonious neighbourhood community” (hexie shequ).

70However, the personal relations between the committee officials and the residents of the neighbourhood can also lead to insults and mockeries. For example, the assistant director of one former industrial neighbourhood committee came from Shandong province, so she spoke the Beijing dialect with a marked accent. This was often the subject of pejorative remarks made by the residents behind her back. [68]

71The legitimacy of the residents’ committees in these Beijing neighbourhoods is subject to the scrutiny of the inhabitants. Yet the borders of these zones, these so-called “neighbourhood communities”, essentially make the current committees administrative bodies, for all except the elderly or those in social difficulty who play the participation game.

Inventory, surveillance and prevention: ensuring the transmission of social control

73

“Everything starts because there are so many Chinese […] really too many.” [69]

74In China, the imaginary associated with overpopulation justifies the transmission of social control to organise society. Maintaining order remains one of the principle concerns of local authorities who delegate a significant role in the census and surveillance of the population to the residents’ committees. The latter are thus responsible for social order on the local level.

75In Beijing, the neighbourhood is a site for propaganda. [70] Banners bearing slogans concerning the regime are recurring elements in the urban landscape. The explicit inscription of official norms into public spaces is performed by the committee officials: on banners, blackboards, and public notices on walls and in doorways. The population must be sensitised to urban norms, information and advice in terms of civility, protection of the environment and security.

76

“Today, the police noticed that the entry doors to your courtyard house [71] and your windows had not been closed. In order to ensure the security of persons and goods, we ask you to kindly close and lock your doors and windows.” [72]

Photograph 2

General security advice from the police, transmitted by the residents’ committee, old neighbourhood, 2009

General security advice from the police, transmitted by the residents’ committee, old neighbourhood, 2009

77Not only are the residents’ committees responsible for the spatial circulation of official norms, but the main task of officials is to centralise information between the administration and the inhabitants. The committee officials transmit official information throughout the neighbourhood: new regulations, meetings, census announcements, openings for enrolments in the crèche or for social welfare, job offers, and so forth.

78

“The residents can come and collect a ‘contraception pack’ for free at the residents’ committee office”. [73]

79The officials also transfer information upwards, by passing on local information to the administration. The census, normally carried out by the Office of Statistics, is delegated to the residents’ committee. Every official presentation of a neighbourhood begins with the population statistics.

80

“[The census] is specialised according to sex, age and so forth. We use a computer and the statistics are updated every month. We know the birthdays on each day. We also know who has problems with their health, blood pressure. […] We investigate. […] We call the residents. […] Sometimes they don’t want to answer.” [74]
“This neighbourhood community is in an old neighbourhood in Beijing. […] The zone includes five apartment buildings and 2,600 rooms in one-storey buildings. The population at the latest census is 2,084 households, some 6,266 individuals. Of these, 1,223 households are long-term residents, some 4,093 people. There are 7 minority groups, 318 people […]. The zone is home to 1,082 people over 60 years old, 19.7% of the population. There are 796 people over 65 years old, 206 people over 80 years old. There are 807 long-term residents over 60 years old, including 20 elderly recipients of the urban minimum wage [dibao]. There are 12 elderly persons living alone, 2 without descendants, and 97 people who receive an old age pension. There are also 89 unemployed persons, 58 who are being re-employed, 334 whose retirement is managed locally, 111 who receive the dibao, 3 low-income households, 8 people in total. There are 141 disabled people, of whom 23 receive the dibao, 9 receive municipal assistance to people in difficulty, and 8 receive a disability pension. […] The migrant population is 619 people.” [75]

81The key populations are the elderly, women of child-bearing age, and struggling urban residents – the unemployed, the poor, the disabled and the unwell. The neighbourhood community carries out the administrative census in order to identify the social profile of the neighbourhood and its “at risk” populations.

