Who Nominates?

16Mayors represent a very broad population. The label “elected mayor” covers elected, delegate, and arrondissement mayors, who participate in the nomination process in very unequal proportions. The following analysis considers only elected mayors, as the others do not have the same powers and are not elected in a comparable manner. It also uses data from the primary database, which provides information on the characteristics of the mayors who most often chose to nominate a candidate.

17Table 3 shows whether or not mayors nominated a candidate, based on their sociodemographic and geographic profile. It thus includes all mayors, whether or not they provided a nomination. Among the key variables, the gender of mayors was highly influential. Within the electorate, the gap between men and women has reduced—and even inverted in 2017—but it remains significant among elected representatives. Not only are 84% of mayors male, but men were also more likely to nominate candidates, by nearly 8 percentage points.

18Age also plays a major role, with young people nominating more frequently. It should also however be acknowledged that nominators constitute an older population (63% of them are over 60), as the mayors of small communes are often retired. The age of nominators remained significantly younger than those who did not nominate, but has a weak impact after controlling for the size of the town or city. Young mayors have more incentive to provide a nomination if they want to be appointed to other posts. In this sense, their nomination is a way of showing their commitment to a party.

19There are differences in the percentages of nominations based on the profession of the elected representative, but these do not reflect those observed within the electorate. While senior managers and the liberal professions accounted for slightly more nominators than the average, this was also true for manual laborers. Conversely, retirees are usually associated with a higher level of electoral participation, but this is not seen among nominators. These differences are however rather small. The regression analysis confirms these results by showing that only a few professions—notaries and doctors—were more likely to nominate a candidate.

20Finally, the size of the commune has the greatest explanatory power. Conversely to the pattern observed within the electorate, it is city mayors who most often take part, with 83% of them providing a nomination, compared to 55% in smaller towns. Below this the percentage of nominations decreases rapidly, and falls below 26% in communes of fewer than 500 inhabitants, which constitute the majority of communes in France. This finding is unsurprising, as in large urban areas the role of mayor is highly professionalized and parties control access to elected positions. In addition, mayors often hold multiple offices. They therefore constitute a pool of nominators who are easily accessible to candidates due to the existence of a structured party network. As small communes are beyond party control, their mayors do not feel this pressure to such an extent.

21The impact of geography is also seen at the département level, with more nominators located within large urban areas. In the départements within the Paris region, mayors were three to five times more likely to nominate a candidate than those elsewhere. Conversely, in the rural départements participation was lower. Thus, while several sociodemographic differences can be identified, the geographic dimension is the strongest single predictive factor for nomination. The size of the commune strongly influences the likelihood of nomination. In addition, nomination is a primarily male act—to a much greater extent than voting across the population as a whole—that is associated with younger individuals and fairly evenly distributed across professions.

22The data available to us also demonstrate that party members nominated more frequently, with 48% of members of right-wing parties, 38% of members of left-wing parties, and 25% of unaffiliated individuals providing a nomination. Members of right-wing parties were twice as likely to nominate a candidate compared to unaffiliated representatives, and members of left-wing parties one and a half times more likely.

Who Nominates Which Candidate?

23In this section, we will first analyze the determinants of candidate choice for mayors, as shown in tables 4, 5, and 6.

24In table 4, we have made a distinction between communes of fewer than 500 inhabitants (52%), those with between 500 and 1,000 inhabitants (17.7%), and those with more than 1,000 inhabitants (29.5%). The mayors in this last group were more likely to nominate Fillon (905), Macron (508), and Hamon (446), but also, to a lesser extent, Jean-Luc Mélenchon (237). For four of the five candidates who received the most votes during the first round of the presidential election, over one third of their nominations came from mayors of towns with over 1,000 inhabitants. Conversely, the other candidates obtained at least two-thirds of their nominations from mayors of communes with 500 inhabitants. The majority of them obtained almost all of their nominations from mayors, and then won little support during the presidential election. The exception was Le Pen, who obtained the majority of her nominations from regional councillors (among whom the FN is strongly represented), and sought her remaining 165 nominations primarily from rural communes.

25Mayors of small communes had much more marked preferences. Despite making up a significant proportion of Le Pen’s nominations, they were overall unlikely to nominate her, with only 139 of them doing so. Two other candidates received relatively little support in these communes: Mélenchon (268) and Hamon (282). The “minor candidates”, on the other hand, obtained more support, with 351 signatures for Philippe Poutou and 448 for Nicolas Dupont-Aignan. Fillon (801) and Macron (583) remained the most popular in this group, and the disparity between this pairing and the Mélenchon/Hamon pairing is quite astonishing. It might be seen as indicating true preferences, revealing a rejection of the main left-wing candidates by the mayors of small communes, but could also be seen as a political strategy, with some candidates not seeking support from small communes as they had enough signatures from the major cities and legislative bodies.

