Sociologists have at least three different ways of relating to philosophy. The first may be called demarcationism: it advocates for a strict boundary between the two disciplines due to the inconsistency of their respective epistemologies. The second is integrationism: it presumes that there is no real gap between philosophy and sociology, and therefore justifies uniting their results in one unique discourse. Finally, a third position may be called conversionism: it permits the sociological borrowing of philosophical concepts and reasoning schemes on the express condition of “paying the toll,” i.e., of making a special effort to re-translate them into the logic of sociological inquiry. This paper argues that conversionism is the attitude that best fits the purpose of sociology. Three examples are discussed: the possible contribution of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the sociological analysis of normativity; the possible contribution of Leibniz’s philosophy to the sociological analysis of social actors’ reflexivity; and the possible contribution of pragmatism to the sociological analysis of social actors’ tendencies to act. We asked Sylvie Mesure, who is both a philosopher and a sociologist, to write a commentary on Cyril Lemieux’s paper, in order to preserve the spirit of debate that defines this section of our journal. Although Sylvie Mesure is a member of Sociology’s editorial board, she remains personally responsible for the views expressed in this commentary.