82In practice, the population census is a difficult task because it requires going door-to-door or calling residents by telephone and asking them for specific information. This is therefore tedious for two reasons. Firstly, residents are rarely in their homes during the daytime, which obliges the officials to remain late in the evenings to reach them. Moreover, urban residents are careful about sharing information.

83

“Many people don’t understand why we’re asking them to fill out all that. […] And then, who will get their hands on it?” [76]

84The census meets with mistrust from the residents, who draw the line between what they are prepared to volunteer to the administration and what concerns their private lives.

85Moreover the residents’ committee officials play the role of moral entrepreneurs, [77] along the lines of their old propaganda role. They provide assistance to the local police who regularly ask them for information on suspicious individuals (drug abuse, disorderly conduct). [78] In return, the police supervise the events organised by the committee.

86

“There are security problems but no really dangerous situations. The residents’ committees and the local police co-operate, they belong to the same authority.” [79]

87An important aspect of maintaining order is birth control and prevention. If the criteria that are imposed are not respected, the employees in the residents’ committees are the first people held responsible. Every woman over fifteen years old living in a particular zone must obtain a “woman of child-bearing age” certificate. Subsequently she must provide information about her family and sex life: marriage, first child, contraception etc. The committees organise campaigns for education and prevention (free distribution of condoms, contraceptive pills, IUDs and pregnancy tests).

88

“We provide administration and services. For example, birth control, it’s administrative because we regularly record women who are pregnant or who have given birth. But it’s also a service because we also provide free gynaecological consultations.” [80]

89Each committee organises activities on public health/hygiene and security risks. In old neighbourhoods, priority was given to the prevention of fires resulting from the use of coal in winter. [81] In 2002-2003 during the SARS epidemic in China, the residents’ committees were given preventative tasks, including cleaning public spaces, overseeing population movements, conducting inspections, and monitoring cases of contamination.

90

“We had to put residents presenting symptoms of the illness into quarantine.” [82]
“We did not let anyone leave without a valid reason. If there was a household with a family member who was affected by the illness, we sent them to the hospital and we shut the rest of that family up in their house, without permission to leave. We brought them food and so forth. We also had to provide information about hygiene to the residents.”

91Through these public health preventative measures, the committee officials suggest ways of “living better” to the residents, which suggests a form of bio-politics. [83] But this role is essentially pragmatic and limited in its extent.

92Standardisation does not only take place through exchanges with the police and the health system. Civilisation policies have been carried out by the residents’ committees as a legacy of their former role in policing moral and social mores. The governmentality of the Chinese state has been directed, over the course of these reforms, towards control of both population size (through birth control), but also its “quality” (suzhi). The committee officials attempt to civilise the residents in order to bring them “up to par”, [84] to make them conform to an ideal-type of urbanity. The Beijing Olympics accelerated and amplified this moralisation. The committee officials organised campaigns to cultivate minds and the norms of civility (wenming). For example, on 18 May 2007, a teacher from a specialised institute of “manners” presented the residents with the rules of politeness, propriety, and self-presentation.

93

“We invited a specialist in makeovers to show the elderly people how to take care of their appearance […]. All our events are intended to raise people’s awareness.” [85]
“The policies of reform and openness brought problems. The first were the people; concerning their human and cultural qualities, their learning of morals, we had to improve the standards. The level of general culture is still very low. There are people who refuse to read books, who think that culture is useless.” [86]
“There are several types of people, their qualities are not the same. For example, there are people who push into queues for the bus. Human qualities are very important in China. We pay attention with the Olympic Games coming up, because there are minority groups that could have a bad influence on the way people see China. So the residents’ committees are taking care of it […] Politeness is important in China, in its long history, its rituals etc. But at the moment there is an education problem […] I mean that long-term residents of Beijing [laobeijing] are polite, but the migrants have different habits.” [87]

94Finally, the work of any residents’ committee must focus on supporting marginal groups. The committee’s selection of requests for help goes hand-in-hand with the fight against fraud. Awarding social assistance is based on collective surveillance by the whole community – a legacy of the socialist period (see Photograph 3). In China, the procedure for a request for state aid involves surveillance and in-depth investigation.

