CAIRN-INT.INFO : International Edition

1How can we grasp an object as vague as the emergence of an object of research? We are not looking here at a discipline, with boundaries more or less monitored by institutional gatekeepers; nor a profession, with claims of jurisdiction more or less in line with social power struggles; nor, even, an actual field, with an autonomy protected, to a greater or lesser extent, by objectivized principles of hierarchization. What the emergence of “European studies” brings to light, instead, are the strategies that institutional and individual actors have to deploy in order to bring this “object” into existence.

2Everything leads us to think of the emergence of “European studies” as a dependent variable of “European construction”: academic production followed mechanically from a political enterprise. [1] Is this not the case for every object of the social sciences? The mechanical effects of institutionalization processes must not however overshadow the dynamic of co-production that binds political and scholarly constructions together. This double construction is the result of strategies that unfold simultaneously in a number of relatively autonomous social worlds. [2] Ideally, it would be necessary to reconstruct the respective logics of scientific fields in America and Europe—France, Germany, Britain, Switzerland, and so on—and, within these, the division of labor between political, legal, and economic disciplines, as well as the poaching strategies that constantly throw these disciplines into question. We would then be able to measure the effects of individual or collective enterprises that seek to impose an “object” (or even a “space”), conceived as interdisciplinary, within these scientific fields, which are structured by a division of labor that is both specific and lasting; and therefore, in some sense, to subvert this institutional, particularly this disciplinary, order.

3Such a panorama is beyond the practical reach of this article. Nonetheless, by reconstructing the logic underlying the institutional generation of “European studies” from the point of view of its central actors, the Ford Foundation and the European Community Institute for University Studies (ECIUS), we will be able to provide an overview of the different social worlds in which “European studies” were somehow implanted. We will see that this heterogeneous set traces out a more or less dense “network”, but also the difficulties involved with penetrating national academic worlds, to convert or subvert them. Above all, we will see the repeated failure of attempts to create a European university, a failure that results from the national structure of academic fields, accreditation and equivalence of diplomas, and every aspect of awarding specific degrees and titles outside of state authority. Put simply, transnational enterprises do not automatically make up a “field”, even a “weak” one. [3]

4This article is part of a longstanding research project on the genesis and structure of the “European field of power”. [4] It aims to show from this perspective that the field’s “academic” foundations are a major concern within the strategies of the elites involved in this dynamic; by contrast, the question occupies a wholly marginal place in research on this dynamic. Political sociology has long emphasized the role of schools of power in the formation of elites. In The State Nobility, Pierre Bourdieu highlighted the structural relations between the (national) field of power and (national) schools of power, although Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have subsequently shown that globalization has profoundly transformed the dual relationship between fields of power and schools of power, both national and global. [5] But empirical scholarship on this transformation remains relatively rare. More so, the scholarship on structural relations between the formation of a European field of power and transformations of the national fields of schools of power are in reverse proportion to the issue. [6] From this point of view, the article aims to describe empirically the chains of interdependence binding together “the” global—the transatlantic and transcontinental networks the Ford Foundation’s multiform strategies fit into—and the “local”—the wholly Parisian rivalry between the Law Faculty and the Institut d’Études Politiques (Institute of Political Studies, IEP), where the development strategies of European studies took shape; and to show how the ECIUS developed as a game coordination center at their “European” intersection.

5At the same time, this article aims to show that European studies are in fact only a residual part of far more audacious strategies that aimed to subvert the indigenous hierarchies of national academic fields. Such strategies were designed to lay the foundations for a European field of power based on new elites, trained in new institutions and possessing new knowledge, so to occupy new positions of power. We can thereby understand the forms of “resistance” that emerged in national fields. In some cases, these “European” strategies encountered local ones that absorbed their resources for other ends: for instance, the fact that the grants of the Ford Foundation did not so much serve the goals of its executives, but rather became a new means of pursuing the rivalry between the Law Faculty and the IEP. In other cases, contrary national strategies have cancelled, limited, or delayed their effects: for instance, the fact that the long-desired creation of a European university has ultimately taken the form of a more modest European university institute. Therefore, it would be excessive to speak of a “field” of European studies, or even of a European academic field, without considering the force of national fields in the structuration of “global” and “continental” spaces.

6More directly related to the theme of this special issue, this article aims to show that as a social space (see the introduction to the special issue), a “discipline” like political science cannot be understood in isolation from a multiplicity of other, apparently foreign social spaces—that is, not just other “disciplines” like legal or economic sciences, but also the “outside” world. In the case of European studies, that means a hazy constellation including the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE) and the Trilateral Commission. Seeking their own origins, many political scientists have pointed out the lesser role played by political science in the development of European studies in France. This contrasts with the United States, where political science developed new theoretical models early on in order to grasp what was conceived of at the time as a “European integration”. [7] It would be impossible to enter into the nuances of such self-reflection here. However, this article should help us see that, while in the United States institutional development occurred in a second phase, with the creation of the Council for European Studies, in Europe and particularly in France the institutional enterprise in some ways preceded intellectual development, as part of a secondary, instrumental strategy that aimed to make the academic world the tool for a political strategy.

Promoting “European Studies“: A Political Enterprise in the Academic World

7The institutional emergence of European studies is deeply wrapped up in the Cold War strategies that bound the small “Atlantic” world together. In this first section, we will thus penetrate this milieu with an embedded camera, so to speak, by tracing out the creation of the ECIUS from the Ford Foundation’s point of view. Where “political science” often sacrifices the detail of archives, with grand theory appearing sometimes to parade outside the empirical world, by contrast, socio-history uses such detail to bring out not just a history but also social worlds caught up in their day-to-day interactions.

8Strictly speaking, the Rockefeller Foundation had no specific program for developing “European studies”. In 1954, it had given 123,000 dollars for six years to St. Antony’s College, at Oxford, to develop its “program in European Studies”. [8] In the 1950s and 1960s, the Rockefeller Foundation also received specific requests for funding for research and seminars. But these grants and scholarships did not constitute a genuine “program”—nothing, for instance, on the order of the Rockefeller Foundation’s ambitions to promote International Relations theory. [9]

9Things were quite different for the Ford Foundation. Created in 1936, it began to develop its vast program for “advancing human welfare” only in the 1950s, following the lines laid down in 1949 by the Rand Corporation’s founding president, H. Rowan Gaither. [10] The Ford Foundation was more strongly rooted than the Rockefeller Foundation in the issues of the Cold War, the “cultural” part of which often involved creating areas free from any Communist or Marxist influence, sometimes from scratch, and then maintaining them even when, as was often the case, they seemed above-ground. It was also deeply embedded in the institutional and personal network that lay at the foundation of American foreign policy, [11] epitomized by its third president, Paul Hoffman (1950-53), the former director of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), in charge of the Marshall Plan. [12] It was up to Hoffman, and then to John McCloy—while he was still High Commissioner in Germany—to draw up guidelines (“the conditions of peace”) for what quickly became the Ford Foundation’s “International Affairs” (IA) program. At the end of 1952, McCloy was appointed as chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank and a trustee of the Ford Foundation; the department of European and international affairs was entrusted to his right-hand man, Shepard Stone. [13]

Shepard Stone

Born Shepard Cohen in 1908, Stone came from a Lithuanian Jewish family that had settled in Nashua, New Hampshire, where his father, a small businessman, ended up running the local department store. [14] Having studied American history at Dartmouth, Stone began his career as a journalist in Berlin in 1929, where, in 1932, he defended a doctoral thesis in history supervised by Hermann Oncken (“Deutschland, Danzig und Polen, 1918-1932“). On his return he was hired by the New York Times to cover German and Polish issues. Assigned to military intelligence and psychological warfare, he was sent to England in 1943 and then Germany in 1945. He left the army as a lieutenant-colonel, returning to the New York Times. In 1949 he became the director of cultural and educational relations at the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) for the High Commissioner in Germany, McCloy, and took over the OPA in 1950. In these positions, he financed both the press and projects like the Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit which took place in Berlin in June 1950. This became an established organization in 1951, the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

10As early as 1952, McCloy and Stone felt the Ford Foundation “might usefully sponsor the creation of one institute or a number of institutes for research in the problems of the European Community”. [15] The Foundation accordingly supported a number of initiatives lying at the border between the politics of European construction and the research on European construction. [16] For example, the Foundation provided a grant of 50,000 dollars to the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE) for a series of comparative studies on federalism, led by Robert Bowie and Carl Friedrich, which were meant to contribute to the drafting of a European Constitution. [17] Since the mid-1950s, part of this activity started to focus more closely on “European studies”. This came through Jean Monnet, who resigned from the presidency of the High Authority (HA) in June 1955 and went on to create the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE) in October. As early as July, Monnet addressed Stone (“Shep”) about his plan to create a “study group” of four or five professors from different European universities, chaired by a “top committee including policy making personalities”, with an operating budget of 75,000 dollars over three years. [18] In June 1956, this initial project grew in scope. [19] It now aimed to create a “center for European studies”. Max Kohnstamm, Vice-President of ACUSE, drafted a proposal that Monnet sent to Stone. [20] As a result, three entities were established between 1957 and 1958: the European Research Centre (ERC), the ACUSE Documentation Center (DC), and the ECIUS. The more general ambition, however, was to create a European university.

Between European Community and Atlantic Partnership

11From a chronological point of view, the ERC was the first of the three entities to be created, in 1957. In March, Monnet told Stone he wanted the Ford Foundation to support an initiative by the University of Lausanne, which had just created a “chair of European integration”. He proposed they do so by funding Henri Rieben, who was appointed to the chair in April, and with whom Monnet planned to create a “European research center”. [21] In July, the rector of the University of Lausanne, Edmond Grin, made an official request. [22] By 30 August, the Foundation had awarded the ERC a 25,000 dollar grant as part of its IA program, for a period of “approximately” two years, to carry out “research relating to practical problems of European integration”, and to “facilitate the research activities” of Rieben, who wanted to answer “those concrete efforts of these pioneers of a united Europe”. [23] The expectations behind this decision were simple:


There will be a wide need in Europe over the coming decade (a) for research into economic, social, constitutional and political aspects of integration, and (b) for men trained to staff the new organizations. In particular, Jean Monnet, who has played a prominent role in European unification, is working out plans for the establishment of new institutes in various European countries to carry out necessary research and training. [24]

13The ERC was founded a year later, in July 1958. In his speech, Rieben celebrated the fact that the Association des Instituts d’Études Européennes (Association of Institutes for European Studies, AIEE), created in 1951 and headed by Dusan Sidjanski, and the Association des Universitaires d’Europe (Association of European Academics, AUE), created in 1955, could now use Lausanne as an example when they called for the “immediate creation of chairs of European integration”. [25] But while the Ford Foundation’s goal was to “assist and encourage European integration by supporting a research institution” that seemed “promising”, the initial results were concerning. [26] The ERC’s first activity report in October 1958 emphasized other objectives and achievements. Its main aim was to “create a team of researchers capable of scientifically studying the concrete problems posed by European integration (a) to Switzerland and its cantons, (b) to the Swiss economy as a whole, (c) to the main sectors of this economy, and (d) to the different categories of the Swiss population”. [27] The list of published or forthcoming publications attached to this was largely devoted to Switzerland. (One study, for instance, was titled “Swiss Watchmaking in a Time of European Integration”.) Rieben tried unsuccessfully to renew the funding at the end of this first period of financial support. [28] The whole experiment could have been short-lived.

