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For many observers, France, with its “laïcité à la française,” is a unique and special case of how a country may regulate religion and religious diversity institutionally (Baubérot, 2004, 2014, 2017; Beckford, 2004 ; Portier, 2016; Willaime, 2009; Zuber, 2017). What is less widely known—although specialists have remarked on it several times—is that France is also a particularly irreligious country (Bréchon, 2000; Dargent, 2010; Stoetzel, 1983). This is the case even though France is traditionally Catholic, with only small Protestant minorities (Fath, 2005; Fath & Willaime, 2011). The hypothesis that France might be an especially irreligious country has not yet been tested systematically with longitudinal data, and this is precisely what we intend to do in our article.
Recent research has shown that secularization—understood as a decline in religiosity—takes the form of cohort replacement in many Western countries (Crockett & Voas, 2006; Voas & Chaves, 2016). This means that it is not the case that individuals change their religiosity during their journey through life, either because of lifecycle or period effects; rather, what happens is that more religious cohorts are replaced by less religious cohorts. While cohort replacement seems to be the major factor in most Western countries, we also find deviating cases, where period effects clearly play a role and individuals become more secular over time (e.g. New Zealand) (Voas & Chaves, 2016), or where countries succeed in either accelerating or decelerating the secularization process (Stol…

Français

Si les chercheurs ont souvent souligné le fait que la France est peut-être un pays exceptionnellement irréligieux, cette hypothèse n’a pas encore été testée avec des données longitudinales ; et les chercheurs n’ont pas non plus tenté d’expliquer cette prétendue irréligiosité. Le présent article tente de combler cette lacune de la littérature en comparant la France à d’autres pays catholiques d’Europe occidentale. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons l’ensemble de données européennes qui est, à ce jour, le plus complet sur l’appartenance et la fréquentation des églises dans les pays européens (CARPE), ainsi que les données du Programme international d’enquête sociale (ISSP) qui permettent de mesurer les croyances religieuses rétrospectivement, dès les années 1910. La France affiche une religiosité globale significativement plus faible que les autres pays catholiques d’Europe occidentale, bien que cet écart ait diminué au cours des dernières décennies (et ce faible niveau de religiosité ne peut s’expliquer par des effets de période, spécifiques à la France, opérant au cours des quarante dernières années). La sécularisation en France prend plutôt la forme d’un remplacement de cohortes, ce qui a conduit à la reproduction des différences de religiosité entre les pays d’une génération à l’autre. En d’autres termes, si la France est plus irréligieuse c’est qu’elle a pris la voie de la transition séculière plus tôt que les autres pays, ou en partant d’un niveau plus bas.

  • Sécularisation
  • France
  • Transition séculière
  • Remplacement de cohortes
  • Sociologie des religions
English

While scholars have often pointed to the fact that France might be an exceptionally irreligious country, this hypothesis has not yet been tested with longitudinal data; and nor have researchers tried to account for this alleged irreligiosity. The present article tries to fill this gap in the literature by comparing France to other Catholic countries in Western Europe. To do so, we use the Church Attendance and Religious change Pooled European (CARPE) dataset, which to date is the most extensive dataset of church affiliation and church attendance in European countries, as well as International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data that allow us to measure religious beliefs and make retrospective estimations as far back as the 1910s. We find that France shows significantly lower aggregate religiosity than other Catholic countries in Western Europe, although this difference has diminished in the last few decades; and this low level of religiosity cannot be explained by France-specific period effects operating in the last 40 years. Rather, secularization in France takes the form of cohort replacement, which has led to differences in religiosity between the countries being reproduced from one generation to the other. In other words, France is so irreligious because it began on the path of secular transition earlier or from a lower level than comparable countries.

  • Secularization
  • France
  • Secular transition
  • Cohort replacement
  • Sociology of religion
Jörg Stolz
Ferruccio Biolcati
Francesco Molteni
This is the latest publication of the author on cairn.
This is the latest publication of the author on cairn.
This is the latest publication of the author on cairn.
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