95

“I have received the dibao for two years: 330 yuan per month. It’s not simple to get it. You have to go yourself to see the residents’ committee, or else no one will take care of you […] You have to be from Beijing; if you aren’t then you aren’t eligible for this assistance. […] I’m unemployed and I’m sick, I’m diabetic […] I have to go to the hospital twice a month, and the residents’ committee checks to see that I’m still sick.” [88]
“The people who receive the dibao, it’s because they can’t find work, so because they are sick […]. To get it, you have to go and see the residents’ committee, fill out the forms and provide the documents, for example medical prescriptions. Generally you have to be over 35 years old. The committee sends these documents to the Office of Civil Affairs. After about six months you receive the payments. The committee puts up a notice informing the residents and they are asked for their opinion of the recipient […] I haven’t had any problems but for other people, payments have been suspended because other residents reported them.” [89]

96The committee officials investigate the lives of those who ask for assistance, on the look-out for any material fraud (having a mobile telephone, eating meals with fish or meat, keeping pets) or moral fraud (political opposition). In the neighbourhoods, solidarity and surveillance are interconnected in terms of the attribution of social assistance. [90] The only legitimate recipients are those who can justify their inability to work.

97

“If you’re 20 years old, it’ll never happen. It’s a question of being able to work. If someone is 30 they’re able to work, so you have to actively look for a job. We can’t give the dibao to everyone […] We can’t give the state’s money to young people who have never tried to work, it takes time to prove that you can’t work.” [91]

98Moreover, social assistance is organised territorially, and unequally distributed at the local level. This leads to “competition” between people asking for assistance in former industrial areas, and very concrete criteria by which to judge their legitimacy. [92] “Mass surveillance” is thus considered necessary.

99

“[The dibao] reinforces people in their laziness. If the state gives you money, you’re never going to look for a job.” [93]

Photograph 3

Public request for the urban minimum wage (dibao) for a 43-year-old woman and her 11 year-old daughter, old neighbourhood, March 2009

Public request for the urban minimum wage (dibao) for a 43-year-old woman and her 11 year-old daughter, old neighbourhood, March 2009

“Concerning the family who have submitted an application for dibao, this neighbourhood community has implemented the protocol for the public notice of the request for 7 days. You are all invited to exercise your surveillance. Reasons given for the application: widow, unemployed, heavy burden, difficult life history.”

100

“Neighbourhood surveillance is normal. We can award assistance only to the most serious situations. If we give it to one person, another person doesn’t get it, so we have to be very careful about who must receive it.” [94]

101The selection of the “poor” for the attribution of dibao payments demonstrates a form of power over the most vulnerable. In China social assistance has been updated by individualising social welfare combined with a strategy of making recipients accountable.

Supporting the weak and the vulnerable: activities, mediation, and social work

102

“It’s meticulous, gentle but also harmonious work.” [95]

103This quotation suggests that solicitude has become a norm of administrative work: officials perform “benevolent” [96] surveillance and demonstrate a requirement for tact in local government.