14In fact, the ERC was kind of a local branch of a much larger project that formed in 1957. In March, ACUSE set up its Documentation Center (DC). This was physically located at ACUSE’s headquarters in Paris, on Avenue Foch, but as a separate entity, a non-profit association located in Lausanne, in the canton of Vaud, under Swiss law. [29] In July, Monnet explained to Stone that he was pursuing the project of a real university alongside Kohnstamm and Jacques Van Helmont, ACUSE’s secretary general, on secondment from the HA. But this faced difficulties in the short term (“it is going to take more time before we have a complete plan worked out in such a form that it can be submitted to your friends”). In the meantime, he wanted the Ford Foundation to finance the DC, specifying in a postscript that, “of course”, ACUSE was “exclusively” funded by its members—political parties and trade unions—and that his request “only” concerned the DC. [30] From the Ford Foundation’s point of view, financing the DC would be a first step toward creating a network of “European training and research centers”. [31] Stone encountered a favorable response to the proposal in Europe, particularly from Robert Triffin, whom he met in Paris. Triffin was on sabbatical from Yale, working with the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). He was “mainly interested” in the creation of a “European financial community” (“central bank, one currency”), but nonetheless “enthusiastic about the idea of developing various research centers and training institutions”. A meeting was planned at the end of the month between Monnet, Stone, Triffin, and Robert Marjolin, the OEEC’s former secretary general. The Ford Foundation supported the project from the outset. [32] But it also insisted Monnet bring in private companies and universities. [33] In any case, certain academics—those already in contact with the Foundation—should be briefed in greater detail about the project. [34]

15The evaluation report for the Executive Committee meeting of 12 December clearly set this project in a more general context. The report began by recalling that the Rome Treaties would be taking effect two weeks later, and that this would necessarily lead to a new “European integration” initiative; why not a “European Financial Community”? It described these developments as “a challenge to the European universities and institutes, which will be called on to develop basic research into European problems, train young people for European-wide management posts, and stimulate a European rather than a narrowly national approach to common political, economic, social, and cultural problems”. [35] This was all the more important because the Ford Foundation explicitly supported the political project:


A strong European Community, closely associated with the United States, is of great importance to American national interest, and support for educational and research activities related to the European Community is a principal element of the Foundation’s European program. [36]

17The DC had already received 35,000 dollars from European industrialists and established cooperative relations with a number of research centers, including the Center for International Affairs run by Robert Bowie at Harvard. It used the Ford grant to disseminate “up-to-date information on European integration problems” and “detailed technical research for precise action proposals” to ACUSE members, bringing in “the services of European and American professors and other experts to conduct research of immediate significance to the European Community”—in sum, professors like Triffin. Above all, this grant would be the foundation stone of a more general enterprise:


The present grant is one of a series of major actions which the staff will propose in respect to the European Community. Mr. Monnet, Professor Marjolin, Mr. Kohnstamm, and Professor Walter Hallstein, former rector of Frankfurt University and for many years State Secretary of Foreign Affairs at Bonn, are now developing plans, which will be presented to the Foundation in 1958, for a Central Institute for University Studies of European Integration. A grant of $25,000 made earlier this year to the University of Lausanne for European economic studies is serving as the pilot project for the plans for the Central Institute. The concept is to help the universities of Europe take a broader view of their programs and studies. [37]

19The next day, Stone announced to Monnet that the Ford Foundation’s Board of Trustees had approved a 150,000-dollar grant. From that date on, the Foundation financed the DC in 150,000-dollar installments, which went to a Chase Manhattan account. Initially, this was for “approximately” every three years (1958-60 and 1960-62), and then every two years (1963-64 and 1965-66). [38] This increasing rate of funding was spurred by a major development. On 22 December 1962, the Foundation’s board approved an endowment of 3,000,000 dollars for the fiscal year 1963 to strengthen the Atlantic partnership, which Kennedy had made an essential dimension of his presidency. [39] Financing for the DC now came from this budget. From 1963 onward, the DC’s mission was thus to carry out “policy research” on “European unification and the Atlantic partnership”. [40] Its evaluation report emphasized that “in future the Center’s research will to an increasing extent emphasize economic, legal, political, and educational aspects of the Atlantic Partnership”. [41]

20In 1959, in its first activity report, the DC emphasized its “particularly close” collaboration with the ERC and the institutions of the European Communities, as well as its desire to build up “a coherent network of research organisations, in Europe and elsewhere, concerned with the problems of European unity and its impact on world affairs”. [42] As early as 1961, François Duchêne, a former member of the HA who had been running the DC since May 1958, could congratulate himself on having brought together a group of “first-rate experts”, including representatives of Community institutions, governments, and civil services, lawyers and bankers, but also “outstanding professors”, and that this network was gradually expanding. [43]


The staff of the Documentation Center has also made a point of keeping in close contact with organizations and research institutes whose expertise may be relevant to European integration proposals. Collaboration has been particularly close in the Common Market area with the Netherlands Economic Institute of Rotterdam (Professor Tinbergen) and the Institute of the European Community for University Studies of Brussels; in Britain, with PEP and the Economist Intelligence Unit, London; in Switzerland, with the Centre de Recherches Européennes of Lausanne; in America, with the Harvard Center for International Affairs and the Twentieth Century Fund; as well as with the FAO, GATT, the OEEC, and of course, the European Community’s institutions. [44]

22In autumn 1967, Monnet thanked the Ford Foundation for its financial support, but informed its secretary, Joseph McDaniel, that the DC’s activities had ceased in December 1966 with the end of the final grant. Henceforth, “the researches and studies conducted by the institutions of the Common Market in Brussels provide all the information wanted”. [45] The third part of the project initiated in 1957, alongside the ERC and ACUSE’s DC, now took precedence. This was the ECIUS.

The European Community Institute for University Studies in the Genesis of European Studies

23The initial inspiration for the ECIUS is lost in the flurry of exchanges within the small Atlantic world: it is difficult even to say whether it was Monnet, Kohnstamm, or Stone himself who first had the idea. At the end of 1957 Kohnstamm sent Stone two notes (“as asked by you”). [46] At the beginning of 1958, Monnet in turn sent two successive memoranda. All of these had the same goal: to mobilize the academic world more actively, not only because of the “constant stimulus which European universities can provide” in discussions about the “manifold problems of European unification”, but also “to explain to their students the working of the Communities”. [47] Several goals were described:


There would appear to be four main ways in which European universities can be helped to contribute to the development of European federation: firstly, by increasing the at present very limited number of chairs dealing specifically with problems of European integration; secondly, by reinforcing existing university centers; thirdly, by establishing additional centers; fourthly, by instituting a clearing-house for relevant information and material likely to be of value to universities and lecturers. [48]

25This grant application, for 500,000 dollars over five years, was spread, for the first year, between operating expenses (30,000 dollars), grants to universities to create either “special chairs for European integration” or “centers of European studies” (each 25,000 dollars), and the costs of the “preparation of European University” (20,000 dollars). [49] It was the most ambitious of the three applications submitted by Monnet and his collaborators, and the Ford Foundation saw the project as consistent with the policy it had been developing over recent years.


On January 1, 1958 EURATOM and the European Common Market began to function. Together with the Coal and Steel Community these institutions are opening what may become a new era of European history. The development of the European Community has been strongly supported by the United States as essential to the security and interests of this country. One of the major objectives of the Foundation’s International Affairs Program has been to support activities to strengthen the European Atlantic alliance. Toward this objective the Foundation, during recent years, has made grants for research, planning, scientific, and other activities directed toward European integration and the Atlantic alliance. Funds have been made available to: CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research at Geneva); the Center of Documentation of Action Committee of Europe (Monnet Committee); for support of European scientific institutes; American Committee for United Europe—to analyze the problem of European federalism; American Council on NATO; University of Lausanne—for economic studies in European integration; PEP—study of Britain and the Common Market [...]; and the Study Center for International Relations in France. These grants help to make available American experience, participation, and connections which are vital both to Europe and to the United States. [50]

27The Ford Foundation emphasized that European universities had begun financing this project by creating “special chairs for European integration problems” in Lausanne and Rotterdam, and through projects to establish institutes in Leiden, Heidelberg, Strasbourg, Nancy, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Saarbrücken, Rome, Brussels, and elsewhere. With the ECIUS, the Foundation saw a chance to support these undertakings—to “strengthen institutes in the six countries of the Community and in other European countries, including the United Kingdom”—aiming “to concentrate on the long-range political, economic, social, and constitutional problems and relationships of the European Community, the proposed Free Trade area, and the United States; and to train the men and women who will assume leading posts in the various European Community institutions”. [51]

28In pursuit of this, the Foundation would undertake a jumble of projects: creating a documentation center for universities (“a central library”); reinforcing “existing centers of European studies, for example by supporting chairs in European-Atlantic problems”; financing the creation of similar centers; commissioning research that would help Community institutions with their “immediate and long-range needs”; contributing to the future establishment of a European University; and, last of all, creating “channels through which the experience of European and American statesmen, political and business leaders will be made available to the European universities and thereby bring Europe’s universities closer to the Community”. [52] The Foundation was quite clear:


The European Community Institute will fill an important need. European universities have lagged behind events and have tended to remain provincial in character. It is essential that the national universities of Europe broaden their horizons and their outlook become European-Atlantic so that the future leaders of Europe will be trained to meet the needs of the larger Community. The European Community Institute will be in a central position to aid European universities to overcome parochial interests. The development of a European and Atlantic outlook at the old universities of Europe and the founding of a new university are revolutionary steps in European higher education. [53]

30But doubts arose from within the Foundation. Its executives were skeptical. Thomas Carroll, one of its six vice-presidents, raised questions about the actual relationship between the ECIUS and the national institutes, as well as the feasibility of the Ford Foundation paying American professors through the ECIUS. [54] McDaniel expressed his concerns directly to President Heald: “Is this Institute a going concern or is it something which we will be starting more or less from scratch?” He concluded: “This proposal presents to me a highly confused picture”. [55]

31In spite of this, the ECIUS received its first grant of 500,000 dollars for five years on 31 March 1958. [56] The ECIUS was thus officially created on 26 April 1958, with the same status of an association as the ERC: its legal seat was in the canton of Vaud; it was led by a president, Monnet, a secretary general, Kohnstamm, and an administrative secretary, Rieben; and of course an account was opened at Chase Manhattan. [57] A second grant of 300,000 dollars was awarded for three years on 26 December 1963; a third for 250,000 dollars for two years on 7 February 1968; and a fourth for 50,000 dollars for two years in 1971. In total, the ECIUS received 1,100,000 dollars between 1958 and 1973. [58] This is equivalent to the amount received over a similar period by the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris.