26In terms of gender, the proportion of female mayors was higher among those nominating Arthaud, and lower for Le Pen. In relation to the two female candidates we can therefore conclude that being a woman does not necessarily attract more nominations from women. It should however be noted that the predominantly male voter base of the FN was reflected among its nominators. [16] The most surprising finding is that Macron, along with Cheminade, was the candidate with the lowest proportion of nominations from female mayors. Multinomial regressions confirm that this discrepancy was significant. This finding is difficult to explain, given that Macron’s campaign made political parity one of his objectives, although the post-electoral survey shows that his voters were primarily male.

27In terms of age, differences are not significant and are comparable to those observed within the voter base of these candidates. Fillon, whose voters were among the oldest, also had significantly older nominators than the others. Conversely, Le Pen had a relatively young voter base and also attracted support from the youngest mayors. The other percentages did not stand up to statistical testing.

28There are marked differences in the professional profiles of nominators (table 5), with leftwing candidates primarily nominated by civil servants, teachers, and public sector employees. Arthaud was partly an exception to this rule, as her nominations primarily came from private sector employees. Right-wing candidates, on the other hand, were predominantly nominated by farmers, artisans, retailers, and entrepreneurs. Fillon was the most popular candidate among the liberal professions. These variations are all confirmed by the multivariate analysis and remain significant after controlling for the other factors considered in this article. The similarity of this result with the voter base of these candidates was particularly marked. To a certain extent, mayoral nominations reflect the popular vote.

29Finally, geographic differences are strongly associated with candidate choice. The candidates who would go on to win the majority of votes in the election obtained many nominations in relatively large communes. Conversely, the candidates who won few votes in the election obtained the majority of their nominations from mayors of communes with fewer than 500 inhabitants. Le Pen remained the exception, with the profile of her nominating mayors tending to resemble that of the minor candidates. This result can be explained by rejection of the FN beyond its core supporters.

30Ultimately, sociodemographic variables predict candidate choice relatively accurately, and in many ways closely reflect the voter profile for the different candidates in terms of age, gender, and profession. This leads us to surmise that introducing citizen nomination would not necessarily lead to a change in candidates selected to stand for election, as elected mayors represent their voters relatively well.

31We now turn to the issue of party and strategic nominations (table 6). Unfortunately, as we only had access to data for communes with more than 1,000 inhabitants this includes limited numbers, from 897 signatures for Fillon to just 19 for Le Pen.

32Party-driven logics are clear. The French Communist Party, the Left Front, and members of the Left Coalition were strongly over-represented among those nominating Mélenchon. Socialist mayors and left-wing coalitions primarily supported Hamon. Republicans and rightwing coalitions were over-represented among those supporting Fillon. Among Macron’s supporters, centrist and center-left mayors (MoDem, UDI, Centrist Coalition, and the PS) were slightly over-represented. Finally, the few nominations obtained by Le Pen were concentrated among far-right and unaffiliated individuals. If we cluster these results on a leftright spectrum, the left is over-represented among those nominating Macron, Hamon, Mélenchon, Poutou, and Arthaud, while the right is more strongly represented among those nominating Fillon, Dupont-Aignan, and Lassalle.

33Conversely, there is little evidence to support the idea of strategic nomination. Among mayors belonging to the main political parties, there was no clear desire to dilute the vote in the opposing camp. However, two conservative candidates—Asselineau and Cheminade—were strongly supported by left-wing elected representatives who might have seen this as a way to deprive Fillon and Le Pen of some votes. However, there is no additional data to support this interpretation: for example, none of these individuals were rewarded with nomination for a left-wing candidacy in the legislative elections. As a result, we remain skeptical about the widespread presence of strategic behaviors.

Varying Rates of Participation

35Due to the heterogeneity of profiles, participation rates greatly vary from one type of elected representative to another (table 7). The mean participation rate was 41%, but this included a significant level of variation. National and European elected representatives had the highest levels of participation. This confirms our observation in regard to mayors, with the elected representatives closest to centers of decision-making and the most professionalized posts being those with the highest participation rates. It should also be highlighted that the very low number of nominations from inter-community council leaders can be explained by the fact that the vast majority of nominators holding this office are also mayors, and registered their nomination as such.

36Party affiliation constitutes the primary explanatory factor (table 8), with party membership resulting in a nomination for the candidate endorsed (or supported) by this party or, to a lesser extent, for ideologically related candidates. This homogeneity can be seen on the right, among the Republicans, and among the FN there was also a high number of nominations for Le Pen. MoDem-elected representatives responded to the call from Bayrou and Macron. However, party affiliation is a less reliable factor on the left. In both the Socialist Party and among the Greens, we see a significant number of nominations for a candidate other than the one endorsed by these parties, Benoît Hamon. There was not only a high level of support for Macron, but also for Mélenchon. The proliferation of left-wing candidates resulted in a scattering of support, unlike on the right which was solidly committed to the Fillon and Le Pen candidacies. As such, the behavior of elected representatives reflects that observed among voters who are, in a way, “victims” of the multiplicity of candidacies. [17] However, very few left-wing elected representatives supported a right-wing candidate.

37On the right, nomination therefore remains strongly linked to party affiliation. The UDI was an exception to this rule, with a considerable number of its members supporting Macron (26%). On the left, different intraparty movements and different ambitions resulted in different choices within a single party, particularly within the PS.