104The objective of events that are both festive and educational is to encourage “friendly and fraternal” relations between inhabitants. The residents’ committee coordinates social entertainment events in the neighbourhood in the context of developing personal services, with a focus on the problem of the aging population. It’s about “channelling” the dynamism of individuals into “healthy” collective recreational practices by cultivating Chinese political and cultural folklore. The employees of the residents’ committees monitor the evolution of social groups in their neighbourhoods and attempt to link any new leisure activity to the policy of their shequ. The committee officials plan the installation of tables and benches in public spaces so that residents can play mah-jong, chess, or cards. Indoor spaces are made available for them to practise “suitable” activities for free. The residents are encouraged to participate in activities which combine culture and sport with education and awareness-raising about government policies. Despite this support for government policies and a general patriotic tone, the festive aspects of the events are real. The free activities (choirs, ping-pong, dance) are open to all and for the older residents hark back to the memory of communist culture. Whether they are members of the Communist Party or not, those over 60 years old appreciate these activities and see them as collective. This generation has remained attached to group sociability and solidarity, considering it healthier than individualism, which they associate with egoism and “bourgeois mentality”. To this can be added a concern for their bodies and general health. Transformed into providers of social activities, the committee officials try to encourage sociability and the integration of single or dependent people. There are regular public shows or collective outings and they aim to “entertain the residents and bring them closer to each other”. [97] The funding of bus outings involves partnerships with businesses – shop factories – which ensures low prices. The outings are rarely organised on the weekend because employees do not work on these days and this time is reserved for family visits. Participants rarely say they are satisfied; the outings rarely have any novelty. But they continue to enrol for them, despite their complaints. This role as a provider of social activities is an element that contributes to the legitimacy of the residents’ committees.

105

“We organise activities and cultural events with a view to bringing residents together. So they start to get to know us and will be more cooperative in our more formal administrative tasks.” [98]

106They manage to reach certain groups in particular; the generations that lived under Mao or who were socialised by the danwei system find common references in this and appreciate time spent with their neighbours. However, the style of these events remains quite different from the leisure activities of other generations, who are more demanding and more autonomous in their practices.

107Beyond being an attempt to bring the residents’ committee and the residents together, the organisation of these events demonstrates a desire to display the solicitude of the Chinese state.

108

“Human rights in China are widely criticised. But in fact, human rights are important to us and we respect them […] fundamentally.” [99]

109This discourse illustrates the compassionate role of the residents’ committees which support vulnerable individuals, in order to “keep them alive”.

110

“Just over 100 people receive the dibao. Often the recipients are junkies, that sort of people […] we have to stop them dying. If the state doesn’t help them, they will die.” [100]
“It is enough that there are people, that there is life and we are responsible. […] We seek to protect the quality and to preserve the life of the people in our neighbourhood.” [101]

111The residents’ committee takes care of the disabled people in the neighbourhood.

112

“You see these objects. They are handmade by our disabled residents […] There are more than 100 disabled people in this shequ […]. People who are not able to survive by themselves, the state looks after them. We have moved from administration to human services.” [102]

113Social assistance to the most disadvantaged reflects the objective of establishing a social equilibrium and, at the same time, sorting and categorising the (urban) vulnerable population, and excluding others (migrants). The employees speak maternally about “taking care” of the disadvantaged; solicitude has become one of the policies for the re-founding of the welfare state in China.

114This compassionate tendency is incarnated in the “folklore” [103] surrounding campaigns for donations.

115

“We’re busy with with the preparations for the anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. On 1 July, the director of the residents’ committee will visit the elderly Party members and those in difficult situations [pinkun]. He will give them gifts, talk about their situations, and offer them help and services.” [104]
“The residents’ committee gave me a wheelchair and portable toilet […] because I am disabled.” [105]

116The collection of donations and solidarity sometimes extends to the national level. The residents’ committees were strongly mobilised after the earthquake in Sichuan on 12 May 2008. [106] The names of donors, dates and amounts given are published on placards placed outside the office in an attempt to project an image of transparency.

117

“The shequ is not like a business, it’s a grassroots organisation, it cannot receive any money. […] This is an impartial, charitable, egalitarian and transparent action. […] Everyone can give. It is because of this that records must be kept. Everything is published […] We do not want to risk the residents having doubts about our honesty.” [107]

118The treatment of social issues is also more easily dealt with in terms of “relationship-based” support. The slogan “Providing services to residents” relates to the social work sector, which is being constructed through this body and in connection with NGOs and local associations. The importance of “listening” to social suffering, [108] as well as support and mediation demonstrates the redeployment of the state in the social work sector.