32The ECIUS’s activities began in January 1959. It was located on Avenue Foch, like ACUSE’s DC. Its board of directors was chaired by Monnet and made up of representatives of the three “executives”: Louis Armand, president of the Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC); Paul Finet, president of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); Walter Hallstein, president of the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC); and Étienne Hirsch, commissioner-general of the French Plan and, in 1959, Armand’s successor at the EAEC. [59] The Board of Directors soon came to include Pietro Campilli, president of the European Investment Bank (EIB); Andreas Donner, president of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC); Paride Formentini, who succeeded Campilli at the EIB in 1959; and Piero Malvestiti, Finet’s successor at the HA. The ECIUS then moved to the premises of the European Commission in Brussels, on the Rue Belliard. In 1969, it moved to the Berlaymont. [60] Most importantly, Kohnstamm, who was initially its executive director, became president.

Max Kohnstamm

Born in Amsterdam in 1914, Max Kohnstamm came from an affluent, cosmopolitan background. His mother’s side was Dutch Protestant, descended from the Kessler family, which ran Royal Dutch Shell. His father’s side was German Jewish, descended from the Wertheim family, which had founded the bank Wertheim & Gompertz. [61] As a history student in Amsterdam, Kohnstamm became closely involved with the student movement of the 1930s. He was chairman of the Breeroo conference, rector of the council of the Koninklijke Studenten Schietvereeniging Amsterdam, and, after a year at the American University of Washington in 1938-39, president of the Nederlandse Christen Studenten Vereniging (NCSV) and, as such, founder of the Nerderlandsche Studenten-Federatie (NSF). Under the occupation, his father, a university professor, was dismissed from his post. Kohnstamm, too, had to give up teaching. On 30 January 1942, he was arrested and imprisoned in Amersfoort. He was released, but arrested again on 13 July 1942, and held in Haaren and subsequently Sint-Michielsgestel, where Dutch ministers, industrialists, and intellectuals were kept. He was released on 13 September 1944. In the spring of 1945, he became Queen Wilhelmina’s private secretary, and joined the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), remaining a member until 1975. After Wilhelmina abdicated in favor of Juliana in 1948, Kohnstamm joined the government’s Commissariat, which was charged with implementing the Marshall Plan in Europe. He subsequently became a member of the Europe section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, heading the department that dealt with German affairs. He was Dirk Spierenburg’s deputy in the Dutch delegation to negotiations on the Schuman Plan. With the creation of the ECSC he became secretary of the HA from 1952 to 1955, and in 1956, its first permanent representative in the United Kingdom. He was then appointed secretary general of the Committee of the Three Wise Men, which was tasked with examining European atomic energy production within the framework of the EAEC, and subsequently became special adviser to the Communities on nuclear matters. At an unknown date he joined the steering committee of the Bilderberg Group, which was financed by the Ford Foundation and whose president was Prince Consort Bernhard of the Netherlands. [62]

33The ECIUS’s goals underwent slight shifts across its different requests to the Ford Foundation. The “Atlantic” dimension was already present in 1958, but became far more pronounced in 1963. The purpose was to push “promising and deserving young scholars to study European problems in a wider Atlantic concept” and to support “new university ventures in European and European-Atlantic studies”. These had a certain liberal orientation: “At what stage on the road towards free trade will Atlantic economic institutions become necessary?” [63] Indeed, the decision to renew the grant was motivated to a large degree by this orientation.


Notwithstanding the difficulties which have emerged during the past year, there continues to be, on both sides of the Atlantic, a determination to go forward with the European-Atlantic idea. Quite apart from its validity as a balance to the Soviet power idea in the East, the Atlantic concept remains essential if the free world is not to fall back into the nationalistic antagonisms of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. There can be no detour around unity and strength in Europe and the Atlantic as the prerequisite of peaceful arrangements with the Soviet Union. [64]

35The main shift, however, came from the resounding failure to form a genuine European university. The project was rooted in the dynamics of mobilization of the late 1940s, and had been regularly revived by Europeanist groups. Its first legal mooring came from Article 9 of the treaty which established the EAEC. This aimed to create an “institution at university level” in the short term. At the beginning of 1958, Kohnstamm wrote to Stone to express his interest in creating a European university. [65] Several practical considerations explain why there were high expectations attached to this project: it would allow the children of ECSC staff leaving European private schools to continue studying at a European university while still remaining in Luxembourg (the first European baccalaureates were awarded in 1958), or, on the contrary, it would offer the Grand-Duchy an acceptable amount of compensation for moving the ECSC institutions from Luxembourg to Brussels and thereby creating a “single seat”. [66] Hallstein laid out this last consideration to Stone in detail in February 1958, asking, “very confidentially”, for the Ford Foundation’s support:


Now such a solution, of course, if it is to succeed, will demand considerable expenditure of money. Of course, the six countries in the Community will have to make large contributions. I believe, however that it would help advance this entire idea if one knew now that the great foundations, with their world-wide activities, would show interest in this problem (the example of the Free University of Berlin shows how successful such activity can be). [67]

37In autumn 1958, a committee chaired by Enrico Medi made a number of proposals for creating this European university. An interim committee chaired by Hirsch did the same in the autumn of 1959. Nor did the ECIUS remain idle. As early as 1959 it began discussing the state of the university system within the six member states of the European Communities. In his first progress report, Kohnstamm reported on the consensus that, he believed, had emerged from Medi’s committee and his own discussions with “representative groups from a number of universities” in Europe and the United States. [68]


It is generally felt that the facilities offered by the European universities are insufficient for the modern world and that only a small percentage of talented young people can obtain a university education because of the high costs involved and the limited number of scholarships and grants available. The existence of the European Community is rapidly changing the economic situation of its member-nations, but these very changes will create a need for more and more university graduates. The rapid evolution which is now taking place in Europe would be fundamentally incomplete if it were not accompanied by a thoroughgoing reform of the various European university systems. [69]

39Similar thinking began about scientific research. According to Kohnstamm, it was not “keeping abreast” with its American or Soviet competitors: “No detailed study has ever been undertaken as to the causes of this failure”. [70] The ECIUS therefore established a Commission d’Études Européenne pour le Développement de l’Enseignement et de la Recherche (European Study Commission for the Development of Education and Research, CEEDER). This was briefly chaired by Gaston Berger until his sudden death on 13 November 1960. It was subsequently headed by André Aymard, dean of the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at the University of Paris, and Gerhard Hess, president of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. [71] The rapporteur was Raymond Poignant, maître des requêtes to the Conseil d’État on secondment, general rapporteur for school supply problems in the Monnet Plan, and chief of staff of the Minister of Education. To assist him, Arnold Kramish, an American physicist, a specialist in research organization and in Soviet science, had been made available by the Rand Corporation. [72]

40CEEDER’s work was rooted in the conviction that “national educational and research systems” differed so much that it was “hard to establish meaningful comparisons” between them; the only thing they had in common was their collective unsuitability to compete with the two great powers. In this context, “if our Community wants to keep up with the developments elsewhere and especially in the USA and USSR, a much greater educational and research effort will be needed”. This especially involved increasing the number of students, drawn from “all classes of society”, [73] a statement of fact with which the final report closes by emphasizing “just how narrow access to further studies is for those from the working class”. [74]

41These efforts were in vain. In the summer of 1960, de Gaulle torpedoed the flagship project for this sort of European community for higher education and research. He did not want a “single seat”; above all, he did not want a European university. [75] Reservations voiced by Maurice Couve de Murville in the councils of ministers of the EEC and EAEC about the name, funding, and institutional framework of a European university put an end to the project. [76]

42The global dynamic this article is describing was, in a brief period, given a persistent orientation both and at the same time by the Ford Foundation’s major commitment to “European studies”, and by the immediate failure of its ultimate goal, a “European university”. Its ghost, however, remained present everywhere.

Instituting European Studies: A Transnational Network and Its Local Footholds

43Faced with a lack of leverage to create a European community for higher education and research, the ECIUS devoted itself to setting up and consolidating a transnational network to promote “European studies”. This became its main concern. Taking stock of this investment, Kohnstamm justified it as follows:


The main activity of the Institute has been to foster European studies in European universities. These studies are important from several points of view. Firstly, they acquaint students with the realities of the European situation today. Secondly, in the humanities European universities have always had and still have a formidable tradition of looking towards the past and closing themselves off from the present. European studies have been one of the elements of change in this situation. Thirdly, interdisciplinary activities were non-existent twenty years ago and are still underdeveloped today. European studies are helping to foster an interdisciplinary approach. [77]

45Over the course of the decade, the ECIUS helped fund many “European” teaching chairs and research centers, including some in the United Kingdom and France, but “the situation was not easy”. [78] In its initial program the ECIUS indicated the need to find “exceptionally capable people, ready to devote themselves entirely to studying and teaching these new problems”. It also pointed out the necessity of putting them in contact with one another and with the institutions of the Community so that—“naturally, without affecting academic freedom”—this “network of university chairs” could contribute to “the development of different European policies”. [79] As Kohnstamm summarized it at the time, the project was to “decide on the most suitable universities at which to found new chairs” and to “find the right men to occupy them”. [80]

