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In 1977, Guy Michelat and Michel Simon published what has become a classic book, highlighting the effect of social class and religious affiliation on voting in France. The book was based on nondirective interviews and on data from a survey (number of respondents (n) = 1,780) conducted in December 1996 by the Institut Français d’Opinion Publique(IFOP) (Institute for Opinion Polls). It showed the depth of the left-right divide and the importance of two variables underlying it:
religious affiliation, contrasting self-declared Catholics and irreligious Communist sympathizers;
class affiliation, contrasting the middle class and the working class.
In 2017, forty years after the book was published and more than half a century after the surveys on which it was based, to what extent do its socio-religious conclusions concerning elections remain true? It is clear that France has experienced upheavals in the intervening period. Secularization (Berger 1967; Lambert 1993) has had enormous demographic effects on the Catholic population (Michelat et al. 1991; Lambert 1994; Bréchon 2000, 2013; Bréchon, Gonthier, and Astor 2019). Moreover, it has been rightly suggested that Catholicism is becoming external to society (Hervieu-Léger 2003), while a new religion has become established in France due to immigration (Kepel 1987; Dargent 2010a). Admittedly, Christianity’s decline has sometimes been nuanced; in particular, certain forms of believing have persisted, a “believing without belonging” (Davie 1996)…

English

Based on French data collected in the 1960s, Guy Michelat and Michel Simon’s book Classe, religion et comportement politique established the existence of both religious and political bipolarity, with Catholics on the right and voters with no religion on the left. From the vantage point of the 2017 presidential election, this observation appears relevant sixty years later. In the first round, religion continued to be the most important factor for explaining the left-right divide. In order of importance, it came before assets, age, socio-professional group, education level, and gender. A significant new development is that Muslims, who have emerged as a key demographic in the intervening period, now outnumber voters with no religion on the left. Partially avoiding the left-right divide, Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen both suffered in the first round from the reluctance of the most committed Catholics to back them. Faced with just these two candidates in the second round, Catholics preferred the Front National candidate, creating a major point of difference with Muslims. Nevertheless, social class was also important, with executives overwhelmingly voting for the eventual president–unlike the working classes.

  • vote
  • election
  • political behavior
  • religion
  • catholic
  • muslim
  • no religion
  • social class
  • executive
  • manual worker
  • gender
  • age
  • education level
  • socio-professional category
  • assets
  • logistic regression
Français

Fondé sur des données françaises recueillies dans les années 1960, le livre de G. Michelat et M. Simon Classe, religion et comportement politique établissait l’existence d’une bipolarité à la fois religieuse et politique, les catholiques se situant à droite, les irréligieux à gauche. Soixante ans plus tard, au vu de l’élection présidentielle de 2017, ce constat demeure pertinent. Au premier tour, la religion continue d’être le facteur explicatif le plus important du clivage gauche-droite. Elle devance dans l’ordre le patrimoine, l’âge, le groupe socioprofessionnel, le niveau de diplôme et le genre. La nouveauté majeure est que les musulmans, apparus entretemps, dépassent les sans-religion sur leur gauche. Échappant partiellement au clivage gauche-droite, E. Macron et M. Le Pen pâtissent tous deux au premier tour d’une réticence des catholiques les plus intégrés. Confrontés à ces deux seules candidatures au second, les catholiques préfèrent la candidate du Front national, l’écart avec les musulmans devenant alors considérable. Mais la classe sociale pèse également lourd, les cadres optant massivement pour le futur président – à la différence des classes populaires.

  • vote
  • élection
  • comportement politique
  • religion
  • catholique
  • musulman
  • sans-religion
  • classe sociale
  • cadre
  • ouvrier
  • genre
  • âge
  • diplôme
  • catégorie socioprofessionnelle
  • patrimoine
  • régression logistique
Claude Dargent
The author holds an agrégation (higher teaching qualification) in social sciences, a doctorate in political science, and is professor of sociology at Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis (Paris 8 University Vincennes-Saint-Denis). He is a researcher at the Centre de recherches sociologiques et politiques de Paris (Center for Sociological and Political Research in Paris) (CRESPPA-GTM, CNRS/Paris 8/Paris Nanterre Joint Research Unit), and an associate researcher at Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Cevipof) (Center for Political Research at Sciences Po). His research focuses on the sociology of religions, values, and political attitudes and behavior. More specifically, it uses quantitative data, mainly in the form of national and European surveys. He has recently published in French Politics, Social Compass, and coedited Science et religion (Paris : Éditions du CNRS, 2017).
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