119

“I’m preparing the exam for social work qualifications. […] They ask us how to manage such and such a problem. We have to know how to help people who have problems.” [109]

120Listening, mediation, and personal services have become essential. The committee officials are trained in law, sociology, or psychology. As the social work sector is being constructed, femininity represents both a quality and a constraint in professional terms. Residents and employees consider that this job “suits women” because it is associated with low levels of efficacy and with interpersonal relations, availability, appeasement, compassion, patience, calm, and listening.

121

“This job is more suited to women. Women are gentler than men; it’s adapted to our personality.” [110]
“Women are more suited to social work and tasks involving contact.” [111]
“To do this job, you have to have compassion, you have to be devoted […] you have to do everything to please people, otherwise it’s not worth it.” [112]
“I can’t abandon my residents. I’m too generous, I’m always there to help them, I can’t refuse.” [113]
“If you have a strong temperament, then it will be difficult to adapt to this job.” [114]

122Moreover, the location of the committees in the neighbourhood, as the extension of domestic space, confirms the connection between feminine and professional abilities.

123Finally, residents’ committees are responsible for conflict mediation. This mission is justified by their role as a third party in problems involving families or neighbours. Although they are ineffective in political conflicts linked to real estate economy, [115] the officials sometimes find solutions to small-scale problems. In many cases where the official cannot help residents, forms of sympathy emerge, much as is the case for welfare office workers when faced with unemployed people seeking payments. [116]

The tricks of being flexible: prioritising tasks when faced with a varied workload

124Know-how is a product of the precarious and flexible status and context within the residents’ committee. The execution of directives and circulars coming “from above” is reconstructed “below” in the face-to-face contact with the population, thus demonstrating officials’ specific training. In carrying out these missions, the officials of the residents’ committee expose them to the field.

125

“The work is not just administrative, it’s also providing services to people.” [117]

126The employees, trained in “number-based” [118] management techniques, therefore adapt themselves to specific cases and demands. My study showed that they develop this expertise in the treatment of demands.

127First, given the absence of official administrative culture, public action is largely based on the personal qualifications and talents of officials, which increases the diversity of situations, depending on the neighbourhood, the social profile of the residents, and the committee personnel. Since the committee does not constitute a specific “profession” with its own profile or recruitment path, its employees come from various backgrounds. However, shared internal norms develop because there is generally a positive atmosphere within the teams, who view the work from a perspective of solidarity and share an ambiguous status.

128The expertise of residents’ committee officials characterises their ability to prioritise their different public action tasks. Their dual nature, administrative and popular, enables officials to organise demands according to a hierarchy.

129

“After the end of work, at 5pm, it’s over until the next day. Those who need help, they can wait until the next day.” [119]

130The employees also give themselves certain leeway to make their work less laborious.

131

“If the heads of the households are not there to sign during our door-knocking, we get someone to sign anyway, imitating their names.” [120]

132The employees of the residents’ committees also accept the fact that they don’t manage to respond to all the inhabitants’ problems, invoking not incompetence but lack of means.

133

“We’re not always satisfied, there are many things that we would like to do but we can’t. […] But we don’t have the power.”

134In effect they prioritise on a daily basis: recording the recipients of social welfare, choosing which problem to transfer to their superiors, reporting a particular suggestion made by the residents, counting the census population. The officials define their own ways of going about matters whilst remaining within the framework defined by the administration, and awarding priority to the evaluations of their superiors. The office is above all a place of “paperwork” [121] and numbers management, which take precedence over other tasks. [122] Before submitting their annual report, officials ensure that the data is coherent from one year to the next, which does not rule out falsification.

135Their daily routine is punctuated by urgent micro-decisions, depending on the public they are dealing with. The prioritisation of tasks also means they have to reflect on “power intermittences”. [123] Political and social control alternately tightens and loosens its grip on administrative work. The officials’ stress increases at the time of writing annual activity reports. Intensification of local control arises during time-frames that are politically sensitive at the central level (CCP Congress, Olympic Games). The work of the officials is then concentrated on maintaining order and security.