46A number of university research and teaching bodies thus received grants, each averaging 36,000 dollars over three years (table 1). Without this money they would in all likelihood never have been created; in many cases, it remained their sole or principal source of funding. This was the case in Germany for the University of Tübingen’s Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Forschung auf den Gebieten des Europäischen Rechts und der Europäischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (Society for the Promotion of Research in European Legislation and Economic Relations, GFFGEREW), which was co-directed by Ernst Steindorff and Nicolas Kloten. The same was true in Belgium for the University of Louvain’s Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales (Institute of Economic and Social Research, IRES), directed by Louis Duquesne de la Vinelle. It was also the case in the Netherlands, with Leiden University’s Europa Institute (EI), headed by Ivo Samkalden, who held the chair of European international law, and then with the University of Tilburg’s John F. Kennedy Institute (JFK). [81] In the United Kingdom, Kohnstamm tried, unsuccessfully, to interest Oxford and/or Cambridge in European studies. The ECIUS instead gave grants to the University of Edinburgh’s Committee on European Community Studies (CECS), directed by the constitutionalist John D. B. Mitchell, as well as to the University of Sussex’s Centre for Contemporary European Studies (CCES), headed by the Italianist Roy Pryce. A former research fellow at Cambridge and Oxford, Pryce had served as press attaché to the HA delegation between 1957 and 1960, and head of the Information Service of the European Communities between 1960 and 1964 in London. [82] Finally, Kohnstamm congratulated himself on several occasions for having helped the Journal of Common Market Studies, which had been founded in 1962 by Uwe Kitzinger, “to get through the difficult years”. [83] Other chairs or institutes were discussed but did not come into being—in Italy, for instance, at the University of Rome, where Kohnstamm’s intermediary was Mario Bandini, economic adviser to the EEC Commission and a professor in the University of Perugia’s Agriculture faculty. [84]

Table 1. Grants awarded by the ECIUS to European institutes and research centers in contemporary USD (1959-67) and 2015 USD (1960-67)

Grants500 000300 000800 0006 204 862
LausanneCRE12 50012 50012 50012 50012 50012 50012 5008 40095 900743 807
LeidenEI10 00010 00010 00010 00040 000310 243
TübingenGFFGEREW12 00012 00012 00036 000279 218
LouvainIRES12 00012 00012 00036 000279 218
Paris-RennesCEESR12 00012 00012 00036 000279 218
LondonRIIA12 50012 50012 50012 50050 000387 803
ParisCUECE7 5007 5007 50022 500174 511
ParisCEDECE12 00012 00012 00036 000279 218
EdinburghCECS7 5007 50015 000116 341
SussexCCES7 5007 50015 000116 341
TilburgJFKI7 5007 50058 170
Total22 50058 50071 00078 50032 50044 50039 50042 900389 9003 024 094
180 407464 353557 975608 852248 820335 284289 344304 8412 989 876
tableau im1

Table 1. Grants awarded by the ECIUS to European institutes and research centers in contemporary USD (1959-67) and 2015 USD (1960-67)

Note: RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351. The figures in italics are uncertain. The budget documents sent by the ECIUS to the Ford Foundation are not always entirely clear about spending. Inconsistencies may therefore exist between different documents. This table has been constructed based on different activity reports and appendices sent to the Ford Foundation by the ECIUS. The equivalent amounts for USD in 2015 (final line, final column) were calculated using the US Inflation Calculator, The year 1963 was used to calculate the right-hand column.

47In some cases the ECIUS’s grants followed, duplicated, or even preceded those of the Ford Foundation, and were sometimes substantially higher. In Lausanne, for instance, the ERC had already received an initial grant before the ECIUS took over. [85] For many years, Rieben nevertheless continued to send the ERC’s activity reports to Stone, until the Ford Foundation eventually informed him it was no longer necessary, removing any ambiguity. [86] Similarly, in Louvain, the IRES had already received a grant of 60,000 dollars in 1959 before the ECIUS took over. [87] Less frequently, the ECIUS’s grants were outmatched by those from the Ford Foundation: this was the case for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London, better known as Chatham House, which the ECIUS allocated 50,000 dollars between 1961 and 1965, even while it was being funded by the Ford Foundation, which had given 400,000 dollars in 1956 and 125,000 dollars in 1964. [88] On a few occasions, it was the ECIUS which took the first step, as happened at Sussex, where the CCES received a grant of 100,000 dollars from the Ford Foundation in 1968. [89]

48In some cases, these grants also attracted or accompanied external funding, which could be public or private, local, national, or transnational. In Lausanne, the ERC was supported by the canton of Vaud and the University of Lausanne. However, its audience as well as its main financial resources progressively resulted from its publications (the “cahiers rouges”), with subscriptions coming primarily from industry. The ratio of income from grants and income from sales was gradually reversed, with the ECIUS permanently ceasing to fund the ERC in 1967. [90] In Leiden, the EI received a grant from the European Commission and donations from large Dutch firms, including Unilever, Philips, and Royal Dutch. [91] In Tübingen, the GFFGEREW received a grant from Baden-Württemberg. [92] Finally, in Edinburgh, the CECS received two large grants from the Volkswagen Foundation and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. [93]

49In addition to such funding projects, the ECIUS maintained a biographical file of “all professors working on problems of European integration”. [94] Most importantly, it published a newsletter, Recherches et Études Universitaires sur l’Intégration Européenne (University Research and Studies on European Integration). A contract was drawn up with the Commission of the EEC in 1961, and publication began in 1963. The European Commission gradually assumed control of it. [95]

50In sum, the activity of the ECIUS partially intersected with that of the Ford Foundation and the European Commission, but it remained relatively independent from them. [96] The French case illustrates this intermediate position.

The Law Faculty and the Institut d’Études Politiques in the Institutionalization of European Studies

51Expansive as it was, this funding program was not without its difficulties. This was particularly true in France. American foundations were very active there. [97] The Ford Foundation played an important role in the humanities and the social sciences. [98] It gave the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (National Foundation of Political Science, FNSP) a grant of 250,000 dollars in 1958, as well as a further 160,000 dollars in 1964, to finance its Centre d’Études des Relations Internationales (International Relations Study Center, CERI). [99] In 1963—if we focus only on European studies—it paid a 75,000-dollar grant to the Centre International de Formation Européenne (International Center for European Training, CIFE) set up by Alexandre Marc in 1954. [100] As for the ECIUS, it subsidized three organizations: the Centre Européen d’Économie et Sociologie Rurales (European Center for Rural Economy and Sociology, CEESR), the Centre Universitaire d’Études des Communautés Européennes (University Study Center for the European Communities, CUECE) at the University of Paris, and the Commission pour l’Étude des Communautés Européennes (Commission for the Study of European Communities, CEDECE).

52The first grant was made in 1960 to the CEESR, created at this time by the Laboratoire de Sociologie et d’Économie Rurale (Rural Sociology and Economics Research Center) at the Institut National Agronomique (National Agronomic Institute) in Paris and the Station d’Économie Rurale (Rural Economics Center) at the École Nationale d’Agriculture (National School of Agriculture) in Rennes. Its mission was to carry out “a study of the development of agricultural production structures and the possibility of adapting them to European agricultural development”, led by two professors, Michel Cépède (Paris) and Louis Malassis (Rennes). [101] As Kohnstamm pointed out bitterly, however, things were not quite so simple:


Many of the most influential professors of the all-powerful University of Paris opposed the Schuman Plan and were deeply hostile to the plans for a European Defense Community. [102] The advent of de Gaulle created other problems, among other things limiting the freedom of action of the European Commission’s Information Service in its attempts to interest French universities in European matters. At the same time, in no European country is the influence of the universities so great as in France, and obtaining their active interest therefore so important. That this, notwithstanding these difficulties, proved possible has largely been the result of the Institute’s work done in close collaboration with François Fontaine and a group of enthusiastic young university lecturers, backed by such outstanding men as Professors Teitgen and Byé. [103]

54The CUECE was headed by Pierre-Henri Teitgen, with Berthold Goldman assisting him with the Law Section and Maurice Byé for the Economics Section. All three were members of the board, which was chaired by Georges Vedel. [104] The Economics Section was founded in January 1963 and the Law Section in October. The CUECE offered a specific diploma, the Certificat d’Études Européennes (European studies certificate), which was awarded at the end of the Licence—then a four-year degree. This certificate was accredited by the national Ministry of Education on 8 July 1964, in record time. [105] In order to allow the law and economics faculties or the various institutes of political studies to receive grants, as stated in the CUECE activity report, “deans, directors, and professors had to create parallel associations to guarantee the granting of expenses”. These associations included for instance the Association pour l’Étude des Communautés Européennes (Association for the Study of European Communities, AECE), created in June 1963 in Brussels with Vedel as its chair, for the purpose of “facilitating the creation and operation” of the CUECE. [106] To this was added the CEDECE, created in September 1964, and aimed at “promoting teaching and research on the law and economics of the European Communities”—but only outside Paris, already covered by the AECE. Jean Boulouis chaired the CEDECE, with a board that included François de Menthon as vice-president, Henri Lesguillons as secretary general, and Teitgen as treasurer. Finally, it seems that another association was created in Paris in July 1965: “Europe Université”, also with Lesguillons as its secretary general. [107] While it is difficult to check the accounts of these nested, overlapping organizations, it seems clear the ECIUS expended a great deal of energy to help departments develop programs of “European studies”, particularly the Law Faculty in Paris.

55Of course, this enterprise triggered a reaction from the Rue Saint-Guillaume. In March 1964, a faculty member appealed to the IEP’s director, Jacques Chapsal, to create a genuine European studies center.


In recent years the number of European institutes and university centers specializing in European questions has increased enormously. (The most recent of these is the “Centre d’Étude des Communautés Européennes“ at the Law Faculty of Paris.) These creations demonstrate an increasing interest in European problems, and offer the framework needed for teaching and research to develop fully. (See, in this regard, the report in the Bulletin titled Recherches et études universitaires sur l’intégration européenne, published by the European Community Institute for University Studies in Brussels.) [108]

57Pierre Gerbet had been a research fellow at the CERI since 1958, thanks to a grant from the Ford Foundation. He had also been a lecturer at the Humanities Faculty of Paris since 1962, following a visiting fellowship at Columbia’s School of International Affairs in 1961-62. To him, an “important adaptation effort” was underway at the IEP, one that included his own course on European politics, Paul Reuter’s course on European institutions since 1945, as well as their joint seminar on European political problems. [109] But that was not enough.


We ought to enhance this effort by adopting a “label“ that attracts attention. Some more or less serious European institutes are held in high regard because of their title—whereas people hardly think of the Institut d’Études Politiques or the Fondation [i.e. the FNSP]. Creating a “Centre d’Études Européennes“ at the Rue Saint-Guillaume would make it possible to take our place alongside European institutes, and to join the Association of Institutes for European Studies (122 Rue de Lausanne, Geneva) and participate in its activities. [110]

59Above all, Gerbet insisted on the disciplinary dimension of this project—that is, “developing European political science research”.