38While the rationales of party affiliation dominate among non-mayoral elected representatives, strategic behaviors are the exception. Although some candidates are guaranteed to obtain a sufficient number of nominations, the party faithful continue to support them. This is particularly true among members of the Republicans (LR), who supported Fillon in large numbers. Given he was certain to receive enough nominations to stand, we might have expected some Republicans to decide to help dilute the vote on the left, or even the far right, by nominating candidates who might compete with Le Pen, Hamon, or Mélenchon. The predominance of party affiliation demonstrates a kind of automation in the nomination process, at least among those elected representatives affiliated to a party. In this sense, for the large parties, nomination is akin to peer validation of the selection. For the smallest parties, it resembles a search for republican spirit among unaffiliated elected representatives. As a whole, the results confirm our findings among mayors.

39The fact that a significant number of elected representatives (particularly on the left) chose a candidate other than the one supported by their party does however demonstrate that party discipline is not an adequate explanation. The fact that many socialist elected representatives nominated Macron supports the hypothesis of strategic behavior, since at the time nominations were being collected he was ahead in the polls.

40This interpretation appears to be refuted however by the weak link between nomination and party endorsement for the legislative elections. Table 9 shows that nomination followed by candidacy in the legislative elections can be observed primarily among those who supported Le Pen, and to a lesser extent among those who nominated candidates from traditional parties, namely the PS and LR. However, as these latter were often already members of parliament, it is difficult to interpret their nominations in strategic terms. In regard to those nominating Le Pen, all such individuals were strongly attached to the FN prior to the nomination process (few non-FN nominators). This was less true for those nominating Macron, who all came from a party other than La République En Marche! (LREM). [18] In addition, even the members of parliament hoping to be endorsed by LREM had to go through the official process with no guarantee of success. Some members of parliament thus failed to obtain it. Nevertheless, many of them stood for election without LREM endorsement while still declaring their support for the elected president. It is of course difficult to know with certainty whether these nominations were offered with a view to endorsement or simply as a result of shared beliefs. However, the fact that more nominators were endorsed (excluding the LR, PS, and FN) within LREM than elsewhere indicates that this option cannot be discounted.

41* * *

42Four main conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of nominations.

43First, the party affiliation of elected representatives plays a crucial role in their behavior. Party members are more likely to participate in the nomination process, and this factor also largely determines their choice of candidate. The nomination system thus results in a form of inertia and homogeneity in the candidates on offer during elections, at least in the mediumterm. We can see this between 2012 and 2017, with the candidates standing in 2017 the successors of those in 2012, or even the same.

44Second, this effect is compounded by the fact that “professional politicians” provide the majority of nominations, particularly for the major candidates. European and national members of parliament and senators all had a participation rate above 70%. Other categories of elected representatives fluctuated between 40% (département councillors) and 60% (regional councillors). Conversely, mayors of communities with fewer than 500 inhabitants—despite representing almost half the potential nominations—had a participation rate of 26%.

45Third, we did not observe systematic behaviors consistent with strategic nominations, at least as we have defined them. Few nominations for minor candidates from the opposing camp were observed, and elected representatives remained partisan long after the threshold of 500 signatures had been surpassed. Furthermore, the act of nomination did not increase the chance of an individual standing as a candidate at the next legislative election. We cannot however discount the existence of more refined strategic behaviors that cannot be observed from our data. Identifying such behaviors would require studying data over time, by analyzing the links between parties and candidates. The public nature of our data may also discourage elected representatives from pursuing overtly visible strategies.

46Finally, in some ways the choices made by mayors resemble those of citizens. Profession, age, and gender predispose elected representatives to choose their candidate in the same way they shape the choice of voters. This is particularly the case for the mayors of rural communes. These “amateur” mayors are the primary individuals responsible for the existence of a large number of candidacies. Without them, only four candidates would have stood: Macron, Fillon, Mélenchon, and Hamon. And while the other candidates played a minor role in the presidential election, this would most notably have meant the absence of Le Pen, despite her qualifying for the second round. In total, the candidates who owed their presence in the presidential election to “amateur mayors” obtained the support of nearly a third of the electorate in the first round.

47We can therefore posit that the absence of a citizen nomination process, which is present in all other European semi-presidential democracies, is in fact offset by the typically French existence of a very large number of rural communes, whose mayors are often retired volunteers and elected unopposed. Their nominations resemble those of citizens, with left-leaning and right-leaning professions, and a relative weight of age and gender in their voting choices. These variables have a similar impact on both nominators and voters. As such, there is no definitive evidence that the introduction of citizen nominations would have a significant impact on which candidates were nominated to stand for election.

48However, the consolidation of communes raises the question of the population size that will be represented by nominators in future elections. If, as at present, commune mergers and the development of inter-community councils do not reduce numbers of elected representatives, or even increase them, the nomination system will likely retain its legitimacy, despite numerous criticisms from experts. If, on the other hand, the number of elected representatives is decreased, rural commune mayors will be the first to go. Under such circumstances we would anticipate increased criticism of the inaccessibility of the French system, and increased calls to introduce citizen nomination. [19]