136

“This week, we will be busy organising the 17^th Party Congress. We have to organise volunteer groups for security. […] We don’t need them every day, only for the major events. But then they have to go out every day.” [124]

137During these moments the specificity of Beijing as a “political place”, as the site of the central state, emerges. The employees are more anxious, less available and focus their energy on mobilising the residents for the security of public spaces.

138

“During the Olympic Games, we modified our work. We had to involve the residents. We had to make sure that no one was a problem for the government so we provided education on different aspects: the environment, for example, recycling, and security. We spread information, held thematic events to mobilise them.” [125]

139In the neighbourhoods of Beijing, everyone considered that “in the lead-up to the Games, security is a serious issue”. [126] Moreover, volunteers for security were clearly in demand. [127] After each heightened mobilisation, security controls were relaxed again. [128]

140Flexibility and adaptation to the local context thus constitute a set of working norms. There are important differences in working conditions between neighbourhood communities because of unequal local resources. Whilst some committees have spacious premises, others have offices in basements, particularly in recent residences. However, the long-term embeddedness of a team of officials contributes to its recognition in older neighbourhoods, where this organisation has existed since the 1950s.

141Prioritising has led employees to master a double language: that of the administration and the official framework, but also the local language, by developing tact in dealing with the resident public. Sometimes they end up providing services unequally in their neighbourhoods. The problem of favouritism was raised by several residents.

142

“If you don’t pay them compliments, you can’t get help. You can make criticisms about administrative problems but they prefer that you don’t, there’s a kind of blackmail in fact.” [129]
“There is help for the unemployed but it depends on personal relationships. […] That’s still a necessary condition for reintegrating oneself.” [130]

143The committee officials rely on informal networks to increase the efficacy of their work in collecting information, even if this sometimes involves interests that are considered unjust by others. They offer certain residents small gifts to thank them for their help. [131] The residents’ committees are sometimes even accused of fraud. In one case, for example, they were suspected of having rented part of their public premises at a profit. However the extent of these clientelist practices remains limited.

144The territorialisation of the para-public action of neighbourhood communities has led to a geographical and temporal differentiation. The ambiguity of statuses and missions has allowed officials to adapt to the context and maintain a certain flexibility.

145

“The residents’ committee is like a basket, you can put anything in it.”

146This body is becoming professionalised as part of an “ongoing” reform. Officials have developed specific work norms and adapted to this changing status. The neighbourhood reform has thus “invented a professional group” [132] without a profession.

147* * *

148Symbols of an ideological past, Beijing residents’ committees are becoming professionalised without actually joining the category of civil servants in the Chinese administration. This article takes the opposite perspective to unilateral analyses of Chinese authoritarianism, of its omnipresence or of resistances, and instead studies the ambiguities of government through the neighbourhood community, and the shifting lines of power within the neighbourhoods.

149The ethnographic study of the work of these officials demonstrates that participative bureaucratisation reinforces their precarious status, as workers who are subject to the dual control of both the administration and the residents. Whilst maintaining their historic status, the municipality has introduced administrative norms in order to use them as auxiliaries in the field. For the committee officials this participative bureaucratisation has led to an unstable position and a lack of recognition that contributes to their social disqualification and their difficulty in gaining legitimacy in the neighbourhoods. Both as the relay of the administration and as an organisation of mediation, the energy they deploy on a daily basis is not sufficient to create a relationship of trust with the inhabitants.

150In spite of their ambiguous status, the employees occupy a strategic position within government because the implementation of public action and the initiatives of direct contact with the residents are both the fruit of their labours. Although it is not seen as being in a state of a crisis, this body is continually “being reformed”. The Beijing municipality has announced the development of direct elections, along the lines of what is already occurring in the countryside. It has also extended “neighbourhood community building” (shequ jianshe) into the urbanised rural zones on a large scale. In so doing it is maintaining the ambiguity of this structure of government. [133]