It seems normal that the Foundation should do for political science what the Law Faculty has successfully achieved for law and economics. Besides, this could be done in close collaboration between the two institutions, with the Law Faculty continuing to offer the legal and economic courses for its “Certificat d’Études Européennes”, and the Rue Saint-Guillaume covering the political science courses. This activity would largely be based on existing courses and seminars, and naturally fall within the framework of the Centre d’Études Européennes. This problem should require particular attention because the European labor market is important for the students of the Rue Saint-Guillaume. It should not be the case that, once they finish their diploma, they go on specializing at the Law Faculty and break all contact with the Institut d’Études Politiques. The system described above would allow the Institute to complete the training of its students. Finally, it should be noted that the Rue Saint-Guillaume is far better equipped than the Law Faculty to study European problems from the point of view of political science (variety of courses, bulk of documentation). It therefore would seem natural for the Rue Saint-Guillaume to take up this task. [111]

61On 24 March, Jean Touchard, the FNSP’s secretary general, sent a note to Chapsal approving the creation of the center. He also laid out some problems that had to be solved: the patronage committee, which he considered unnecessary; the list of professors who would be responsible for seminars; an assistant, to be “paid by the CERI”; and, of course, a director: “Should I give Gerbet a title? What should it be?” [112] As a matter of fact, Gerbet had neither a doctorate—he only defended his Ph.D. in Humanities much later, in 1977—nor any real status at the IEP, where he was not appointed assistant professor until in 1966. A month later, after an interview with Gerbet, Chapsal answered Touchard: “You and I will have to find him a spot at the CERI”. [113] In the margins of Gerbet’s note, Chapsal had in fact jotted down the idea that the European studies center could be a “section of the CERI”. [114] In spite of this momentum, however, the center never saw the light of day. But in May 1964 an Association pour le Développement de la Science Politique Européenne (Association for the Development of European Political Science, ADSPE) was set up, “with the aim of developing teaching and research about the European Communities, particularly within institutes of political studies and certain specialized institutes”. [115] Chaired by Daniel Pépy, a conseiller d’État, the board was made up of Jean François-Poncet, a councilor at the Quai d’Orsay, and Max Peyrard, an assistant professor at the Law Faculty of Paris.

62Local contingencies, which made some of the initiatives resulting from the global dynamic either fail or succeed, shifted this global dynamic, thereby shaping the “field” of European studies in its paradoxical form, at once transnational and insular, dominated in some places by lawyers, in others by political scientists, and so on. The creation of the European University Institute in Florence nevertheless marked an important stage within this dynamic.

From the European Community Institute for University Studies to the European University Institute

63From the beginning of the 1960s, by means of the funding it offered, the ECIUS had become the nexus of a transnational academic network which offered a major resonance chamber for Community institutions. On 9-10 December 1960, a meeting was for instance organized by Hallstein between Community executives and the directors of the different research centers that the ECIUS funded. Two topics were discussed: competition policy, which was introduced by Samkalden (EI) and Steindorff (GFFGEREW), and the common agricultural policy, introduced by Malassis (CEESR). [116] Donner, Hallstein, and Hirsch were present, as well as Hans Von der Groeben, the Commissioner for Competition, and Sicco Mansholt, the Commissioner for Agriculture. Also present were Michel Gaudet, director general of the Legal Service of the European Communities, and Jacques-René Rabier, director general of the Information Service. This initial network of recurrent interlocutors—three such meetings took place between 1960 and 1962 [117]—gave birth to shared initiatives, like the creation of the Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft für Europarecht in the spring of 1961. [118] The turbulent political context of the mid-1960s—the Empty Chair Crisis, the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, the Prague Spring—was present in every page of the reports Kohnstamm sent to the Ford Foundation. Within this context, however, he made significant efforts to develop this transnational network beyond the Iron Curtain, traveling to Poland in spring 1965 and 1966, to Budapest in autumn 1967, and to Budapest and Prague in spring 1968. [119]

64In parallel, the ECIUS also wanted to participate in the “the development of European studies in American universities”. [120] In the 1950s, the Ford Foundation actively supported “East European studies”, which were most of the time joined to “Soviet studies”. In the mid-1960s, this policy was extended to include “West European studies”. As a result, a 400,000-dollar grant was thus awarded in 1964 to the Foreign Area Fellowship Program—one of the Ford Foundation’s flagship programs, created in 1952 to promote “area studies”, jointly administered by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), amounting to a total of 12,000,000 dollars. [121] In the early 1970s, however, the Ford Foundation observed that “for many years after World War II, European studies were largely neglected while American social scientists directed their attention to more exotic regions”. [122] This statement was reflected in the regular renewal of the specific grant to the SSRC for “West European studies”, and in a series of grants to American universities for thematic research projects. As part of the same movement, at the initiative of Stanley Hoffmann, Ernst Haas, Joseph LaPalombara, and Leon Lindberg, among others, the Ford Foundation decided to fund the creation of a genuine scholarly society for European studies: the Council for European Studies (CES). This was to be based at the University of Pittsburgh, which received a grant of 385,000 dollars in 1970 and a further 260,000 dollars in 1973. [123]

Table 2. The ECIUS’s principal expenditures in contemporary USD (1964-71)

Grant300 000250 000550 000
Operations63 15043 05048 36040 29651 70066 670313 226
Bulletin16 1007 9501 7207 41228 30038 830100 312
Higher education and research reforms6 5004 5706 45071210 20052 00080 432
Grants54 50037 40018 880026 9000137 680
Other000011 90025 090‰36 990
Total140 25092 97075 41048 420129 000182 590668 640
tableau im2

Table 2. The ECIUS’s principal expenditures in contemporary USD (1964-71)

Note: RAC, FFR, R, 453, PA 57-351 [124]

65In line with these initiatives, transatlantic academic exchange intensified at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1969, a research seminar for doctoral students was organized by the CCES at the University of Sussex with the ECIUS’s support. This brought together 34 young political scientists and economists for a week, overseen by Leon Lindberg and Jean-Claude Casanova. [125] It was followed in 1970 by a second seminar, organized in a similar way, but this time in Bruges, with 36 young academics, headed by Ronald Inglehart. The theme of this second seminar was promising: “The Decision-Making Process and European Integration”. [126] Starting in 1969, the ECIUS also awarded research scholarships for studies on transatlantic relations. These were granted by a panel which, notably, included Dean Claussen, public affairs officer at the United States Mission to the European Communities, which funded these scholarships. [127] The young Karel Van Miert (Ghent University) was then given the award for a study on “the attitude of the United States government to the Commission of the European Communities”. [128]

66Paradoxically, European studies had by this point acquired such a solid institutional position, thanks to the ECIUS’s structuring efforts, that the ECIUS’s own activity came to seem increasingly redundant, even useless. Kohnstamm could declare himself relatively satisfied at the end of the first grant in 1963.


When the European Community Institute for University Studies began its activities, interest in the study of these problems was limited to a few universities. In the years since 1958, interest in these studies has greatly increased and widened in scope. [129]

68For Kohnstamm, “relatively small sums placed in well chosen places have had wide repercussions”—whether founding a research institute, creating a chair which the university committed itself to financing further, or even funding a doctoral thesis. As he noted in summer 1966, the “nationalization” of universities, once European, had not yet given way to the expected “Europeanization”—especially in France, where universities were “the most conservative in Europe”—but still, “it does not seem immodest to claim a very good return on the money which the Ford Foundation has generously put into the Institute!” [130] However, as he pointed out after the second grant in 1967, an important phase of the ECIUS’s work had “clearly” been completed:


European studies are now so firmly inplanted [sic] in all the countries of the Common Market and in the United Kingdom and Switzerland that no further outside stimuli are needed. The Institute can regard its task in this field as fulfilled. Of course, this does not mean that the situation is now ideal and that no more money could be usefully spent on new initiatives or on strengthening existing centers for European studies. It simply means that European studies have established themselves as a necessary part of university life and will undoubtedly continue to flourish. [131]

70Kohnstamm wasn’t the only one satisfied by the ECIUS. The Ford Foundation—who praised the Institute’s “energetic director”, whom it considered “an effective leader” [132]—was very happy with its achievements:


By all accounts the Institute’s work has been very successful. In 1958 there were only a handful of European study centers in Europe. In 1967 numerous universities have such centers, and most faculties of law, economics, and political science offer courses on European integration and its effects. [133]

72From 1967—and particularly at the end of the third grant, in 1970—Kohnstamm began to signal to the Ford Foundation his ambition to profoundly transform the ECIUS’s activities. [134] The ambition here was to create an Institute for European Policy Planning Studies (IEPPS), which would be a kind of “European Brookings”. [135] In the context of the first enlargement of the European Communities, the IEPPS could be formed from a merger between the ECIUS and the Trans-Europe Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), a network uniting institutes like the British Federal Trust for Education and Research, the French Club Jean-Moulin, and the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), yet another one of the Ford Foundation’s creations. [136] The IEPPS would offer “an opportunity for experts, now often working in national isolation, to join forces in devising European solutions to European problems”. [137] Unlike the United States, where “independent, non-governmental organizations” actively contribute to public debate, there were “no European-wide non-governmental institutions”. [138] Kohnstamm thus seemed to regret the fact that the European Commission was obliged to commission studies at “independent research centers”, whereas a single “private, non-profit-making and completely independent” institute with a limited staff of fifteen to twenty people could fulfill this function perfectly well. [139] It would be located in Brussels, and “should cooperate with existing institutes, national governments and the institutions of the European Community”. [140] The creation of this new institute was scheduled for mid-1973, and was to be funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, the Agnelli Foundation, and the Royal Dutch Shell Group, which, according to Kohnstamm, had already agreed. [141] The project was strongly supported by Robert Schaetzel, the United States representative to the European Communities. [142] It also had the support of the Ford Foundation. However, criticism began to develop within the Ford Foundation. Alessandro Silj, who was now directing the European and International Affairs (EIA) program in the International Division, pointed out, after discussing the project with Kohnstamm, that the latter was “aware of the fact that his contacts with younger generations of scholars are limited”. Silj recommended Kohnstamm make contact with the leaders of the CES and of the “Consortium of European Political Scientists”. [143]

73Craufurd Goodwin, Silj’s successor, was even more severe in a 1976 report. [144] According to him, the ECIUS’s original ambitions “exude the confidence and excitement of the times” about what should have become an “integrative device” aiming all at the same time to create a link between “Europeanists”, to “modernize European social science through exposure to American research techniques and, especially, research for public policy”, and even to serve as an “intellectual bulwark against communism”. Goodwin thus expressed his surprise that, in the motivations for the initial grant, the Institute’s leadership could have been “characterized by political sympathy for the United States and the belief that without the United States even a United Europe would be overrun by Soviet Russia”. [145] His report instead pointed at the “schizophrenic” character of the initial project, aiming either simultaneously or cumulatively to develop a “visible, physical structure” and/or become a “‘clearinghouse’” or a “‘switchboard’”—“various terms were used throughout the years”. Had the final achievements met these initial ambitions? According to Goodwin, the ECIUS hardly bore comparison with the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), which had also been created in 1958, under the direction first of Alastair Buchan (1958-69) and then of Duchêne (1969-74).


Whereas ISS worked carefully to build up a wide constituency and broad base of support, ECIUS never became much more than a funnel for Ford Foundation funds and dispersed its income annually for such things as chairs and centers of European studies at several European universities. Moreover, much of its energy seems to have gone into the dream of perhaps becoming the European university. [146]

75In short, its unique objective, the creation of “the European nation state”, had harmed the ECIUS. Furthermore, the report also pointed out Kohnstamm’s own limitations:


Kohnstamm’s background as a political administrator did not stand him in good stead with professional social scientists. He seems to have had difficulty in distinguishing good academic talent and prospects from bad ones.

77Kohnstamm’s many activities—his fight for ecumenism with the Committee on Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX), his promotion of Latin American studies in Europe—had come at the expense of the Institute. Apart from the Ford Foundation, on the other hand, the ECIUS’s “only substantial funder” was the Volkswagen Foundation, created in 1961, “which, in the early years, depended on Ford advice”. [147] Faced with the “thinness” of the ECIUS’s reports and the absence of any “serious” evaluation by the Foundation (“despite three successive general support grants!”), the report concluded using a very critical tone. [148]


We would probably not make the grants today, partly because our objectives have changed and partly because our perception of correct operating style is different. “Lessons“ we can learn from this experience may be (1) the dangers of lack of perspective and in being too close to a grantee; (2) the desirability of stating clearly and precisely the goals of a new institution; (3) the need for regular outside appraisal of repeated grantees (and especially dependent organizations). [149]

79Such posthumous regrets, however, do not seem to have spoiled relations between Kohnstamm and the Ford Foundation. Admittedly, the project of a European university remained at a standstill for many years. But de Gaulle’s death meant that what had once been unlikely was now plausible. Since the start of the 1970s, the European Communities had started from scratch to build a public policy domain on higher education and research. [150]

80On 15 November 1976, a European University Institute (EUI)—a sort of hybrid born from the interbreeding between a European university and an institute of European studies—finally opened its doors in Florence. The name of its president, however, had been decided back in 1973: Kohnstamm. [151] He was president of the Trilateral Commission at the time (1973-76), and could take advantage of the transnational network he had established over the years. He benefited first and foremost from the support of the “European community”, embodied by the Commission’s secretary-general, Émile Noël, who campaigned on Kohnstamm’s behalf with European governments and later signed a contract with him in view of writing a “History of European integration”. [152] Secondly, Kohnstamm also enjoyed the support of the “Atlantic community”, embodied by the Rockefeller Foundation, who supported two conferences organized at the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio. The first took place in 1974 (“The Institutional Development of the European Community”), and the second in 1976 (“The Organization of the European University Institute, in Florence, Italy”). [153] Nor did the Ford Foundation’s monies completely disappear. In 1976, the EUI received its first grant of 50,000 dollars; and, in 1978, a second grant of 100,000 dollars in order to support research on “the development of a new common law in Europe under the [authority of] the European Court of Justice, the Common Market, and human rights treaties”. [154] The classics of European studies were on the move.

81* * *

82In the dynamic that nurtured the emergence of a European field of power—that is, not just the institutions of the European Communities, but a more complex space of relations between formal and informal Atlantic and European institutions, as well as between economic, political, legal, and military agents—academic enterprises are of central importance. Their ultimate goal is the formation of elites and, consequently, the long-term distribution of positions of power within this emerging field. In the shorter term their aim is also the formation of learned representations of this emergent power—and thus, in part, the legitimation of the new forms of domination resulting from them.

83From this point of view, the promotion of European studies and, alongside, of a European university, appears as something other than a simple mechanical effect of “European construction”. It appears, instead, as one of the most significant of all European constructions. [155]


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    John T. S. Keeler, “Mapping EU Studies: The Evolution from Boutique to Boom Field 1960-2001”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 43(3), 2005, 551-82.
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    Cécile Robert and Antoine Vauchez, “L’Académie européenne: savoirs, experts et savants dans le gouvernement de l’Europe”, Politix, 89, 2010, 9-34.
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    Stephanie Lee Mudge and Antoine Vauchez, “Building Europe on a Weak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational Politics”, American Journal of Sociology, 118(2), 2012, 449-92.
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    Antonin Cohen, “De congrès en assemblées: la structuration de l’espace politique transnational européen au lendemain de la guerre”, Politique européenne, 18, 2006, 105-25.
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    Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, 261ff; Yves Dezalay, “Enquêter sur l’internationalisation des noblesses d’État: retour réflexif sur des stratégies de double jeu”, Cultures & conflits, 98, 2015, 15-52.
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    Exceptions include Anne-Catherine Wagner, Les nouvelles élites de la mondialisation: une immigration dorée en France, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998; Virginie Schnabel, “Élites européennes en formation: les étudiants du ‘Collège de Bruges’ et leurs études”, Politix, 43, 1998, 33-52; and Niilo Kauppi and Tero Erkkilä, “The Struggle over Global Higher Education: Actors, Institutions, and Practices”, International Political Sociology, 5(3), 2011, 314-26.
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    Andy Smith, “French Political Science and European Integration”, Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4), 2000, 663-9.
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    The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1954, 236-7, hereafter RFAR.
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    Nicolas Guilhot (ed.), The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory, New York, Columbia University Press, 2011.
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    Francis X. Sutton, “The Ford Foundation: The Early Years”, Daedalus, 116(1), 1987, 41-91.
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    Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power, New York, Columbia University Press, 2012.
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    Henry Ford was succeeded by his son and grandson, Edsel Ford (1936-43) and Henry Ford II (1943-50). The presidency of the Foundation then fell, for the period considered here, to Paul G. Hoffman (1950-53), H. Rowan Gaither Jr. (1953-56), Henry T. Heald (1956-65), and McGeorge Bundy (1966-79).
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    Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992, 391ff.
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    Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001.
  • [15]
    McCloy to Hoffman and Milton Katz, cited in ibid., 151 and 322.
  • [16]
    It nevertheless took several months to establish a genuine “European” program within the Foundation, whose spending in Europe rarely exceeded 5% of its total expenditure. See Francis X. Sutton, “The Ford Foundation and Europe: Ambitions and Ambivalences” in Giuliana Gemelli (ed.), The Ford Foundation and Europe (1950’s-1970’s): Cross-Fertilization of Learning in Social Science and Management, Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1998, pp. 21-67; Valérie Aubourg, “La Fondation Ford et l’intégration européenne, 1950-1967: une relation intime et privilégiée” in Gérard Bossuat and Georges Saunier (eds), Inventer l’Europe: Histoire nouvelle des groupes d’influence et des acteurs de l’unité européenne, Berne, Peter Lang, 2003, pp. 325-39.
  • [17]
    The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1952, 28, hereafter FFAR.
  • [18]
    Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe (FJME) (Dorigny), Fonds Jean Monnet, AMK 33/1/1: “J.M.” to Stone, 15 July 1955. An appendix describes a “foundation project”, a work program dealing primarily with institutional questions: –/2.
  • [19]
    FJME, AMK 33/1/5: Kohnstamm to Monnet, 18 June 1956; -/4: “Aide-mémoire sur le programme des travaux du Centre d’études européennes” (Memo on the Work Program for the European Studies Center), 16 June 1956; -/6: “Aide-mémoire sur le projet de Centre d’études européennes” (Memo on the European Studies Center Project), no date.
  • [20]
    FJME, AMK 33/1/7: Monnet to Stone, 21/06/1956; -/8 and 9: “Memorandum on the Establishment of an Institute of European Studies”, two versions, no date.
  • [21]
    Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) (Sleepy Hollow), Ford Foundation Records, R 453, PA 57-351: Monnet to Stone, 11 March 1957 (erroneously dated 1956); Stone to Monnet, 25 March 1957. The chair was created at the University of Lausanne’s École des Hautes Études Commerciales (Graduate Business School) by a decision of the Conseil d’État on 8 January 1957, and was officially inaugurated on 29 October 1957: Rieben to Kohnstamm, 27 May 1959.
  • [22]
    Grin to Stone, 20 July 1957.
  • [23]
    Program Action (PA) Form No. 57-351 and Request for Grant Action (GA) No. IA-37G; FFAR 1956-57, p. 44; Stone to Rieben, 22 August 1957; Stone to Monnet, 23 August 1957; Rieben to Stone, 3 September 1957. The quoted phrases come from Rieben to the Board, 12 September 1957.
  • [24]
    Request for GA No. IA-37G, p. 1.
  • [25]
    “Discours prononcé le 11 juillet 1958...” (Speech Delivered on 11 July 1958), pp. 1-2. On the IAEA, the AUE, and their connection to the Centre Européen de la Culture (CEC), created in 1950, see Nicolas Stenger, Denis de Rougemont: Les intellectuels et l’Europe au XXe siècle, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015, 195ff and 247ff. The Ford Foundation steadfastly refused to finance the CEC, and only made small grants to the European Cultural Foundation (ECF), which had been created precisely for this purpose in 1954 under the presidency of Robert Schuman and later of Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.
  • [26]
    Request for GA No. IA-37G, pp. 1 and 2.
  • [27]
    Activity Report (AR) 1958, 25 October 1958, p. 1.
  • [28]
    Rieben to Stone, 24 April 1959.
  • [29]
    Memo drafted by Monnet and Kohnstamm (5 November 1958) and statutes of the DC. Taxation was never completely absent from transnational strategies, as shown by a long memo by Kohnstamm of 9 September 1959, comparing “the advantages provided for in the tax legislation of the different Common Market countries for donations and legacies given to certain associations, particularly for scientific and cultural purposes”, but also “measures likely to increase these tax advantages” (p. 1).
  • [30]
    RAC, FFR, R 460, PA 58-35: Monnet to Stone, 24 July 1957. When the DC was created, Monnet worked with Erich Ollenhauer, president of the SPD, to make sure ACUSE would not be financed by business organizations. The founding of the DC, then, was a way of getting around this commitment. But despite Monnet pouring part of his own fortune into it, which came from the sale of Monnet Cognac, ACUSE’s debts at the end of its activities were ultimately paid for by business organizations. See Maria Grazia Melchionni, “Le Comité d’action pour les États-Unis d’Europe: un réseau au service de l’Union européenne”, in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens (eds), Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la Paix, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, pp. 221-51, p. 246.
  • [31]
    “European Training and Research Centers (Monnet)”, Stone, 8 November 1957.
  • [32]
    Waldemar A. Nielsen wrote to Stone on 5 August 1957 to tell him this initiative should be encouraged. Nielsen was Assistant Director of the IA program.
  • [33]
    Joseph (Joe) E. Slater to Nielsen, 18 November 1957, 21 November 1957. Formerly secretary general of the High Commission in Germany and then executive secretary of the United States Representative to NATO and the OEEC, Slater, an economist at Standard Oil, was then associated with the IA program at the Ford Foundation. He became president of the Aspen Institute in 1970.
  • [34]
    Neil W. Chamberlain to Slater, 20 November 1957. Chamberlain was director of the Economic Development and Administration program.
  • [35]
    Docket Excerpt (DE), 12 December 1957, p. 1, and preparatory notes.
  • [36]
    Ibid., p. 2.
  • [37]
    Ibid., p. 2-3. The document states (p. 3) that the Foundation also intended to finance a similar “pilot” project in the United Kingdom, looking at “the intentions and probable role concerning European integration”. In 1958, a grant of 177,400 dollars was awarded to the think tank Political and Economic Planning (PEP). This was renewed once in 1962 (134,000 dollars) and subsequently in the 1970s. See FFAR 1958, pp. 80 and 138, and FFAR 1962, pp. 47 and 134.
  • [38]
    Terms of Grant (TG), 14 January 1958, 3 October 1960, 29 January 1963, 15 December 1964. FFAR 1960, p. 152; FFAR 1961, p. 143; FFAR 1963, p. 49; FFAR 1965, p. 138. In total, the DC received 600,000 dollars from the Ford Foundation between 1958 and 1966. In 1958, Ford Foundation financing accounted for more than 75% of the DC’s revenue (20,000,000 French francs). This eventually rose to 100%, including interest rates negotiated with Chase Manhattan by Monnet himself.
  • [39]
    Speech given on 4 July 1962: Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1993, 239-40.
  • [40]
    PA No. 58-35, 58-35A, 58-35B, 58-35C, 12 December 1957, 22 September 1960, 29 January 1963, and 10 December 1964. Monnet to Stone, 8 January 1963, 3 August 1964. In 1960, there was no mention of this Atlantic partnership in the DC’s research objectives: see Monnet to Stone, 7 May 1960.
  • [41]
    “Grant Request—IA”, 28 December 1962.
  • [42]
    “Report to the Ford Foundation of the Activities of the Centre”, 20 November 1959, p. 9.
  • [43]
    “The activity of the Documentation Center of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Autumn 1959-end 1960”, p. 3; Monnet to Stone, 13 February 1961. In 1960, however, compensation for “consultants” and “experts” amounted to only 1.26% of total expenditure—to which we must add “research expenses” (9.13%), which makes approximately one-tenth of the total.
  • [44]
    Ibid., p. 4.
  • [45]
    RAC, FFR, R 460, PA 58-35: Monnet to McDaniel, 23 November 1967; “Grant Status Report” of 21 March 1968.
  • [46]
    RAC, FFR, R 1157: Kohnstamm to Stone, 5 December 1957.
  • [47]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: “Memorandum on the European Community Institute for University Studies” (ECIUS), no date, p. 1; Monnet and Kohnstamm to Stone, 15 March 1958. There are several documents related to this first application, the exact chronology of which is difficult to establish.
  • [48]
    Ibid., p. 2.
  • [49]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: “Estimated and tentative budget (1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959) for the Ford Foundation’s participation in the financing of the ECIUS”.
  • [50]
    “IA/ECIUS”, p. 1, draft recommendation of funding to be submitted to the Board, forwarded by Don Price (vice-president) to Henry Heald (president) on 12 February 1958.
  • [51]
    Ibid., p. 2.
  • [52]
    Ibid., p. 3.
  • [53]
    Ibid., p. 4. This is followed by a glowing review of the ECIUS’s leadership, comprising “outstanding leaders” characterized by their “political sympathy for the United States” and the “belief that, without the United States, even a united Europe would be overrun by Soviet Russia”.
  • [54]
    Carroll to McDaniel, 14 February 1958.
  • [55]
    McDaniel to Heald, 18 February 1958.
  • [56]
    Slater to Monnet, 31 March 1958; FFAR 1958, pp. 80 and 138.
  • [57]
    FJME, AMK January 33/1/10: “Extrait du registre du commerce de Lausanne” (Excerpt from the Lausanne Trade Register); RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: Monnet and Kohnstamm to Stone, 15 March 1958; Kohnstamm to??, 6 November 1958.
  • [58]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: TG, 21 March 1958 (1958-1963); PA No. 58-137A and TG, 26 December 1963 (1964-1966); PA No. 58-137B and TG, 7 February 1968 (1968-1970); and see the correspondence between Norman W. MacLeod, the assistant treasurer, and Kohnstamm; FFAR 1964, pp. 42 and 131; FFAR 1968, pp. 64 and 139; FFAR 1971, pp. 84 and 85.
  • [59]
    Monnet and Kohnstamm to Stone, 15 March 1958.
  • [60]
    “Report on the activities of the ECIUS from 31 March 1958 to 31 December 1963”.
  • [61]
    Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, Max Kohnstamm: A European’s Life and Work, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011.
  • [62]
    Valérie Aubourg, “The Bilderberg Group: Promoting European Governance Inside an Atlantic Community of Values” in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Michael Gehler (eds), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe 1945-83, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 38-60.
  • [63]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: Report of the ECIUS, hereafter RECIUS, 1 September 1963, p. 7.
  • [64]
    DE 12-13/12/1963, p. 1.
  • [65]
    RAC, FFR, R 460, PA 58-35: “Max” (on HA stationery) to Stone, 3 January 1958; Stone to Kohnstamm, 15 January 1958.
  • [66]
    Ibid., pp. 106-7.
  • [67]
    RAC, FFR, R 1167: Hallstein to Stone, 21 February 1958; Nielsen to Stone, 17 July 1958.
  • [68]
    RECIUS, 29 July 1959, p. 2.
  • [69]
    Ibid., p. 4.
  • [70]
    Ibid., p. 5.
  • [71]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: RECIUS, 15 September 1961, p. 4.
  • [72]
    Composition of CEEDER; RECIUS, 20 July 1960, p. 6. FJME AMK 33/1/14: Kramish to Kohnstamm, 27 May 1960.
  • [73]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: “Progress of the Work of the European Study Committee for the Development of Education and Research” (Ninth Session, 10-11 July 1961, Paris).
  • [74]
    Raymond Poignant, L’enseignement dans les pays du Marché commun, Paris, Institut pédagogique national, 1965, 257. Our translation.
  • [75]
    On the later project to create a European MIT, see Giuliana Gemelli, “Western Alliance and Scientific Diplomacy in the Early 1960s: The Rise and Failure of the Project to Create a European MIT” in R. Laurence Moore and Maurizio Vaudagna (eds), The American Century in Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 171-92.
  • [76]
    Jean-Marie Palayret and Richard Schreurs, A University for Europe: Prehistory of the European University Institute in Florence (1948-1976), Florence, Presidency of the Council of Ministers/European University Institute, 1996, 93-6.
  • [77]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: untitled program review, 26 July 1967, p. 1.
  • [78]
    Ibid., p. 3.
  • [79]
    RAC, FFR, R 1167: “Note concernant le programme de travail et l’utilisation des fonds de l’ECIUS” (Note Concerning the Program of Work and the Use of ECIUS Funds), 20 January 1959, pp. 5-6.
  • [80]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: RECIUS, 29 July 1959, p. 3.
  • [81]
    Ivo Samkalden was “one of the most outstanding law professors in the Netherlands” (RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: RECIUS, 29 July 1959, p. 3). Alongside Kohnstamm, Samkalden was a former member of the “Group of Ten”, which in the early 1950s brought together senior officials close to the PvdA who were critical of the official line of the party. He was subsequently Minister of Justice from 1956-58.
  • [82]
    He later became director of the European Commission’s information service. See Pierre Tilly, “Entretien avec Roy Pryce”, 19 September 2011:
  • [83]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: untitled program review, 26 July 1967, p. 3; RECIUS, 25 July 1966, p. 4. It appears that the ECIUS awarded a “small subsidy of £500” and then endorsed the review, “thus making possible its continued publication”.
  • [84]
    RECIUS, 15 September 1961, p. 3.
  • [85]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: Rieben to Kohnstamm, 27 May 1959; Rieben to Stone, 29 May 1959; RECIUS, 29 July 1959, p. 3.
  • [86]
    Note from “mk” to Stone, 1 August 1963; “Rapport final...” (Final report); Rieben to Stone, 12 August 1963.
  • [87]
    FFAR 1959, pp. 66 and 139.
  • [88]
    FFAR 1956, pp. 105 and 184; FFAR 1964, pp. 43 and 134; etc.
  • [89]
    FFAR 1968, pp. 64 and 139.
  • [90]
    RECIUS, 25 July 1967, p. 2. Chamberlain, who visited the ERC on 13 June 1967, stated that a foundation was set up at the beginning of 1967 to finance the ERC through an endowment from the Swiss National Science Foundation and a Swiss retail chain, Migros. He kept open the possibility that the Ford Foundation might eventually intervene: Chamberlain Inter-Office Memorandum (IOM), 16 June 1967.
  • [91]
    AR, 1960, for the University of Leiden’s EI, January 1961, p. 1.
  • [92]
    AR, 1960-1, for the University of Tübingen’s GFFGEREW.
  • [93]
    RECIUS, 25 July 1967, p. 2; RAC, FFR, R 1167: “Report to the ECIUS 1966-1967 Session”, no date, p. 1.
  • [94]
    RECIUS, 18 June 1971, p. 4.
  • [95]
    In a note from 1968 summarizing cooperation between the ECIUS and the Commission, and future prospects for it, Kohnstamm gave a brief financial statement of their respective contributions. The costs associated with two researchers, two secretaries, and a translator, as well as publication expenses, were paid by the Commission—probably a total of 1,800,000 Belgian francs (approximately 35,000 dollars) for a single publication: Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence), Fonds Max Kohnstamm, MK-47: “Coopération entre la Direction Générale X—Presse et Information—et l’Institut de la Communauté européenne pour les études universitaires”, 5 November 1968, appendix, p. 1.
  • [96]
    Oriane Calligaro, Negotiating Europe: EU Promotion of Europeanness Since the 1950s, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
  • [97]
    Ludovic Tournès, Sciences de l’homme et politique: Les fondations philanthropiques américaines en France au XXe siècle, Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2013.
  • [98]
    Giuliana Gemelli, Fernand Braudel, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1995.
  • [99]
    FFAR 1958, pp. 81 and 141; FFAR 1964, pp. 41-2 and 131.
  • [100]
    FFAR 1963, pp. 49 and 137.
  • [101]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: CEESR AR 1960-1961, September 1961, p. 1; RECIUS, 15 September 1961; 12-13 December 1963.
  • [102]
    On this point, see Marc Milet, “Les publicistes français et la CED, controverse doctrinale et engagement civique”, Relations internationales, 149, 2012, 101-13.
  • [103]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: untitled program review, 26 July 1967, pp. 4-5. In a letter to Stone of 30 January 1964, Kohnstamm clarified further: “You know better than anyone how difficult it is to get a conservative University like Paris University to concern itself with contemporary problems. You will therefore understand that I am rather proud of what is going on in Paris now. This center, which is becoming really quite a sizeable affair, has been greatly helped by my friend François Fontaine, who is Head of the Information Office of the European Communities; without the Institute’s money, though, it could not have started”.
  • [104]
    Julie Bailleux, Penser l’Europe par le droit: L’invention du droit communautaire en France, Paris, Dalloz, 2014.
  • [105]
    Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Paris), Fonds Sciences Po, 2 SP 43: “CUECE, année scolaire 1963-1964“; RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: CUECE AR, 5 July 1965, p. 3.
  • [106]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: CUECE AR, 5 July 1965, p. 1.
  • [107]
    RECIUS, 25 July 1966.
  • [108]
    FNSP, 2 SP 43: “Note sur la création d’un centre d’études européennes au sein de la Fondation” (Note on the Creation of a Center for European Studies Within the Foundation), signed by Pierre Gerbet, annotated “Received 24.3.64”, p. 1.
  • [109]
    Pierre Favre and Denis Pays, Cent dix années de cours à l’École libre des sciences politiques et à l’Institut d’études politiques de Paris, 1871-1982, n.p., 1986, 2 vol.
  • [110]
    “Note sur la création”, p. 2. The passages in italics are underlined by Jacques Chapsal in the original.
  • [111]
    Ibid., pp. 4-6.
  • [112]
    FNSP, 2 SP 43: note, signed “JT”, to “Mr Chapsal”, 24 March 1964.
  • [113]
    Unsigned, undated note, in Chapsal’s handwriting.
  • [114]
    “Note sur la création”, p. 3.
  • [115]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: CUECE AR, 5 July 1965, p. 2; FNSP, 2 SP 43, draft statutes of the ADSPE.
  • [116]
    RECIUS, 15 September 1961, p. 4; Kohnstamm to the members of the Institute, 21 December 1960: RAC, FFR, R 1167.
  • [117]
    RECIUS, 31 July 1962, p. 2.
  • [118]
    Antoine Vauchez, Brokering Europe: Euro-Lawyers and the Making of a Transnational Polity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
  • [119]
    RECIUS, 1 February 1969, p. 6.
  • [120]
    “Request no ID-51” by David E. Bell to Bundy, 29 December 1967, p. 8. Bell was vice-president and director of the International Division.
  • [121]
    FFAR 1964, pp. 29-30. See Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies” in Noam Chomsky et al., The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years, New York, New Press, 1997, 195-231; Bruce Cumings, “Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War” in Christopher Simpson (ed.), Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War, New York, New Press, 1998, pp. 159-88.
  • [122]
    FFAR 1970, pp. 80-1.
  • [123]
    FFAR 1970, pp. 80 and 81 (“Inter-University Council on Western European Studies”); FFAR 1973, pp. 74 and 75. See also The simultaneous creation in 1970 of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) at the University of Essex, driven in part by the Ford Foundation, which made a grant of 272,500 dollars, permanently transformed the context of action: FFAR 1970, pp. 39 and 40 (the report makes reference to the “European University Consortium for Political Research”). See Thibaud Boncourt, “Acteurs multipositionnés et fabrique du transnational: la création du European Consortium for Political Research”, Critique internationale, 59, 2013, 17-32.
  • [124]
    In 1967, Kohnstamm admitted the operating expenditures of the ECIUS were too high because of his own salary, which had been partly covered by the EAEC until 1962. On the one hand, according to him, “a university professor could have done the job, in addition to his university work, for a compensation which certainly would have been considerably lower than the full salary paid to me”. On the other hand, the arrangement was justified for very specific reasons: “I hope that I do not sound too vain however, in saying that it would not have been very easy to find a professor disposing over the same contacts everywhere in Europe, and the same possibilities of opening the European Community’s doors to some of the new centres, and other university visitors” (AHUE, MK-46: untitled program review, 27 April 1967, pp. 9-10). In 1969, however, Kohnstamm admitted that two-thirds of his time had been devoted to the ACUSE, while receiving only two-thirds of the salary he would have received as director-general of the European Commission (AHUE, MK-48: “Note concernant les relations financières entre le Comité et mon Institut” [Note Concerning the Financial Relations Between the Committee and my Institute], appendix to a letter from Kohnstamm to Monnet, 6 November 1969, MK-47: “Coopération entre la Direction Générale X—Presse et Information—et l’Institut de la Communauté européenne pour les études universitaires” (Cooperation Between the Directorate-General X—Press and Information—and the European Community Institute for University Studies), 5 November 1968, appendix, p. 2).
  • [125]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: RECIUS, 9 April 1970, p. 6.
  • [126]
    RECIUS, 18 June 1971, p. 4; RAC, FFR, R 1167. In 1966, ADSPE organized a first symposium at the IEP of Lyon on “La décision dans les Communautés européennes” (Decision in European Communities), published in Brussels in 1969.
  • [127]
    Ibid., p. 5.
  • [128]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: RECIUS, 9 April 1970, p. 8.
  • [129]
    RECIUS, 1 September 1963, p. 2.
  • [130]
    AHUE, MK-45: note on the ECIUS, 6 July 1966, pp. 1 and 3.
  • [131]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: untitled program review, 26 July 1967, p. 10.
  • [132]
    “Request no ID-51” from Bell to Bundy, 29 December 1967, p. 4.
  • [133]
    Ibid., p. 2; and see the annotated drafts of this document and the “discussion draft”, 1 December 1967, as well as Kohl to Slater, 9 October 1967 and 19 September 1967: RAC, FFR, R 1167.
  • [134]
    “Discussion draft”, 1 December 1967, p. 5; Kohnstamm to Slater, 19 October 1967. At the time, Slater directed the International Division’s International Relations program. In the spring of 1968, Kohnstamm explained that he had “completely halted this sort of activity in order to use all the Institute’s financial resources to build projects of its own“: Kohnstamm to Monnet, 2 May 1968: AHUE, MK-47.
  • [135]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351 RECIUS, 18 June 1971, p. 8.
  • [136]
    Established in Rome in 1965 by Altiero Spinelli, the IAI received four grants between 1966 and 1979, totalling 760,000 dollars: FFAR 1966, pp. 32 and 94; FFAR 1969, pp. 75 and 152; FFAR 1973, pp. 73 and 74; FFAR 1978, p. 53; FFAR 1979, p. 56.
  • [137]
    RECIUS, 18 June 1971, p. 10.
  • [138]
    “Europe in the Seventies: Proposal for the Creation of a European Institute for Policy Planning Studies”, 17 February 1970, pp. 3 and 4. The exact name of the institute varies slightly from document to document.
  • [139]
    Ibid., pp. 6 and 9.
  • [140]
    Ibid., p. 9.
  • [141]
    RECIUS, 18 June 1971, p. 11.
  • [142]
    RAC, FFR, R 1167: Robert Schaetzel to Alessandro Silj, 23 July 1970. A former assistant under-secretary of state for Atlantic Affairs, Schaetzel was “ambassador” to Brussels from 1966 to 1972. On his subsequent career see Giles Scott-Smith, “Mending the ‘Unhinged Alliance’ in the 1970s: Transatlantic Relations, Public Diplomacy, and the Origins of the European Union’s Visitors Program”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16(4), 2005, 749-78.
  • [143]
    IOM by Silj, 17 June 1970; Silj to Kohnstamm, 4 June 1970; Kohnstamm to Silj, 12 June 1970.
  • [144]
    RAC, FFR, R 453, PA 57-351: IOM by Craufurd D. Goodwin, 13 January 1976.
  • [145]
    Ibid., p. 1. See above.
  • [146]
    Ibid., p. 2. The ISS is also a recurring recipient of Ford Foundation money: 150,000 dollars in 1959, 140,000 dollars in 1961, 550,000 dollars in 1965, 525,000 dollars in 1971, and finally (for the period under consideration) 650,000 dollars in 1976: FFAR 1959, pp. 66 and 139; FFAR 1961, pp. 62 and 143; FFAR 1965, pp. 48 and 137; FFAR 1971, pp. 84 and 85; FFAR 1976, pp. 54 and 55; FFAR 1977, p. 48.
  • [147]
    Ibid., p. 3.
  • [148]
    Ibid., p. 2.
  • [149]
    Ibid., p. 3.
  • [150]
    Anne Corbett, Universities and the Europe of Knowledge: Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education Policy, 1955-2005, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
  • [151]
    Palayret and Schreurs, A University for Europe, 180-5.
  • [152]
    Oriane Calligaro, “The European University Institute and the Historiography of European Integration: A Disputed Independence”, paper presented at the conference “L’Archive européenne: espaces et instruments de connaissance de l’Union”, Paris, Panthéon-Sorbonne University, 3 July 2015.
  • [153]
    RFAR 1974, p. 74; RFAR 1976, p. 95.
  • [154]
    FFAR 1976, p. 56; FFAR 1978, pp. 53 and 54, where the passage quoted occurs.
  • [155]
    The research on which this article is based benefited from a grant from the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC). I would like to express my deepest thanks to Camilla Harris and the entire RAC team, especially Nancy Adgent, Lucas Buresch (who helped me navigate the maze of the Ford Foundation archives), Michele Hiltzik Beckerman, Camelia Muresan, Tom Rosenbaum, and Judy Russo. My thanks also go to Didier Bigo and Wolfram Kaiser.

Tracing the main enterprise of the Ford Foundation aiming at instituting European Studies, from the 1950s to the 1970s, this article shows how transnational strategies linked with the institutionalization of the European field of power come up against the resistances of national fields. “European Studies” indeed appear to be the residual lot of much more ambitious strategies to create a truly “European University”. In this special issue about the sociohistory of political science, this article thus illustrates the fact that a “discipline” cannot be apprehended in isolation from other social spaces seemingly extraneous.


  • european integration
  • European Studies
  • Ford Foundation
  • national/transnational field
Antonin Cohen
Antonin Cohen is a professor of political science. He teaches at the University of Paris Nanterre. His publications include Le régime politique de l’Union européenne, Paris, La Découverte, 2014. He co-edited, with Bernard Lacroix and Philippe Riutort, the Nouveau manuel de science politique, Paris, La Découverte, 2015 (first ed. 2009). His research focuses on the institutionalization of the European field of power in the twentieth century. (Université Paris Nanterre, UFR Droit et Science politique, 200 Avenue de la République, 92001 Nanterre cedex,
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